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Author SHA1 Message Date
Gergo Magyar 79cdcb04a6 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into pr-179-merge 2026-03-09 17:30:55 +00:00
Grouchy af1ed13bd3 feat(python): index module-level singleton instances as CodeElement nodes
- Add definition.instance query to PYTHON_QUERIES, anchored to module
  scope with call on right-hand side
- Add definition.instance to DEFINITION_CAPTURE_KEYS and label maps in
  both sequential (parsing-processor.ts) and worker (parse-worker.ts) paths
- Compose with #137: instances are now linkable targets for File->Symbol
  IMPORTS edges created by symbol-level import resolution
2026-03-05 17:18:12 -08:00
4282 changed files with 35193 additions and 2396923 deletions
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{
"name": "gitnexus-marketplace",
"interface": {
"displayName": "GitNexus"
},
"plugins": [
{
"name": "gitnexus",
"version": "1.6.10-rc.39",
"source": {
"source": "local",
"path": "./gitnexus-claude-plugin"
},
"policy": {
"installation": "AVAILABLE",
"authentication": "ON_INSTALL"
},
"category": "Developer Tools"
}
]
}
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"plugins": [
{
"name": "gitnexus",
"version": "1.6.10-rc.39",
"version": "1.3.3",
"source": "./gitnexus-claude-plugin",
"description": "Code intelligence powered by a knowledge graph. Provides execution flow tracing, blast radius analysis, and augmented search across your codebase."
}
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# GitNexus PR Reviewer Swarm — Claude Code adapter
This is the **Claude Code** entrypoint for the cross-CLI GitNexus PR reviewer swarm. The
review logic itself is CLI-neutral and lives in **[`pr-swarm-review/`](../pr-swarm-review/README.md)**
— that README is the canonical guide and covers every CLI (Claude Code, Gemini, Copilot,
Cursor, Codex, and any AGENTS.md-aware agent).
## Invocation (Claude Code)
```
/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review <PR URL or PR number>
```
Runs in **Swarm mode**: the coordinator skill dispatches the seven `gitnexus-*` subagents in
parallel (lanes 1–2 first, 3–6 in parallel, lane 7 last as a hard gate).
## Files in this adapter
| File | Role |
|------|------|
| `.claude/skills/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review/SKILL.md` | Coordinator — runs Swarm mode per `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md` |
| `.claude/agents/gitnexus-*.md` | Seven thin subagent wrappers; each reads its canonical persona in `pr-swarm-review/personas/` |
Each subagent keeps valid Claude Code frontmatter (model, tools, etc.); the mechanical
verifier lanes (`test-ci-verifier`, `branch-hygiene-reviewer`) run on Haiku, the analytical
lanes on Sonnet.
## Key properties
- **Read-only.** Tools limited to Read/Grep/Glob/Bash, and every persona enforces an
explicit permitted/prohibited Bash list. No agent edits files, commits, or posts.
- **Evidence-grounded**; **missing visibility becomes verification work**; **manually invoked.**
## Editing
Edit review behavior in the canonical files under `pr-swarm-review/` (orchestration +
personas), **not** in these wrappers. After adding or editing files in `.claude/agents/`,
restart Claude Code so it reloads the agent definitions.
## Relationship to `/gitnexus-pr-review`
Coexists with the single-agent `/gitnexus-pr-review` skill (a linear checklist using GitNexus
MCP tools). This swarm is the multi-persona deep production-readiness review.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-branch-hygiene-reviewer
description: "GitNexus branch hygiene and mergeability reviewer. Use to classify merge state, conflicts, stale branches, merge-from-main commits, unrelated churn, mixed domains, and whether rebase or split is required."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
maxTurns: 30
---
# GitNexus Branch Hygiene & Mergeability Reviewer
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/02-branch-hygiene-reviewer.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-docs-dod-reviewer
description: "GitNexus docs and Definition-of-Done reviewer. Use to translate repo guidance, linked issues, changed domains, docs requirements, release notes, and acceptance criteria into a PR-specific DoD."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
maxTurns: 30
---
# GitNexus Docs & Definition-of-Done Reviewer
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/06-docs-dod-reviewer.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-pr-facts-historian
description: "GitNexus PR facts and repository-history investigator. Use to gather PR identity, visible GitHub state, changed files, commits, linked issues, related PRs, historical fixes, regressions, stale follow-ups, and missing visibility."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
maxTurns: 40
---
# GitNexus PR Facts & Repository-History Investigator
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/01-pr-facts-historian.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
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---
name: gitnexus-risk-architect
description: "GitNexus production-risk reviewer. Use for risk-model-first review of changed files, runtime behavior, multi-domain changes, user impact, failure modes, compatibility, and merge-blocking risk."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
maxTurns: 40
---
# GitNexus Production-Risk Architect
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/03-risk-architect.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-security-boundary-reviewer
description: "GitNexus security and trust-boundary reviewer. Use for auth, permissions, secrets, injection, unsafe parsing, external input handling, hidden Unicode, YAML/Docker/workflow risks, and suspicious non-ASCII hygiene."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
maxTurns: 35
---
# GitNexus Security & Trust-Boundary Reviewer
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/05-security-boundary-reviewer.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-synthesis-critic
description: "GitNexus final review synthesis critic. Use to check whether the final PR review is evidence-grounded, risk-prioritized, GitNexus-specific, non-generic, and follows required verdict rules."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
maxTurns: 25
---
# GitNexus Final-Review Synthesis Critic
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/07-synthesis-critic.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-test-ci-verifier
description: "GitNexus test and CI reviewer. Use to verify whether changed behavior is covered by targeted tests, whether CI actually runs those tests, and whether workflow changes weaken validation."
tools:
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
model: claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
maxTurns: 35
---
# GitNexus Test & CI Verifier
Your complete operating spec — role, what to inspect, classifications, and the required output sections — lives in the canonical, CLI-neutral persona file:
**`pr-swarm-review/personas/04-test-ci-verifier.md`**
Read that file now with the Read tool and follow it exactly. It is the single source of truth shared across all AI CLIs; this subagent only adapts it to Claude Code. The orchestration contract (lane order, Swarm vs Solo execution, output structure) is in `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`.
## Rules (always enforced)
- **Do not edit files.** You are read-only.
- **Bash is read-only.** Permitted: `git log`, `git diff`, `git show`, `git grep`, `git ls-files`, `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue view`, and inspection tools (`grep`, `cat`, `find`, `ls`). Prohibited: any command that writes files, modifies git state (`git commit`, `git add`, `git checkout -- <path>`), posts to GitHub (`gh pr comment`, `gh pr review`, `gh issue comment`), installs packages, or runs arbitrary scripts.
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---
name: gitnexus-guide
description: "Use when the user asks about GitNexus itself — available tools, how to query the knowledge graph, MCP resources, graph schema, or workflow reference. Examples: \"What GitNexus tools are available?\", \"How do I use GitNexus?\""
---
# GitNexus Guide
Quick reference for all GitNexus MCP tools, resources, and the knowledge graph schema.
## Always Start Here
For any task involving code understanding, debugging, impact analysis, or refactoring:
1. **Read `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context`** — codebase overview + check index freshness
2. **Match your task to a skill below** and **read that skill file**
3. **Follow the skill's workflow and checklist**
> If step 1 warns the index is stale, run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in the terminal first.
## Skills
| Task | Skill to read |
| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------- |
| Understand architecture / "How does X work?" | `gitnexus-exploring` |
| Blast radius / "What breaks if I change X?" | `gitnexus-impact-analysis` |
| Trace bugs / "Why is X failing?" | `gitnexus-debugging` |
| Rename / extract / split / refactor | `gitnexus-refactoring` |
| Tools, resources, schema reference | `gitnexus-guide` (this file) |
| Index, status, clean, wiki CLI commands | `gitnexus-cli` |
## Tools Reference
| Tool | What it gives you |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `query` | Process-grouped code intelligence — execution flows related to a concept |
| `context` | 360-degree symbol view — categorized refs, processes it participates in |
| `impact` | Symbol blast radius — what breaks at depth 1/2/3 with confidence |
| `trace` | Shortest path between two symbols — "how does A reach B?" in one call |
| `detect_changes` | Git-diff impact — what do your current changes affect |
| `rename` | Multi-file coordinated rename with confidence-tagged edits |
| `cypher` | Raw graph queries (read `gitnexus://repo/{name}/schema` first) |
| `explain` | Persisted taint findings — source→sink data flows (needs `analyze --pdg`) |
| `pdg_query` | Control/data dependence — what gates X (CDG) / where Y flows (REACHING_DEF); needs `analyze --pdg` |
| `check` | Check graph invariants such as circular imports |
| `list_repos` | Discover indexed repos (paginated — `limit`/`offset`) |
### Paginating `list_repos`
`list_repos` is paginated so a large registry is not truncated by MCP/LLM token limits. It takes optional `limit` (default **50**, max **200**) and `offset`, and returns:
```jsonc
{
"repositories": [
{ "name": "...", "path": "...", "indexedAt": "...", "lastCommit": "...", "stats": { } }
],
"pagination": {
"total": 437,
"limit": 50,
"offset": 0,
"returned": 50,
"hasMore": true,
"nextOffset": 50
}
}
```
To enumerate **every** repository, keep calling with `offset` set to `pagination.nextOffset` until `hasMore` is `false`:
```text
list_repos {} → repos 1–50, nextOffset 50, hasMore true
list_repos { offset: 50 } → repos 51–100, nextOffset 100, hasMore true
…
list_repos { offset: 400 } → repos 401–437, hasMore false (done)
```
Notes: `offset` ≥ `total` returns an empty page (with `total` still reported). Out-of-range or malformed `limit`/`offset` (non-integer, `limit` outside `[1, 200]`, `offset < 0`) are rejected with a clear error — `limit` above the max is rejected, not silently capped. The order is deterministic (lower-cased name, then path), so paging never skips or duplicates an entry while the registry is unchanged.
### Taint findings (`explain`)
`explain` returns intra-procedural taint findings (`TAINTED` edges) recorded by `gitnexus analyze --pdg` — each with a sink category (command-injection, code-injection, path-traversal, sql-injection, xss), source/sink lines, and the ordered hop path with the variable carried on each hop.
- `explain {}` — enumerate all findings for the repo (bounded by `limit`, deterministic order)
- `explain { target: "src/vuln.ts" }` — findings in a file (suffix path match accepted)
- `explain { target: "runUserCommand" }` — findings in a function (resolved like `context`; ambiguous names return ranked candidates)
A repo indexed without `--pdg` returns a clear "no taint layer" note. Caveats: findings are intra-procedural only — cross-function, closure/callback, property/field, and implicit flows are not modeled, so the absence of a finding is **not** proof of safety. `SANITIZES` (sanitizer-kill) edges are queryable via `cypher`.
### Control & data dependence (`pdg_query`)
`pdg_query` reads the control/data-dependence layers `gitnexus analyze --pdg` records (CDG + REACHING_DEF, basic-block granular) — the control/data analog of `explain`. It is **always anchored** (a `target` file path or symbol, resolved like `context`) and has two modes:
- `pdg_query { mode: "controls", target: "..." }` — CDG: "under what condition does X run?". Each edge is a controlling predicate block → dependent block with the branch sense (`'T'`/`'F'`) in `reason`; an edge into an early `return`/`throw` is flagged `guard: true` (guard-clause discovery — the sense depends on the predicate, so don't filter guards by a fixed label).
- `pdg_query { mode: "flows", target: "...", variable?: "..." }` — REACHING_DEF def→use edges within the function; pass `variable` to trace one binding.
A repo indexed without `--pdg` returns a "no PDG layer" note (or "status unknown" when the layer can't be confirmed). Intra-procedural only — cross-function flow is taint's domain (`explain`). The raw CDG/REACHING_DEF edges are also queryable via `cypher`. See the `gitnexus-pdg-query` skill for the full query surface.
### Shortest path between two symbols (`trace`)
`trace` answers "how does A reach B?" in one call — the shortest directed path over `CALLS` (plus `HAS_METHOD`, so a class-rooted trace descends into its methods) instead of chaining 3–8 `context`/`impact` hops by hand.
- `trace { from: "validateUser", to: "executeQuery" }` — shortest path between two symbols.
- Disambiguate common names with `from_uid`/`to_uid` (zero-ambiguity) or `from_file`/`to_file`; an ambiguous name returns ranked candidates.
- `maxDepth` (default 10, max 30) bounds the search; `includeTests` (default false) lets the traversal pass through test-file symbols.
Returns ordered `hops` (each `{ name, filePath, startLine }`) and an aligned `edges[]` of `{ relType, confidence }`, so call hops and containment (`HAS_METHOD`) hops stay distinguishable. When no path exists it reports the **furthest** reachable node (where the chain breaks) and sets `truncated: true` if a traversal cap was hit first. Every result carries a `status`: `ok` / `no_path` / `ambiguous` / `not_found` / `error`.
## Resources Reference
Lightweight reads (~100-500 tokens) for navigation:
| Resource | Content |
| ---------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context` | Stats, staleness check |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/clusters` | All functional areas with cohesion scores |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/cluster/{clusterName}` | Area members |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/processes` | All execution flows |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/process/{processName}` | Step-by-step trace |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/schema` | Graph schema for Cypher |
## Graph Schema
**Nodes:** File, Function, Class, Interface, Method, Community, Process
**Edges (via CodeRelation.type):** CALLS, IMPORTS, EXTENDS, IMPLEMENTS, DEFINES, MEMBER_OF, STEP_IN_PROCESS
```cypher
MATCH (caller)-[:CodeRelation {type: 'CALLS'}]->(f:Function {name: "myFunc"})
RETURN caller.name, caller.filePath
```
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-pr-swarm-review
description: "Run a GitNexus production-readiness pull request review using a coordinated reviewer swarm."
---
# GitNexus PR Swarm Review (Claude Code adapter)
Use this skill to review a GitNexus pull request and produce a production-readiness review.
```
/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review <PR URL or PR number>
```
You are the **swarm coordinator**. The full review contract — lanes, dependencies,
classifications, output structure, finding format, hidden-Unicode checks, and behavior
rules — is the canonical, CLI-neutral spec:
**`pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md`** — read it now and follow it.
This adapter only pins the Claude Code specifics:
- **Run in Swarm mode.** Dispatch each lane as its own subagent via the Agent tool. The
seven subagents are the project agents named `gitnexus-*` (one per persona); each reads
its canonical persona under `pr-swarm-review/personas/`. Run lanes 1–2 first, lanes 3–6
in parallel after, and lane 7 last on the draft.
- **Lane 7 is a hard gate.** Do not emit the final review while the synthesis critic's
"Required corrections before posting" section is non-empty — revise and re-run it.
- Stay **read-only**: investigate and report; never edit, commit, or post.
Do not flatten the review into a generic checklist; delegate to the subagents and
synthesize per `orchestration.md`.
@@ -5,16 +5,14 @@ description: "Use when the user needs to run GitNexus CLI commands like analyze/
# GitNexus CLI Commands
Commands below use `node .gitnexus/run.cjs <command>` — the project-local runner `gitnexus analyze` drops next to the index. It auto-selects an available runner at call time (global `gitnexus`, else `pnpm dlx`, else `npx`), so no package-manager assumption and no global install is required.
> **Not analyzed yet, or `node .gitnexus/run.cjs` reports `Cannot find module`** (the gitignored runner is absent — e.g. a fresh clone or `git clean`)? (Re)generate it with `npx gitnexus analyze` from the project root. On **npm 11.x**, if `npx` crashes during install (`node.target is null`), install once with `npm i -g gitnexus` (then `gitnexus analyze`) or use `pnpm --allow-build=@ladybugdb/core --allow-build=gitnexus --allow-build=tree-sitter dlx gitnexus@latest analyze`. See [#1939](https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus/issues/1939).
All commands work via `npx` — no global install required.
## Commands
### analyze — Build or refresh the index
```bash
node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze
npx gitnexus analyze
```
Run from the project root. This parses all source files, builds the knowledge graph, writes it to `.gitnexus/`, and generates CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md context files.
@@ -23,14 +21,13 @@ Run from the project root. This parses all source files, builds the knowledge gr
| -------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `--force` | Force full re-index even if up to date |
| `--embeddings` | Enable embedding generation for semantic search (off by default) |
| `--drop-embeddings` | Drop existing embeddings on rebuild. By default, an `analyze` without `--embeddings` preserves them. |
**When to run:** First time in a project, after major code changes, or when `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context` reports the index is stale. In Claude Code, a PostToolUse hook detects staleness after `git commit` and `git merge` and notifies the agent to run `analyze` — the hook does not run analyze itself, to avoid blocking the agent for up to 120s and risking KuzuDB corruption on timeout.
**When to run:** First time in a project, after major code changes, or when `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context` reports the index is stale.
### status — Check index freshness
```bash
node .gitnexus/run.cjs status
npx gitnexus status
```
Shows whether the current repo has a GitNexus index, when it was last updated, and symbol/relationship counts. Use this to check if re-indexing is needed.
@@ -38,7 +35,7 @@ Shows whether the current repo has a GitNexus index, when it was last updated, a
### clean — Delete the index
```bash
node .gitnexus/run.cjs clean
npx gitnexus clean
```
Deletes the `.gitnexus/` directory and unregisters the repo from the global registry. Use before re-indexing if the index is corrupt or after removing GitNexus from a project.
@@ -51,7 +48,7 @@ Deletes the `.gitnexus/` directory and unregisters the repo from the global regi
### wiki — Generate documentation from the graph
```bash
node .gitnexus/run.cjs wiki
npx gitnexus wiki
```
Generates repository documentation from the knowledge graph using an LLM. Requires an API key (saved to `~/.gitnexus/config.json` on first use).
@@ -68,7 +65,7 @@ Generates repository documentation from the knowledge graph using an LLM. Requir
### list — Show all indexed repos
```bash
node .gitnexus/run.cjs list
npx gitnexus list
```
Lists all repositories registered in `~/.gitnexus/registry.json`. The MCP `list_repos` tool provides the same information.
@@ -16,23 +16,23 @@ description: "Use when the user is debugging a bug, tracing an error, or asking
## Workflow
```
1. query({search_query: "<error or symptom>"}) → Find related execution flows
2. context({name: "<suspect>"}) → See callers/callees/processes
1. gitnexus_query({query: "<error or symptom>"}) → Find related execution flows
2. gitnexus_context({name: "<suspect>"}) → See callers/callees/processes
3. READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/process/{name} → Trace execution flow
4. cypher({statement: "MATCH path..."}) → Custom traces if needed
4. gitnexus_cypher({query: "MATCH path..."}) → Custom traces if needed
```
> If "Index is stale" → run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in terminal.
> If "Index is stale" → run `npx gitnexus analyze` in terminal.
## Checklist
```
- [ ] Understand the symptom (error message, unexpected behavior)
- [ ] query for error text or related code
- [ ] gitnexus_query for error text or related code
- [ ] Identify the suspect function from returned processes
- [ ] context to see callers and callees
- [ ] gitnexus_context to see callers and callees
- [ ] Trace execution flow via process resource if applicable
- [ ] cypher for custom call chain traces if needed
- [ ] gitnexus_cypher for custom call chain traces if needed
- [ ] Read source files to confirm root cause
```
@@ -40,58 +40,46 @@ description: "Use when the user is debugging a bug, tracing an error, or asking
| Symptom | GitNexus Approach |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| Error message | `query` for error text → `context` on throw sites |
| Error message | `gitnexus_query` for error text → `context` on throw sites |
| Wrong return value | `context` on the function → trace callees for data flow |
| Intermittent failure | `context` → look for external calls, async deps |
| Performance issue | `context` → find symbols with many callers (hot paths) |
| Recent regression | `detect_changes` to see what your changes affect |
| "How does A reach B?" | `trace` between the two symbols — shortest call chain in one call |
## Tools
**query** — find code related to error:
**gitnexus_query** — find code related to error:
```
query({search_query: "payment validation error"})
gitnexus_query({query: "payment validation error"})
→ Processes: CheckoutFlow, ErrorHandling
→ Symbols: validatePayment, handlePaymentError, PaymentException
```
**context** — full context for a suspect:
**gitnexus_context** — full context for a suspect:
```
context({name: "validatePayment"})
gitnexus_context({name: "validatePayment"})
→ Incoming calls: processCheckout, webhookHandler
→ Outgoing calls: verifyCard, fetchRates (external API!)
→ Processes: CheckoutFlow (step 3/7)
```
**cypher** — custom call chain traces:
**gitnexus_cypher** — custom call chain traces:
```cypher
MATCH path = (a)-[:CodeRelation {type: 'CALLS'}*1..2]->(b:Function {name: "validatePayment"})
RETURN [n IN nodes(path) | n.name] AS chain
```
**trace** — shortest call chain between two symbols ("how does A reach B?"), one call instead of chaining `context` hops:
```
trace({ from: "processCheckout", to: "fetchRates" })
→ status: ok, hopCount: 3
→ hops: processCheckout → validatePayment → verifyCard → fetchRates
→ edges: CALLS (1.0), CALLS (0.95), CALLS (1.0)
```
When no path exists, `trace` reports the furthest reachable node — exactly where the chain breaks (dynamic dispatch, reflection, or an external boundary).
## Example: "Payment endpoint returns 500 intermittently"
```
1. query({search_query: "payment error handling"})
1. gitnexus_query({query: "payment error handling"})
→ Processes: CheckoutFlow, ErrorHandling
→ Symbols: validatePayment, handlePaymentError
2. context({name: "validatePayment"})
2. gitnexus_context({name: "validatePayment"})
→ Outgoing calls: verifyCard, fetchRates (external API!)
3. READ gitnexus://repo/my-app/process/CheckoutFlow
@@ -18,20 +18,20 @@ description: "Use when the user asks how code works, wants to understand archite
```
1. READ gitnexus://repos → Discover indexed repos
2. READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/context → Codebase overview, check staleness
3. query({search_query: "<what you want to understand>"}) → Find related execution flows
4. context({name: "<symbol>"}) → Deep dive on specific symbol
3. gitnexus_query({query: "<what you want to understand>"}) → Find related execution flows
4. gitnexus_context({name: "<symbol>"}) → Deep dive on specific symbol
5. READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/process/{name} → Trace full execution flow
```
> If step 2 says "Index is stale" → run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in terminal.
> If step 2 says "Index is stale" → run `npx gitnexus analyze` in terminal.
## Checklist
```
- [ ] READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/context
- [ ] query for the concept you want to understand
- [ ] gitnexus_query for the concept you want to understand
- [ ] Review returned processes (execution flows)
- [ ] context on key symbols for callers/callees
- [ ] gitnexus_context on key symbols for callers/callees
- [ ] READ process resource for full execution traces
- [ ] Read source files for implementation details
```
@@ -47,18 +47,18 @@ description: "Use when the user asks how code works, wants to understand archite
## Tools
**query** — find execution flows related to a concept:
**gitnexus_query** — find execution flows related to a concept:
```
query({search_query: "payment processing"})
gitnexus_query({query: "payment processing"})
→ Processes: CheckoutFlow, RefundFlow, WebhookHandler
→ Symbols grouped by flow with file locations
```
**context** — 360-degree view of a symbol:
**gitnexus_context** — 360-degree view of a symbol:
```
context({name: "validateUser"})
gitnexus_context({name: "validateUser"})
→ Incoming calls: loginHandler, apiMiddleware
→ Outgoing calls: checkToken, getUserById
→ Processes: LoginFlow (step 2/5), TokenRefresh (step 1/3)
@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@ context({name: "validateUser"})
```
1. READ gitnexus://repo/my-app/context → 918 symbols, 45 processes
2. query({search_query: "payment processing"})
2. gitnexus_query({query: "payment processing"})
→ CheckoutFlow: processPayment → validateCard → chargeStripe
→ RefundFlow: initiateRefund → calculateRefund → processRefund
3. context({name: "processPayment"})
3. gitnexus_context({name: "processPayment"})
→ Incoming: checkoutHandler, webhookHandler
→ Outgoing: validateCard, chargeStripe, saveTransaction
4. Read src/payments/processor.ts for implementation details
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
---
name: gitnexus-guide
description: "Use when the user asks about GitNexus itself — available tools, how to query the knowledge graph, MCP resources, graph schema, or workflow reference. Examples: \"What GitNexus tools are available?\", \"How do I use GitNexus?\""
---
# GitNexus Guide
Quick reference for all GitNexus MCP tools, resources, and the knowledge graph schema.
## Always Start Here
For any task involving code understanding, debugging, impact analysis, or refactoring:
1. **Read `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context`** — codebase overview + check index freshness
2. **Match your task to a skill below** and **read that skill file**
3. **Follow the skill's workflow and checklist**
> If step 1 warns the index is stale, run `npx gitnexus analyze` in the terminal first.
## Skills
| Task | Skill to read |
| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------- |
| Understand architecture / "How does X work?" | `gitnexus-exploring` |
| Blast radius / "What breaks if I change X?" | `gitnexus-impact-analysis` |
| Trace bugs / "Why is X failing?" | `gitnexus-debugging` |
| Rename / extract / split / refactor | `gitnexus-refactoring` |
| Tools, resources, schema reference | `gitnexus-guide` (this file) |
| Index, status, clean, wiki CLI commands | `gitnexus-cli` |
## Tools Reference
| Tool | What it gives you |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `query` | Process-grouped code intelligence — execution flows related to a concept |
| `context` | 360-degree symbol view — categorized refs, processes it participates in |
| `impact` | Symbol blast radius — what breaks at depth 1/2/3 with confidence |
| `detect_changes` | Git-diff impact — what do your current changes affect |
| `rename` | Multi-file coordinated rename with confidence-tagged edits |
| `cypher` | Raw graph queries (read `gitnexus://repo/{name}/schema` first) |
| `list_repos` | Discover indexed repos |
## Resources Reference
Lightweight reads (~100-500 tokens) for navigation:
| Resource | Content |
| ---------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/context` | Stats, staleness check |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/clusters` | All functional areas with cohesion scores |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/cluster/{clusterName}` | Area members |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/processes` | All execution flows |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/process/{processName}` | Step-by-step trace |
| `gitnexus://repo/{name}/schema` | Graph schema for Cypher |
## Graph Schema
**Nodes:** File, Function, Class, Interface, Method, Community, Process
**Edges (via CodeRelation.type):** CALLS, IMPORTS, EXTENDS, IMPLEMENTS, DEFINES, MEMBER_OF, STEP_IN_PROCESS
```cypher
MATCH (caller)-[:CodeRelation {type: 'CALLS'}]->(f:Function {name: "myFunc"})
RETURN caller.name, caller.filePath
```
@@ -17,22 +17,22 @@ description: "Use when the user wants to know what will break if they change som
## Workflow
```
1. impact({target: "X", direction: "upstream"}) → What depends on this
1. gitnexus_impact({target: "X", direction: "upstream"}) → What depends on this
2. READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/processes → Check affected execution flows
3. detect_changes() → Map current git changes to affected flows
3. gitnexus_detect_changes() → Map current git changes to affected flows
4. Assess risk and report to user
```
> If "Index is stale" → run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in terminal.
> If "Index is stale" → run `npx gitnexus analyze` in terminal.
## Checklist
```
- [ ] impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) to find dependents
- [ ] gitnexus_impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) to find dependents
- [ ] Review d=1 items first (these WILL BREAK)
- [ ] Check high-confidence (>0.8) dependencies
- [ ] READ processes to check affected execution flows
- [ ] detect_changes() for pre-commit check
- [ ] gitnexus_detect_changes() for pre-commit check
- [ ] Assess risk level and report to user
```
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ description: "Use when the user wants to know what will break if they change som
## Tools
**impact** — the primary tool for symbol blast radius:
**gitnexus_impact** — the primary tool for symbol blast radius:
```
impact({
gitnexus_impact({
target: "validateUser",
direction: "upstream",
minConfidence: 0.8,
@@ -73,10 +73,10 @@ impact({
- authRouter (src/routes/auth.ts:22) [CALLS, 95%]
```
**detect_changes** — git-diff based impact analysis:
**gitnexus_detect_changes** — git-diff based impact analysis:
```
detect_changes({scope: "staged"})
gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "staged"})
→ Changed: 5 symbols in 3 files
→ Affected: LoginFlow, TokenRefresh, APIMiddlewarePipeline
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ detect_changes({scope: "staged"})
## Example: "What breaks if I change validateUser?"
```
1. impact({target: "validateUser", direction: "upstream"})
1. gitnexus_impact({target: "validateUser", direction: "upstream"})
→ d=1: loginHandler, apiMiddleware (WILL BREAK)
→ d=2: authRouter, sessionManager (LIKELY AFFECTED)
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-pdg-query
description: "Use when querying or extending GitNexus's PDG control/data-dependence surface (the `pdg_query` MCP tool, CDG/REACHING_DEF edges), or reasoning about \"what controls X\" / \"where does Y flow\" / guard clauses. Examples: \"what guards this statement?\", \"trace this variable within the function\", \"why is the pdg_query result empty?\", \"add a CDG query\"."
---
# PDG query surface with GitNexus
Expert knowledge for the `pdg_query` MCP tool and the control/data-dependence
edges it reads — the opt-in `--pdg` program-dependence layers. Read this before
touching `gitnexus/src/mcp/local/local-backend.ts` (`_pdgQueryImpl`) or the
`pdg_query` tool def, or when explaining a `pdg_query` result.
## When to Use
- "Under what condition does this statement run?" (guarding predicates).
- "Where does this variable flow inside the function?" (def→use).
- Guard-clause discovery (early-return guards — subsumes the #559 heuristic).
- Extending or reviewing `pdg_query` / the CDG / REACHING_DEF read path.
- Debugging an empty or surprising `pdg_query` result.
## The layered substrate (build order)
`pdg_query` runs **on** the same graph taint runs on. Each layer is opt-in
behind `--pdg`; a default `analyze` run records none of them (byte-identical).
```
L1 CFG per-function basic blocks + control-flow edges (M1 #2081)
L2 REACHING_DEF GEN/KILL def→use data dependence (pure solver) (M2 #2082)
L5 CDG Ferrante control dependence (post-dominators) (M5 #2085)
```
All three are `BasicBlock → BasicBlock` edges in the single `CodeRelation` table
(keyed by the `type` property). There is **no** `Function → BasicBlock` edge.
