The PASSKEY_DISABLED silence guard compared the string error code
against error.code, but the api client puts the numeric envelope code
there and the string code in error.reason, so the guard never matched
and every /profile visit on deployments without WebAuthn configured
showed a spurious "failed to load passkeys" toast.
Read error.reason instead, and skip the credentials request entirely
when the feature is disabled so the card no longer issues a request
that is guaranteed to fail with 403.
UserRepository.Update and APIKeyRepository.Update rewrote the whole row on
every call, regardless of which fields the caller meant to change. Several
columns on those tables are maintained by dedicated atomic paths (balance
deduction, quota and rate-limit counters, limit adjustments, activity
timestamps), so a caller holding a slightly older snapshot could silently
roll them back - a lost update.
Both methods now take an explicit column mask and persist only the columns
the caller declares; everything else keeps its current database value.
- All user and API-key call sites declare exactly what they mutate, which
turns admin edits and profile saves into genuine partial updates.
- Email uniqueness locking/lookup and allowed_groups sync only run when
those fields are part of the update.
- UserUpdateFields deliberately has no balance/total_recharged members, so
Update cannot touch them. New AdjustBalance/SetBalance apply the change in
a single statement and return before/after values; admin balance
adjustment uses them instead of read-modify-write.
- promo_codes.used_count is no longer written by Update; it is only ever
incremented by the redemption path.
- The billing hot path that marks an API key quota-exhausted writes only
status.
- Dropped a no-op row write in RevokeAllUserTokens: users has no
token_version column, so it persisted nothing while still overwriting
concurrently-updated columns.
Adds integration coverage that a stale snapshot cannot revert concurrent
atomic writes, and unit coverage pinning the column set each entry point
declares.
A hijacked session must not be able to silently add a passkey as a
persistent backdoor or remove the victim's credentials. Registration
(begin) and deletion now verify the account password server-side,
reusing the existing PASSWORD_REQUIRED / PASSWORD_INCORRECT errors.
The password is used instead of TOTP step-up so the guard also protects
deployments that never configured a TOTP encryption key. The password
key in both request bodies is covered by the audit middleware's
key-substring redaction, so no credential material reaches audit_logs.
Frontend: the add-passkey form gains a current-password field, and the
delete confirmation is now a dialog with a password input (replacing
window.confirm), mirroring the TOTP disable dialog. Backend error
messages (e.g. wrong password) are surfaced instead of the generic
failure toast. Rename remains password-free as it is cosmetic.
- parseSettings now reports passkey_enabled=false whenever the WebAuthn
deployment config is absent: a stale "true" row left behind after the
config is removed previously made the admin update gate reject every
settings save while the UI toggle was disabled, leaving no recovery
path from the admin panel. Added a regression test.
- update the admin settings API contract goldens with the new
passkey_enabled/passkey_configured/passkey_rp_id/passkey_rp_origins
fields.
- errcheck: check rows.Close in passkey repository (repo convention).
- staticcheck QF1001: apply De Morgan's law in WebAuthn origin scheme
validation.
Administrators often need exact model identifiers while editing account whitelists. Add a dedicated copy action without changing model selection or upstream sync behavior.
Constraint: Keep the contribution frontend-only and avoid model routing or persistence changes
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep copy and selection as separate actions
Tested: focused Vitest, account component regression tests, frontend typecheck, lint, and production build
Not-tested: Authenticated browser screenshot
Related: Wei-Shaw/sub2api#2151
An OpenAI account with auto-passthrough enabled (extra.openai_passthrough=true,
"replace auth only, allow all models") was still filtered out during account
selection when it had a non-empty credentials.model_mapping that did not list the
requested model. isOpenAICompatibleAccountEligibleForRequest calls
Account.IsModelSupported directly, and IsModelSupported only bypassed the mapping
whitelist for passthrough accounts when the mapping was empty. A leftover mapping
(common after switching an account from whitelist mode to passthrough) therefore
excluded the account -> zero candidates -> ErrNoAvailableAccounts, and the client
saw 404 "Model ... is not supported by any configured account in this group" even
though a direct account test with the same model succeeded (that path already
honored passthrough via isModelSupportedByAccount).
Fix: short-circuit passthrough at the top of Account.IsModelSupported, before the
model_mapping check, so it is consistent with isModelSupportedByAccount. Add a
regression test covering passthrough + non-empty leftover mapping.
Ricardo-binZzz