## The two modes
- `pdg_query({ mode: 'controls', target })` — CDG. For the anchored function,
each edge: controlling predicate block → dependent block + branch sense in
`label` (`'T'` = predicate's true/taken arm, `'F'` = false/fall-through). An
edge into an early-return/throw block is flagged `guard: true`.
- `pdg_query({ mode: 'flows', target, variable? })` — REACHING_DEF def→use
edges; `variable` filters to one binding.
`target` is **required** — a file path or a symbol/function name (resolved like
`context()`). There is no anchorless mode (see below).
## The corrected guard-clause Cypher
The RFC #567 §2 form (`[:CDG {label:'F'}]`) does **not** run as written. Edges
are values of the single `CodeRelation` table's `type` property, and the branch
sense is in `reason`, NOT a `label` column:
```cypher
MATCH (pred:BasicBlock)-[r:CodeRelation {type: 'CDG'}]->(dep:BasicBlock)
WHERE dep.text STARTS WITH 'return' OR dep.text STARTS WITH 'throw'
RETURN pred.startLine, r.reason AS branch, dep.startLine, dep.text
```
`r.reason` is the sense the predicate took to reach the early exit. For
`if (!ok) return;` the return rides the predicate's **true** arm (`'T'`) and the
protected body rides the **false** arm (`'F'`) — polarity depends on the guard,
so don't hard-code one sense.
## Gotchas (the load-bearing ones)
- **Always anchored + LIMIT-bounded.** LadybugDB has no rel-property index, so
an unanchored `[:CDG*]`/`[:REACHING_DEF*]` path scan is unbounded. `pdg_query`
requires `target` and bounds the page; raw `cypher` callers must anchor on a
file id-prefix or symbol span themselves.
- **BasicBlock↔symbol join is reconstructed.** No `Function→BasicBlock` edge:
the block is matched by its id-prefix (`BasicBlock:<file>:<fnStartLine>:…`)
plus `startLine` within the symbol's span. BasicBlock `startLine` is **1-based**
while the symbol node's `startLine`/`endLine` are **0-based**, so **both** bounds
are shifted `+1` (`[symStart+1, symEnd+1]`): the upper `+1` keeps a guard/def/use
on the function's **final line**, the lower `+1` excludes an adjacent function's
block on the line directly **above**. Same-line / nested functions anchor coarsely.
- **No PDG layer ⇒ a note, not an error.** If the repo wasn't indexed with
`--pdg` the tool returns `{ results: [], note: "no PDG layer …" }` (cheap meta
probe on `RepoMeta.pdg.maxCdgEdgesPerFunction` / `maxReachingDefEdgesPerFunction`).
- **CDG labels are binary in M5/M6.** Every `switch`-case arm is `'T'`; per-case
conditions are not yet distinguished.
- **Intra-procedural only.** Cross-function flow is taint's domain (`explain`).
## Mirror, don't fork
`_pdgQueryImpl` is the front half of `_explainImpl` (WAL wrapper, meta no-layer
probe, limit validation, `resolveSymbolCandidates` anchoring) with CDG/
REACHING_DEF instead of TAINTED — and none of taint's path-codec / interproc
`TAINT_PATH` machinery. Reuse those shared helpers; do not re-implement them.
@@ -18,24 +18,24 @@ description: "Use when the user wants to review a pull request, understand what
```
1. gh pr diff <number> → Get the raw diff
2. detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"}) → Map diff to affected flows
2. gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"}) → Map diff to affected flows
3. For each changed symbol:
impact({target: "<symbol>", direction: "upstream"}) → Blast radius per change
4. context({name: "<key symbol>"}) → Understand callers/callees
gitnexus_impact({target: "<symbol>", direction: "upstream"}) → Blast radius per change
4. gitnexus_context({name: "<key symbol>"}) → Understand callers/callees
5. READ gitnexus://repo/{name}/processes → Check affected execution flows
6. Summarize findings with risk assessment
```
> If "Index is stale" → run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in terminal before reviewing.
> If "Index is stale" → run `npx gitnexus analyze` in terminal before reviewing.
## Checklist
```
- [ ] Fetch PR diff (gh pr diff or git diff base...head)
- [ ] detect_changes to map changes to affected execution flows
- [ ] impact on each non-trivial changed symbol
- [ ] gitnexus_detect_changes to map changes to affected execution flows
- [ ] gitnexus_impact on each non-trivial changed symbol
- [ ] Review d=1 items (WILL BREAK) — are callers updated?
- [ ] context on key changed symbols to understand full picture
- [ ] gitnexus_context on key changed symbols to understand full picture
- [ ] Check if affected processes have test coverage
- [ ] Assess overall risk level
- [ ] Write review summary with findings
@@ -63,20 +63,20 @@ description: "Use when the user wants to review a pull request, understand what
## Tools
**detect_changes** — map PR diff to affected execution flows:
**gitnexus_detect_changes** — map PR diff to affected execution flows:
```
detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"})
gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"})
→ Changed: 8 symbols in 4 files
→ Affected processes: CheckoutFlow, RefundFlow, WebhookHandler
→ Risk: MEDIUM
```
**impact** — blast radius per changed symbol:
**gitnexus_impact** — blast radius per changed symbol:
```
impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream"})
gitnexus_impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream"})
→ d=1 (WILL BREAK):
- processCheckout (src/checkout.ts:42) [CALLS, 100%]
@@ -86,20 +86,20 @@ impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream"})
- checkoutRouter (src/routes/checkout.ts:22) [CALLS, 95%]
```
**impact with tests** — check test coverage:
**gitnexus_impact with tests** — check test coverage:
```
impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream", includeTests: true})
gitnexus_impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream", includeTests: true})
→ Tests that cover this symbol:
- validatePayment.test.ts [direct]
- checkout.integration.test.ts [via processCheckout]
```
**context** — understand a changed symbol's role:
**gitnexus_context** — understand a changed symbol's role:
```
context({name: "validatePayment"})
gitnexus_context({name: "validatePayment"})
→ Incoming calls: processCheckout, webhookHandler
→ Outgoing calls: verifyCard, fetchRates
@@ -112,20 +112,20 @@ context({name: "validatePayment"})
1. gh pr diff 42 > /tmp/pr42.diff
→ 4 files changed: payments.ts, checkout.ts, types.ts, utils.ts
2. detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"})
2. gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "compare", base_ref: "main"})
→ Changed symbols: validatePayment, PaymentInput, formatAmount
→ Affected processes: CheckoutFlow, RefundFlow
→ Risk: MEDIUM
3. impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream"})
3. gitnexus_impact({target: "validatePayment", direction: "upstream"})
→ d=1: processCheckout, webhookHandler (WILL BREAK)
→ webhookHandler is NOT in the PR diff — potential breakage!
4. impact({target: "PaymentInput", direction: "upstream"})
4. gitnexus_impact({target: "PaymentInput", direction: "upstream"})
→ d=1: validatePayment (in PR), createPayment (NOT in PR)
→ createPayment uses the old PaymentInput shape — breaking change!
5. context({name: "formatAmount"})
5. gitnexus_context({name: "formatAmount"})
→ Called by 12 functions — but change is backwards-compatible (added optional param)
6. Review summary:
@@ -16,78 +16,78 @@ description: "Use when the user wants to rename, extract, split, move, or restru
## Workflow
```
1. impact({target: "X", direction: "upstream"}) → Map all dependents
2. query({search_query: "X"}) → Find execution flows involving X
3. context({name: "X"}) → See all incoming/outgoing refs
1. gitnexus_impact({target: "X", direction: "upstream"}) → Map all dependents
2. gitnexus_query({query: "X"}) → Find execution flows involving X
3. gitnexus_context({name: "X"}) → See all incoming/outgoing refs
4. Plan update order: interfaces → implementations → callers → tests
```
> If "Index is stale" → run `node .gitnexus/run.cjs analyze` in terminal.
> If "Index is stale" → run `npx gitnexus analyze` in terminal.
## Checklists
### Rename Symbol
```
- [ ] rename({symbol_name: "oldName", new_name: "newName", dry_run: true}) — preview all edits
- [ ] gitnexus_rename({symbol_name: "oldName", new_name: "newName", dry_run: true}) — preview all edits
- [ ] Review graph edits (high confidence) and ast_search edits (review carefully)
- [ ] If satisfied: rename({..., dry_run: false}) — apply edits
- [ ] detect_changes() — verify only expected files changed
- [ ] If satisfied: gitnexus_rename({..., dry_run: false}) — apply edits
- [ ] gitnexus_detect_changes() — verify only expected files changed
- [ ] Run tests for affected processes
```
### Extract Module
```
- [ ] context({name: target}) — see all incoming/outgoing refs
- [ ] impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) — find all external callers
- [ ] gitnexus_context({name: target}) — see all incoming/outgoing refs
- [ ] gitnexus_impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) — find all external callers
- [ ] Define new module interface
- [ ] Extract code, update imports
- [ ] detect_changes() — verify affected scope
- [ ] gitnexus_detect_changes() — verify affected scope
- [ ] Run tests for affected processes
```
### Split Function/Service
```
- [ ] context({name: target}) — understand all callees
- [ ] gitnexus_context({name: target}) — understand all callees
- [ ] Group callees by responsibility
- [ ] impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) — map callers to update
- [ ] gitnexus_impact({target, direction: "upstream"}) — map callers to update
- [ ] Create new functions/services
- [ ] Update callers
- [ ] detect_changes() — verify affected scope
- [ ] gitnexus_detect_changes() — verify affected scope
- [ ] Run tests for affected processes
```
## Tools
**rename** — automated multi-file rename:
**gitnexus_rename** — automated multi-file rename:
```
rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: true})
gitnexus_rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: true})
→ 12 edits across 8 files
→ 10 graph edits (high confidence), 2 ast_search edits (review)
→ Changes: [{file_path, edits: [{line, old_text, new_text, confidence}]}]
```
**impact** — map all dependents first:
**gitnexus_impact** — map all dependents first:
```
impact({target: "validateUser", direction: "upstream"})
gitnexus_impact({target: "validateUser", direction: "upstream"})
→ d=1: loginHandler, apiMiddleware, testUtils
→ Affected Processes: LoginFlow, TokenRefresh
```
**detect_changes** — verify your changes after refactoring:
**gitnexus_detect_changes** — verify your changes after refactoring:
```
detect_changes({scope: "all"})
gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "all"})
→ Changed: 8 files, 12 symbols
→ Affected processes: LoginFlow, TokenRefresh
→ Risk: MEDIUM
```
**cypher** — custom reference queries:
**gitnexus_cypher** — custom reference queries:
```cypher
MATCH (caller)-[:CodeRelation {type: 'CALLS'}]->(f:Function {name: "validateUser"})
@@ -98,24 +98,24 @@ RETURN caller.name, caller.filePath ORDER BY caller.filePath
| Risk Factor | Mitigation |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| Many callers (>5) | Use rename for automated updates |
| Many callers (>5) | Use gitnexus_rename for automated updates |
| Cross-area refs | Use detect_changes after to verify scope |
| String/dynamic refs | query to find them |
| String/dynamic refs | gitnexus_query to find them |
| External/public API | Version and deprecate properly |
## Example: Rename `validateUser` to `authenticateUser`
```
1. rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: true})
1. gitnexus_rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: true})
→ 12 edits: 10 graph (safe), 2 ast_search (review)
→ Files: validator.ts, login.ts, middleware.ts, config.json...
2. Review ast_search edits (config.json: dynamic reference!)
3. rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: false})
3. gitnexus_rename({symbol_name: "validateUser", new_name: "authenticateUser", dry_run: false})
→ Applied 12 edits across 8 files
4. detect_changes({scope: "all"})
4. gitnexus_detect_changes({scope: "all"})
→ Affected: LoginFlow, TokenRefresh
→ Risk: MEDIUM — run tests for these flows
```
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
---
name: gitnexus-taint-analysis
description: "Use when working on, reviewing, or extending GitNexus's CFG/taint/PDG subsystem (the `--pdg` layers), or when reasoning about source→sink data-flow findings. Examples: \"How does taint analysis work here?\", \"Why didn't explain find this flow?\", \"Add a new sink/source\", \"Review the interprocedural taint code\"."
---
# CFG & Taint Analysis with GitNexus
Expert knowledge for the opt-in `--pdg` program-analysis subsystem: control-flow
graphs, reaching definitions, and intra- + inter-procedural taint. Read this
before touching `gitnexus/src/core/ingestion/cfg/**` or
`gitnexus/src/core/ingestion/taint/**`, or when explaining a finding.
## When to Use
- "How does the taint engine work / why is this flow (not) reported?"
- Adding a source, sink, or sanitizer to the model.
- Extending or reviewing the CFG / reaching-defs / taint / summary code.
- Understanding the `explain` MCP tool's findings (intra- vs inter-procedural).
- Debugging a false positive or false negative in `--pdg` output.
## The layered substrate (build order)
Taint runs **on** the graph, not beside it. Each layer is opt-in behind `--pdg`
and a default `analyze` run is **byte-identical** (the golden parity gate is the
hard floor for every change here).
```
L1 CFG per-function basic blocks + control-flow edges (M1 #2081)
L2 REACHING_DEF GEN/KILL def→use data dependence (pure solver) (M2 #2082)
L3 Taint (intra) source→sink over RD facts, minus sanitizers (M3 #2083)
L4 Taint (inter) per-function summaries composed over CALLS (M4 #2084)
```
- **Worker-built, main-thread-solved.** The parse worker builds each function's
CFG + harvests def/use + call-site facts onto `ParsedFile.cfgSideChannel`
(plain, structured-clone-safe data — never AST nodes). The main thread runs
the pure solvers. NEVER re-parse on the main thread (re-introduces the #1983
OOM).
- **In-phase emit (KTD1).** L1–L4-harvest all run INSIDE the scope-resolution
pdg window (`scope-resolution/pipeline/run.ts`, gated `input.pdg === true`),
because the disk-backed ParsedFile store is cleared when that phase ends — a
standalone post-`mro` phase would read empty data. The cross-function fixpoint
(L4) is the exception: it runs in its OWN registered phase (`taintSummaries`)
AFTER scope-resolution, because it needs the COMPLETE call graph, and consumes
small plain summary data threaded out via `ScopeResolutionOutput`.
- **Pure-solver contract.** `computeReachingDefs`, `computeTaintFlows`,
`harvestFunctionSummary`, and `solveInterprocTaint` are pure and deterministic
(no graph, no I/O, no logger; sorted outputs). Snapshot tests and
content-derived edge ids depend on it.
## Intra-procedural taint (L3)
Forward reachability over RD facts from matched **sources** to matched **sinks**,
killed by **sanitizers**. Key design points worth internalizing:
- **Occurrence-tagged sites.** A flat per-arg binding set cannot tell
`exec(escape(x))` (safe) from `exec(x)` (finding); the harvest records nested
call structure (`SiteRecord.parent`/via-tags) so sanitizer interposition is
precise.
- **Kind-set sanitizer model.** A taint carries a set of *neutralized*
`SinkKind`s; a sink fires unless its kind is in the set. So `escape(req.body)`
suppresses `res.send` (xss) but STILL fires `db.query` (sql) — a kind-blind
kill would be a suppressed live injection (the forbidden FN direction).
`path.basename(t)` neutralizes path-traversal only, not command-injection.
- **Statement-level finding identity.** NOT block-pair (block conflation drops
distinct findings; `exec(req.body, req.query)` is two findings).
- Persisted as `TAINTED` edges (BasicBlock→BasicBlock); the path rides the
`reason` column via the shared versioned codec (`taint/path-codec.ts`).
## Interprocedural taint (L4) — the functional/summary method
The production approach (Sharir-Pnueli 1981; the same shape as Meta's Pysa and
Mariana Trench, and FB Infer) — NOT full IFDS tabulation. Each function is
reduced to a compact **summary**, and summaries are composed over the already-
resolved `CALLS` graph.
**Summary shape** (`taint/summary-model.ts`, whole-parameter granularity):
| Edge | Meaning | Analogue |
|------|---------|----------|
| `param→return` | a param flows to the return value | TITO — **reserved** (the floor already covers its recall; precision pass deferred) |
| `param→callee-arg` | a param flows into arg *j* of a call (carries the path's neutralized sink kinds) | TITO into callee |
| `param→sink` | a param reaches a modelled sink | partial/triggered sink |
| `source→return` | the function generates+returns a source | generative — **composed** via the caller's `callResults` |
| `source→callee-arg` | a generated source flows into a call | fixpoint SEED |
| `callResults` | a user-function call's result flows to a sink/return/callee-arg in the caller | composes with callee `source→return` |
**The fixpoint** (`taint/interproc-solver.ts`): the unit is `(function,
parameter, source)`. Seed from `source→callee-arg`, propagate via
`param→callee-arg`, fire a finding when a tainted param meets `param→sink`.
- **Cycle-safe by monotonicity.** The tainted-set is monotone over a finite
lattice (`fn × param × source`), so the worklist converges — a recursive call
just re-proposes an already-visited entry. SCC condensation would only refine
processing order; correctness/termination don't require it.
- **Source-discriminated state (load-bearing).** Key the state by the SOURCE
too. Keying only by `(fn, param)` collapses multi-source flows: a sink param
tainted by source A is marked visited and a later flow from source B is dropped
before firing — the recurring multi-source bug class. (Bit M3; bit M4 U9.)
- **Name-based call join.** Match a summary's call-arg edge to a `CALLS` edge by
CALLEE NAME, not call-site line — line-base parity (CFG 1-based vs reference
site) is fragile; the callee identity is exact and context-insensitivity
taints the callee's param identically at every call site.
- Persisted as `TAINT_PATH` edges (Function→Function), function-level hop chain
in `reason` via the same codec; confidence < the intra-procedural 1.0.
**Context-insensitivity** is the accepted trade-off at this tier: one summary
per function, return/call-site merging accepted (security-conservative). Expect
some FP from merging; the bigger FN sources are unmodeled features (below).
## Known false-negative classes (documented, deferred)
The largest is **closures/callbacks** (`arr.forEach(() => sink(y))`) — taint
into a callback is dropped without per-library models (true of CodeQL's JS libs
too). Also deferred: field/property flows (`obj.x = taint; sink(obj.y)`),
field-sensitive access paths, guard-style sanitizers, implicit/control-dependence
flows, promise/async-await threading, and **destructured/rest params before a
tainted simple param** (the summary port index is the binding ordinal, not the
formal arg position — needs a formal-param index threaded from the worker
`BindingEntry`). The interprocedural join is also context-insensitive: when one
caller invokes two distinct **same-named callees**, a flow into one
over-attributes to both (sound — over-report, never a missed flow). Absence of a
finding is NOT proof of safety.
## GitNexus-specific gotchas
- **Function↔CFG join.** `FunctionCfg.functionStartLine` is 1-based; `Function`/
`Method` node `startLine` is 0-based — join at `startLine - 1`. Function nodes
have no column, so same-line functions (`{a:()=>x(), b:()=>y()}`) are
ambiguous → drop (the summary driver counts `unresolved`) rather than
cross-wire.
- **No rel-property index (S1).** Kuzu has no secondary index on relationship
properties, and unanchored `[:TAINTED*]`/`[:TAINT_PATH*]` queries explode.
TAINT_PATH is therefore MATERIALIZED + anchored at analyze time, never
traversed live; `explain` reads it source-anchored + LIMIT-guarded.
- **`explain` is the only discovery surface.** `TAINTED`/`TAINT_PATH` are
deliberately OUT of `VALID_RELATION_TYPES` (impact's allow-list) and the web
schema (pinned in `security.test.ts`). `explain` enumerates both layers
(cross-function findings carry `interprocedural: true`).
- **One shared codec.** Both the emit path and `explain` import
`taint/path-codec.ts`. Two hand-rolled copies of a wire format drift — never
fork it. New metadata extends the format WITHIN the version when writer +
reader ship together.
- **Cache versioning.** A worker-harvest shape change bumps the parse-cache pdg
NAMESPACE (`pdg:N`), NOT `SCHEMA_BUMP` (which cold-invalidates every user).
Persisted-graph/config changes ride `RepoMeta.pdg`'s key-union mismatch →
full writeback. Model content rides `taintModelVersion`.
## Adding a source / sink / sanitizer
Edit the language model in `taint/typescript-model.ts` (registered via the
explicit `registerBuiltinTaintModels` seam, keyed by `SupportedLanguages`). The
spec is hashable data (no functions). A sanitizer's `neutralizes` lists the
EXACT sink kinds it defends — never a blanket kill. Add a fixture + assert the
finding (or its absence) in `test/unit/taint/` (real-source harness:
`test/helpers/ts-cfg-harness.ts`); the end-to-end proof is
`test/integration/cfg/`.
## Validation checklist for any `--pdg` change
```
1. tsc clean (schema additions are exhaustiveness-checked; watch the
api.ts getNodeQuery runtime read-path if a node label is added).
2. Targeted vitest by directory (test/unit/taint, test/unit/cfg,
test/integration/cfg) — verify by ISOLATION, not full-suite exit
(known load-flakes). `node scripts/build.js` before worker/integration runs.
3. Flag-off golden byte-identical (pipeline-graph-golden.test.ts).
4. bench/cfg/measure.mjs --check (no fingerprint drift / budget regression).
5. detect_changes() before commit; impact({direction:'upstream'}) before
editing shared symbols (KnowledgeGraph, RepoMeta, RelationshipType, codec).
```
## Prior art (for deeper design questions)
Sharir & Pnueli 1981 (functional approach); Reps-Horwitz-Sagiv IFDS (POPL 1995);
FlowDroid/StubDroid (access-path summaries); Pysa & Mariana Trench (TITO /
propagations, parallel SCC fixpoint); CodeQL Models-as-Data (the richest port
notation, incl. callback ports); Infer (content-keyed incremental summaries).
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plans/
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# GitNexus PR Swarm Review
You are the GitNexus PR review coordinator. Review the pull request named after this command
(a PR URL or number for `https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus`). If none was given,
ask for one.
Read `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md` in this repository and follow it exactly — it is the
canonical, CLI-neutral review contract (lanes, classifications, output structure, finding
format, hidden-Unicode checks, behavior rules).
Run in **Solo mode**: you are a single agent, so perform all seven lanes yourself in
dependency order, adopting each persona in `pr-swarm-review/personas/0N-*.md` in turn
(lanes 1–2 first, then 3–6, then lane 7). Keep every lane's findings in context. Lane 7
(synthesis critic) is a hard gate: do not emit the final review until its "Required
corrections before posting" section is empty.
Stay strictly read-only: investigate and report; never edit files, commit, or post to GitHub.
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---
alwaysApply: true
---
# GitNexus — Cursor project rules
Last reviewed: 2026-03-24
Canonical agent instructions: **[AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md)** (GitNexus MCP rules, monorepo commands, Cursor Cloud notes). **[CLAUDE.md](../CLAUDE.md)** adds Claude Code-specific notes and points back to AGENTS.md for GitNexus.
## Non-negotiables (always apply)
- NEVER edit a function/class/method without running `gitnexus_impact` first.
- NEVER rename symbols with find-and-replace — use `gitnexus_rename`.
- NEVER commit without running `gitnexus_detect_changes()`.
- NEVER ignore HIGH/CRITICAL risk warnings from impact analysis.
- NEVER run `npx gitnexus analyze` without `--embeddings` if the index metadata (`.gitnexus/gitnexus.json` / legacy `meta.json`) shows stored embeddings.
Full rules: **[AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md)** (`gitnexus:start` block, Cursor Cloud section).
**Rule architecture:** Prefer this file plus optional `.cursor/rules/*.mdc` globs (YAML `globs` in frontmatter). Legacy `.cursorrules` is deprecated; content lives here.
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---
globs:
- "gitnexus/**"
- "gitnexus-web/**"
---
# GitNexus build/test quick refs
- CLI (`gitnexus/`): `npm test`; `npm run test:integration`; `npx tsc --noEmit`.
- Web (`gitnexus-web/`): `npm test`; `npm run dev`; `npx tsc -b --noEmit`; `E2E=1 npx playwright test` (needs servers).
- `npm install` in `gitnexus/` runs `prepare` (tsc build) and `postinstall` (tree-sitter patches); needs `python3`, `make`, `g++`.
- LadybugDB locking tests may fail in containerized environments because of `/tmp` file locks (known issue, not a code bug).
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---
globs:
- "eval/**"
---
# GitNexus eval harness (Python)
- **Run tests**: `cd eval && uv run pytest tests/`
- **Run with coverage**: `cd eval && uv run coverage run -m pytest tests/ && uv run coverage report`
- **Lint**: `cd eval && uv run ruff check .`
- **Run eval**: `cd eval && uv run python run_eval.py --config configs/<config>.yaml`
- Shared constants live in `eval/constants.py`; tool specs in `eval/tool_registry.py`.
- Error logging uses `utils/errors.py` — set `GITNEXUS_EVAL_DEBUG=1` for full tracebacks.
- Property-based tests use Hypothesis (`eval/tests/test_property_based.py`).
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# Deprecated for Cursor Agent Mode
# AI Agent Rules
Use **`.cursor/index.mdc`** (`alwaysApply: true`) for project rules. See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md).
Follow .gitnexus/RULES.md for all project context and coding guidelines.
This file is kept only as a breadcrumb for older workflows.
This project uses GitNexus MCP for code intelligence. See .gitnexus/RULES.md for available tools and best practices.
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# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
# Base image: Microsoft's TypeScript+Node devcontainer image. It works on both
# linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, gets monthly security patches, and ships the
# non-root `node` user (UID 1000, i.e. user ID 1000), zsh + Oh My Zsh, eslint
# global, and the `gh` CLI.
#
# We pin the image by digest, not by tag. That way a silent upstream retag can't
# change the build under us. This matches the Dockerfile.cli /
# gitnexus/Dockerfile.test convention and issue #1451.
#
# We pin it as a bare `name@digest` with NO `:tag` prefix on purpose. The
# production Dockerfiles use plain `docker build`, but this one is built by
# `@devcontainers/cli` / the VS Code Dev Containers resolver. That resolver's
# image-name parser rejects the combined `name:tag@sha256:...` form.
#
# The digest below is for the `1-22-bookworm` tag. It is the multi-arch
# manifest-list digest, so it still picks the right platform. To refresh it when
# bumping the readable tag, run:
# docker buildx imagetools inspect \
# mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/typescript-node:1-22-bookworm \
# --format '{{json .Manifest.Digest}}'
FROM mcr.microsoft.com/devcontainers/typescript-node@sha256:7c2e711a4f7b02f32d2da16192d5e05aa7c95279be4ce889cff5df316f251c1d
# Bun is installed via the official remote script (bun.sh/install), pinned by
# version. Claude Code and Cursor also use official install scripts (no version
# to pin). To harden Bun: switch to a pinned tarball + per-arch sha256
# (release artifacts at github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases).
ARG BUN_VERSION
ARG TZ=UTC
ARG USERNAME=node
# Copy the build-only ARGs into runtime ENV so shells and lifecycle scripts can
# read them. We deliberately do not set CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR here. Its one true
# value lives in devcontainer.json `containerEnv`, and the runtime value wins
# anyway.
ENV BUN_VERSION=${BUN_VERSION} \
BUN_INSTALL=/home/${USERNAME}/.bun \
TZ=${TZ} \
DEVCONTAINER=true \
NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096 \
POWERLEVEL9K_DISABLE_GITSTATUS=true
# Native build toolchain that gitnexus/postinstall needs. It compiles
# tree-sitter native bindings, the vendored Dart/Proto/Swift grammars, and the
# @ladybugdb/core N-API addon (a native Node add-on). python3, make, and g++ are
# required. This mirrors the apt block in the existing Dockerfile.cli /
# gitnexus/Dockerfile.test images.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
python3 make g++ git curl ca-certificates bash unzip \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Create and chown the named-volume mount points (~/.npm, ~/.local,
# /commandhistory) up front. That way an empty volume inherits `node:node`
# ownership the first time it is mounted. The three CLI config dirs (~/.claude,
# ~/.codex, ~/.cursor) are bind-mounted from the host instead. A bind mount
# completely hides the image-side ownership, so those paths need no chown here.
RUN mkdir -p \
/home/${USERNAME}/.npm \
/home/${USERNAME}/.local/bin \
/commandhistory \
&& chown -R ${USERNAME}:${USERNAME} \
/home/${USERNAME}/.npm \
/home/${USERNAME}/.local \
/commandhistory
USER ${USERNAME}
# Install Claude Code via the official native installer. Downloads the latest
# self-contained binary for the running platform and places it at
# ~/.local/bin/claude — no Node.js runtime dependency, no version to pin.
RUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash
# Install the Codex CLI globally via npm. No version pinned — @latest at build
# time. (Codex has no native binary installer; npm is the canonical method.)
RUN npm install -g @openai/codex
# Install the Cursor agent CLI via the official install script. Downloads the
# latest agent-cli-package for the running platform and places `cursor-agent`
# and `agent` into ~/.local/bin — no version or hash to pin.
RUN curl -fsSL https://cursor.com/install | bash
# Install Bun via the official remote installer, pinned by version. The first
# positional arg to `bash` is the release tag (`bun-vX.Y.Z`), so a specific
# version is fetched even though the install script itself is downloaded fresh
# on every build. NOTE: this is the ONE remote script we run unverified in
# this image — Cursor and the base image are pinned by sha256/digest. Hardening
# path: switch to a pinned tarball + per-arch sha256 in the Cursor style
# (artifacts at github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases). `BUN_INSTALL` is set in ENV
# above so the binary lands at a known path regardless of any rc-file edits
# the installer makes (which we ignore — we own the shell rc files).
RUN set -eux; \
curl -fsSL --retry 3 --max-time 120 https://bun.sh/install \
| bash -s "bun-v${BUN_VERSION}"; \
test -x "${BUN_INSTALL}/bin/bun"
# Put ~/.local/bin and Bun's bin dir on PATH for interactive shells and
# lifecycle scripts. ~/.local/bin is where Cursor's installer drops the `agent`
# and `cursor-agent` symlinks; ${BUN_INSTALL}/bin is where the Bun installer
# drops `bun` / `bunx`.
ENV PATH=/home/${USERNAME}/.local/bin:${BUN_INSTALL}/bin:${PATH}
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# GitNexus Devcontainer
A cross-platform Dev Container that pre-installs Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI, Cursor CLI, and Bun alongside the GitNexus native build chain. Supported hosts: **macOS, Linux, Windows 11 (native), and Windows 11 via WSL2.** Windows-native needs a **one-time `HOME` env var setup** — handled automatically by the `initializeCommand` on first run (see [Windows 11 setup](#windows-11-setup)).
> ### ⚠️ Read this before using it on a work machine
>
> This devcontainer **does not write to your host AI-CLI config.** Your skills, agents, commands, plugins, memory, prompts, and rules are **copied once** from a read-only host stage into a per-container volume on first create; the container edits its own copy and can never write back. So a compromised workspace dependency running in the container **cannot** drop a malicious agent, command, skill, or plugin onto your host for your next host CLI session to load — the write-through vector earlier versions had is closed. Your **credentials** (Claude/Codex/Cursor logins, plus `gh`) likewise stay in per-container volumes and are never written back, and `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.azure`, and `~/.docker` are mounted **read-only**.
>
> What is **still** exposed: the read-only host stages (`/host/.claude`, `/host/.codex`, `/host/.cursor`, `/host/.claude-mem`) and the read-only credential mounts are all **readable** inside the container. A compromised dependency can therefore READ your host CLI config, memory, SSH/cloud credentials, and GitHub token — and there is **no egress firewall yet**, so it has the network to exfiltrate what it reads. Read-only protects you from tampering and write-back, not from disclosure.
>
> The trade-off of the copy model: host and container config **diverge after first create.** A skill or plugin you add on the host later won't appear in the container until you wipe the config volume and rebuild (see [§ Rebuild / reset](#rebuild--reset)). Edits you make inside the container persist across rebuilds but never reach the host.
**Contents:** [Quick start](#quick-start) · [Windows 11 setup](#windows-11-setup) · [macOS](#macos) · [Linux](#linux) · [How CLI state flows from your host](#how-cli-state-flows-from-your-host) · [Session resume](#session-resume-across-container-recreation) · [Trust boundary](#trust-boundary-concretely) · [First-time CLI authentication](#first-time-cli-authentication) · [API key auth](#alternative-api-key-authentication-ci--headless) · [Port forwarding](#port-forwarding) · [Known gotchas](#known-gotchas) · [Rebuild / reset](#rebuild--reset) · [Bumping CLI versions](#bumping-cli-versions) · [What's not included (yet)](#whats-not-included-yet) · [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
## Quick start
1. Install [Docker Desktop](https://docs.docker.com/desktop/) (Windows/macOS) or Docker Engine (Linux).
2. Install [VS Code](https://code.visualstudio.com/) with the [Dev Containers extension](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=ms-vscode-remote.remote-containers).
3. Install [Node.js](https://nodejs.org/) on the **host** (Node 18+). This is the only host-side toolchain dependency beyond Docker and VS Code — the devcontainer's `initializeCommand` runs `node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` to set up the bind-mount source directories before container create. If you already use Claude Code or another Node-based CLI on the host, you're already set.
4. Open the repo in VS Code → Command Palette → **Dev Containers: Reopen in Container**.
5. Wait for the first build (~3–6 minutes) and `postCreateCommand` to finish installing workspace dependencies.
6. Authenticate the three CLIs once — see [First-time CLI authentication](#first-time-cli-authentication) below.
## Windows 11 setup
### Windows-native (one-time setup, then "just works")
The host bind mounts use `${localEnv:HOME}/.claude` (and `.codex`, `.cursor`, `.ssh`, `.config/git`, `.config/gh`, `.gitconfig`). VS Code resolves `${localEnv:HOME}` by reading its own process env, and Windows doesn't set `HOME` by default — it uses `USERPROFILE`. So the bind mounts can't resolve until you tell Windows to also expose your profile as `HOME`.
The `initializeCommand` (`node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`) handles this automatically:
1. **First time you Reopen in Container**, the script detects the missing `HOME`, runs `setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"` (which writes to your user-level Windows env — no admin needed), prints a one-time setup banner, and exits.
2. **Close all VS Code windows** (File → Exit) and reopen. VS Code picks up the new `HOME` at startup.
3. **Reopen in Container again.** The script now sees `HOME=C:\Users\<you>`, skips the setup block, creates the bind-mount source dirs, and Docker brings the container up.
Subsequent rebuilds work normally with no extra steps. The `HOME` env var is set persistently in your Windows user environment, so it'll be there for every future VS Code session (and any other tool that wants `HOME`).
If you'd rather set it manually before opening the container:
```powershell
setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"
# Close & reopen VS Code
```
### Known trade-offs of Windows-native vs WSL2
Windows-native works, but Docker Desktop's Windows bind-mount layer has rough edges that WSL2 avoids:
- **File watchers can miss events.** Vite / jest `--watch` running inside the container watching workspace files mounted from `D:\...` may miss changes — chokidar polling (`CHOKIDAR_USEPOLLING=true`) is the usual workaround.
- **`npm install` is 3-5× slower** through the Windows-to-Linux bind-mount translation than on a WSL2-native filesystem.
- **Permission edge cases.** The husky `.husky/_/h` EPERM class we hit earlier in this PR is specific to Windows-side bind mounts changing UID ownership between container runs. `post-create.sh` clears the cache defensively to keep this from being fatal, but it's still a real source of friction.
If you hit any of those and want to migrate to WSL2 later, the steps are below.
### WSL2 (faster, fewer edge cases)
To clone and open the repo inside WSL2:
```bash
# 1. Install WSL2 and a Linux distro if you haven't already.
wsl --install -d Ubuntu
# 2. Enter WSL.
wsl
# 3. Clone the repo inside your WSL2 home directory.
cd ~
git clone https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus.git
cd GitNexus
# 4. Launch VS Code from inside WSL — this opens VS Code attached to the WSL2
# filesystem, so `${localEnv:HOME}` resolves to the WSL user's home and
# subsequent "Reopen in Container" uses the WSL2-side path.
code .
```
Then run **Dev Containers: Reopen in Container**. The workspace will be bind-mounted from `\\wsl$\Ubuntu\home\<user>\GitNexus`, which is fast and gives reliable file-system events. **Make sure Docker Desktop's WSL integration is enabled** for your distro: Docker Desktop → Settings → Resources → WSL Integration → toggle on the distro you cloned into.
## macOS
Open the repo folder in VS Code → **Reopen in Container**. The image is multi-arch; on Apple Silicon you'll pull the `linux/arm64` variant automatically.
## Linux
Same as macOS — open in VS Code and reopen in container. `updateRemoteUserUID: true` (default) shifts the container's `node` user UID/GID to match your host user, so bind-mounted files stay writable without extra setup.
## How CLI state flows from your host
### AI CLIs (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor): copy-once from a read-only host stage + per-container credentials
The three AI CLIs use a **copy-from-read-only-stage topology**: the host's `~/.<cli>` folders (and `~/.claude-mem`) are mounted **read-only** at `/host/.<cli>`, and `post-create.sh` copies out of them into per-container named volumes. Credentials, identity, and single config files are copied on **every** create; the shareable subdirs (plugins, skills, agents, memory, commands, prompts, rules) are copied **once** on first create and then owned by the container. Nothing is bind-mounted read-write into the host's CLI config, so the container can never modify your host setup. Session sub-paths overlay the config volume via their own named volumes (Docker mount precedence — more specific path wins).
| Mount | Source | Target | Mode | Purpose |
| -------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Container Claude config dir | _named volume_ `claude-config-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.claude` | rw | Per-container credentials + identity |
| Container Codex config dir | _named volume_ `codex-config-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.codex` | rw | Per-container credentials |
| Container Cursor config dir | _named volume_ `cursor-config-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.cursor` | rw | Per-container credentials |
| Container gh config dir | _named volume_ `gh-config-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.config/gh` | rw | Per-container `gh` auth (`hosts.yml`/`config.yml`) seeded from host stage; in-container login persists |
| **Claude sessions** (overlay on the config volume) | _named volume_ `…-claude-sessions-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.claude/projects` | rw | `--resume` transcripts; survives the `<cli>-config` volume wipe — see [Session resume](#session-resume-across-container-recreation) |
| **Codex sessions** | _named volume_ `…-codex-sessions-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.codex/sessions` | rw | `codex resume` rollouts; SQLite index backfills on recreation |
| **Cursor sessions** | _named volumes_ `…-cursor-sessions-${devcontainerId}`, `…-cursor-projects-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.cursor/chats`, `/home/node/.cursor/projects` | rw | `cursor-agent resume` store (best-effort — layout reverse-engineered) |
| **claude-mem store** | _named volume_ `claude-mem-${devcontainerId}` | `/home/node/.claude-mem` | rw | claude-mem's SQLite DB + Chroma vector store; **seeded once** from `/host/.claude-mem`, then container-private — see note below |
| Host Claude state, read-only stage | `$HOME/.claude` | `/host/.claude` | **read-only** | `post-create.sh` reads credentials + identity from here on container-create |
| claude-mem store, read-only stage | `$HOME/.claude-mem` | `/host/.claude-mem` | **read-only** | `post-create.sh` seeds the claude-mem volume from here on first create |
| Host Codex state, read-only stage | `$HOME/.codex` | `/host/.codex` | **read-only** | Same purpose for Codex |
| Host Cursor state, read-only stage | `$HOME/.cursor` | `/host/.cursor` | **read-only** | Same purpose for Cursor |
| **Claude shareable subdirs** | _seeded into the config volume from_ `$HOME/.claude/{plugins/marketplaces,plugins/cache,skills,agents,memory,commands}` | same under `/home/node/.claude/` | n/a (copy) | **Seed-once** copy from the read-only stage; container owns its copy after |
| **Codex shareable subdirs** | _seeded from_ `$HOME/.codex/{plugins,prompts,memories,skills}` | same under `/home/node/.codex/` | n/a (copy) | **Seed-once** copy (whole `plugins/` dir — no path-bearing registry inside it) |
| **Cursor shareable subdirs** | _seeded from_ `$HOME/.cursor/{plugins/marketplaces,plugins/local,rules,commands,agents,skills}` | same under `/home/node/.cursor/` | n/a (copy) | **Seed-once** copy of the Cursor 2.5 plugin/rules/commands surface |
**What gets seeded once from the host (copy, not bind):**
- **Claude**: `plugins/marketplaces`, `plugins/cache`, `skills/`, `agents/`, `memory/`, `commands/`
- **Codex**: `plugins/` (whole dir), `prompts/`, `memories/`, `skills/`
- **Cursor**: `plugins/marketplaces`, `plugins/local`, `rules/`, `commands/`, `agents/`, `skills/`
On the **first** container-create, `post-create.sh` copies each of these out of the read-only `/host/.<cli>` stage into the per-container config volume, then writes a `.devcontainer-shareable-seeded` marker. On every later rebuild the marker is present, so the copy is skipped and the container keeps whatever it has accumulated. A plugin/skill/agent you install **inside** the container persists across rebuilds; one you add on the **host** after first create won't appear in the container until you remove the config volume and rebuild (see [§ Rebuild / reset](#rebuild--reset)). Nothing here is writable back to the host — `/plugin marketplace add` inside the container installs into the container's own volume copy, not your host `~/.<cli>/plugins/`.
**Single config files are copied on container-create, not bind-mounted** — on Docker Desktop Windows a single-file bind is 9p while the named volume is ext4, and atomic config writes (`tmp` → rename onto target) trip EXDEV (this is what caused Codex's `config/batchWrite failed in TUI`). So these are synced from host on rebuild and the container rewrites its own copy until the next rebuild: `settings.json` + `$HOME/.claude.json` (Claude), `config.toml` (Codex), `cli-config.json` + `mcp.json` (Cursor). `hooks.json` (Cursor) is deliberately **not** synced — Cursor hooks execute shell commands, so sharing them would widen the supply-chain attack surface; add it yourself if you want it.
**Plugin registry files with absolute paths are translated, not copied verbatim** — Claude's `known_marketplaces.json` / `installed_plugins.json` / `plugin-catalog-cache.json` and Cursor's `installed_plugins.json` bake in `C:\Users\…` (Windows) or `/Users/…` (macOS) install paths. `post-create.sh` rewrites those to `/home/node/.<cli>/plugins/…` and writes the result into the named volume, so plugins resolve inside Linux instead of failing with `cache-miss`. This translation is **also seed-once per CLI** — it runs only for a CLI being seeded that create (`translate-plugin-registries.cjs claude cursor`), so it stays consistent with the seed-once `cache/` copy and won't overwrite a plugin you installed inside the container on a later rebuild. Codex needs no translation — its enablement registry is `config.toml` (git URLs + logical keys, no filesystem paths), so its whole `plugins/` dir is copied as-is.
**What stays per-container (in the named volume) and is synced from host on container-create:**
- `.credentials.json` (Claude OAuth tokens), `auth.json` (Codex), `cli-config.json` (Cursor) — credentials
- `~/.claude/.claude.json` (Claude's identity-only file: `userID`, `oauthAccount`, migration tracking) — kept per-container so logging in via container doesn't overwrite host's stored identity
`post-create.sh` runs on every container-create, copies host's credentials into the volume if present, then container manages refresh from there. Sync is "always overwrite if host has the file, otherwise leave container alone". So:
- Host has credentials → container starts logged in.
- Host has no credentials → `claude login` / `codex login --device-auth` / `cursor-agent login` inside container; credentials stay in the named volume across rebuilds (volume is keyed by `${devcontainerId}`, stable for the workspace path).
- `claude logout` inside container clears volume credentials only; host is untouched.
**Why CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is intentionally NOT set:** Claude's default `~/.claude` matches the named-volume mount target, so the env var added no behavior — but setting it changed which file Claude reads `hasCompletedOnboarding` from. With it set, Claude reads `$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json` (the small identity-only file) and re-onboards every container; without it, Claude reads `$HOME/.claude.json` (copied from the read-only `/host/.claude.json` stage on container-create via `seed-claude-config.cjs`, with `hasCompletedOnboarding: true`).
**Host CLI config is protected from write-through.** The shareable dirs are copied out of a **read-only** stage into the container's own volume, so a compromised npm package in the workspace dep tree — running inside the container — **cannot** write a malicious agent, command, skill, or plugin back to `~/.claude/`, `~/.codex/`, or `~/.cursor/` on the host. The earlier design bind-mounted these read-write and accepted that write-through as the cost of live sync; this design closes it. An even earlier alternative (read-only stage + symlinks) made `/plugin marketplace add` inside the container fail with EROFS; copying into a writable volume avoids that, because the container writes to its own copy rather than a read-only mount. What a compromised dependency can still do is **read** the read-only host stages (`/host/.<cli>`, `/host/.claude-mem`) and the read-only credential mounts and exfiltrate them — there is [no egress firewall yet](#whats-not-included-yet). The cost of the copy model is **divergence**: host edits made after first create don't reach the container until you wipe the config volume and rebuild.
**Refresh-token divergence between rebuilds.** Container's credentials match host's at container-create time; after that, container manages its own refresh until the next rebuild. Anthropic rotates refresh tokens on every use, so an unattended container that hasn't talked to the API in weeks can hit a silent 401 if the host has refreshed since. Re-run `claude login` inside the container, or rebuild, to recover.
**claude-mem is seeded once, then container-private.** The [claude-mem](https://github.com/thedotmack/claude-mem) store (`$HOME/.claude-mem` — a multi-GB SQLite DB `claude-mem.db` + `-wal`/`-shm`, plus a Chroma vector store `chroma/chroma.sqlite3` and its HNSW index binaries) is the one shareable-looking folder that is **deliberately not a host bind**, for the same SQLite reason as sessions below: a multi-GB WAL database over the 9p/virtiofs bind risks unreliable `fcntl` locking and corruption — sharply so if claude-mem ran on the host and in the container against the same DB at once. So it gets its own per-container named volume (`claude-mem-${devcontainerId}`), and `post-create.sh` **seeds it once** from the read-only `/host/.claude-mem` stage _only when the volume has no DB yet_. The first container-create copies the host's store in (a one-time copy, possibly several GB); every later rebuild keeps whatever the container accumulated and skips the copy. The container's memory and the host's **diverge from that seed point** — writes do not flow back — which is the price of keeping SQLite off a shared bind. To re-seed from the host's current store, remove the volume (`docker volume rm claude-mem-<id>`) and rebuild. `ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs` creates an empty `~/.claude-mem` on hosts that never installed claude-mem, so the read-only stage bind always resolves; the seed then finds no DB and the container simply starts with empty memory.
### Session resume across container recreation
`claude --resume`, `codex resume`, and `cursor-agent resume` all read **local** transcript files. Those live _inside_ each CLI's config dir, which is a per-container named volume — so they already survive an ordinary **Rebuild Container**. What they did _not_ survive were the very things this README tells you to do: `docker volume rm <cli>-config-${devcontainerId}` to force a re-login or clear an `EACCES`, a `${devcontainerId}` change, or a full delete-and-recreate. Each of those drops the config volume and takes your session history with it.
So the resume/transcript directories get their **own** named volumes (mount group 6 in `devcontainer.json`), keyed like the `node_modules` volumes (`${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-…-${devcontainerId}`) and mounted _over_ the config volume at the session sub-paths:
| Resume command | Persisted volume → target | What's stored |
| -------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `claude --resume` / `--continue` | `…-claude-sessions-…` → `~/.claude/projects` | `<encoded-cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl` transcripts + `sessions-index.json`. Container cwd is always `/workspace`, so only that slice is stored. Pure JSONL/JSON — no SQLite. |
| `codex resume` / `resume --last` | `…-codex-sessions-…` → `~/.codex/sessions` | `YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*.jsonl`. The `state_5.sqlite` thread index stays on the config volume (a single WAL file we don't split out); when it's absent after a recreation, Codex rebuilds it from these rollouts on the next start (a one-time backfill). |
| `cursor-agent resume` / `ls` | `…-cursor-sessions-…` → `~/.cursor/chats`; `…-cursor-projects-…` → `~/.cursor/projects` | `chats/{hash}/{uuid}/store.db` (one SQLite db per session, each in its own dir) + `projects/.../agent-transcripts`. cursor-agent's layout is reverse-engineered, so treat this as best-effort. |
Because these are **separate** volumes from `<cli>-config-${devcontainerId}`, the re-login fix (`docker volume rm claude-config-…`) no longer destroys your sessions — that was the point.
**Survives:** Rebuild Container, Rebuild Without Cache, a full delete-and-recreate of the container, and the `docker volume rm <cli>-config-…` re-login / `EACCES` fix.
**Does _not_ survive** (same durability tier as the `node_modules` volumes): `docker volume prune`, a `${devcontainerId}` change (moving the checkout to a new path, or switching between Windows-native and WSL2), or moving to a new machine. To deliberately wipe sessions, remove the session volumes too — see [Rebuild / reset](#rebuild--reset). Two checkouts with the **same folder name** on one host would share session volumes only if they also share a `${devcontainerId}`; they don't, so they stay separate.
**First rebuild after adopting this, one-time:** if a container created _before_ these volumes existed already had sessions on the config volume (`~/.claude/projects`, `~/.codex/sessions`, …), the new empty session volume mounts _over_ that sub-path and **masks** the old content — same Docker-precedence shadowing described for plugins above. The old sessions are hidden, not deleted. To carry them forward once, copy them out of the config volume into the session volume; or just start fresh — new sessions land on the session volume from then on.
**Why sessions are container-private and not even seeded from the host.** The shareable config dirs are _seeded once_ from the host (you want your skills/agents/plugins in the container). Sessions are deliberately _not_ seeded and never touch the host, because a transcript can contain anything you pasted or the agent read — API keys, file contents, connection strings. Binding or copying them to/from the host would (a) spill that to host disk, (b) add a write-through surface a compromised dependency can reach (there's still [no egress firewall](#whats-not-included-yet)), and (c) leak _every other project's_ transcripts into the container (Codex `sessions/` and Cursor `chats/` aren't project-scoped). Container-private volumes avoid all three while still surviving recreation. And Claude/Codex transcripts embed the container cwd (`/workspace`), so even if you _did_ bind them to the host, the host CLI wouldn't natively `--resume` them — its encoded-cwd folder differs.
**Opt in to host-shared sessions anyway.** If you want transcripts visible/portable on the host and accept the trade-offs above, uncomment the host-bind block in `devcontainer.json` (just below the group-6 volumes) and add the matching source dirs to `ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`'s `DIRS` so Docker can resolve the binds. That block scopes Claude to `/workspace`'s encoded subdir to limit the cross-project leak; the Codex and Cursor stores can't be scoped that way, so they expose every project's transcripts.
### Other host bind mounts
| Container path | Host source | Mode | Why |
| --------------- | ------------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `~/.config/git` | `$HOME/.config/git` | **read-only** | XDG-style git config / ignore / attributes |
| `~/.ssh` | `$HOME/.ssh` | **read-only** | SSH commit signing + git push over SSH |
| `~/.config/gh` | `$HOME/.config/gh` | **copy → volume** | `gh` CLI auth (PR/issue create, checks) — seeded from your host login on create into a per-container volume; in-container `gh auth login` persists across rebuilds and never writes back to the host |
| `~/.docker` | `$HOME/.docker` | **read-only** | Container registry auth + buildx config (inert until you add Docker CLI via a Feature) |
| `~/.aws` | `$HOME/.aws` | **read-only** | AWS CLI / SDK credentials (forward-compat — empty by default) |
| `~/.azure` | `$HOME/.azure` | **read-only** | Azure CLI credentials (forward-compat — empty by default) |
**Why `ssh`/`aws`/`azure`/`docker` are read-only, and why `gh` is copied into a volume:** `ssh`/`aws`/`azure` are consumed read-only by their clients (the SSH client and the AWS/Azure SDKs only read their credential files), so a one-way mount loses nothing. `docker` _can_ write its own state (`docker login` / buildx write `config.json`), but a read-write host bind would let a compromised in-container dependency rewrite your host `~/.docker/config.json` (point a `credHelper` at an attacker-controlled binary) — a credential-takeover vector. The common case is _reading_ an existing host login, so `docker` stays **read-only**: registry pulls/pushes using your host creds work, only a `docker login` inside the container won't persist back. `gh` used to be read-only for the same reason, but that meant an in-container `gh auth login` had nowhere to write and silently failed. So `gh` now uses the **copy-into-volume** model (the same one the AI-CLI credentials use): the host `~/.config/gh` is a read-only _stage_ at `/host/.config/gh`, and `post-create.sh` copies `hosts.yml`/`config.yml` out of it into the per-container `gh-config` volume on create. The container gets a **writable** copy — `gh auth login` / `gh auth refresh` inside the container now work and persist across rebuilds — while the read-only stage guarantees nothing is ever written back to the host's token. If you want `docker` to behave the same way, give it the same treatment (a `/host/.docker` stage + a docker-config volume + a copy step in `post-create.sh`).
`~/.gitconfig` is **not** bind-mounted — VS Code's Dev Containers extension auto-copies the host's gitconfig into the container at attach time (this is built-in behavior, not something this devcontainer configures). The bind-mount approach conflicts with that auto-copy mechanism, so we let VS Code own it. The end result is the same: your host's `user.name` / `user.email` are available inside the container.
If a host source dir doesn't exist when the container is first created, the `initializeCommand` (`node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`) creates it empty — so the bind mount always has a valid source.
### Per-CLI quirks worth knowing
- **Claude Code on macOS** stores credentials in the system Keychain, not in `~/.claude/.credentials.json`. The sync silently no-ops; run `claude login` inside the container once and the named volume persists it.
- **Codex on macOS / Linux with `cli_auth_credentials_store = "keyring"`** stores auth in the OS keyring (Keychain / Secret Service), so `~/.codex/auth.json` may not exist on host. Same fallback: `codex login --device-auth` inside the container.
- **Cursor CLI inside containers** has [known upstream auth issues](https://forum.cursor.com/t/cursor-agent-authentication-issue-inside-docker/143995) — even with a correctly-synced `cli-config.json`, you may need to re-run `cursor-agent login` inside the container.
- **Stale named volumes from old rebuilds can carry forward.** If you delete and re-create the same workspace, or if a prior container left interim state with a different `userID`, deleting the named volumes before rebuild guarantees a clean sync: `docker volume rm claude-config-${devcontainerId} codex-config-${devcontainerId} cursor-config-${devcontainerId}` (look them up with `docker volume ls | grep -config-`).
- **User-scope MCP servers with absolute host paths won't resolve in-container.** `~/.claude.json` (Claude), `~/.codex/config.toml` (Codex), and `~/.cursor/mcp.json` (Cursor) are copied from host on container-create, so their user-scope `mcpServers` entries come along. But an entry whose `command` is an absolute host path (`C:\tools\foo.exe`, `/usr/local/bin/foo`) points at a binary that doesn't exist in the container — that server silently fails to launch. Only registry/`npx`-based servers (like this repo's `.mcp.json`, which uses `npx -y gitnexus@latest mcp`) and remote/URL servers work unchanged. The path-translation pass only rewrites `*/.​<cli>/plugins/*` registry paths, **not** arbitrary `mcpServers` command paths (there's no correct container target for a host-local binary). Install such MCP servers inside the container, or use `npx`/remote ones.
- **Host config is seeded once per devcontainer, then diverges — this now applies to everything.** A `mcpServers` entry, setting, plugin, skill, agent, or command you add **on the host after** the container was created is not visible in the container until you remove the config volume and rebuild. Single config files (`mcpServers`, `settings.json`, …) are copy-on-create; the shareable dirs (plugins/skills/agents/memory/commands/prompts/rules) are copy-on-**first**-create (they persist across ordinary rebuilds and aren't even re-copied). Both diverge from the host after their copy. To pull host-side changes in, wipe the relevant volume and rebuild (see [§ Rebuild / reset](#rebuild--reset)).
- **Plugins/skills/agents installed in-container persist; they do not reach the host.** A `/plugin marketplace add` (or `codex plugin add`, or a new skill/agent) inside the container writes to the container's own config volume and survives ordinary rebuilds. It never appears on the host — the host dirs are read-only sources, not bind targets. To get a plugin onto the host, install it on the host (then wipe + rebuild to seed it into the container).
- **No cross-checkout plugin contention.** Because each container copies plugins into its own per-`${devcontainerId}` volume rather than sharing one host bind source, two containers (or checkouts) installing plugins at the same time no longer interleave git clones/extractions against a shared host dir. Each writes only its own copy.
### What you still don't have inside the container
These are commonly-needed CLIs that aren't installed by default — adding them would be follow-up work, not in this PR's scope:
- **Docker CLI** (for `docker push` / `docker build` from inside the container). Add via `ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/docker-outside-of-docker:1` to the `features` block — `~/.docker/` is already mounted **read-only**, so your host `docker login` state works immediately for pulls/pushes; an in-container `docker login` won't persist to the host (drop `,readonly` on that mount if you need it to).
- **AWS CLI / Azure CLI / gcloud / kubectl** — same pattern: add the matching Feature, the host config dirs already flow through.
- **Private npm registry auth** (`~/.npmrc`) — you don't have a global one on this host. If you ever start using private packages, add `source=${localEnv:HOME}/.npmrc,target=/home/node/.npmrc,type=bind,readonly` to the mounts.
That means:
- **Authentication is shared.** If you're already logged in on the host (`claude login`, `codex login`, `cursor-agent login`, `gh auth login`), you're already logged in inside the container. No second login step.
- **Plugins, skills, agents, memory, and commands are seeded from the host once, then container-private.** On first create the container copies your host's plugins/skills/agents/memory/commands (and Codex prompts/memories, Cursor rules) into its own volume. After that they're independent: install or edit inside the container and it stays in the container (persists across rebuilds); add a plugin or agent on the host and the container won't see it until you wipe the config volume and rebuild. Nothing the container does reaches the host. (`settings.json` and the user-scope `~/.claude.json` are copy-on-create the same way; `~/.claude/projects/` is container-local by design.)
- **Git identity comes from the host.** Commits from inside the container use your host's `user.name` / `user.email` — VS Code's Dev Containers extension auto-copies your `~/.gitconfig` into the container at attach time. Any XDG-style config under `~/.config/git/` flows through via the read-only bind mount. To change git identity, edit `~/.gitconfig` on the host (container-side `git config --global` writes to a container-local file that's discarded on rebuild).
- **SSH keys flow through (read-only).** Push over SSH remotes and SSH commit signing work inside the container using your host keys. The mount is read-only so container code can't exfiltrate or modify private keys — agent-perspective, this means you get git operations but the keys stay vendor-side.
- **`gh` auth is shared, and in-container logins persist.** If you're logged in on the host, `gh pr create`, `gh pr checks`, `gh issue create` work inside the container without re-authenticating. If you're not, run `gh auth login` inside the container once — because `gh` config lives in a writable per-container volume (seeded from the host stage), that login persists across rebuilds and never touches the host's token.
- **No per-workspace duplication.** All your devcontainers across all your projects see the same host CLI state, just like all your host shells do.
The bind mount source directories are guaranteed to exist by the `initializeCommand` (`node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs`), which runs on the host before container create. It's a Node script (not a shell one-liner) so the same command works on Windows `cmd.exe` and POSIX shells. It creates the top-level bind-mount source dirs — `~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, `~/.cursor`, `~/.claude-mem`, plus `~/.ssh`, `~/.docker`, `~/.aws`, `~/.azure`, `~/.config/{gh,git}`. It deliberately does **not** pre-create the shareable subdirs (skills/agents/plugins/…): those are no longer bind sources (they're copied out of the whole-`~/.<cli>` read-only stage), and pre-creating empty ones would needlessly write into the host of someone who never used that CLI.
### Trust boundary, concretely
Host and container share a single trust boundary by design — fine for personal-dev, but the consequence is concrete. Any malicious npm package or `postinstall` script in the workspace dep tree, running inside the container, has direct **read** access to:
- **Host AI CLI state** — the read-only stage at `/host/.claude`, `/host/.codex`, `/host/.cursor`, `/host/.claude-mem`, which exposes your **entire** host `~/.<cli>` tree (credentials, identity, AND the shareable skills/agents/plugins/memory/commands) for _reading_. The container copies what it needs out of this stage; a compromised dep can read all of it. It is read-only, so none of it can be written back
- The **container's own credential snapshots** at `/home/node/.claude/.credentials.json` etc. (copied from host on container-create)
- `~/.claude/memory/` / per-project memory (which may contain user-stored secrets if you've used the `/remember` skill)
- The **current container's own session transcripts** (`~/.claude/projects`, `~/.codex/sessions`, `~/.cursor/chats`/`projects` — the group-6 volumes), which can hold anything pasted into or read during a session. These are container-private (see one-way note below), so this is read access to _this_ container's sessions only, not the host's or other projects'
- Your **`gh` token** (`~/.config/gh`)
- Your **SSH private keys** (`~/.ssh/`)
- Docker registry tokens in **`~/.docker/config.json`** (if you've `docker login`-ed)
- AWS/Azure CLI credentials if you've populated `~/.aws/` or `~/.azure/`
It does **not** have write-through to the host's CLI config. The shareable dirs are copied out of the read-only stage into the container's own volume, so a compromised in-container dep **cannot** write into your host `~/.claude/{plugins,agents,skills,commands,memory}/`, `~/.codex/{plugins,prompts,memories,skills}/`, or `~/.cursor/{plugins,rules,commands,agents,skills}/`. The persistence vector earlier versions had — drop a malicious auto-loaded agent/command/skill/rule onto the host, have it run in your next **host** session — is closed: there is no writable path from the container to those host folders. (Cursor's `hooks.json` is still additionally withheld from even the _container's_ copy, because hooks fire without an agent invoking them.) The boundary is now one-way for **all** of the host CLI config, not just credentials.
**What stays one-way (genuinely protected):** everything. Credentials never flow back to host — `.credentials.json` / `auth.json` / `cli-config.json` live only in the per-container named volumes, and the `/host/.<cli>` stage they're copied from is mounted **read-only**, so the snapshot can't be overwritten back. The shareable AI-CLI dirs (skills/agents/plugins/memory/commands/prompts/rules) are now copy-on-create from that same read-only stage, so they have the one-way property too — readable for the copy, never writable back. `~/.ssh`, `~/.config/git`, `~/.aws`, `~/.azure`, and **`~/.docker`** are read-only binds with the same property — a compromised dep can _read_ your registry tokens but cannot _rewrite_ them to hijack your future host auth. **`~/.config/gh`** is now a read-only _stage_ copied into a per-container volume, so it keeps that same one-way property: the container reads it once to seed its own writable copy, and the read-only stage means an in-container `gh auth login` can never overwrite your host token. **Session transcripts** live in per-workspace named volumes (mount group 6) and are never seeded from or written back to the host, and the container can't see any _other_ project's transcripts. The opt-in host-bind block in `devcontainer.json` reverses that for sessions only — enable it only if you accept transcripts on host disk; see [Session resume across container recreation](#session-resume-across-container-recreation).
**The egress firewall is the key compensating control that is still missing.** It's deferred (see "What's not included (yet)" below), so a compromised package currently has unrestricted outbound network to exfiltrate anything in the read list above. Until it lands, treat that read surface as exposed to any code you run in the container — don't use this devcontainer on a machine whose host credentials you couldn't afford to rotate. The isolated-volume setup below removes host AI-CLI config/credentials from that surface entirely.
**If a workspace dep is ever found compromised**, rotate credentials at the vendor side — local file deletion is insufficient because tokens may have already left:
- Anthropic: [console.anthropic.com → Settings → Keys](https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys), revoke the OAuth session under Account
- OpenAI / Codex: [platform.openai.com/api-keys](https://platform.openai.com/api-keys), revoke session under Profile
- Cursor: dashboard → Integrations, rotate API key + revoke CLI session
- GitHub: `gh auth refresh` or revoke the token at github.com/settings/tokens
For high-trust enterprise environments where the container should not even be able to **read** host CLI state, remove the three read-only stage binds (`/host/.claude`, `/host/.codex`, `/host/.cursor`) — plus `/host/.claude-mem` and `/host/.claude.json` — from `.devcontainer/devcontainer.json`. With no stage to copy from, `post-create.sh`'s seed and credential-sync steps quietly do nothing (their `[ -f ]` / `[ -d ]` guards), and each devcontainer starts with empty, fully isolated config and credentials (Anthropic's reference pattern). You give up seeding your host setup into the container in exchange for removing host config/credentials from the container's read surface entirely; log in inside each container instead.
## First-time CLI authentication
Each CLI works either way:
- **Log in on host first** → the container picks it up automatically on the next rebuild (`sync_from_host` copies the credential file into the named volume during `post-create.sh`). Host stays the source of truth.
- **Log in inside the container** → credentials write to the named volume. They persist across ordinary rebuilds (volume is keyed by `${devcontainerId}`, which is stable for a given workspace folder). The host's credentials are untouched.
You can mix and match per-CLI. A common setup is "Claude logged in on host, Codex/Cursor logged in inside container".
### Claude Code
```bash
claude login
```
Opens a browser auth flow. VS Code's port forwarding handles the OAuth callback automatically. After auth, `~/.claude/` is populated and visible from both host and container. The `DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1` env var prevents the in-container CLI from auto-updating — rebuild the container to pick up a newer Claude Code.
### OpenAI Codex CLI
```bash
codex login --device-auth
```
The device-code flow prints a URL and a one-time code. Visit the URL on your host browser, paste the code, and the CLI authenticates without needing a callback listener — this is the most reliable path inside containers. Credentials land in `~/.codex/auth.json` (shared with host).
`codex login` (browser-callback variant) also works but can be flaky in some headless contexts; prefer `--device-auth`.
### Cursor CLI
```bash
cursor-agent login
```
Opens a browser auth flow; VS Code's port forwarding handles the callback. Credentials persist in `~/.cursor/cli-config.json` (shared with host).
Verify any time with `cursor-agent status`.
## Alternative: API key authentication (CI / headless)
For non-interactive use (CI runners, automated scripts), all three CLIs accept API keys via env vars:
| CLI | Env var | Where to get the key |
| ----------- | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
| Claude Code | `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | <https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys> |
| Codex | `OPENAI_API_KEY` | <https://platform.openai.com/api-keys> |
| Cursor | `CURSOR_API_KEY` | Cursor dashboard → Integrations |
These env vars are intentionally **not** injected into the container from the host. `${localEnv:VAR}` resolves an unset host variable to an empty string, and some CLIs (Cursor in particular) treat a set-but-empty key as "use this key" rather than "fall back to stored login" — which would silently break the login flow for everyone who hasn't pre-set the host var.
To use an API key inside the container, export it in your terminal session:
```bash
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
# or OPENAI_API_KEY, or CURSOR_API_KEY
```
For persistence across container shells, carry the export via your VS Code [dotfiles repository](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/devcontainers/containers#_personalizing-with-dotfile-repositories). VS Code clones the dotfiles repo into the container on attach and runs your install command, so the export lands in `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` per your own setup — and your API keys stay out of this repo's committed `devcontainer.json`.
A non-empty API key env var takes precedence over stored login credentials for each CLI.
## Port forwarding
| Port | Service | Notes |
| ------ | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `5173` | Vite dev server (`gitnexus-web`) | Auto-forwarded with notification |
| `4747` | `gitnexus serve` HTTP API | **Must not be remapped** — `gitnexus-web` hardcodes `http://localhost:4747` as the default backend URL |
| `4173` | Static web (Vite preview) | Silently forwarded |
VS Code's Ports panel shows forwarded ports once their listener starts.
## Known gotchas
- **LadybugDB integration tests may fail in containers** (file-locking, `AGENTS.md` § Testing). Default to `npm run test:unit` inside the container; run integration tests on the host. Tracking issue: documented as a known limitation.
- **Single-writer LadybugDB constraint** (`GUARDRAILS.md` § LadybugDB lock). Don't run `gitnexus analyze` on the host and inside the container against the same `.gitnexus/` directory simultaneously — the second writer will get `database busy`.
- **Native grammar builds add ~30s to first install.** Tree-sitter Dart/Proto/Swift/Kotlin are all vendored uniformly: `node-gyp-build` picks a committed GitNexus-built prebuilt `.node` at install time (no compile), and only falls back to compiling from the vendored source during `postinstall` if no prebuild matches the host (then a toolchain is needed). Set `GITNEXUS_SKIP_OPTIONAL_GRAMMARS=1` (in your shell or `remoteEnv`, then rebuild) to skip all four; each loses parsing for the affected language(s), and the install still succeeds.
- **`tree-sitter-kotlin`/`tree-sitter-swift` warnings on install** only appear when no prebuild matches the platform-arch (per `AGENTS.md`); they are non-fatal — parsing for that language is simply unavailable.
- **`.mcp.json` works inside the container**: `npx -y gitnexus@latest mcp` resolves cleanly because npm registry is reachable and the workspace bind mount exposes the same `.mcp.json` the host sees.
- **Husky pre-commit fires inside the container** without extra setup. The root `npm install` (run automatically in `postCreateCommand`) installs the hook via `package.json` `prepare`.
## Rebuild / reset
- **Rebuild Container** (Command Palette) — re-runs the Dockerfile build and `postCreateCommand` against the existing named volumes (auth, history, **and sessions** persist).
- **Rebuild Container Without Cache** — fresh image layers, same volumes.
- **To force a re-login / clear an `EACCES`** — remove the per-container _config_ volumes and rebuild. As of the session-volume change this **no longer drops your `--resume` history** (sessions are on separate volumes — see [Session resume](#session-resume-across-container-recreation)):
```bash
docker volume ls | grep -- -config- # the credential / identity volumes
docker volume rm claude-config-<id> codex-config-<id> cursor-config-<id> gh-config-<id>
```
⚠️ Since the shareable dirs are now seeded into the config volume (not bind-mounted), wiping `<cli>-config` **also discards any plugin/skill/agent/command you installed _inside_ the container** and re-seeds those dirs from the host on the next rebuild. That is the intended way to pull host-side config changes in, but if you have in-container-only plugins you want to keep, reinstall them after the rebuild (or install them on the host first so the re-seed brings them along).
- **To also wipe session history** (a true clean slate) — remove the session volumes too (`<name>` is your workspace folder name):
```bash
docker volume ls | grep -E -- '-(sessions|cursor-projects)-' # the group-6 volumes
docker volume rm <name>-claude-sessions-<id> <name>-codex-sessions-<id> \
<name>-cursor-sessions-<id> <name>-cursor-projects-<id>
```
Then rebuild.
- **To re-seed claude-mem from the host** (the container's memory has diverged and you want the host's current store back) — remove the claude-mem volume and rebuild; `post-create.sh` copies the host store in again on the next create:
```bash
docker volume rm claude-mem-<id>
```
## Bumping CLI versions
Bump the version pins in `.devcontainer/devcontainer.json` `build.args` and rebuild — all three are real, fail-loud pins. Claude Code installs via `npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}` and Codex via `npm install -g @openai/codex@${CODEX_VERSION}`. **Cursor is pinned too:** bump `CURSOR_VERSION` **and** both `CURSOR_SHA256_X64` / `CURSOR_SHA256_ARM64` together — the Dockerfile downloads the pinned `downloads.cursor.com/lab/<version>/linux/<arch>/agent-cli-package.tar.gz` artifact directly (no remote install script) and fails the build on a sha256 mismatch. Re-hash each arch with `curl -fSL <url> | sha256sum`. To stop Cursor from auto-updating in the running container, don't call `cursor-agent update`.
## What's not included (yet)
- **Egress firewall — the most important hardening still outstanding.** The original plan included an opt-in iptables/ipset firewall adapted from Anthropic's reference devcontainer. It was deferred to a follow-up PR — `runArgs` is static in `devcontainer.json`, so toggling NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW capabilities cleanly requires either a separate `devcontainer-firewall.json` profile or an `initializeCommand`-generated overlay. Until it lands, the read surface in [§ Trust boundary](#trust-boundary-concretely) has no network containment — anything readable can be exfiltrated. Track at the project's issue tracker if you need this.
- **Codespaces tuning.** The current config works in Codespaces incidentally (no privileged capabilities, no host-mount assumptions), but isn't actively tested there.
- **Playwright e2e support.** `gitnexus-web`'s `npm run test:e2e` needs Chromium libs that the base image doesn't ship. Use the host for e2e until a Playwright layer is added.
## Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `GitNexus devcontainer one-time Windows setup` banner from `initializeCommand` | First-time Windows-native Reopen-in-Container; `HOME` env var was missing | The script just ran `setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"` for you. Close ALL VS Code windows (File → Exit) and reopen — see [Windows 11 setup](#windows-11-setup) |
| `bind source path does not exist: /.claude` (or similar) from Docker | Windows-native `HOME` env var is still missing even after one rebuild — `setx` may have failed or VS Code wasn't fully restarted | Run `setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"` in a Windows shell manually, fully exit VS Code (check Task Manager that no `Code.exe` remains), reopen |
| `EACCES` / `EPERM` writing into `~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, or `~/.cursor` inside the container | Stale state from a previous container with a different effective UID | Move the affected dir aside and let the CLI rebuild it (`mv ~/.claude ~/.claude.bak` and log in again). Long-term: WSL2 setup, which doesn't hit this class of issue |
| `EPERM: operation not permitted, copyfile ... '.husky/_/h'` in `postCreateCommand` | Leftover `.husky/_/` from a previous container run on a Windows-side bind mount | `post-create.sh` already runs `rm -rf .husky/_` defensively. If you hit this on an older config, delete `.husky/_/` on the host and rebuild. Long-term: clone in WSL2 |
| Vite never hot-reloads | Repo cloned on Windows side, not WSL2 | Re-clone inside WSL2 |
| `gitnexus-web` can't reach the backend | `4747` was remapped or backend isn't running | Verify the Ports panel shows `4747` forwarded with no remap; start the backend with `cd gitnexus && npx gitnexus serve` |
| `npm install` fails on tree-sitter-swift / proto / dart | Native build toolchain missing | This shouldn't happen in the devcontainer — verify the apt layer installed `python3 make g++`. If iterating, set `GITNEXUS_SKIP_OPTIONAL_GRAMMARS=1` to skip the vendored grammars |
| Integration tests fail with `database busy` | LadybugDB single-writer constraint | Don't run host-side `gitnexus analyze` while the container is also analyzing the same repo; choose one writer |
| API key env vars not visible inside the container | They are intentionally not auto-propagated from the host (so an empty/stale host var can't silently break `*-login` for everyone else) | `export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...` / `OPENAI_API_KEY=...` / `CURSOR_API_KEY=...` inside the container shell, or carry it via your VS Code [dotfiles repo](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/devcontainers/containers#_personalizing-with-dotfile-repositories) for persistence |
| `git commit` produces commits with empty author | `~/.gitconfig` is missing or empty on the host (VS Code's auto-copy had nothing to copy) | Set `git config --global user.name "Your Name"` and `git config --global user.email "you@example.com"` from the host shell, then rebuild the container |
| `gh: not logged in` inside the container | Not logged in on the host (nothing to seed), or the `gh-config` volume is empty | Just run `gh auth login` **inside the container** — `gh` config lives in a writable per-container volume, so the login persists across rebuilds. (Logging in on the host instead also works: it seeds in on the next container create.) |
-9
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{
"features": {
"ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/github-cli:1": {
"version": "1.1.0",
"resolved": "ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/github-cli@sha256:d22f50b70ed75339b4eed1ba9ecde3a1791f90e88d37936517e3bace0bbad671",
"integrity": "sha256:d22f50b70ed75339b4eed1ba9ecde3a1791f90e88d37936517e3bace0bbad671"
}
}
}
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@@ -1,375 +0,0 @@
// Devcontainer for GitNexus. It pre-installs Claude Code, the OpenAI Codex
// CLI, and the Cursor CLI, plus the Node.js native build chain. It works on
// macOS, Linux, Windows via WSL2, and Windows native. Windows native needs a
// one-time HOME setup. That setup runs automatically via initializeCommand.
// See .devcontainer/README.md § Windows 11 setup. Open it with the VS Code
// Dev Containers extension.
//
// For first-time setup, auth flows, and troubleshooting, see
// .devcontainer/README.md.
{
"name": "GitNexus AI CLI Devcontainer",
"build": {
"dockerfile": "Dockerfile",
"context": ".",
"args": {
// Bun: pinned by version. Installed by the official bun.sh/install
// script, which accepts the release tag as its first positional arg
// (`bash -s bun-vX.Y.Z`). UNLIKE Cursor, the install path runs an
// unverified remote script — chosen at request time for simplicity.
// To bump: pick a tag from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases and update
// this value.
"BUN_VERSION": "1.3.14",
"TZ": "${localEnv:TZ:UTC}"
}
},
// Runs on the HOST, not the container, before the container is created. We
// write it as a single string on purpose. The spec treats the single-string
// form as one command that each OS runs its own way. The object form means
// "named parallel tasks", not per-OS dispatch. We run it with Node so the
// same command works in cmd.exe on Windows and in bash/zsh on Linux, macOS,
// and WSL. The script reads `os.homedir()`, which respects $HOME on
// Linux/macOS and %USERPROFILE% on Windows. It then creates the host-side
// bind mount source folders, and it is safe to re-run. Host prerequisite:
// Node on PATH. That is the only host-side tool needed beyond Docker Desktop
// and the VS Code Dev Containers extension.
"initializeCommand": "node .devcontainer/ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs",
"features": {
"ghcr.io/devcontainers/features/github-cli:1": {}
},
"remoteUser": "node",
"updateRemoteUserUID": true,
"workspaceMount": "source=${localWorkspaceFolder},target=/workspace,type=bind,consistency=delegated",
"workspaceFolder": "/workspace",
// Mount topology, by group:
//
// 1. AI CLI host config — a READ-ONLY stage at /host/.<cli>. On container-
// create, `post-create.sh` COPIES out of it: credentials, identity, and
// single config files (always), plus the shareable subfolders (Claude
// plugins/skills/agents/memory/commands; Codex plugins/prompts/memories/
// skills; Cursor plugins/rules/commands/agents/skills) ONCE on first create.
// Everything copied lands in the per-container named volume (role 2). It is
// read-only so a container process can NEVER write back to the host — there
// is no read-write bind into the host's CLI config at all. This protects the
// host's on-disk setup: a compromised in-container dependency cannot drop a
// skill, agent, command, or plugin onto the host for the next host session
// to load. The cost is that host and container DIVERGE after the first
// create — host edits don't reach the container until you wipe the config
// volume and rebuild. See README § "Trust boundary, concretely".
//
// 2. AI CLI container config — one named volume per devcontainer. CODEX_HOME
// points here. CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is left unset on purpose, so it resolves
// to the default ~/.claude, which is this same path. Credentials,
// identity, and single config files (.credentials.json,
// ~/.claude/.claude.json, settings.json, config.toml, cli-config.json,
// mcp.json) live here with correct Linux permissions. They are NOT
// bind-mounted, because single-file binds break on Docker Desktop Windows
// (the EXDEV error — see the SINGLE-FILE note below). Container-managed
// state (sessions, history, caches, IDE locks) stays separate per
// devcontainer. So two GitNexus checkouts on the same host can't corrupt
// each other.
//
// 3. Other host config — read-only bind mounts for credential and identity
// folders that lack the permission-flattening and onboarding-state
// complications Claude Code has (ssh, aws, azure, git config, plus gh and
// docker). gh and docker are read-only so a compromised dependency can't
// rewrite the GitHub token or the Docker credHelper. See the inline note
// at those mounts. `~/.gitconfig` is not mounted here. VS Code auto-copies
// it separately.
//
// 4. Per-instance state — scoped by `${devcontainerId}`: shell history and
// the npm cache. These survive rebuilds and stay separate between sibling
// instances.
//
// 5. Per-workspace-name AND per-instance state — the workspace `node_modules`
// volumes use both `${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}` (so you can spot them
// in `docker volume ls`) and `${devcontainerId}` (so sibling instances of
// the same repo never collide). This keeps tree-sitter native binaries and
// onnxruntime off the workspace bind mount, which is faster on Windows and
// macOS.
//
// 6. Per-workspace session state — dedicated named volumes for each CLI's
// resume/transcript dirs (Claude projects/, Codex sessions/, Cursor chats/
// + projects/). Same `${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}` + `${devcontainerId}`
// keying as group 5, but SEPARATE volumes from the group-2 config volumes.
// That separation is the point: the `docker volume rm <cli>-config-*`
// re-login / EACCES fix (README § Rebuild/reset) no longer wipes sessions,
// so `claude --resume`, `codex resume`, and `cursor-agent resume` survive a
// rebuild, a full delete-and-recreate, AND that wipe. They overlay the
// config volume at the session sub-paths (Docker precedence: more specific
// path wins). Container-private by design — transcripts can hold pasted
// secrets, and like the group-1 config (read-only stage, copy-once) these
// add NO host write-through surface and leak no other projects' transcripts.
// They do
// NOT survive `docker volume prune`, a `${devcontainerId}` change (moving
// the checkout, WSL vs native), or a new machine — same tier as group 5.
// To make sessions host-visible/portable instead, see the commented
// host-bind block below and README § "Session resume across recreation".
"mounts": [
// One named volume per container for credentials and identity state. Each
// CLI's real `~/.<cli>` config folder lives in a volume. That keeps
// credentials (with correct Linux 600 permissions) and per-container
// session state separate from the host. Logging in inside the container
// and logging in on the host are independent. The bind mounts BELOW these
// volumes override the volume's contents at the paths they cover. Docker
// mount precedence is: the more specific path wins.
"source=claude-config-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.claude,type=volume",
"source=codex-config-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.codex,type=volume",
"source=cursor-config-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.cursor,type=volume",
// gh CLI config as a per-container named volume, same model as the AI CLI
// configs above: post-create.sh COPIES hosts.yml/config.yml out of the
// read-only /host/.config/gh stage into this volume on container-create.
// The container then owns a WRITABLE copy, so `gh auth login` /
// `gh auth refresh` run INSIDE the container persist across rebuilds — and
// still never write back to the host (the stage is read-only). If the host
// is logged in, that login seeds in; if not, an in-container login sticks.
"source=gh-config-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.config/gh,type=volume",
// claude-mem store. UNLIKE the shareable dirs below (skills/agents/memory),
// this is NOT a host bind. $HOME/.claude-mem is a large, multi-GB SQLite +
// Chroma vector store (claude-mem.db + -wal/-shm, chroma/chroma.sqlite3, HNSW
// index binaries). A read-write host bind would (a) push every byte over the
// 9p/virtiofs share, and (b) expose those SQLite WAL files to unreliable
// fcntl locking across that boundary — with a real corruption risk if
// claude-mem ran on the host and in the container against the same DB at
// once. So it gets its OWN per-container named volume here, same durability
// tier as the config volumes (survives Rebuild Container and a
// delete-and-recreate; keyed by ${devcontainerId}). post-create.sh SEEDS it
// ONCE from the /host/.claude-mem read-only stage when the volume is empty,
// then the container owns its copy — rebuilds never clobber it, and changes
// do NOT flow back to the host. (Container and host memory diverge from the
// seed point on; that is the price of safe SQLite.) Removed by the same
// `docker volume rm` reset flow as the other volumes — see README.
"source=claude-mem-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.claude-mem,type=volume",
// Per-workspace SESSION volumes (mount group 6). These OVERLAY the config
// volumes above at the session sub-paths so "resume my last session"
// survives container recreation the way the seeded config dirs do.
// They are SEPARATE volumes from <cli>-config-${devcontainerId}, so the
// README's `docker volume rm <cli>-config-${devcontainerId}` re-login fix
// does not touch them. post-create.sh chowns each one explicitly (its
// `find -xdev` stops at the config-volume filesystem boundary and won't
// descend into these).
//
// KEEP IN SYNC: if you add/rename/remove a session sub-path, update all
// three places that name it — (1) the mount line here, (2) the DIRS array
// in post-create.sh (so its chown covers the volume), and (3) the mount
// table + Session-resume section in README.md.
//
// Claude: projects/ holds <encoded-cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl transcripts plus the
// sessions-index.json that the `/resume` picker reads. The container cwd is
// always /workspace (encodes to the `-workspace` subdir), so this is the
// container's own slice only. Pure JSONL/JSON — no SQLite/WAL, so a volume
// here is clean. `claude --resume` / `--continue` read straight from it.
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-claude-sessions-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.claude/projects,type=volume",
// Codex: sessions/ holds YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*.jsonl transcripts. The thread
// index (state_5.sqlite + -wal/-shm) stays at the ~/.codex root on the
// config volume — it is a single WAL file we must NOT split onto a host
// bind. On a recreation that drops the config volume, that index is cleanly
// absent and Codex rebuilds it from these rollout files on the next start
// (backfill). See README for the one-time-rebuild and corruption caveats.
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-codex-sessions-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.codex/sessions,type=volume",
// Cursor: chats/{hash}/{uuid}/store.db is one SQLite db per session, each in
// its own leaf dir — a DIRECTORY volume keeps each db beside its -wal/-shm
// sidecar, so there is no cross-filesystem single-file hazard. projects/
// (agent-transcripts) is added too. cursor-agent's on-disk layout is
// community-reverse-engineered (LOW confidence), so this is best-effort;
// keeping it container-private means a wrong guess can't corrupt host state.
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-cursor-sessions-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.cursor/chats,type=volume",
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-cursor-projects-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.cursor/projects,type=volume",
//
// OPT-IN: host-shared sessions (like the plugin/skill binds). Uncomment to
// put transcripts on the host — fully visible and portable, but they then
// land on host disk and become a write-through surface for a compromised
// in-container dependency, and the whole-dir binds expose OTHER projects'
// transcripts to the container. Claude is scoped to /workspace's encoded
// subdir to limit that leak; Codex/Cursor stores are not project-scoped, so
// they expose every project. If you enable these, also add the matching
// source dirs to ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs — to its DIRS array (these are
// directory binds), not FILES (which is only for single-file bind sources
// like ~/.claude.json) — so Docker can resolve the binds. Read README
// § "Session resume across recreation" first.
// "source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude/projects/-workspace,target=/home/node/.claude/projects/-workspace,type=bind",
// "source=${localEnv:HOME}/.codex/sessions,target=/home/node/.codex/sessions,type=bind",
// "source=${localEnv:HOME}/.cursor/chats,target=/home/node/.cursor/chats,type=bind",
// "source=${localEnv:HOME}/.cursor/projects,target=/home/node/.cursor/projects,type=bind",
// Read-only host stage that post-create.sh copies FROM on container-create.
// It is read-only so a container process can never write back to host CLI
// state — that write-back is the attack vector we block. post-create.sh
// reads two kinds of thing from here: (a) the credential + identity files
// (copied into the volume always), and (b) the shareable dirs — skills,
// agents, plugins, memory, commands, prompts, rules — which it copies into
// the volume ONCE on first create (see step 3/4). Nothing here is bound
// read-write into the container, so the host's on-disk setup is protected.
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude,target=/host/.claude,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.codex,target=/host/.codex,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.cursor,target=/host/.cursor,type=bind,readonly",
// Read-only host stage for the claude-mem store. post-create.sh COPIES it
// into the claude-mem named volume on first create (seed-once). Read-only so
// the container can never write back to the host's live DB — the seed is a
// one-way snapshot. ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs creates ~/.claude-mem on the
// host so this bind resolves even when claude-mem was never installed there.
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude-mem,target=/host/.claude-mem,type=bind,readonly",
// NO read-write bind mounts for the shareable subfolders. They USED to be
// bound here (Claude skills/agents/memory/commands/plugins; Codex plugins/
// prompts/memories/skills; Cursor rules/commands/agents/skills/plugins) so
// host and container shared one copy both ways. That bind was a write-through
// hole: a compromised in-container dependency could drop a malicious skill,
// agent, command, or plugin straight onto the host, which the next HOST
// session would auto-load. To protect the host's on-disk setup, these are
// now COPIED once from the read-only /host/.<cli> stage into the per-container
// named volume by post-create.sh (step 3/4), exactly like claude-mem and the
// session volumes. Trade-offs of the copy model:
// - The container gets its OWN writable copy and can never write back to
// the host. Host setup is protected.
// - It is seed-ONCE: host edits made after first create don't reach the
// container until you remove the config volume and rebuild. Container
// edits persist across rebuilds. (See README § Rebuild/reset to re-seed.)
// - The plugin REGISTRY JSONs (Claude known_marketplaces.json /
// installed_plugins.json / plugin-catalog-cache.json; Cursor
// installed_plugins.json) carry absolute OS-native paths, so they can't
// be copied verbatim — post-create.sh translates their paths to the
// container's Linux paths, also seed-once, alongside the cache/ copy so
// the two stay consistent. Codex needs no translation (config.toml holds
// git URLs, not paths), so its whole plugins/ dir is copied as-is.
// - The old read-only-stage-plus-symlink design failed `/plugin marketplace
// add` in the container with EROFS; copy-into-a-writable-volume avoids
// that — the container writes to its own copy, not a read-only mount.
//
// SINGLE-FILE binds for settings.json, .claude.json, and config.toml are
// deliberately ABSENT. On Docker Desktop Windows the named volume sits on
// one filesystem (ext4, /dev/sdd) and a single-file bind from the host sits
// on another (the 9p drvfs share). Apps save a config by writing `foo.tmp`
// and renaming it over `foo`. That rename can't cross filesystems: it hits
// the EXDEV error and fails with `Device or resource busy` or `inter-device
// move failed`. Codex's TUI shows this as "config/batchWrite failed in
// TUI"; Claude just silently loses the write the same way. Instead, we use
// a read-only host stage at /host/.claude, and post-create.sh copies these
// files into the named volume on every container-create. Host changes show
// up on the next rebuild. Container changes stay inside the container until
// a rebuild.
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude.json,target=/host/.claude.json,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.config/git,target=/home/node/.config/git,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.ssh,target=/home/node/.ssh,type=bind,readonly",
// gh uses the COPY-INTO-VOLUME model (read-only host stage at
// /host/.config/gh + the gh-config named volume above). post-create.sh seeds
// hosts.yml/config.yml from this stage into the volume on create, so the
// container has a writable copy: an in-container `gh auth login` persists
// across rebuilds, and nothing is ever written back to the host because this
// stage is read-only. docker stays a direct READ-ONLY bind: the container
// reads your EXISTING host login (the common case), and a compromised
// in-container dependency can't rewrite ~/.docker/config.json (the registry
// credHelper, which points at a binary). A `docker login` run inside the
// container won't persist back to the host — re-run it on the host, or give
// docker the same copy-into-volume treatment as gh. See README § Trust boundary.
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.config/gh,target=/host/.config/gh,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.docker,target=/home/node/.docker,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.aws,target=/home/node/.aws,type=bind,readonly",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.azure,target=/home/node/.azure,type=bind,readonly",
"source=commandhistory-${devcontainerId},target=/commandhistory,type=volume",
"source=npm-cache-${devcontainerId},target=/home/node/.npm,type=volume",
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-root-node-modules-${devcontainerId},target=/workspace/node_modules,type=volume",
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-gitnexus-node-modules-${devcontainerId},target=/workspace/gitnexus/node_modules,type=volume",
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-gitnexus-web-node-modules-${devcontainerId},target=/workspace/gitnexus-web/node_modules,type=volume",
"source=${localWorkspaceFolderBasename}-gitnexus-shared-node-modules-${devcontainerId},target=/workspace/gitnexus-shared/node_modules,type=volume"
],
// Interactive login is the default way to authenticate for all three CLIs.
// Credentials live in the per-container named volumes (claude-config,
// codex-config, cursor-config), NOT in the host bind mounts. They are copied
// from the read-only /host/.<cli> stage into the volume on container-create.
// Single-file binds would break on Docker Desktop Windows (the EXDEV error).
// Shareable content (plugins, skills, agents, memory, commands) is NOT bound
// read-write — it is copied once from the read-only /host/.<cli> stage into
// the volume on first create, so the host's on-disk setup stays protected.
// API keys (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, CURSOR_API_KEY) are NOT
// injected via containerEnv. `${localEnv:VAR}` turns an unset host var into
// an empty string. Cursor in particular treats `CURSOR_API_KEY=""` as "use
// this empty key" instead of "fall back to the stored login", which would
// silently break `cursor-agent login`. If you need API-key auth, `export`
// the var in your container shell, or carry it in your VS Code dotfiles repo
// (see .devcontainer/README.md).
// CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is left unset on purpose. The Claude default is
// `$HOME/.claude` (= `/home/node/.claude`), which is exactly where the
// claude-config named volume mounts. Setting the env var would change which
// file Claude reads `hasCompletedOnboarding` from. With the var set, Claude
// reads `$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json`, the small identity file. Without
// it, Claude reads `$HOME/.claude.json`, the big onboarding-state file that
// actually holds `hasCompletedOnboarding`, the user-scope MCP config, and
// per-project trust. Leaving the var unset matches host behavior. It also
// lets post-create.sh's sync of `$HOME/.claude.json` skip the setup wizard
// on every container-create.
//
// CODEX_HOME is kept even though it matches the Codex default, as a canary.
// If we ever move the Codex named volume target, this env var makes the
// dependency explicit instead of silently following the default.
"containerEnv": {
"CODEX_HOME": "/home/node/.codex",
"HISTFILE": "/commandhistory/.zsh_history"
},
"customizations": {
"vscode": {
"extensions": [
"anthropic.claude-code",
"dbaeumer.vscode-eslint",
"esbenp.prettier-vscode",
"eamodio.gitlens"
],
"settings": {
"editor.formatOnSave": true,
"editor.defaultFormatter": "esbenp.prettier-vscode",
"editor.codeActionsOnSave": {
"source.fixAll.eslint": "explicit"
},
"files.eol": "\n",
"terminal.integrated.defaultProfile.linux": "zsh",
"terminal.integrated.profiles.linux": {
"bash": { "path": "bash", "icon": "terminal-bash" },
"zsh": { "path": "zsh" }
}
}
}
},
// Do not remap port 4747 (gitnexus serve). gitnexus-web hardcodes
// http://localhost:4747 as its default backend URL.
"forwardPorts": [5173, 4747, 4173],
"portsAttributes": {
"5173": {
"label": "Vite dev (gitnexus-web)",
"onAutoForward": "notify"
},
"4747": {
"label": "gitnexus serve HTTP API",
"onAutoForward": "notify",
"requireLocalPort": true
},
"4173": {
"label": "Static web (Vite preview)",
"onAutoForward": "silent"
}
},
// Lifecycle split (from the Dev Container spec):
// - `updateContentCommand` runs on container-create AND whenever the
// workspace content changes, such as a lockfile update. It owns installing
// the workspace dependencies. Re-installing on every container-create
// wastes time when nothing changed, but it must re-run when deps change.
// - `postCreateCommand` runs once on container-create. It owns syncing the
// AI CLI credentials and identity from the host. That work should happen
// exactly once per container instance, not on every content update.
// Run both with an explicit `bash` so they don't depend on the script's
// executable bit surviving the workspace bind mount.
"updateContentCommand": "bash .devcontainer/install-deps.sh",
"postCreateCommand": "bash .devcontainer/post-create.sh"
}
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// This runs on the HOST, not inside the container, before the dev container is
// created. devcontainer.json calls it via `initializeCommand`. Its job is to
// make sure the bind-mount source folders listed in devcontainer.json already
// exist on the host. Docker rejects a bind mount when its source is missing,
// which happens if a CLI has never been used.
//
// It works on every platform. `os.homedir()` returns the home folder ($HOME on
// Mac/Linux, %USERPROFILE% on Windows). `fs.mkdirSync({recursive: true})`
// creates folders. It is safe to run repeatedly: a path that already exists is
// left alone. We deliberately do NOT handle `~/.gitconfig` here. VS Code's Dev
// Containers extension copies the host gitconfig into the container when you
// attach, and a bind mount fights with that, so it was removed.
//
// The path-creating logic is exported (ensurePaths/DIRS/FILES) so tests can use
// it. The Windows HOME side effect only runs when this file is run directly as
// the initializeCommand. That keeps tests able to drive it against a temp dir
// without touching the real home or calling `setx`.
//
// Host prerequisite: Node.js must be on PATH. That is the only host requirement
// beyond Docker Desktop and the VS Code Dev Containers extension. Everything
// else runs inside the container.
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
// Folders that are bind-mount sources in devcontainer.json. Docker rejects a
// bind mount whose source is missing, so we create each one.
//
// We create the TOP per-CLI folders (~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor) and
// ~/.claude-mem. These back the /host/.<cli> and /host/.claude-mem read-only
// STAGE mounts that post-create.sh copies from on container-create. We do NOT
// create the shareable subfolders (skills/agents/plugins/memory/commands/...)
// here anymore: they used to be read-write bind sources, but they are now
// copied once out of the read-only stage into the per-container volume, so they
// are no longer bind sources and pre-creating empty ones would needlessly write
// into the host of someone who never used that CLI. post-create.sh's seed step
// simply skips any subfolder the host doesn't have. The read-only stage bind is
// the whole ~/.<cli> dir, so whatever shareable subfolders DO exist are visible
// to the seed without being listed here.
const DIRS = [
'.claude',
// claude-mem store ($HOME/.claude-mem). A SEPARATE top-level folder from
// ~/.claude, holding claude-mem's SQLite DB + Chroma vector store. It is NOT
// bind-mounted (a multi-GB SQLite/WAL store is unsafe over a 9p bind on Docker
// Desktop Windows). post-create.sh SEEDS it once into a per-container named
// volume from the /host/.claude-mem read-only stage. We create the source here
// so that stage bind resolves even for a host that never ran claude-mem
// (Docker rejects a missing bind source); the seed then finds no DB to copy
// and the container starts with empty memory.
'.claude-mem',
'.codex',
'.cursor',
'.ssh',
'.docker',
'.aws',
'.azure',
path.join('.config', 'gh'),
path.join('.config', 'git'),
];
// Files to pre-create. Only `~/.claude.json` is created here. It is the one
// source that is bound as a single file (read-only at /host/.claude.json). If
// that source is missing, Docker would create a FOLDER in its place, so it has
// to exist as a file first. `~/.claude/settings.json` and
// `~/.codex/config.toml` are NOT single-file binds. post-create.sh copies them
// out of the /host/.<cli> read-only folder stage, and `sync_from_host` simply
// does nothing when they are absent (the `[ -f ]` guard). Creating them here
// would needlessly write to the host of someone who never ran that CLI, so we
// don't.
const FILES = ['.claude.json'];
// Create every folder and touch every file under `home`. Safe to run again:
// an existing path is left untouched. The root is a parameter so tests can run
// it against a temp dir.
function ensurePaths(home, dirs = DIRS, files = FILES) {
for (const dir of dirs) {
const full = path.join(home, dir);
if (!fs.existsSync(full)) {
fs.mkdirSync(full, { recursive: true });
}
}
for (const file of files) {
const full = path.join(home, file);
if (!fs.existsSync(full)) {
fs.closeSync(fs.openSync(full, 'a'));
}
}
}
module.exports = { ensurePaths, DIRS, FILES };
if (require.main === module) {
// One-time setup for native Windows. VS Code fills in the bind-mount sources
// using `${localEnv:HOME}`, which reads its own process environment. Windows
// does not set `HOME` by default; it uses `USERPROFILE`. With no `HOME`, the
// bind sources shrink to filesystem-root paths (`/.claude`, `/.codex`, ...)
// and Docker rejects them with `bind source path does not exist`.
//
// The fix is to save `HOME=%USERPROFILE%` into the user's environment with
// `setx`. `setx` writes to `HKCU\Environment`. Every process the user starts
// after that inherits the new value, including VS Code once it restarts. The
// current VS Code process can't see the change, because its environment was
// set when it launched. So we tell the user to restart VS Code once.
//
// Later runs see that `HOME` is set, skip this block, and continue normally.
// Mac, Linux, and WSL hosts already have `HOME` set by the shell, so this
// block does nothing on those platforms.
if (process.platform === 'win32' && !process.env.HOME) {
const userprofile = process.env.USERPROFILE;
if (userprofile) {
try {
require('child_process').execFileSync('setx', ['HOME', userprofile], {
stdio: 'ignore',
});
console.error('');
console.error('='.repeat(70));
console.error(' GitNexus devcontainer one-time Windows setup');
console.error('='.repeat(70));
console.error('');
console.error(`HOME has been set to %USERPROFILE% (${userprofile}).`);
console.error("VS Code reads this at startup, so the current session can't pick it up.");
console.error('');
console.error(' 1. Close ALL VS Code windows (File > Exit, not just the window).');
console.error(' 2. Reopen VS Code, open this folder, and re-run Reopen in Container.');
console.error('');
console.error('This is a one-time setup. Subsequent rebuilds work normally.');
console.error('='.repeat(70));
process.exit(1);
} catch (err) {
console.error('ERROR: failed to set HOME automatically: ' + err.message);
console.error('');
console.error('Run this in a Windows shell, then restart VS Code:');
console.error(' setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"');
process.exit(1);
}
} else {
console.error('ERROR: neither HOME nor USERPROFILE is set on this host.');
console.error('');
console.error('Set HOME to your user profile directory and restart VS Code:');
console.error(' setx HOME "%USERPROFILE%"');
process.exit(1);
}
}
ensurePaths(os.homedir());
}
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Devcontainer updateContentCommand. The Dev Container spec runs this when the
# container is created AND whenever workspace content changes (for example a
# lockfile update). This script installs workspace dependencies only. Syncing AI
# CLI state lives in post-create.sh, which runs once right after this.
#
# Why the split: updateContentCommand re-runs on content changes, but
# postCreateCommand runs only at container-create. Keeping `npm install` here
# means a rebuild after pulling new dependencies refreshes them. The AI CLI
# credential and path-translation work does not re-run each time.
set -euo pipefail
cd /workspace
echo "[install-deps] 1/4: chown workspace node_modules + npm cache mount points"
# The named volumes (workspace/*/node_modules and ~/.npm) are created at first
# mount. They inherit ownership from the image's UID before realignment. Then
# `updateRemoteUserUID: true` shifts the `node` user's UID. Now the volumes are
# owned by the old, stale UID and npm install cannot write to them. So we chown
# again here, after realignment. Running it again later changes nothing.
#
# We use `find -xdev -exec chown -h` (the same idiom as post-create.sh) instead
# of a plain `chown -R`. There are two separate guards. First, `-xdev` stops
# find from descending past each volume's own filesystem, so it won't recurse
# into a host folder mounted underneath. Second, `-h` makes chown change the
# symlink itself instead of following it to its target. Without `-h`, a symlink
# in the tree (one a dependency's postinstall drops, or a dangling
# node_modules/.bin link) would either send the chown onto a target on another
# filesystem, or fail to follow and abort the whole script under `set -e`. For
# regular files and directories `-h` does nothing, so the ownership fix is the
# same.
for d in /workspace/node_modules \
/workspace/gitnexus/node_modules \
/workspace/gitnexus-web/node_modules \
/workspace/gitnexus-shared/node_modules \
/home/node/.npm; do
sudo find "$d" -xdev -exec chown -h node:node {} +
done
echo "[install-deps] 2/4: clear stale .husky/_ runtime cache"
# On Docker Desktop for Windows, the bind-mount permission translation won't let
# the new container's `node` user overwrite a `.husky/_/h` file that an earlier
# container wrote under a different UID. So we delete it. `.husky/_` is a
# gitignored runtime cache, and husky rebuilds it during the root `npm install`.
# Husky upstream has no fix for this UID clash.
rm -rf .husky/_
echo "[install-deps] 3/4: npm install at root, then gitnexus-shared (build required)"
# Install order matters. Root goes first, for lint-staged, husky, and prettier.
# Then gitnexus-shared, which must be built before installing gitnexus-web or
# gitnexus. Both of those depend on it via `file:../gitnexus-shared`.
npm install
cd /workspace/gitnexus-shared
npm install
npm run build
echo "[install-deps] 4/4: npm install gitnexus-web, then gitnexus"
# gitnexus-web goes before gitnexus. The gitnexus `prepare` script runs
# scripts/build.js, which compiles gitnexus-web when that directory is present.
# In the devcontainer the whole workspace is bind-mounted, so gitnexus-web/ is
# present when gitnexus installs. The production Dockerfiles COPY only selected
# files, so the directory is not present there.
cd /workspace/gitnexus-web
npm install
cd /workspace/gitnexus
npm install
echo "[install-deps] done"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Devcontainer postCreate script. It runs once, right after the container is
# created. devcontainer.json wires it up via `postCreateCommand`. Workspace
# dependencies are installed elsewhere, in install-deps.sh (`updateContentCommand`).
# That script runs BEFORE this one — that is the order the devcontainer spec
# defines. This script does one job: sync the AI CLI credentials and identity
# from the host.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
echo "[post-create] 1/4: chown AI CLI named-volume mount points"
# Fix ownership on the named volumes (~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor,
# /commandhistory). When they first mount, they take the user ID baked into the
# image, before any realignment. Then `updateRemoteUserUID: true` shifts the
# `node` user to a new ID. Now the volumes are owned by the old, stale ID, and
# writes into them fail. (~/.local is a directory in the image, not a volume.
# We chown it too, just to be safe.) install-deps.sh fixes the workspace side.
# This script fixes the AI CLI side, so each lifecycle hook handles its own part.
#
# There are two separate guards here, and they do different things. `-xdev`
# keeps find from descending into other filesystems. The shareable dirs (skills,
# agents, plugins, memory, commands, prompts, rules) are no longer host bind
# mounts — they now live INSIDE the config volume (seeded in step 3/4), so
# `-xdev` correctly walks and chowns them as the container-private volume files
# they are. What `-xdev` still stops at are the SESSION volumes (mount group 6),
# which remain separate filesystems mounted at sub-paths (see below). `-h` tells
# chown to act on a symlink ITSELF instead of following it, so it never lands on
# a target across a filesystem boundary and never aborts on a broken symlink
# under `set -e` (a legacy Option-B symlink could still exist on a carried-over
# volume). For regular files and directories `-h` does nothing extra.
#
# The session volumes (mount group 6: .claude/projects, .codex/sessions,
# .cursor/chats, .cursor/projects) are their OWN filesystems mounted at
# sub-paths, so `-xdev` rooted at the config-volume parent deliberately skips
# them. That is why each one is listed as its own root below: rooted there,
# `-xdev` walks just that volume and chowns its top level, so the CLI's first
# write doesn't hit EACCES on a stale image UID. These are container-private
# volumes, not the host's own files — the read-only /host/.<cli> stages we copy
# from are mounted elsewhere and are never chowned.
DIRS=(
/home/node/.claude
/home/node/.claude/projects
/home/node/.codex
/home/node/.codex/sessions
/home/node/.cursor
/home/node/.cursor/chats
/home/node/.cursor/projects
/home/node/.config/gh
/home/node/.local
/commandhistory
)
# claude-mem volume: chown it ONLY on first create (its completion sentinel is
# absent). The step-4/4 seed copies the store as the node user, so a populated
# claude-mem volume is already node-owned on every later rebuild — a recursive
# `find` over a multi-GB store (the 7GB+ DB plus the Chroma index) just to
# re-stamp ownership that is already correct would add real latency to every
# rebuild for nothing. On first create the volume is empty, so this chown of the
# bare mount point is trivial and lets the seed write into it.
[ -f /home/node/.claude-mem/.claude-mem-seeded ] || DIRS+=(/home/node/.claude-mem)
for d in "${DIRS[@]}"; do
# Skip a root that isn't present rather than aborting the whole run under
# `set -e`. Docker creates every declared volume's mount point before this
# script runs, so in the normal case all roots exist and this is a no-op.
# The guard matters only if a session volume is later removed from
# devcontainer.json without its matching DIRS entry being removed too — then
# provisioning skips it instead of failing before credentials ever sync.
[ -d "$d" ] || continue
sudo find "$d" -xdev -exec chown -h node:node {} +
done
echo "[post-create] 2/4: sync AI CLI credentials + identity from host"
# Clean up after an older devcontainer design (Option B). Back then these paths
# were symlinks pointing into the read-only host stage
# (e.g. /home/node/.claude/plugins -> /host/.claude/plugins). A write through
# such a symlink would land on a read-only host file and fail. Delete any that
# survive on a carried-over volume. The shareable dirs are now real directories
# in the named volume, seeded from the host in step 3/4 below.
for p in plugins skills agents memory commands; do
[ -L "/home/node/.claude/$p" ] && rm "/home/node/.claude/$p"
done
for p in plugins prompts memories skills config.toml; do
[ -L "/home/node/.codex/$p" ] && rm "/home/node/.codex/$p"
done
for p in plugins rules commands agents skills; do
[ -L "/home/node/.cursor/$p" ] && rm "/home/node/.cursor/$p"
done
mkdir -p /home/node/.claude/plugins /home/node/.cursor/plugins
# Shareable content (skills, agents, plugins, memory, commands, prompts, rules)
# is NO LONGER bind-mounted. It is COPIED once from the read-only host stage into
# the named volume in step 3/4 below, so a compromised in-container dependency
# can't write through to the host's on-disk CLI setup. This step handles only the
# credentials, identity, and single config files. Those stay per-container in the
# named volume and are COPIED from the host once when the container is created:
# - .credentials.json (Claude OAuth tokens)
# - .claude/.claude.json (Claude identity: userID, oauthAccount, and
# migration tracking — a different file from $HOME/.claude.json)
# - settings.json (Claude), config.toml (Codex), mcp.json (Cursor). These are
# single config files, and single files can't be bind-mounted on Windows
# (the EXDEV error explained below).
# - auth.json (Codex), cli-config.json (Cursor — which mixes auth and settings)
# - the plugin registry JSONs that contain absolute paths (Claude + Cursor).
# Those are translated below.
#
# How the sync behaves: it ALWAYS overwrites from the host when the container is
# created. A fresh container then starts logged in as the host's user, if the
# host had credentials. From that point the container manages its own login,
# until the next rebuild copies the host files again. Logging out inside the
# container does NOT log out the host. Per-container login is the goal, and
# bind-mounting these files would instead make a logout shared between both.
sync_from_host() {
local src=$1
local dst=$2
local mode=${3:-600}
if [ -f "$src" ]; then
rm -f "$dst"
cp "$src" "$dst"
chmod "$mode" "$dst"
fi
}
sync_from_host \
/host/.claude/.credentials.json /home/node/.claude/.credentials.json
sync_from_host \
/host/.claude/.claude.json /home/node/.claude/.claude.json 644
# These config files are COPIED from the host, not bind-mounted. We tried
# bind-mounting them as single files and it didn't work. On Docker Desktop for
# Windows the named volume (ext4) and the host bind mount (9p drvfs) are
# different filesystems. Apps save a config by writing a temp file and renaming
# it over the real one, and that rename fails across filesystems (the "EXDEV" or
# "Device or resource busy" error). So copy the host's version into the named
# volume when the container is created. The container can then rewrite it freely
# until the next rebuild copies the host version again.
sync_from_host /host/.claude/settings.json /home/node/.claude/settings.json 644
sync_from_host /host/.codex/config.toml /home/node/.codex/config.toml 644
# Seed $HOME/.claude.json from the host, but NOT as a straight copy. That file
# mixes two kinds of state. Some is portable account and onboarding state we
# want to keep: hasCompletedOnboarding, oauthAccount, userID, projects,
# tipsHistory. The rest describes how Claude is installed on the HOST, and that
# part is never valid here — for example the host's `installMethod` value only
# makes sense for the host's binary. The fix strips the machine-specific fields
# and forces hasCompletedOnboarding, while handling a host file that isn't a
# JSON object. That logic lives in seed-claude-config.cjs so it can be
# unit-tested and prettier-checked (translate-plugin-registries.test.cjs).
node "$SCRIPT_DIR/seed-claude-config.cjs"
# Codex auth. Some hosts store credentials in the OS keyring instead of on disk
# (`cli_auth_credentials_store = "keyring"`, the default on macOS). Those hosts
# have no auth.json file, so the copy below quietly does nothing. In that case,
# log in inside the container with `codex login --device-auth`.
sync_from_host \
/host/.codex/auth.json /home/node/.codex/auth.json
# Cursor CLI. Its cli-config.json holds both auth and settings in one file.
# Cursor has known upstream problems authenticating inside Docker, even when the
# config is copied correctly. If `cursor-agent` reports auth errors after the
# copy, run `cursor-agent login` again inside the container. mcp.json (Cursor's
# MCP server config) is also a single file, so it is copied on create rather
# than bind-mounted, for the same EXDEV reason as above. hooks.json is left out
# on purpose. Cursor hooks run shell commands, and sharing the host's hooks
# would widen the supply-chain attack surface inside the container. Copy it in
# yourself if you want the host's hooks in the container.
sync_from_host \
/host/.cursor/cli-config.json /home/node/.cursor/cli-config.json
sync_from_host \
/host/.cursor/mcp.json /home/node/.cursor/mcp.json 644
# gh CLI auth + settings. Same copy-into-volume model as the credentials above:
# hosts.yml holds the GitHub token (mode 600), config.yml holds settings (644).
# Copied from the read-only /host/.config/gh stage into the gh-config named
# volume on create. Because the volume is writable, an in-container
# `gh auth login` / `gh auth refresh` persists across rebuilds; because the
# stage is read-only, nothing flows back to the host. If the host had no login,
# both copies quietly no-op and whatever the container wrote is kept.
sync_from_host /host/.config/gh/hosts.yml /home/node/.config/gh/hosts.yml
sync_from_host /host/.config/gh/config.yml /home/node/.config/gh/config.yml 644
echo "[post-create] 3/4: seed shareable config dirs from host (first create only)"
# The shareable dirs (Claude skills/agents/memory/commands/plugins; Codex
# plugins/prompts/memories/skills; Cursor rules/commands/agents/skills/plugins)
# used to be read-write host bind mounts, so a write inside the container landed
# directly on the host's files. That exposed the host's on-disk CLI setup: a
# compromised workspace dependency running in the container could drop a malicious
# skill, agent, command, or plugin into the host's folders, which the next HOST
# session would then auto-load. To protect the host, these are no longer bound.
# Instead we COPY them once from the read-only /host/.<cli> stage into the
# per-container named volume, exactly like claude-mem (step 4/4) and the session
# volumes. The container gets its own writable copy and can NEVER write back to
# the host. The container also avoids the old read-only-stage EROFS failure,
# because it writes to its own volume copy, not a read-only mount.
#
# Seed-once, persist: a per-CLI marker file records that the copy has happened.
# On the first container-create the marker is absent, so we copy; on every later
# rebuild the marker is present, so we skip and keep whatever the container has
# accumulated. Host edits made AFTER the first create do NOT reach the container
# until you remove the config volume and rebuild (see README § Rebuild/reset).
seed_shareable() {
# seed_shareable <cli> <subdir>...: copy each /host/.<cli>/<subdir> into the
# named volume, once. Skips a subdir the host doesn't have. We use `cp -r`,
# NOT `cp -a`/`cp -p`: this script runs as the non-root node user, and the
# host-stage files are owned by a different UID, so trying to preserve
# ownership would fail with EPERM and abort the run under `set -e` (the same
# reason sync_from_host uses plain cp). `cp -r` copies contents owned by node
# — exactly what we want — and preserves symlinks as symlinks (GNU default).
local cli=$1
shift
local marker="/home/node/.$cli/.devcontainer-shareable-seeded"
[ -f "$marker" ] && return 0
for sub in "$@"; do
local src="/host/.$cli/$sub"
local dst="/home/node/.$cli/$sub"
[ -d "$src" ] || continue
mkdir -p "$dst"
cp -r "$src/." "$dst/"
done
}
# Decide which plugin registries to translate BEFORE seeding sets the markers.
# We translate only a CLI being seeded this run, so a plugin installed inside the
# container isn't overwritten by the host's registry on a later rebuild. Codex
# has no path-bearing registry (config.toml holds git URLs), so it's never here.
TRANSLATE_CLIS=()
[ -f /home/node/.claude/.devcontainer-shareable-seeded ] || TRANSLATE_CLIS+=(claude)
[ -f /home/node/.cursor/.devcontainer-shareable-seeded ] || TRANSLATE_CLIS+=(cursor)
seed_shareable claude skills agents memory commands plugins/marketplaces plugins/cache
seed_shareable codex plugins prompts memories skills
seed_shareable cursor rules commands agents skills plugins/marketplaces plugins/local
# Translate the path-bearing plugin registries (Claude + Cursor) for the CLIs we
# just seeded. They store absolute, OS-native install paths
# (`C:\Users\X\.claude\plugins\...` on Windows), which the Linux container can't
# resolve — it would fail with `cache-miss`. translate-plugin-registries.cjs
# rewrites those to the container's paths and writes the result into the volume.
if [ "${#TRANSLATE_CLIS[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
node "$SCRIPT_DIR/translate-plugin-registries.cjs" "${TRANSLATE_CLIS[@]}"
fi
# Record that each CLI's shareable surface is seeded, so later rebuilds keep the
# container's copy. Touch even when the host had nothing to copy — an empty CLI
# is still "seeded", and we don't want to re-scan the host on every rebuild.
#
# ORDERING INVARIANT — do NOT move these touches earlier (e.g. into
# seed_shareable per-CLI). The markers must be written only AFTER the registry
# translation above, because seed (cache copy) and translate (registry rewrite)
# are logically atomic: a marker set between them would let a later rebuild skip
# translation for an already-seeded CLI, leaving its cache/ in place but its
# registry still pointing at host paths (`cache-miss`). Writing all markers here,
# after translate, means any abort mid-seed leaves NO markers, so the next create
# re-runs the whole seed+translate. The cost is re-copying an already-copied CLI
# on retry; `cp -r` overwrites in place, so that is idempotent and cheap relative
# to a broken plugin registry.
for cli in claude codex cursor; do
touch "/home/node/.$cli/.devcontainer-shareable-seeded"
done
echo "[post-create] 4/4: seed claude-mem store from host (first create only)"
# claude-mem keeps its memory in $HOME/.claude-mem — a SQLite DB (claude-mem.db
# plus -wal/-shm) and a Chroma vector store (chroma/chroma.sqlite3 + HNSW index
# binaries). It is mounted as a per-container named volume, NOT a host bind:
# pushing a multi-GB SQLite/WAL store over the 9p/virtiofs bind risks unreliable
# fcntl locking and corruption, especially if claude-mem ran on the host and in
# the container against the same files at once (see devcontainer.json).
#
# So seed it ONCE, then let the container own its copy. On every later rebuild
# we skip the copy and keep whatever the container has accumulated since —
# rebuilds never clobber it. The container's memory and the host's diverge from
# this seed point on; that is the deliberate cost of keeping SQLite off a shared
# bind. To re-seed from the host, remove the volume (`docker volume rm
# claude-mem-<id>`) and rebuild.
#
# The skip guard is a COMPLETION SENTINEL (.claude-mem-seeded), NOT the presence
# of claude-mem.db. Keying on the DB file would be a trap: a multi-GB `cp -r` can
# be interrupted (disk full, I/O error) and abort the script under `set -e`,
# leaving a PARTIAL claude-mem.db behind. The next create would then see that
# truncated file and treat the store as "already seeded", sticking the container
# with a corrupt DB forever. With a sentinel touched only AFTER `cp` returns 0,
# an interrupted seed leaves no sentinel; the next create clears the half-copied
# store and retries cleanly. CONSISTENCY: copying a live WAL database is only
# crash-consistent if claude-mem is NOT writing on the host during the copy — do
# not run claude-mem on the host during a first-create or a re-seed rebuild.
#
# `cp -r` (not `cp -a`/`cp -p`) copies the DB together with its -wal/-shm
# sidecars in one pass. We avoid preserving ownership for the same reason as the
# shareable seed above: this runs as the non-root node user against host-owned
# files, so `cp -a` would fail with EPERM and abort under `set -e`. `cp -r`
# leaves the copies owned by node. The host stage is read-only, so this can
# never write back to the host's live DB.
if [ -f /host/.claude-mem/claude-mem.db ] && [ ! -f /home/node/.claude-mem/.claude-mem-seeded ]; then
echo "[post-create] seeding ~/.claude-mem from host (one-time copy, may be several GB)"
# Clear any partial store left by a previously-interrupted seed (mindepth 1
# so the volume mount point itself is never removed), then copy and only then
# write the sentinel. A partial store is node-owned (cp runs as node, and
# step 1 re-chowns the volume whenever the sentinel is absent), so no sudo.
find /home/node/.claude-mem -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf {} +
cp -r /host/.claude-mem/. /home/node/.claude-mem/
touch /home/node/.claude-mem/.claude-mem-seeded
else
echo "[post-create] skipping claude-mem seed (already seeded, or host has no store)"
fi
echo "[post-create] done"
-83
View File
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
// Builds the container's $HOME/.claude.json from the host's copy. It does NOT
// copy the host file verbatim. The host's ~/.claude.json holds two kinds of
// data. Some is portable account and onboarding state: hasCompletedOnboarding,
// oauthAccount, userID, projects, tipsHistory. We keep that. The rest tracks
// how Claude was installed on the host machine, and that is never right inside
// this container.
//
// Here is why the install fields break things. The image installs Claude with
// `npm install -g`. But if the host's `installMethod` says something like
// "native", Claude looks for ~/.local/bin/claude and fails with
// "claude command not found at /home/node/.local/bin/claude". So we drop the
// install and machine fields. With them gone, the npm-global binary detects its
// own install method. We also force hasCompletedOnboarding so the setup wizard
// is skipped, even when the host has never run Claude before.
//
// This logic was pulled out of a heredoc in post-create.sh. As its own file the
// transform can be unit-tested and prettier-checked (see seed-claude-config.test
// via the translate-plugin-registries test harness). DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1 in
// containerEnv already stops runtime updates. This file only quiets the doctor
// mismatch and the native-path probe.
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
// Fields that describe how Claude was installed on the host machine. They are
// never valid in an `npm install -g` container. Removing them lets Claude
// detect the npm-global install on its own.
const MACHINE_FIELDS = [
'installMethod',
'autoUpdates',
'autoUpdatesProtectedForNative',
'shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled',
];
// Pure transform: take whatever the host file parsed to and return a config
// object suitable for the container. It also guards against a host file that is
// valid JSON but not an object. A bare number, string, or array would pass the
// parse try/catch. Then the field deletes would do nothing, the
// hasCompletedOnboarding assignment would silently fail, and onboarding would
// trigger again on every rebuild. The guard replaces such a value with {}.
function sanitizeClaudeConfig(parsed) {
let cfg = parsed;
if (cfg === null || typeof cfg !== 'object' || Array.isArray(cfg)) {
cfg = {};
}
for (const k of MACHINE_FIELDS) {
delete cfg[k];
}
cfg.hasCompletedOnboarding = true; // skip the wizard, even on a first-time host
return cfg;
}
function readHostConfig(src) {
try {
if (fs.existsSync(src) && fs.statSync(src).size > 0) {
return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(src, 'utf8'));
}
} catch {
// Host file is malformed or unreadable. Fall back to an empty config so the
// container still gets a valid file that carries hasCompletedOnboarding.
}
return {};
}
function main() {
const src = process.argv[2] || '/host/.claude.json';
const dst = process.argv[3] || '/home/node/.claude.json';
const cfg = sanitizeClaudeConfig(readHostConfig(src));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(dst, JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2));
fs.chmodSync(dst, 0o644);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[post-create] ERROR: failed to seed ${dst}: ${err && err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
module.exports = { sanitizeClaudeConfig, readHostConfig, MACHINE_FIELDS };
if (require.main === module) {
main();
}
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
// Rewrites the host paths inside Claude and Cursor plugin-registry JSON files
// so they point at the container's Linux paths, then writes the results into
// the named volume.
//
// Why: both CLIs store absolute, OS-native install paths in their registry
// JSONs. On Windows that looks like `C:\Users\X\.claude\plugins\...`; on macOS
// like `/Users/X/.cursor/...`. The Linux container can't use those paths. If we
// just bind-mounted the host files in, the CLI would try to resolve a Windows
// path under Linux and fail with `cache-miss`. So for each CLI we read the host
// registry, rewrite every absolute path ending in `/.<cli>/plugins/<rest>` to
// `/home/node/.<cli>/plugins/<rest>`, and write the result into the named volume.
//
// Codex is left alone. Its registry is config.toml and holds git URLs, not
// filesystem paths, so there's nothing to translate — its whole plugins/ dir is
// copied as-is into the container volume instead (seeded once by post-create.sh).
//
// This code lived inside a post-create.sh heredoc. We pulled it out so the regex
// and the deep rewrite can be unit-tested and prettier-checked. The regex has
// had path-handling bugs before.
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
// Build a regex that matches an absolute path containing
// `<sep>.<cli><sep>plugins<sep><rest>`, where <sep> is `/` or `\`. It's anchored
// at the start of the string. The lazy `.*?` eats the home prefix up to the
// FIRST `.<cli>/plugins` segment.
function buildRe(cliName) {
return new RegExp(`^(?:[A-Za-z]:)?[\\\\/].*?[\\\\/]\\.${cliName}[\\\\/]plugins[\\\\/](.*)$`);
}
// Walk `obj` and rewrite every string value that matches `re`. A match is
// remapped under `ctr`, the container's plugins dir. Windows backslashes in the
// matched part are switched to forward slashes.
function rewriteDeep(obj, re, ctr) {
if (Array.isArray(obj)) return obj.map((v) => rewriteDeep(v, re, ctr));
if (obj && typeof obj === 'object') {
const out = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(obj)) out[k] = rewriteDeep(v, re, ctr);
return out;
}
if (typeof obj === 'string') {
return obj.replace(re, (_, rest) => `${ctr}/${rest.replace(/\\/g, '/')}`);
}
return obj;
}
const REGISTRIES = [
{
cli: 'claude',
host: '/host/.claude/plugins',
ctr: '/home/node/.claude/plugins',
files: ['known_marketplaces.json', 'installed_plugins.json', 'plugin-catalog-cache.json'],
},
{
cli: 'cursor',
host: '/host/.cursor/plugins',
ctr: '/home/node/.cursor/plugins',
files: ['installed_plugins.json'],
},
];
function translate(registries) {
for (const reg of registries) {
const re = buildRe(reg.cli);
try {
fs.mkdirSync(reg.ctr, { recursive: true });
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[post-create] ERROR: failed to create ${reg.ctr}: ${err && err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
}
for (const name of reg.files) {
const src = path.join(reg.host, name);
const dst = path.join(reg.ctr, name);
if (!fs.existsSync(src) || fs.statSync(src).size === 0) continue;
let data;
try {
data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(src, 'utf8'));
} catch {
continue; // Skip a malformed host registry instead of aborting.
}
try {
fs.writeFileSync(dst, JSON.stringify(rewriteDeep(data, re, reg.ctr), null, 2));
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[post-create] ERROR: failed to write ${dst}: ${err && err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
}
}
// Filter the registry table by CLI name. post-create.sh passes the CLIs it is
// seeding this run (e.g. `claude`), so a registry is only (re)generated on the
// FIRST container-create for that CLI — never on a rebuild, where it would
// clobber a plugin the user installed inside the container. An empty filter
// (no args) means "translate every registry" — the original behavior.
function selectRegistries(registries, only) {
return only && only.length ? registries.filter((r) => only.includes(r.cli)) : registries;
}
module.exports = { buildRe, rewriteDeep, REGISTRIES, translate, selectRegistries };
if (require.main === module) {
translate(selectRegistries(REGISTRIES, process.argv.slice(2)));
}
@@ -1,436 +0,0 @@
// Unit tests for the devcontainer host->container config transforms.
//
// This code used to live inside post-create.sh heredocs, where lint could not
// see it and tests could not reach it. We test three things:
// - plugin-registry path translation (buildRe + rewriteDeep + the real
// filesystem translate() driver). Path handling here has had bugs before.
// - the strip of machine-specific fields from $HOME/.claude.json
// (sanitizeClaudeConfig + readHostConfig + the seed-claude-config main()
// entry point)
// - the host bind-source bootstrap (ensurePaths). One test guards against a
// regression: ensurePaths must NOT pre-create settings.json / config.toml
// on the host.
//
// We test both pure functions and code that touches the filesystem. The
// filesystem tests use throwaway directories under os.tmpdir() and delete them
// when done. So they run in CI with no mounts and never touch the real home dir.
//
// Run with the built-in Node test runner (no extra dependencies):
// node --test .devcontainer/
'use strict';
const test = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const os = require('node:os');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const {
buildRe,
rewriteDeep,
translate,
selectRegistries,
} = require('./translate-plugin-registries.cjs');
const { sanitizeClaudeConfig, readHostConfig } = require('./seed-claude-config.cjs');
const { ensurePaths, DIRS, FILES } = require('./ensure-host-config-dirs.cjs');
const CLAUDE = '/home/node/.claude/plugins';
const CURSOR = '/home/node/.cursor/plugins';
// Make a fresh throwaway directory under the OS temp root. mkdtemp picks a
// unique name on every call, so we don't need Date.now() or random names.
function tmp() {
return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gn-dc-'));
}
function rw(value, cli, ctr) {
return rewriteDeep(value, buildRe(cli), ctr);
}
test('claude: Windows backslash absolute path -> container path', () => {
assert.equal(
rw('C:\\Users\\gergo\\.claude\\plugins\\cache\\x\\1.0', 'claude', CLAUDE),
'/home/node/.claude/plugins/cache/x/1.0',
);
});
test('claude: Windows forward-slash absolute path -> container path', () => {
assert.equal(
rw('C:/Users/gergo/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m', 'claude', CLAUDE),
'/home/node/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m',
);
});
test('claude: macOS POSIX path -> container path', () => {
assert.equal(
rw('/Users/alice/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m', 'claude', CLAUDE),
'/home/node/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m',
);
});
test('claude: Linux POSIX path -> container path', () => {
assert.equal(
rw('/home/bob/.claude/plugins/cache/foo', 'claude', CLAUDE),
'/home/node/.claude/plugins/cache/foo',
);
});
test('cursor: Windows path -> container cursor path', () => {
assert.equal(
rw('C:\\Users\\gergo\\.cursor\\plugins\\local\\myplug', 'cursor', CURSOR),
'/home/node/.cursor/plugins/local/myplug',
);
});
test('cross-CLI isolation: claude regex leaves a .cursor path untouched', () => {
const input = 'C:\\Users\\g\\.cursor\\plugins\\x';
assert.equal(rw(input, 'claude', CLAUDE), input);
});
test('non-path strings pass through unchanged', () => {
assert.equal(rw('not-a-path', 'claude', CLAUDE), 'not-a-path');
assert.equal(
rw('https://github.com/EveryInc/x.git', 'claude', CLAUDE),
'https://github.com/EveryInc/x.git',
);
});
test('non-string scalars pass through unchanged', () => {
assert.equal(rw(42, 'claude', CLAUDE), 42);
assert.equal(rw(null, 'claude', CLAUDE), null);
assert.equal(rw(true, 'claude', CLAUDE), true);
});
test('nested objects/arrays are rewritten deeply', () => {
const input = {
'compound-engineering@m': [
{ installPath: 'C:\\Users\\g\\.claude\\plugins\\cache\\ce\\3.9.2', version: '3.9.2' },
],
nested: { installLocation: '/Users/g/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m' },
};
const out = rw(input, 'claude', CLAUDE);
assert.equal(
out['compound-engineering@m'][0].installPath,
'/home/node/.claude/plugins/cache/ce/3.9.2',
);
assert.equal(out['compound-engineering@m'][0].version, '3.9.2');
assert.equal(out.nested.installLocation, '/home/node/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/m');
});
test('sanitizeClaudeConfig: strips machine fields, forces hasCompletedOnboarding', () => {
const out = sanitizeClaudeConfig({
installMethod: 'native',
autoUpdates: false,
autoUpdatesProtectedForNative: true,
shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled: true,
userID: 'abc',
oauthAccount: { emailAddress: 'x@y.z' },
});
assert.equal(out.installMethod, undefined);
assert.equal(out.autoUpdates, undefined);
assert.equal(out.autoUpdatesProtectedForNative, undefined);
assert.equal(out.shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled, undefined);
assert.equal(out.userID, 'abc');
assert.equal(out.oauthAccount.emailAddress, 'x@y.z');
assert.equal(out.hasCompletedOnboarding, true);
});
test('sanitizeClaudeConfig: non-object inputs become a valid onboarding-bearing object', () => {
for (const bad of [42, 'x', null, ['a'], true]) {
const out = sanitizeClaudeConfig(bad);
assert.equal(typeof out, 'object');
assert.equal(Array.isArray(out), false);
assert.equal(out.hasCompletedOnboarding, true);
}
});
test('sanitizeClaudeConfig: empty object still gets hasCompletedOnboarding', () => {
assert.deepEqual(sanitizeClaudeConfig({}), { hasCompletedOnboarding: true });
});
// --- readHostConfig: reading the file, and the fallbacks when it fails ------
test('readHostConfig: missing file -> {}', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
assert.deepEqual(readHostConfig(path.join(dir, 'nope.json')), {});
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('readHostConfig: empty (zero-byte) file -> {}', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
const f = path.join(dir, 'empty.json');
fs.writeFileSync(f, '');
assert.deepEqual(readHostConfig(f), {});
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('readHostConfig: malformed JSON -> {}', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
const f = path.join(dir, 'bad.json');
fs.writeFileSync(f, '{ not valid json');
assert.deepEqual(readHostConfig(f), {});
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('readHostConfig: valid object is parsed through', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
const f = path.join(dir, 'ok.json');
fs.writeFileSync(f, JSON.stringify({ userID: 'u', hasCompletedOnboarding: false }));
const out = readHostConfig(f);
assert.equal(out.userID, 'u');
assert.equal(out.hasCompletedOnboarding, false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
// --- translate(): runs against real registry files on disk ------------------
test('translate: rewrites host absolute paths and writes into the ctr dir', () => {
const hostDir = tmp();
const ctrParent = tmp();
const ctrDir = path.join(ctrParent, 'plugins'); // need not exist yet; translate creates it
try {
const reg = [{ cli: 'claude', host: hostDir, ctr: ctrDir, files: ['installed_plugins.json'] }];
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(hostDir, 'installed_plugins.json'),
JSON.stringify({ 'p@m': [{ installPath: 'C:\\Users\\g\\.claude\\plugins\\cache\\p\\1.0' }] }),
);
translate(reg);
const out = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'installed_plugins.json'), 'utf8'));
assert.equal(out['p@m'][0].installPath, `${ctrDir}/cache/p/1.0`);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(hostDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(ctrParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('translate: idempotent — a second run reproduces byte-identical output', () => {
const hostDir = tmp();
const ctrParent = tmp();
const ctrDir = path.join(ctrParent, 'plugins');
try {
const reg = [{ cli: 'claude', host: hostDir, ctr: ctrDir, files: ['installed_plugins.json'] }];
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(hostDir, 'installed_plugins.json'),
JSON.stringify({ 'p@m': [{ installPath: 'C:\\Users\\g\\.claude\\plugins\\cache\\p\\1.0' }] }),
);
translate(reg);
const first = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'installed_plugins.json'), 'utf8');
translate(reg);
const second = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'installed_plugins.json'), 'utf8');
assert.equal(first, second);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(hostDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(ctrParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('translate: malformed host registry is skipped, dst not written', () => {
const hostDir = tmp();
const ctrParent = tmp();
const ctrDir = path.join(ctrParent, 'plugins');
try {
const reg = [{ cli: 'claude', host: hostDir, ctr: ctrDir, files: ['installed_plugins.json'] }];
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(hostDir, 'installed_plugins.json'), '{ broken');
translate(reg);
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'installed_plugins.json')), false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(hostDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(ctrParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('translate: empty and missing host registries are skipped without error', () => {
const hostDir = tmp();
const ctrParent = tmp();
const ctrDir = path.join(ctrParent, 'plugins');
try {
const reg = [
{ cli: 'claude', host: hostDir, ctr: ctrDir, files: ['empty.json', 'missing.json'] },
];
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(hostDir, 'empty.json'), ''); // we never create missing.json
translate(reg);
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'empty.json')), false);
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(ctrDir, 'missing.json')), false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(hostDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.rmSync(ctrParent, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
// --- selectRegistries: the per-CLI filter post-create.sh drives translate with
test('selectRegistries: no filter -> all registries (original behavior)', () => {
const regs = [{ cli: 'claude' }, { cli: 'cursor' }];
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, []), regs);
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, undefined), regs);
});
test('selectRegistries: filter keeps only the named CLIs', () => {
const regs = [{ cli: 'claude' }, { cli: 'cursor' }];
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, ['claude']), [{ cli: 'claude' }]);
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, ['cursor']), [{ cli: 'cursor' }]);
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, ['claude', 'cursor']), regs);
});
test('selectRegistries: an unknown CLI name selects nothing', () => {
const regs = [{ cli: 'claude' }, { cli: 'cursor' }];
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries(regs, ['codex']), []);
});
test('selectRegistries: empty registry table stays empty under any filter', () => {
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries([], ['claude']), []);
assert.deepEqual(selectRegistries([], []), []);
});
// --- seed-claude-config main(): end-to-end, through the real CLI entry point
const SEED_SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, 'seed-claude-config.cjs');
test('seed main: strips machine fields, keeps account, sets onboarding, chmod 644', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
const src = path.join(dir, 'host.claude.json');
const dst = path.join(dir, 'out.claude.json');
fs.writeFileSync(
src,
JSON.stringify({
installMethod: 'native',
userID: 'abc',
oauthAccount: { emailAddress: 'x@y.z' },
}),
);
execFileSync(process.execPath, [SEED_SCRIPT, src, dst]);
const out = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(dst, 'utf8'));
assert.equal(out.installMethod, undefined);
assert.equal(out.userID, 'abc');
assert.equal(out.oauthAccount.emailAddress, 'x@y.z');
assert.equal(out.hasCompletedOnboarding, true);
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
assert.equal(fs.statSync(dst).mode & 0o777, 0o644);
}
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('seed main: missing host file still writes a valid onboarding-bearing file', () => {
const dir = tmp();
try {
const dst = path.join(dir, 'out.claude.json');
execFileSync(process.execPath, [SEED_SCRIPT, path.join(dir, 'nope.json'), dst]);
assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(dst, 'utf8')), { hasCompletedOnboarding: true });
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('seed main: chmodSync widens a pre-existing restrictive dst to 0o644', () => {
// This checks the file's permission bits, which only exist on POSIX systems.
//
// The catch: CI's default umask is 022, so a plain writeFileSync already
// creates files at mode 0o644. Asserting 0o644 right after a fresh write
// would therefore NOT prove the explicit chmodSync did anything.
//
// So we pre-create dst at the stricter mode 0o600. Opening a file in 'w'
// mode replaces its contents but KEEPS the mode of a file that already
// exists. That means the only way dst can end up at 0o644 is the chmodSync
// inside seed-claude-config.cjs. This pins the test to the chmod and not to
// the umask: delete the chmodSync line and this test fails, while the other
// seed test still passes.
if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
const dir = tmp();
try {
const src = path.join(dir, 'host.claude.json');
const dst = path.join(dir, 'out.claude.json');
fs.writeFileSync(src, JSON.stringify({ userID: 'u' }));
fs.writeFileSync(dst, '{}');
fs.chmodSync(dst, 0o600);
execFileSync(process.execPath, [SEED_SCRIPT, src, dst]);
assert.equal(fs.statSync(dst).mode & 0o777, 0o644);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(dst, 'utf8')).userID, 'u');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
// --- ensurePaths: sets up the host paths the bind mounts point at -----------
test('ensurePaths: creates every DIR and FILE under a temp home, idempotently', () => {
const home = tmp();
try {
ensurePaths(home);
for (const d of DIRS) {
assert.equal(fs.statSync(path.join(home, d)).isDirectory(), true, `not a dir: ${d}`);
}
for (const f of FILES) {
assert.equal(fs.statSync(path.join(home, f)).isFile(), true, `not a file: ${f}`);
}
// Running it again must not throw and must not overwrite existing content.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(home, '.claude.json'), '{"keep":true}');
ensurePaths(home);
assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(path.join(home, '.claude.json'), 'utf8'), '{"keep":true}');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('ensurePaths: does NOT pre-create settings.json / config.toml (no gratuitous host mutation)', () => {
const home = tmp();
try {
ensurePaths(home);
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(home, '.claude', 'settings.json')), false);
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(home, '.codex', 'config.toml')), false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('ensurePaths: does NOT pre-create the shareable subdirs (now copied, not bound)', () => {
// The shareable dirs are seeded into the per-container volume from the
// read-only /host stage, so they are no longer bind-mount sources. Pre-creating
// empty ones would needlessly write into the host of someone who never used a
// CLI. This pins the DIRS trim: re-adding any of these would fail the test.
const home = tmp();
const mustNotExist = [
path.join('.claude', 'skills'),
path.join('.claude', 'agents'),
path.join('.claude', 'memory'),
path.join('.claude', 'commands'),
path.join('.claude', 'plugins'),
path.join('.codex', 'plugins'),
path.join('.codex', 'prompts'),
path.join('.codex', 'memories'),
path.join('.codex', 'skills'),
path.join('.cursor', 'rules'),
path.join('.cursor', 'commands'),
path.join('.cursor', 'agents'),
path.join('.cursor', 'skills'),
path.join('.cursor', 'plugins'),
];
try {
ensurePaths(home);
for (const sub of mustNotExist) {
assert.equal(fs.existsSync(path.join(home, sub)), false, `should not pre-create: ${sub}`);
}
// The top-level stage roots that ARE still bind sources must exist.
for (const top of ['.claude', '.codex', '.cursor', '.claude-mem']) {
assert.equal(fs.statSync(path.join(home, top)).isDirectory(), true, `missing root: ${top}`);
}
} finally {
fs.rmSync(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
.git
.gitignore
.DS_Store
node_modules
**/node_modules
dist
**/dist
coverage
**/coverage
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
**/*.tsbuildinfo
.gitnexus
gitnexus-web/playwright-report
gitnexus-web/test-results
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# Images (signed Cosign keyless on every push from main / vX.Y.Z tags).
# Available from both GHCR (default below) and Docker Hub — pick one:
# GHCR: ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus{,-web}:latest
# Docker Hub: akonlabs/gitnexus{,-web}:latest
# Both registries receive the same digest from a single signed build.
SERVER_IMAGE=ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus:latest
WEB_IMAGE=ghcr.io/abhigyanpatwari/gitnexus-web:latest
# Container names
SERVER_CONTAINER_NAME=gitnexus-server
WEB_CONTAINER_NAME=gitnexus-web
# Host ports — the web UI expects the server on http://localhost:4747 by default.
SERVER_HOST_PORT=4747
WEB_HOST_PORT=4173
# Optional read-only mount, exposed to the server as /workspace.
# Override with the directory that contains the repos you want to index.
WORKSPACE_DIR=./
# Azure DevOps Server Integration (passed to the server container)
# Prefer https:// — the PAT rides in an Authorization header, so cleartext
# http:// exposes it on the wire (still supported for internal-only instances).
# AZURE_DEVOPS_URL=https://azuredevops.example.com
# AZURE_DEVOPS_PAT=your-pat-here
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
description = "GitNexus production-readiness PR swarm review (Solo mode)"
prompt = """
You are the GitNexus PR review coordinator. Review this pull request: {{args}}
(a PR URL or number for https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus). If no target was
given, ask for one.
Read `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md` in this repository and follow it exactly. It is the
canonical, CLI-neutral review contract (lanes, classifications, output structure, finding
format, hidden-Unicode checks, behavior rules).
Run in **Solo mode**: you are a single agent, so perform all seven lanes yourself in
dependency order, adopting each persona in `pr-swarm-review/personas/0N-*.md` in turn
(lanes 1-2 first, then 3-6, then lane 7). Keep every lane's findings in context. Lane 7
(synthesis critic) is a hard gate: do not emit the final review until its "Required
corrections before posting" section is empty — revise and re-run it otherwise.
Stay strictly read-only: investigate and report; never edit files, commit, or post to GitHub.
"""
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
# Prettier initial formatting (2026-03-28)
afcc3d1523f99c77ff67c4fd1af12334660113f6
# ESLint unused import removal (2026-03-28)
1491826bc8da5436d3b1eb092d9274f2c9f028a7
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
* text=auto eol=lf
.husky/* text eol=lf
# Shell scripts: force LF unconditionally so devcontainer scripts
# (e.g. anything COPYed into a Linux container) execute correctly when
# checked out on Windows hosts with core.autocrlf=true.
*.sh text eol=lf
*.bash text eol=lf
# Native and binary assets shouldn't be treated as text under any
# auto-detection or eol normalization.
*.node binary
*.wasm binary
*.onnx binary
*.so binary
*.dll binary
*.dylib binary
-5
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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
# Code owners
* @abhigyanpatwari
* @magyargergo
* @azizur100389
-86
View File
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
name: Bug report
description: Report unexpected behavior or a regression
labels: [bug]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
**Goal:** capture enough context to reproduce and fix the issue quickly.
Use **one issue per bug**; split unrelated problems.
- type: dropdown
id: area
attributes:
label: Area
description: Where does the problem show up?
options:
- gitnexus (CLI / core / indexing / MCP server)
- gitnexus-web (browser UI / WASM / workers)
- CI / GitHub Actions
- Documentation / developer experience
- Other
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: summary
attributes:
label: Summary
description: One sentence — what went wrong?
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: context
attributes:
label: Context
description: What were you trying to do? Any relevant links, PRs, or commits?
validations:
required: false
- type: textarea
id: expected
attributes:
label: Expected behavior
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: actual
attributes:
label: Actual behavior
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: reproduce
attributes:
label: Steps to reproduce
description: Ordered steps, sample repo or minimal case, commands run.
placeholder: |
1. …
2. …
3. …
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: environment
attributes:
label: Environment
description: OS, Node version, browser (if web), GitNexus version or commit SHA.
placeholder: |
- OS:
- Node:
- Browser (if applicable):
- Commit / version:
validations:
required: false
- type: textarea
id: logs
attributes:
label: Logs / screenshots
description: Paste errors, stack traces, or attach screenshots (redact secrets).
validations:
required: false
-1
View File
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
blank_issues_enabled: true
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
name: Feature request
description: Propose a new capability or improvement
labels: [enhancement]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
**Goal:** describe the problem and desired outcome so maintainers can size and prioritize.
Prefer **small, shippable** requests; split large ideas into phases.
- type: dropdown
id: area
attributes:
label: Area
description: Primary part of the monorepo this relates to.
options:
- gitnexus (CLI / core / indexing / MCP server)
- gitnexus-web (browser UI / WASM / workers)
- CI / release / packaging
- Documentation / developer experience
- Other
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
label: Problem or opportunity
description: What pain point or gap exists today?
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: proposal
attributes:
label: Proposed solution
description: What should happen instead? User-visible behavior, APIs, or UX.
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: alternatives
attributes:
label: Alternatives considered
description: Other approaches you considered and why this one is preferred.
validations:
required: false
- type: textarea
id: acceptance
attributes:
label: Acceptance criteria
description: Testable conditions for “done” (bullets or checkboxes in prose).
placeholder: |
- When … then …
- Documentation / tests updated where appropriate
validations:
required: false
- type: textarea
id: constraints
attributes:
label: Constraints
description: Compatibility, performance, security, or “must not change” boundaries.
validations:
required: false
- type: checkboxes
id: willing
attributes:
label: Contribution
options:
- label: I am willing to open a PR for this (may need design discussion first).
required: false
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
## Summary
<!-- One or two sentences: what does this PR change? -->
## Motivation / context
<!-- Why is this change needed? Link issues, ADRs, or prior discussion. -->
## Areas touched
<!-- Check all that apply -->
- [ ] `gitnexus/` (CLI / core / MCP server)
- [ ] `gitnexus-web/` (Vite / React UI)
- [ ] `.github/` (workflows, actions)
- [ ] `eval/` or other tooling
- [ ] Docs / agent config only (`AGENTS.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `.cursor/`, `llms.txt`, etc.)
## Scope & constraints
**In scope**
- <!-- bullets -->
**Explicitly out of scope / not done here**
- <!-- bullets — prevents reviewers assuming missing work is an oversight -->
## Implementation notes
<!-- Optional: design choices, tradeoffs, follow-ups -->
## Testing & verification
<!-- What you ran; paste commands. Omit sections that do not apply. -->
- [ ] `cd gitnexus && npm test`
- [ ] `cd gitnexus && npm run test:integration` *(if core/indexing/MCP paths changed)*
- [ ] `cd gitnexus && npx tsc --noEmit`
- [ ] `cd gitnexus-web && npm test` *(if web changed)*
- [ ] `cd gitnexus-web && npx tsc -b --noEmit` *(if web changed)*
- [ ] Manual / Playwright E2E *(note environment — see `gitnexus-web/e2e/`)*
## Risk & rollout
<!-- Breaking changes, migrations, index refresh (`npx gitnexus analyze`), release notes -->
## Checklist
- [ ] PR body meets repo minimum length (workflow may label short descriptions)
- [ ] If `AGENTS.md` / overlays changed: headers, scope block, and changelog updated per project conventions
- [ ] No secrets, tokens, or machine-specific paths committed
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
# Wraps docker/build-push-action with one automatic retry. Upstream explicitly
# keeps retry out of the action (docker/build-push-action#1422); a local
# composite keeps docker.yml readable and pins the same action SHA in one place.
name: Docker build-push (with retry)
description: >-
Runs docker/build-push-action twice on failure with a configurable backoff,
then exposes the digest from whichever attempt succeeded.
inputs:
context:
description: Build context path
required: false
default: '.'
file:
description: Dockerfile path (relative to repo root)
required: true
platforms:
description: Comma-separated platforms list for buildx
required: true
push:
description: Whether to push (string 'true' or 'false')
required: true
tags:
description: Newline-separated image tags (from docker/metadata-action)
required: true
labels:
description: Labels string (from docker/metadata-action)
required: true
cache-from:
description: buildx cache-from value
required: true
cache-to:
description: buildx cache-to value (include ignore-error=true for GHA cache flakes)
required: true
retry-wait-seconds:
description: Seconds to sleep before the second attempt
required: false
default: '45'
outputs:
digest:
description: Manifest digest from the successful build attempt
value: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.digest }}
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Build and push (attempt 1)
id: try1
continue-on-error: true
uses: docker/build-push-action@bcafcacb16a39f128d818304e6c9c0c18556b85f # v7.1.0
with:
context: ${{ inputs.context }}
file: ${{ inputs.file }}
platforms: ${{ inputs.platforms }}
push: ${{ inputs.push == 'true' }}
tags: ${{ inputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ inputs.labels }}
cache-from: ${{ inputs.cache-from }}
cache-to: ${{ inputs.cache-to }}
provenance: mode=max
sbom: true
- name: Backoff before Docker build retry
if: steps.try1.outcome == 'failure'
shell: bash
env:
RETRY_WAIT_SECONDS: ${{ inputs.retry-wait-seconds }}
run: |
echo "::warning::Docker build-push attempt 1 failed; retrying in ${RETRY_WAIT_SECONDS}s…"
sleep "${RETRY_WAIT_SECONDS}"
- name: Build and push (attempt 2)
id: try2
if: steps.try1.outcome == 'failure'
uses: docker/build-push-action@bcafcacb16a39f128d818304e6c9c0c18556b85f # v7.1.0
with:
context: ${{ inputs.context }}
file: ${{ inputs.file }}
platforms: ${{ inputs.platforms }}
push: ${{ inputs.push == 'true' }}
tags: ${{ inputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ inputs.labels }}
cache-from: ${{ inputs.cache-from }}
cache-to: ${{ inputs.cache-to }}
provenance: mode=max
sbom: true
- name: Resolve image digest
id: resolve
if: always()
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${{ steps.try1.outcome }}" = "success" ]; then
echo "digest=${{ steps.try1.outputs.digest }}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
if [ "${{ steps.try2.outcome }}" = "success" ]; then
echo "::notice::docker-build-push retry succeeded (attempt 2); investigate if this recurs across runs."
echo "digest=${{ steps.try2.outputs.digest }}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "::error::Docker build and push failed after two attempts (registry/cache flake or real build error)."
exit 1
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
name: Setup GitNexus Web
description: Setup Node.js 22, build gitnexus-shared, install web dependencies
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
# Vite 7 requires Node ^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0 (require(esm) support).
node-version: 22
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: gitnexus-web/package-lock.json
- name: Build gitnexus-shared
run: npm install && npm run build
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus-shared
- name: Install web dependencies
run: npm ci
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus-web
+3 -8
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: Setup GitNexus
description: Setup Node.js 22, install dependencies, and optionally build
description: Setup Node.js 20, install dependencies, and optionally build
inputs:
build:
@@ -10,17 +10,12 @@ inputs:
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 22
node-version: 20
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: gitnexus/package-lock.json
- name: Build gitnexus-shared
run: npm install && npm run build
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus-shared
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
shell: bash
-122
View File
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
version: 2
updates:
# Keep third-party Actions SHA pins current. See CONTRIBUTING.md — when
# reviewing these bumps, verify the SHA corresponds to the claimed tag by
# running `gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/refs/tags/<tag>` before merge.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
commit-message:
prefix: chore
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
- ci
# Keep pinned Docker base-image digests current for the root Dockerfiles.
- package-ecosystem: docker
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
commit-message:
prefix: chore(deps)
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
- ci
# Keep the nested test-image Docker base digest current as well.
- package-ecosystem: docker
directory: /gitnexus
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
commit-message:
prefix: chore(deps)
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
- ci
# Gitnexus npm deps — tree-sitter grammars checked daily so we catch
# new releases that unblock the tree-sitter 0.25 upgrade ASAP. Grammars
# are grouped so lockstep bumps produce a single PR. The tree-sitter
# RUNTIME is pinned — upgrade deliberately via the drift check workflow.
# See .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py for
# the upgrade readiness tracker.
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /gitnexus
schedule:
interval: daily
cooldown:
default-days: 7
semver-major-days: 30
semver-minor-days: 7
semver-patch-days: 3
open-pull-requests-limit: 10
commit-message:
prefix: chore(deps)
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
groups:
tree-sitter-grammars:
patterns:
- tree-sitter-*
exclude-patterns:
- tree-sitter
- tree-sitter-cli
ignore:
# Pin the tree-sitter runtime at 0.21.x until the drift check
# reports all grammars are peer-dep compatible with 0.25.
- dependency-name: tree-sitter
update-types:
- version-update:semver-major
- version-update:semver-minor
# tree-sitter-cli follows the runtime's version cadence. Bump when
# regenerating vendor/tree-sitter-proto/src/parser.c, not on a schedule.
- dependency-name: tree-sitter-cli
# gitnexus-web (thin frontend client).
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /gitnexus-web
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
semver-major-days: 30
semver-minor-days: 7
semver-patch-days: 3
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
commit-message:
prefix: chore(deps)
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
- frontend
# Shared types package.
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /gitnexus-shared
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
semver-major-days: 30
semver-minor-days: 7
semver-patch-days: 3
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
commit-message:
prefix: chore(deps)
include: scope
labels:
- dependencies
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
---
description: 'GitNexus production-readiness PR swarm review (Solo mode)'
mode: 'agent'
---
You are the GitNexus PR review coordinator. Review the pull request the user names (a PR URL
or number for `https://github.com/abhigyanpatwari/GitNexus`). If none was given, ask for one.
Read `pr-swarm-review/orchestration.md` in this repository and follow it exactly — it is the
canonical, CLI-neutral review contract (lanes, classifications, output structure, finding
format, hidden-Unicode checks, behavior rules).
Run in **Solo mode**: you are a single agent, so perform all seven lanes yourself in
dependency order, adopting each persona in `pr-swarm-review/personas/0N-*.md` in turn
(lanes 1–2 first, then 3–6, then lane 7). Keep every lane's findings in context. Lane 7
(synthesis critic) is a hard gate: do not emit the final review until its "Required
corrections before posting" section is empty.
Stay strictly read-only: investigate and report; never edit files, commit, or post to GitHub.
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
# release-drafter config — used only for PR autolabeling by
# `.github/workflows/pr-labeler.yml` (the workflow passes `disable-releaser: true`,
# so the draft-release side of release-drafter never runs).
#
# The labels applied here are the same ones `.github/release.yml` maps to
# categorized release-notes sections.
#
# `sync-labels: true` removes managed autolabels that no longer match the PR —
# critical for the breaking-change case: if a PR title drops the `!` or the body
# drops `BREAKING CHANGE:`, the `breaking` label is pulled off automatically.
# Required by release-drafter; not used because releaser is disabled.
name-template: 'unused'
tag-template: 'unused'
template: |
$CHANGES
sync-labels: true
autolabeler:
- label: enhancement
title:
- '/^feat(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: bug
title:
- '/^fix(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: performance
title:
- '/^perf(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: refactor
title:
- '/^refactor(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: documentation
title:
- '/^docs(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: test
title:
- '/^test(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: ci
title:
- '/^ci(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: dependencies
title:
- '/^(build|deps)(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
- label: chore
title:
- '/^(chore|revert)(\([^)]+\))?!?:/i'
# Breaking-change marker: either `!` in the type prefix or `BREAKING CHANGE:` in body.
- label: breaking
title:
- '/^[a-z]+(\([^)]+\))?!:/i'
body:
- '/BREAKING[ -]CHANGE:/i'
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ changelog:
- dependencies
- title: "\U0001F4DD Other Changes"
labels:
- '*'
- "*"
exclude:
labels:
- dependencies
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Enforce the GitHub Actions concurrency convention.
See CONTRIBUTING.md -> "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention" for the rules.
Invoked from .github/workflows/ci-quality.yml. Runs locally too:
python3 .github/scripts/check-workflow-concurrency.py .github/workflows
Rules:
1. Every entry-point (non-reusable) workflow declares a top-level
`concurrency:` block.
2. Reusable workflows (on: workflow_call ONLY) do NOT declare one.
3. The `concurrency.group` expression MUST reference either
`${{ github.workflow }}` or one of the approved hardcoded literal prefixes
for workflows that are simultaneously entry-points AND reusable (on: push/
workflow_call). Two such exceptions are currently approved:
- `CI-` for ci.yml (the original canonical form)
- `docker-build-push-` for docker.yml
This is checked by substring containment rather than prefix match because
the group value is a conditional expression that resolves to a `CI-…` or
`docker-build-push-…` literal at runtime.
We deliberately do not use a YAML library — keeps the script dependency-free
on any vanilla runner. `on:` block parsing is line-based and handles both the
flat (`on: workflow_call`) and mapping (`on:\n workflow_call:`) forms.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import re
import sys
REQUIRED_TOKENS = ("${{ github.workflow }}", "CI-", "docker-build-push-")
def is_reusable(lines: list[str]) -> bool:
"""Return True iff the workflow's `on:` block names only `workflow_call`."""
in_on = False
on_indent: int | None = None
keys: list[str] = []
for raw in lines:
# Skip blank lines and comments
stripped = raw.strip()
if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
continue
indent = len(raw) - len(raw.lstrip(" "))
if not in_on:
if raw.startswith("on:"):
remainder = raw[len("on:"):].strip()
if not remainder:
# `on:` followed by indented mapping on next lines
in_on = True
on_indent = indent
continue
if remainder.startswith("[") and remainder.endswith("]"):
# Flow-style list: on: [workflow_call]
items = [
item.strip() for item in remainder.strip("[]").split(",")
]
return items == ["workflow_call"]
# Scalar form: on: workflow_call (or a single other event)
return remainder == "workflow_call"
continue
# Inside the `on:` block; stop when indentation returns to <= on_indent
if on_indent is not None and indent <= on_indent:
break
# Only consider keys at on_indent + indentation step (anything deeper
# is nested config like `types:`)
if ":" not in stripped:
continue
# Heuristic: first-level event keys are those with indent == on_indent + 2
# (the canonical step for a 2-space YAML doc). We collect all first-level
# keys by tracking the smallest indent seen inside the block.
keys.append((indent, stripped.split(":", 1)[0].strip()))
if not keys:
return False
# Take only the outermost-indented keys as the event list
min_indent = min(i for i, _ in keys)
events = [name for i, name in keys if i == min_indent]
return events == ["workflow_call"]
CONCURRENCY_RE = re.compile(r"^concurrency:\s*$")
GROUP_RE = re.compile(r"^\s+group:\s*(.+?)\s*$")
def extract_group_key(lines: list[str]) -> str | None:
"""Return the `group:` value of the top-level `concurrency:` block, or None."""
for idx, raw in enumerate(lines):
if CONCURRENCY_RE.match(raw):
# Scan forward until we leave the concurrency block (next top-level key
# is at column 0 and ends with `:`).
for follow in lines[idx + 1:]:
if follow and not follow.startswith(" ") and follow.rstrip().endswith(":"):
break
m = GROUP_RE.match(follow)
if m:
return m.group(1).strip().strip("'").strip('"')
break
return None
def has_top_level_concurrency(lines: list[str]) -> bool:
return any(CONCURRENCY_RE.match(raw) for raw in lines)
def check(workflows_dir: pathlib.Path) -> int:
fail = 0
files = sorted(
list(workflows_dir.glob("*.yml")) + list(workflows_dir.glob("*.yaml"))
)
for path in files:
lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
reusable = is_reusable(lines)
has_conc = has_top_level_concurrency(lines)
if reusable:
if has_conc:
print(
f"::error file={path}::Reusable workflow (on: workflow_call) "
"must NOT declare its own concurrency block — it inherits "
"from the caller. See CONTRIBUTING.md -> GitHub Actions — "
"Concurrency Convention."
)
fail = 1
continue
if not has_conc:
print(
f"::error file={path}::Missing top-level concurrency block. "
"See CONTRIBUTING.md -> GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention."
)
fail = 1
continue
group = extract_group_key(lines)
if group is None:
print(
f"::error file={path}::concurrency block is missing a "
"`group:` key."
)
fail = 1
continue
if not any(token in group for token in REQUIRED_TOKENS):
print(
f"::error file={path}::concurrency.group `{group}` must "
f"reference one of {REQUIRED_TOKENS} (use ${{{{ github.workflow }}}} "
"for normal entry-point workflows; use an approved literal prefix "
"only for workflows that are both entry-points AND reusable — "
"see CONTRIBUTING.md -> GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention)."
)
fail = 1
return fail
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if len(argv) != 2:
print(f"usage: {argv[0]} <workflows-dir>", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
workflows_dir = pathlib.Path(argv[1])
if not workflows_dir.is_dir():
print(f"not a directory: {workflows_dir}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
return check(workflows_dir)
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
@@ -1,477 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Tests for check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py.
Stdlib-only (``unittest`` + ``unittest.mock``) to match the script under test,
which is deliberately dependency-free so it runs on any vanilla runner. Run with:
python3 -m unittest .github/scripts/test_check_tree_sitter_upgrade_readiness.py
(pytest also discovers ``unittest.TestCase`` classes, so a future pytest CI job
picks these up unchanged.)
These tests lock in the #858 fix: the 5 vendored grammars
(c/swift/kotlin/dart/proto) are classified from the shared manifest
(.github/vendored-grammars.json), their ABI is read from gitnexus/vendor/<name>,
and the report never renders a bare ``?`` placeholder. All network is mocked.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import http.client
import importlib.util
import io
import json
import pathlib
import re
from unittest import TestCase, main, mock
# ── Load the hyphenated script as a module ───────────────────────────────
_SCRIPTS_DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
_SCRIPT = _SCRIPTS_DIR / "check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py"
_REPO_ROOT = _SCRIPTS_DIR.parents[1]
_MANIFEST = _REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "vendored-grammars.json"
_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("readiness_under_test", _SCRIPT)
readiness = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
_spec.loader.exec_module(readiness) # type: ignore[union-attr]
# The exact row-diff regex the workflow's change-detection bot uses
# (.github/workflows/tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.yml) — byte-identical so a matrix
# format change that would silently break change-detection fails here. Group 2 is
# ONLY the Status cell ([^|]+? before the final `|$`).
_ROW_DIFF_RE = re.compile(r"\| `(tree-sitter-[^`]+)` \|.*\| ([^|]+?) \|$", re.M)
# Mirrors the scheduled issue-update summary extraction in
# tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.yml. If the report prose changes again, the issue
# comment should not silently degrade to "?/? ready. ? blocker(s)".
_ISSUE_READY_RE = re.compile(
r"- (\d+)/(\d+) npm-installed grammars already accept tree-sitter@"
)
_ISSUE_BLOCKER_RE = re.compile(r"\*\*Blocked\*\* — (\d+) grammars? ")
def _physical_vendor_grammars() -> set[str]:
vendor = _REPO_ROOT / "gitnexus" / "vendor"
return {
p.name
for p in vendor.iterdir()
if p.is_dir() and p.name.startswith("tree-sitter-")
}
def _render_report() -> tuple[str, int]:
"""Run main() with network mocked to mirror PRODUCTION; return (md, exit_code).
- npm grammars resolve to a permissive "Ready" peer dep, so the only blockers
left are the held vendored grammars (tree-sitter-c, tree-sitter-kotlin) plus
the intentionally-pinned tree-sitter-cpp — letting us assert holds are
load-bearing (exit code stays non-zero because of them).
- npm_view_json records its calls so we can prove vendored grammars are never
npm-queried.
- fetch_text mirrors the real workflow: upstream parser.c resolves to a real
ABI (committed upstream), commit endpoints return a sha — EXCEPT swift's
upstream, whose parser.c is generated at build time and so is unreachable
(None). That single miss exercises the labeled-sentinel path; every other
cell must be a real value, never a bare '?'.
"""
npm_calls: list[str] = []
def fake_npm_view_json(pkg: str):
npm_calls.append(pkg)
return {"version": "9.9.9", "peerDependencies": {"tree-sitter": "^0.25.0"}}
def fake_fetch_text(url: str, timeout: int = 8):
if "parser.c" in url:
# swift's upstream parser.c is generated at build time → unreachable;
# the others ship a committed parser.c.
if "alex-pinkus" in url:
return None
return "#define LANGUAGE_VERSION 14\n#define STATE_COUNT 1\n"
if "/commits/" in url:
return json.dumps({"sha": "0123456789abcdef"})
# package.json (relaxed-peer probe) etc. — not needed for these assertions.
return None
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "npm_view_json", side_effect=fake_npm_view_json), \
mock.patch.object(readiness, "fetch_text", side_effect=fake_fetch_text), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
code = readiness.main()
report = buf.getvalue()
_render_report.last_npm_calls = npm_calls # type: ignore[attr-defined]
return report, code
class ManifestClassification(TestCase):
def test_manifest_matches_physical_vendor_dirs(self):
"""Consistency guard: the manifest set == the gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*
dirs. Vendoring a grammar without a manifest entry (or vice-versa) fails —
this is what keeps the two tree-sitter workflows aligned (#858)."""
manifest_names = {
g["name"]
for g in json.loads(_MANIFEST.read_text())["grammars"].values()
}
self.assertEqual(manifest_names, _physical_vendor_grammars())
def test_vendored_names_loaded_from_manifest(self):
self.assertEqual(set(readiness.VENDORED_NAMES), _physical_vendor_grammars())
# npm-installed grammars must NOT be classified vendored.
self.assertNotIn("tree-sitter-cpp", readiness.VENDORED_NAMES)
self.assertNotIn("tree-sitter-go", readiness.VENDORED_NAMES)
def test_c_carries_a_hold_cpp_does_not(self):
self.assertTrue(readiness.VENDORED["tree-sitter-c"]["hold"])
self.assertNotIn("tree-sitter-c", readiness.INTENTIONAL_PINS)
# cpp stays an npm intentional pin.
self.assertIn("tree-sitter-cpp", readiness.INTENTIONAL_PINS)
def test_vendored_names_are_a_subset_of_GRAMMARS(self):
# The report + --assert-current iterate the hardcoded GRAMMARS dict for
# upstream-drift coords. A vendored grammar present in the manifest but
# missing from GRAMMARS would be silently dropped from both — re-creating
# the cross-workflow divergence the manifest exists to kill (#858). Guard it.
missing = set(readiness.VENDORED_NAMES) - set(readiness.GRAMMARS)
self.assertEqual(missing, set(), f"manifest grammars missing from GRAMMARS: {missing}")
def test_missing_manifest_raises_a_clear_error(self):
import pathlib
import tempfile
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "REPO_ROOT", pathlib.Path(d)):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as ctx:
readiness.load_vendored_manifest()
self.assertIn("vendored-grammars manifest", str(ctx.exception))
def test_malformed_manifest_raises_a_clear_error(self):
import pathlib
import tempfile
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
gh = pathlib.Path(d) / ".github"
gh.mkdir()
(gh / "vendored-grammars.json").write_text("{ not valid json", encoding="utf-8")
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "REPO_ROOT", pathlib.Path(d)):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as ctx:
readiness.load_vendored_manifest()
self.assertIn("not valid JSON", str(ctx.exception))
def test_path_traversal_grammar_name_is_rejected(self):
import pathlib
import tempfile
bad = '{"grammars": {"evil": {"name": "../etc"}}}'
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
gh = pathlib.Path(d) / ".github"
gh.mkdir()
(gh / "vendored-grammars.json").write_text(bad, encoding="utf-8")
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "REPO_ROOT", pathlib.Path(d)):
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as ctx:
readiness.load_vendored_manifest()
self.assertIn("invalid grammar name", str(ctx.exception))
class AssertCurrent(TestCase):
"""The offline #1922 ABI gate (--assert-current) must stay hermetic — it reads
vendored ABIs from the repo, never the network. (Regression guard: a prior
revision routed vendored grammars through vendored_drift_summary, which fetches
upstream parser.c + commit sha, silently breaking the 'hermetic and offline'
contract — #858 review.)"""
def _run_assert_current(self):
import urllib.request
def explode(*a, **k):
raise AssertionError("--assert-current attempted a network call")
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(urllib.request, "urlopen", side_effect=explode), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
code = readiness.assert_current()
return buf.getvalue(), code
def test_assert_current_is_network_free_and_passes(self):
report, code = self._run_assert_current() # raises if any urlopen fires
self.assertEqual(code, 0)
# All 5 vendored grammars are introspected from the repo (ABI 14), not skipped.
for name in readiness.VENDORED_NAMES:
self.assertIn(f"{name}: vendored ABI", report)
def test_assert_current_fails_an_out_of_range_vendored_abi(self):
# vendored_abi_from_repo is the local-read injection point: force one
# grammar out of the current runtime's ABI window and assert the gate trips.
real = readiness.vendored_abi_from_repo
def fake(name, parser_path):
return 99 if name == "tree-sitter-dart" else real(name, parser_path)
import urllib.request
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "vendored_abi_from_repo", side_effect=fake), \
mock.patch.object(urllib.request, "urlopen", side_effect=AssertionError("network")), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
code = readiness.assert_current()
self.assertEqual(code, 1)
self.assertIn("tree-sitter-dart", buf.getvalue())
self.assertIn("outside current runtime range", buf.getvalue())
class FetchHelperReadPhaseErrors(TestCase):
"""Read-phase transport failures — raised by resp.read() AFTER urlopen has
returned (ConnectionResetError, ssl.SSLError, socket.timeout,
http.client.IncompleteRead) — are NOT urllib.error.URLError subclasses
(urllib only wraps connect-phase OSErrors). A prior revision's narrow except
tuple let them escape npm_view_json / fetch_text, crash main(), and empty
stdout — which makes the workflow's requireMatch throw on a non-drift
scheduled run. The helpers must swallow them to None so the grammar routes to
the fetch_failed blocker bucket and the report still renders completely."""
@staticmethod
def _patch_urlopen(*, read_returns=None, read_raises=None):
class _Resp:
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, *exc):
return False
def read(self, *a, **k):
if read_raises is not None:
raise read_raises
return read_returns
def _fake_urlopen(*a, **k):
return _Resp()
import urllib.request
return mock.patch.object(urllib.request, "urlopen", side_effect=_fake_urlopen)
def test_npm_view_json_swallows_read_phase_connection_reset(self):
# ConnectionResetError is an OSError but NOT a URLError — the broadened
# OSError clause must catch it so the helper returns None, not raises.
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "OFFLINE", False), self._patch_urlopen(
read_raises=ConnectionResetError("peer reset mid-body")
):
self.assertIsNone(readiness.npm_view_json("tree-sitter-anything"))
def test_fetch_text_swallows_read_phase_incomplete_read(self):
# http.client.IncompleteRead is an HTTPException (not OSError), so it must
# be named explicitly in the except tuple.
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "OFFLINE", False), self._patch_urlopen(
read_raises=http.client.IncompleteRead(partial=b"half")
):
self.assertIsNone(readiness.fetch_text("https://example.com/parser.c"))
def test_npm_view_json_still_swallows_bad_json(self):
# JSONDecodeError is a ValueError, not an OSError — broadening the tuple
# must not drop it. Non-JSON body still yields None.
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "OFFLINE", False), self._patch_urlopen(
read_returns=b"<<not json>>"
):
self.assertIsNone(readiness.npm_view_json("tree-sitter-anything"))
class ReportRendering(TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.report, cls.code = _render_report()
cls.rows = dict(_ROW_DIFF_RE.findall(cls.report))
def test_no_bare_question_mark_anywhere(self):
# The only legitimate '?' is the "Satisfies 0.25?" column header.
sanitized = self.report.replace("Satisfies 0.25?", "Satisfies 0.25")
self.assertNotIn("?", sanitized, "report still contains a bare '?' placeholder")
def test_malformed_npm_version_renders_unknown_in_prose_not_bare_question(self):
# A successful (200) npm /latest response that omits `version` leaves
# npm_version == "?"; the grammar is still bucketed (fetch did not fail), so
# its disposition PROSE line must show the labeled sentinel, never a bare '?'.
def fake_npm(pkg: str):
if pkg == "tree-sitter-go":
return {"peerDependencies": {"tree-sitter": "^0.25.0"}} # no 'version'
return {"version": "9.9.9", "peerDependencies": {"tree-sitter": "^0.25.0"}}
def fake_fetch(url: str, timeout: int = 8):
if "parser.c" in url and "alex-pinkus" not in url:
return "#define LANGUAGE_VERSION 14\n"
if "/commits/" in url:
return json.dumps({"sha": "0123456789abcdef"})
return None
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "npm_view_json", side_effect=fake_npm), \
mock.patch.object(readiness, "fetch_text", side_effect=fake_fetch), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
readiness.main()
report = buf.getvalue()
sanitized = report.replace("Satisfies 0.25?", "Satisfies 0.25")
self.assertNotIn("?", sanitized)
# The Ready bucket prose line for go shows the labeled 'unknown', not '?'.
self.assertRegex(report, r"`tree-sitter-go`.*npm latest `unknown`")
def test_every_vendored_grammar_shows_numeric_abi_not_question_mark(self):
for name in readiness.VENDORED_NAMES:
row = self._matrix_row(name)
cells = [c.strip() for c in row.strip().strip("|").split("|")]
abi_cell = cells[5] # Grammar|Pinned|npm|Peer|Satisfies|ABI|UpstreamABI|Status
self.assertRegex(
abi_cell, r"^\d+$",
f"{name} ABI cell is '{abi_cell}', expected a number (read from vendor/)",
)
def test_proto_is_never_npm_queried(self):
# github-only vendored grammars must skip the npm peer-dep path entirely,
# which is what removes the old "? (fetch failed)" for tree-sitter-proto.
self.assertNotIn("tree-sitter-proto", _render_report.last_npm_calls)
self.assertNotIn("tree-sitter-dart", _render_report.last_npm_calls)
self.assertNotIn("Could not check", self.report)
self.assertNotIn("fetch failed", self.report)
def test_held_c_renders_held_and_keeps_exit_nonzero(self):
# Status is the last matrix cell (the row-diff regex captures the whole
# tail, not just status, so read the cell directly).
cells = [c.strip() for c in self._matrix_row("tree-sitter-c").strip().strip("|").split("|")]
self.assertEqual(cells[-1], "Vendored — held")
self.assertIn("**Held:**", self.report)
# With every npm grammar mocked to "Ready", the ONLY remaining blocker is
# the held c — so a non-zero exit proves the hold is treated as a blocker.
self.assertEqual(self.code, 1)
def test_upstream_abi_miss_uses_labeled_sentinel(self):
# swift's upstream parser.c is unreachable (mocked None), so its
# upstream-ABI cell is the labeled 'n/a' token, never a bare '?'.
cells = [c.strip() for c in self._matrix_row("tree-sitter-swift").strip().strip("|").split("|")]
self.assertEqual(cells[6], "n/a") # Upstream ABI column
def test_row_diff_regex_captures_all_fifteen_grammar_statuses(self):
# The change-detection bot keys on this regex: group 1 = grammar name,
# group 2 = the Status cell ONLY (not the whole tail). It must match every
# row after the format change so status transitions keep being detected.
self.assertEqual(len(self.rows), 15)
for name in readiness.VENDORED_NAMES:
self.assertIn(name, self.rows)
# group 2 is the Status cell — held c renders exactly "Vendored — held",
# and no captured status contains a pipe (proves cell-scoped capture).
self.assertEqual(self.rows["tree-sitter-c"], "Vendored — held")
for status in self.rows.values():
self.assertNotIn("|", status)
def test_issue_update_summary_regex_matches_current_report(self):
ready = _ISSUE_READY_RE.search(self.report)
blockers = _ISSUE_BLOCKER_RE.search(self.report)
self.assertIsNotNone(ready)
self.assertIsNotNone(blockers)
# Counts are derived from _render_report()'s mock corpus (all npm peer
# deps mocked permissive): of the 10 npm-installed grammars, 9 render
# Ready and 1 — tree-sitter-cpp — is the intentional pin (#1242), so it is
# not counted ready. The 3 blockers are that same pinned tree-sitter-cpp
# plus two held vendored grammars: ABI-held tree-sitter-c (#1242/#858) and
# tree-sitter-kotlin (pinned to an unreleased fwcd main commit for `fun
# interface` support — ABI 14 is in range, but a hold counts as a blocker
# until it is lifted). If a grammar is added/removed or a pin/hold changes,
# update _render_report()'s mock AND these expected counts together; a
# mismatch here means the report prose drifted, not the regex.
self.assertEqual(ready.groups(), ("9", "10"))
self.assertEqual(blockers.group(1), "3")
def _matrix_row(self, name: str) -> str:
for line in self.report.splitlines():
if line.startswith(f"| `{name}` |"):
return line
# Explicit terminating raise (not self.fail, which CodeQL doesn't model as
# NoReturn) so the function has no implicit fall-through return (CodeQL 754).
raise AssertionError(f"no matrix row for {name}")
class OfflineMode(TestCase):
"""--offline must render the report touching ZERO network — vendored ABIs come
from the repo, npm columns are marked unverified. This is what makes the
network-dependent report deterministically testable in air-gapped CI."""
def _render_offline(self):
import urllib.request
def explode(*a, **k):
raise AssertionError("network call attempted in --offline mode")
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "OFFLINE", True), \
mock.patch.object(urllib.request, "urlopen", side_effect=explode), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
code = readiness.main()
return buf.getvalue(), code
def test_offline_touches_no_network_and_still_renders(self):
report, code = self._render_offline() # raises if any urlopen fires
self.assertIn("Offline mode", report)
# Vendored grammars are introspected from the repo → real ABI 14, not a miss.
for name in readiness.VENDORED_NAMES:
row = next(l for l in report.splitlines() if l.startswith(f"| `{name}` |"))
cells = [c.strip() for c in row.strip().strip("|").split("|")]
self.assertRegex(cells[5], r"^\d+$", f"{name} vendored ABI missing offline")
def test_offline_marks_npm_grammars_offline_not_fetch_failed(self):
report, _ = self._render_offline()
self.assertIn("(offline)", report)
self.assertNotIn("fetch failed", report) # honest: skipped, not failed
def test_offline_report_has_no_bare_question_mark(self):
report, _ = self._render_offline()
sanitized = report.replace("Satisfies 0.25?", "Satisfies 0.25")
self.assertNotIn("?", sanitized)
class VendoredAbiBranches(TestCase):
"""main()'s vendored-ABI classification reads through vendored_abi_from_repo
(the same local-read seam --assert-current uses), so a single patch drives the
out-of-range and prebuilt-only branches that no real vendor dir can trigger
today (all ship parser.c at ABI 14)."""
def _render_with_vendored_abi(self, override):
"""Render main() with the standard production-faithful network mock plus a
vendored_abi_from_repo override (dict: name -> int|None; others read real)."""
real = readiness.vendored_abi_from_repo
def abi_seam(name, parser_path):
return override[name] if name in override else real(name, parser_path)
def fake_npm(pkg):
return {"version": "9.9.9", "peerDependencies": {"tree-sitter": "^0.25.0"}}
def fake_fetch(url, timeout=8):
if "parser.c" in url and "alex-pinkus" not in url:
return "#define LANGUAGE_VERSION 14\n"
if "/commits/" in url:
return json.dumps({"sha": "0123456789abcdef"})
return None
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(readiness, "vendored_abi_from_repo", side_effect=abi_seam), \
mock.patch.object(readiness, "npm_view_json", side_effect=fake_npm), \
mock.patch.object(readiness, "fetch_text", side_effect=fake_fetch), \
contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
code = readiness.main()
return buf.getvalue(), code
def _row(self, report, name):
line = next(l for l in report.splitlines() if l.startswith(f"| `{name}` |"))
return [c.strip() for c in line.strip().strip("|").split("|")]
def test_out_of_range_vendored_abi_is_a_blocker(self):
# Force tree-sitter-dart's vendored ABI outside the target range (13–15).
report, code = self._render_with_vendored_abi({"tree-sitter-dart": 99})
cells = self._row(report, "tree-sitter-dart")
self.assertEqual(cells[-1], "Vendored (ABI out of range)")
self.assertEqual(cells[5], "99")
self.assertEqual(code, 1) # out-of-range vendored grammar is a blocker
def test_prebuilt_only_vendored_abi_renders_prebuilt_not_question(self):
# vendored_abi None (a future binary-only vendor with no parser.c).
report, _ = self._render_with_vendored_abi({"tree-sitter-dart": None})
cells = self._row(report, "tree-sitter-dart")
self.assertEqual(cells[5], "prebuilt") # labeled, never a bare '?'
self.assertEqual(cells[4], "Yes") # prebuilt is assumed target-compatible
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
"""Pure math utilities for triage sweep embedding analysis.
All functions are stateless and perform no I/O (except model loading by FastEmbed).
Each function operates on numpy arrays and returns numpy arrays or plain Python types.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import numpy as np
from numpy.typing import NDArray
from fastembed import TextEmbedding
from sklearn.decomposition import PCA
from sklearn.covariance import EllipticEnvelope
from sklearn.metrics.pairwise import cosine_similarity
# FastEmbed model — BAAI/bge-small-en-v1.5 produces 384-dimensional embeddings.
# ~46MB quantized ONNX, runs on CPU in ~0.5s per batch of 32.
EMBEDDING_MODEL: str = "BAAI/bge-small-en-v1.5"
# Embedding dimensionality (determined by model choice).
EMBEDDING_DIM: int = 384
# Batch size for FastEmbed. 32 balances memory and throughput on
# a 2-vCPU GitHub Actions runner with ~7GB RAM.
EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE: int = 32
def embed_texts(texts: list[str]) -> NDArray[np.float32]:
"""Embed a list of texts into dense vectors using FastEmbed.
Returns an array of shape (len(texts), 384) with dtype float32.
Empty input returns a (0, 384) array.
"""
if not texts:
return np.empty((0, EMBEDDING_DIM), dtype=np.float32)
model = TextEmbedding(model_name=EMBEDDING_MODEL)
vectors = list(model.embed(texts, batch_size=EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE))
return np.vstack(vectors).astype(np.float32)
def normalize_rows(matrix: NDArray[np.float32]) -> NDArray[np.float32]:
"""L2-normalize each row to unit length.
Zero-norm rows (e.g. from empty text) remain zero vectors.
Uses eps=1e-10 in the denominator to avoid division by zero.
"""
if matrix.shape[0] == 0:
return matrix
norms = np.linalg.norm(matrix, axis=1, keepdims=True)
return matrix / (norms + 1e-10)
def reduce_dimensions(
matrix: NDArray[np.float32],
max_components: int,
) -> NDArray[np.float32]:
"""Reduce dimensionality via PCA.
Computes n_components = min(max_components, n-1, d). If n_components < 1,
returns the matrix unchanged. Logs explained variance for observability.
"""
n, d = matrix.shape
if n <= 1:
return matrix
n_components = min(max_components, n - 1, d)
if n_components < 1:
return matrix
pca = PCA(n_components=n_components)
reduced = pca.fit_transform(matrix)
explained = pca.explained_variance_ratio_.sum()
print(f"PCA: {d}d -> {n_components}d, explained variance: {explained:.3f}")
return reduced.astype(np.float32)
def detect_outliers(
matrix: NDArray[np.float32],
contamination: float = 0.1,
iqr_multiplier: float = 3.0,
max_outlier_pct: float = 0.05,
) -> list[tuple[int, float]]:
"""Flag items whose Mahalanobis distance exceeds an IQR-based cutoff.
Uses EllipticEnvelope (robust covariance via MCD) to estimate the
multivariate Gaussian, then computes sqrt(squared Mahalanobis distance)
for each sample. The cutoff is Q75 + iqr_multiplier * IQR, which
adapts to the actual distribution of distances.
A hard cap ensures no more than max_outlier_pct * n items are flagged;
when the cap is hit, only the most extreme items (sorted by distance
descending) are kept.
Returns (index, distance) tuples sorted by index ascending, along with
the cutoff value stored as an attribute on the returned list.
"""
n = matrix.shape[0]
if n < 2:
return []
envelope = EllipticEnvelope(contamination=contamination, random_state=42)
envelope.fit(matrix)
# .mahalanobis() returns squared Mahalanobis distances
distances = np.sqrt(envelope.mahalanobis(matrix))
# IQR-based cutoff
q25, q75 = np.percentile(distances, [25, 75])
iqr = q75 - q25
cutoff = q75 + iqr_multiplier * iqr
outlier_mask = distances > cutoff
indices = np.where(outlier_mask)[0]
# Hard cap: keep at most max_outlier_pct * n items
max_count = max(1, int(max_outlier_pct * n))
if len(indices) > max_count:
# Sort by distance descending, take the most extreme
sorted_by_dist = sorted(indices, key=lambda i: distances[i], reverse=True)
indices = np.array(sorted_by_dist[:max_count])
# Sort by index ascending for stable output
indices = np.sort(indices)
result = [(int(idx), float(distances[idx])) for idx in indices]
# Attach cutoff as metadata so the report can use it
result = _OutlierResult(result) # type: ignore[assignment]
result.cutoff = float(cutoff) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
return result # type: ignore[return-value]
class _OutlierResult(list):
"""A list subclass that carries metadata (cutoff) from outlier detection."""
cutoff: float = 0.0
def find_duplicate_pairs(
matrix: NDArray[np.float32],
threshold: float,
) -> list[tuple[int, int, float]]:
"""Find pairs of items with cosine similarity above threshold.
Returns (i, j, similarity) tuples where i < j. The input should be
L2-normalized embeddings (full dimensionality, not PCA-reduced) so
cosine similarity equals the dot product.
"""
n = matrix.shape[0]
if n <= 1:
return []
sim_matrix = cosine_similarity(matrix)
# Upper triangle indices (i < j), excluding diagonal
rows, cols = np.triu_indices(n, k=1)
similarities = sim_matrix[rows, cols]
mask = similarities > threshold
pairs: list[tuple[int, int, float]] = []
for idx in np.where(mask)[0]:
pairs.append((int(rows[idx]), int(cols[idx]), float(similarities[idx])))
return pairs
# ── Label suggestion via z-score normalized embedding similarity ──────
# Z-score threshold: a label must be this many standard deviations above
# the column mean to be considered a match.
LABEL_Z_THRESHOLD: float = 1.5
# Margin gate: the top-1 label must beat the second-best by this many
# z-score units to be accepted (subsequent labels don't need a margin).
LABEL_Z_MARGIN: float = 0.5
# Floor for per-column standard deviation to avoid division by near-zero.
LABEL_Z_STD_FLOOR: float = 0.01
# Minimum raw cosine similarity required even if z-score is high.
# Prevents suggesting labels that are "relatively best" but still poor.
MIN_RAW_SIMILARITY: float = 0.3
# Maximum number of labels to suggest per item.
MAX_LABELS_PER_ITEM: int = 3
def suggest_labels(
item_embeddings: NDArray[np.float32],
label_embeddings: NDArray[np.float32],
label_names: list[str],
z_threshold: float = LABEL_Z_THRESHOLD,
z_margin: float = LABEL_Z_MARGIN,
std_floor: float = LABEL_Z_STD_FLOOR,
min_raw_sim: float = MIN_RAW_SIMILARITY,
max_per_item: int = MAX_LABELS_PER_ITEM,
) -> list[list[tuple[str, float]]]:
"""Suggest labels for each item using z-score normalized similarity.
1. Compute raw cosine similarity matrix (n items x m labels).
2. Column-wise z-score: for each label j, normalize across all items.
3. For each item, rank labels by z-score descending.
4. Accept a label only if z >= z_threshold AND raw_sim >= min_raw_sim.
5. Margin gate: the top-1 label must beat #2 by z_margin; subsequent
labels don't need a margin.
6. Cap at max_per_item.
Returns a list of length n, where each element is a list of
(label_name, raw_similarity) tuples. Empty list if nothing qualifies.
"""
n = item_embeddings.shape[0]
m = label_embeddings.shape[0]
if n == 0 or m == 0:
return [[] for _ in range(n)]
# (n, m) raw similarity matrix
sim_matrix = cosine_similarity(item_embeddings, label_embeddings)
# Column-wise z-score normalization
col_means = sim_matrix.mean(axis=0) # shape (m,)
col_stds = sim_matrix.std(axis=0) # shape (m,)
col_stds = np.maximum(col_stds, std_floor)
z_matrix = (sim_matrix - col_means) / col_stds
suggestions: list[list[tuple[str, float]]] = []
for i in range(n):
z_row = z_matrix[i]
raw_row = sim_matrix[i]
# Rank labels by z-score descending
ranked = np.argsort(z_row)[::-1]
item_labels: list[tuple[str, float]] = []
# Margin gate: top-1 z-score must beat #2 by z_margin.
# If not, the assignment is ambiguous — skip this item entirely.
if len(ranked) > 1:
top1_z = float(z_row[ranked[0]])
top2_z = float(z_row[ranked[1]])
if top1_z - top2_z < z_margin:
suggestions.append(item_labels)
continue
for rank_pos, idx in enumerate(ranked):
if len(item_labels) >= max_per_item:
break
z_val = float(z_row[idx])
raw_val = float(raw_row[idx])
# Must pass both z-threshold and raw similarity floor
if z_val < z_threshold or raw_val < min_raw_sim:
continue
item_labels.append((label_names[idx], raw_val))
suggestions.append(item_labels)
return suggestions
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fastembed>=0.5.0
numpy>=1.26.0
scikit-learn>=1.4.0
scipy>=1.10.0
-600
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@@ -1,600 +0,0 @@
"""Triage sweep: fetch open issues/PRs, detect outliers and duplicates, generate a report.
Entrypoint script for the triage-sweep workflow. Fetches all open items via
the GitHub REST API, delegates embedding and analysis to embedding_utils,
generates a markdown report, and optionally creates a report issue.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sys
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse
from typing import TypedDict
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from embedding_utils import (
embed_texts,
normalize_rows,
reduce_dimensions,
detect_outliers,
find_duplicate_pairs,
suggest_labels,
LABEL_Z_THRESHOLD,
LABEL_Z_MARGIN,
LABEL_Z_STD_FLOOR,
MIN_RAW_SIMILARITY,
MAX_LABELS_PER_ITEM,
)
# ── Thresholds (overridable via workflow_dispatch inputs) ──────────────
# IQR multiplier for outlier cutoff: cutoff = Q75 + IQR_MULTIPLIER * IQR.
IQR_MULTIPLIER: float = float(os.environ.get("INPUT_IQR_MULTIPLIER", "3.0"))
# Hard cap: at most this fraction of items can be flagged as outliers.
MAX_OUTLIER_PCT: float = float(os.environ.get("INPUT_MAX_OUTLIER_PCT", "0.05"))
# EllipticEnvelope contamination: expected fraction of outliers in the data.
# Governs how aggressively the robust covariance downweights extreme points.
CONTAMINATION: float = float(os.environ.get("INPUT_CONTAMINATION", "0.1"))
# Cosine similarity above which two items are flagged as duplicates.
# 0.92 catches near-identical issues while tolerating paraphrasing.
COSINE_THRESHOLD: float = float(os.environ.get("INPUT_COSINE_THRESHOLD", "0.92"))
# Hard cap on items to process. Prevents runaway costs on very large repos.
MAX_ITEMS: int = int(os.environ.get("INPUT_MAX_ITEMS", "500"))
# When true, print report to stdout/file but do not create a GitHub issue.
DRY_RUN: bool = os.environ.get("INPUT_DRY_RUN", "false").lower() == "true"
# ── Fixed constants (not user-configurable) ───────────────────────────
# Minimum number of samples required for EllipticEnvelope to fit
# a Gaussian reliably. Must be >= 3 * PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS so the
# covariance matrix is estimated from enough data points.
PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS: int = 20
MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION: int = 100
# Max character length for embedding input text. bge-small-en-v1.5 has a
# 512-token context window (~4 chars/token). We keep title + body under
# this limit so the model sees the full text instead of silently truncating.
MAX_EMBED_CHARS: int = 2000
# GitHub REST API page size (max allowed is 100).
API_PAGE_SIZE: int = 100
# Report issue label.
REPORT_LABEL: str = "triage-report"
# Report file path (written for the summary step to pick up).
REPORT_FILE: str = "/tmp/triage-report.md"
class TriageItem(TypedDict):
"""One open issue or PR, with only the fields we need."""
number: int
title: str
html_url: str
is_pr: bool
labels: list[str]
created_at: str
# title + body concatenated, used as embedding input
text: str
def github_api_get(path: str) -> list[dict]:
"""Make a single authenticated GET request to the GitHub REST API.
Reads GITHUB_TOKEN and GITHUB_REPOSITORY from env. Raises SystemExit
with the HTTP status and response body on any non-2xx response.
"""
token = os.environ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
repo = os.environ["GITHUB_REPOSITORY"]
url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}{path}"
req = urllib.request.Request(url)
req.add_header("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
req.add_header("X-GitHub-Api-Version", "2022-11-28")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f"::error::GitHub API {e.code}: {body}")
sys.exit(1)
def fetch_all_open_items() -> list[TriageItem]:
"""Paginate through all open issues and PRs.
Returns up to MAX_ITEMS TriageItem dicts. Items with a pull_request
key are marked is_pr=True. The text field is title + body concatenated.
"""
items: list[TriageItem] = []
page = 1
while len(items) < MAX_ITEMS:
path = (
f"/issues?state=open&per_page={API_PAGE_SIZE}"
f"&sort=created&direction=desc&page={page}"
)
data = github_api_get(path)
if not data:
break
for raw in data:
if len(items) >= MAX_ITEMS:
break
body = raw.get("body", "") or ""
full_text = f"{raw['title']}\n\n{body}"
# Truncate to fit the embedding model's token window.
# Title is always preserved; body gets clipped if needed.
if len(full_text) > MAX_EMBED_CHARS:
full_text = full_text[:MAX_EMBED_CHARS]
items.append(TriageItem(
number=raw["number"],
title=raw["title"],
html_url=raw["html_url"],
is_pr="pull_request" in raw,
labels=[lbl["name"] for lbl in raw.get("labels", [])],
created_at=raw["created_at"],
text=full_text,
))
if len(data) < API_PAGE_SIZE:
break
page += 1
return items
class RepoLabel(TypedDict):
"""A label from the repo with its embedding text."""
name: str
description: str
# "name: description" concatenated for embedding
text: str
def fetch_repo_labels() -> list[RepoLabel]:
"""Fetch all labels from the repository, paginating if needed.
Returns labels with name, description, and a text field suitable
for embedding ("name: description"). Labels with no description
use just the name.
"""
labels: list[RepoLabel] = []
page = 1
while True:
data = github_api_get(f"/labels?per_page={API_PAGE_SIZE}&page={page}")
for raw in data:
name = raw["name"]
desc = raw.get("description", "") or ""
text = f"{name}: {desc}" if desc else name
labels.append(RepoLabel(name=name, description=desc, text=text))
if len(data) < API_PAGE_SIZE:
break
page += 1
return labels
def apply_labels_to_item(item_number: int, labels: list[str]) -> None:
"""Add labels to a single issue/PR via the GitHub API.
Skips silently if labels list is empty. Uses POST which adds labels
without removing existing ones.
"""
if not labels:
return
token = os.environ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
repo = os.environ["GITHUB_REPOSITORY"]
url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}/issues/{item_number}/labels"
payload = json.dumps({"labels": labels}).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=payload, method="POST")
req.add_header("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
req.add_header("X-GitHub-Api-Version", "2022-11-28")
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
# Non-fatal: log warning but don't abort the sweep
print(f"::warning::Failed to label #{item_number}: {e.code} {body}")
def _item_age(created_at: str) -> str:
"""Compute a human-readable age string from an ISO 8601 created_at timestamp."""
try:
created = datetime.fromisoformat(created_at.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
delta = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - created
days = delta.days
if days < 1:
return "<1d"
if days < 30:
return f"{days}d"
if days < 365:
return f"{days // 30}mo"
return f"{days // 365}y"
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return "?"
def _suggested_action(a: TriageItem, b: TriageItem) -> str:
"""Determine a suggested action for a duplicate pair based on types and age."""
if a["is_pr"] and b["is_pr"]:
return "Review for overlap"
if not a["is_pr"] and not b["is_pr"]:
# Both issues — close the newer one
try:
a_dt = datetime.fromisoformat(a["created_at"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
b_dt = datetime.fromisoformat(b["created_at"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
newer = b if b_dt > a_dt else a
except (ValueError, TypeError):
newer = b
return f"Close #{newer['number']} as duplicate"
# One issue, one PR
return "Link PR to issue"
def generate_report(
items: list[TriageItem],
outlier_results: list[tuple[int, float]],
duplicate_pairs: list[tuple[int, int, float]],
label_suggestions: list[list[tuple[str, float]]] | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Generate a structured markdown triage report."""
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
repo = os.environ.get("GITHUB_REPOSITORY", "unknown/repo")
# Compute label suggestion counts early for the health table
outlier_set = {idx for idx, _ in outlier_results}
suggested_count = 0
if label_suggestions is not None:
suggested_count = sum(
1 for i, s in enumerate(label_suggestions)
if s and not items[i]["labels"] and i not in outlier_set
)
# ── Health summary table at the top ──────────────────────────────
lines: list[str] = [
"## Triage Sweep Report",
"",
f"**Run:** {now} UTC",
f"**Items analyzed:** {len(items)}",
f"**Thresholds:** IQR multiplier {IQR_MULTIPLIER}, Cosine > {COSINE_THRESHOLD}",
"",
"### Health Summary",
"",
"| Metric | Value |",
"|--------|-------|",
f"| Items analyzed | {len(items)} |",
f"| Outliers flagged | {len(outlier_results)} |",
f"| Duplicate pairs | {len(duplicate_pairs)} |",
f"| Label suggestions | {suggested_count} |",
"",
]
# ── Outlier section ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Determine cutoff for high-confidence split
cutoff = getattr(outlier_results, "cutoff", 0.0)
high_conf_cutoff = 2 * cutoff if cutoff > 0 else float("inf")
high_conf = [(idx, d) for idx, d in outlier_results if d > high_conf_cutoff]
borderline = [(idx, d) for idx, d in outlier_results if d <= high_conf_cutoff]
lines.extend([
f"### Potential Outliers / Spam ({len(outlier_results)})",
"",
"Items with unusually high Mahalanobis distance from the distribution center.",
"These may be spam, off-topic, or poorly described.",
"",
])
if high_conf:
lines.append(f"**High Confidence** ({len(high_conf)} items, distance > 2x cutoff)")
lines.append("")
lines.append("| # | Type | Title | Distance | Age |")
lines.append("|---|------|-------|----------|-----|")
for idx, distance in high_conf:
item = items[idx]
kind = "PR" if item["is_pr"] else "Issue"
age = _item_age(item["created_at"])
title = item["title"][:80] + ("..." if len(item["title"]) > 80 else "")
lines.append(
f"| [#{item['number']}]({item['html_url']}) "
f"| {kind} | {title} | {distance:.2f} | {age} |"
)
lines.append("")
if borderline:
lines.append("<details>")
lines.append(f"<summary>Borderline ({len(borderline)} items)</summary>")
lines.append("")
lines.append("| # | Type | Title | Distance | Age |")
lines.append("|---|------|-------|----------|-----|")
for idx, distance in borderline:
item = items[idx]
kind = "PR" if item["is_pr"] else "Issue"
age = _item_age(item["created_at"])
title = item["title"][:80] + ("..." if len(item["title"]) > 80 else "")
lines.append(
f"| [#{item['number']}]({item['html_url']}) "
f"| {kind} | {title} | {distance:.2f} | {age} |"
)
lines.append("")
lines.append("</details>")
lines.append("")
if not outlier_results:
lines.append("None found.")
# ── Duplicate pairs section ──────────────────────────────────────
lines.extend([
"",
f"### Potential Duplicates ({len(duplicate_pairs)} pairs)",
"",
"Pairs of items with cosine similarity above the threshold.",
"",
])
if duplicate_pairs:
lines.append("| Item A | Item B | Similarity | Suggested Action |")
lines.append("|--------|--------|------------|------------------|")
for i, j, sim in duplicate_pairs:
a = items[i]
b = items[j]
kind_a = "PR" if a["is_pr"] else "Issue"
kind_b = "PR" if b["is_pr"] else "Issue"
action = _suggested_action(a, b)
lines.append(
f"| [#{a['number']}]({a['html_url']}) {kind_a}: {a['title']} "
f"| [#{b['number']}]({b['html_url']}) {kind_b}: {b['title']} "
f"| {sim:.3f} | {action} |"
)
else:
lines.append("None found.")
# ── Label suggestions section ────────────────────────────────────
if label_suggestions is not None:
# High confidence: top-1 label with raw_sim >= 0.5
# Low confidence: top-1 label with raw_sim < 0.5
high_conf_labels: list[tuple[int, list[tuple[str, float]]]] = []
low_conf_labels: list[tuple[int, list[tuple[str, float]]]] = []
for i, sugs in enumerate(label_suggestions):
if sugs and not items[i]["labels"] and i not in outlier_set:
top1 = sugs[:1]
if top1[0][1] >= 0.5:
high_conf_labels.append((i, top1))
else:
low_conf_labels.append((i, top1))
total_suggestions = len(high_conf_labels) + len(low_conf_labels)
lines.extend([
"",
f"### Suggested Labels ({total_suggestions} unlabeled items)",
"",
"Labels suggested by z-score normalized embedding similarity against repo label descriptions.",
"Only shown for unlabeled items that were not flagged as outliers.",
"",
])
# Label concentration warning
if total_suggestions > 0:
label_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
for _, sugs in high_conf_labels + low_conf_labels:
for name, _ in sugs:
label_counts[name] = label_counts.get(name, 0) + 1
for name, count in label_counts.items():
if count > total_suggestions * 0.5:
lines.append(
f"> **Warning:** Label `{name}` accounts for "
f"{count}/{total_suggestions} suggestions "
f"({count * 100 // total_suggestions}%). "
f"Consider reviewing label descriptions for specificity."
)
lines.append("")
if high_conf_labels:
lines.append("| # | Type | Title | Suggested Label |")
lines.append("|---|------|-------|--------------------|")
for idx, sugs in high_conf_labels:
item = items[idx]
kind = "PR" if item["is_pr"] else "Issue"
label_strs = [f"`{name}` ({score:.2f})" for name, score in sugs]
lines.append(
f"| [#{item['number']}]({item['html_url']}) "
f"| {kind} | {item['title']} | {', '.join(label_strs)} |"
)
if low_conf_labels:
lines.append("")
lines.append("<details>")
lines.append(f"<summary>Low-confidence suggestions ({len(low_conf_labels)} items)</summary>")
lines.append("")
lines.append("| # | Type | Title | Suggested Label |")
lines.append("|---|------|-------|--------------------|")
for idx, sugs in low_conf_labels:
item = items[idx]
kind = "PR" if item["is_pr"] else "Issue"
label_strs = [f"`{name}` ({score:.2f})" for name, score in sugs]
lines.append(
f"| [#{item['number']}]({item['html_url']}) "
f"| {kind} | {item['title']} | {', '.join(label_strs)} |"
)
lines.append("")
lines.append("</details>")
if not high_conf_labels and not low_conf_labels:
lines.append("No unlabeled items need suggestions.")
lines.extend([
"",
"### Summary",
"",
f"- {len(outlier_results)} outliers flagged for review",
f"- {len(duplicate_pairs)} duplicate pairs found",
f"- {len(items)} items analyzed in total",
])
if label_suggestions is not None:
lines.append(f"- {suggested_count} items suggested for labeling")
lines.extend([
"",
"---",
f"*Generated by [triage-sweep](https://github.com/{repo}/actions) — no LLM was used.*",
])
return "\n".join(lines)
def create_report_issue(report_body: str) -> None:
"""Create a GitHub issue with the triage report.
Posts to the issues API with the triage-report label.
Raises SystemExit on non-201 response.
"""
token = os.environ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
repo = os.environ["GITHUB_REPOSITORY"]
url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repo}/issues"
today = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
payload = json.dumps({
"title": f"Triage Sweep Report — {today}",
"body": report_body,
"labels": [REPORT_LABEL],
}).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=payload, method="POST")
req.add_header("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
req.add_header("X-GitHub-Api-Version", "2022-11-28")
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
resp_body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
if resp.status != 201:
print(f"::error::Failed to create issue: {resp.status} {resp_body}")
sys.exit(1)
result = json.loads(resp_body)
print(f"Created issue: {result.get('html_url', 'unknown')}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f"::error::Failed to create issue: {e.code} {body}")
sys.exit(1)
def write_report(report: str) -> None:
"""Write the report to the file system for the summary step."""
with open(REPORT_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(report)
def main() -> None:
"""Orchestrate the full triage sweep."""
# 1. Validate environment
for var in ("GITHUB_TOKEN", "GITHUB_REPOSITORY"):
if not os.environ.get(var):
print(f"::error::Missing required environment variable: {var}")
sys.exit(1)
# 2. Fetch all open issues + PRs
items = fetch_all_open_items()
print(f"Fetched {len(items)} open items")
if len(items) == 0:
report = "## Triage Sweep Report\n\nNo open issues or PRs found."
write_report(report)
print("No items to analyze.")
return
# 3. Extract texts for embedding
texts: list[str] = [item["text"] for item in items]
# 4. Embed all texts (returns numpy float32 array of shape [n, 384])
embeddings = embed_texts(texts)
# 5. L2-normalize
embeddings = normalize_rows(embeddings)
# 6. Outlier detection (Mahalanobis via EllipticEnvelope)
outlier_results: list[tuple[int, float]] = []
if len(items) >= MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION:
reduced = reduce_dimensions(embeddings, PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS)
outlier_results = detect_outliers(
reduced,
contamination=CONTAMINATION,
iqr_multiplier=IQR_MULTIPLIER,
max_outlier_pct=MAX_OUTLIER_PCT,
)
else:
print(
f"Skipping outlier detection: {len(items)} items < "
f"{MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION} minimum"
)
# 7. Duplicate detection (pairwise cosine similarity)
duplicate_pairs = find_duplicate_pairs(embeddings, COSINE_THRESHOLD)
# 8. Label suggestion via embedding similarity
label_suggestions: list[list[tuple[str, float]]] | None = None
repo_labels = fetch_repo_labels()
if repo_labels:
label_texts = [lbl["text"] for lbl in repo_labels]
label_names = [lbl["name"] for lbl in repo_labels]
label_embeddings = embed_texts(label_texts)
label_embeddings = normalize_rows(label_embeddings)
label_suggestions = suggest_labels(embeddings, label_embeddings, label_names)
print(f"Computed label suggestions against {len(repo_labels)} repo labels")
# NOTE: Auto-labeling is disabled. The report shows suggestions for
# human review. To re-enable, uncomment the block below.
#
# # Apply top label to unlabeled items (unless dry run)
# # Skip outliers — flagged items shouldn't get categorized
# outlier_set = {idx for idx, _ in outlier_results}
# if not DRY_RUN:
# applied_count = 0
# for i, sugs in enumerate(label_suggestions):
# if sugs and not items[i]["labels"] and i not in outlier_set:
# # Apply only the top-1 label (highest confidence)
# apply_labels_to_item(items[i]["number"], [sugs[0][0]])
# applied_count += 1
# print(f"Applied labels to {applied_count} unlabeled items")
else:
print("No repo labels found — skipping label suggestions")
# 9. Generate report
report = generate_report(items, outlier_results, duplicate_pairs, label_suggestions)
# 10. Write report to file (for summary step)
write_report(report)
# 11. Create report issue (unless dry run)
if DRY_RUN:
print("Dry run — skipping issue creation and label application.")
print(report)
else:
create_report_issue(report)
print("Report issue created.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for embedding_utils.py — all embedding model calls are mocked."""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
import numpy as np
import pytest
# Mock fastembed before importing the module under test (persistent)
if "fastembed" not in sys.modules:
sys.modules["fastembed"] = MagicMock()
from embedding_utils import (
embed_texts,
normalize_rows,
reduce_dimensions,
detect_outliers,
find_duplicate_pairs,
suggest_labels,
EMBEDDING_DIM,
EMBEDDING_MODEL,
EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE,
LABEL_Z_THRESHOLD,
LABEL_Z_MARGIN,
LABEL_Z_STD_FLOOR,
MIN_RAW_SIMILARITY,
MAX_LABELS_PER_ITEM,
)
class TestEmbedTexts:
"""Tests for the embed_texts function."""
def test_empty_list_returns_empty_array(self):
result = embed_texts([])
assert result.shape == (0, EMBEDDING_DIM)
assert result.dtype == np.float32
@patch("embedding_utils.TextEmbedding")
def test_single_text(self, mock_cls):
mock_model = MagicMock()
mock_cls.return_value = mock_model
vec = np.random.randn(EMBEDDING_DIM).astype(np.float32)
mock_model.embed.return_value = iter([vec])
result = embed_texts(["hello world"])
mock_cls.assert_called_once_with(model_name=EMBEDDING_MODEL)
mock_model.embed.assert_called_once_with(
["hello world"], batch_size=EMBEDDING_BATCH_SIZE
)
assert result.shape == (1, EMBEDDING_DIM)
assert result.dtype == np.float32
np.testing.assert_array_almost_equal(result[0], vec)
@patch("embedding_utils.TextEmbedding")
def test_multiple_texts(self, mock_cls):
mock_model = MagicMock()
mock_cls.return_value = mock_model
vecs = [
np.random.randn(EMBEDDING_DIM).astype(np.float32)
for _ in range(5)
]
mock_model.embed.return_value = iter(vecs)
result = embed_texts(["a", "b", "c", "d", "e"])
assert result.shape == (5, EMBEDDING_DIM)
assert result.dtype == np.float32
class TestNormalizeRows:
"""Tests for L2 row normalization."""
def test_empty_matrix(self):
m = np.empty((0, 10), dtype=np.float32)
result = normalize_rows(m)
assert result.shape == (0, 10)
def test_single_row(self):
m = np.array([[3.0, 4.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = normalize_rows(m)
# Norm should be ~1.0
norm = np.linalg.norm(result[0])
assert abs(norm - 1.0) < 1e-5
def test_multiple_rows(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((10, 50)).astype(np.float32)
result = normalize_rows(m)
norms = np.linalg.norm(result, axis=1)
np.testing.assert_allclose(norms, 1.0, atol=1e-5)
def test_zero_row_stays_near_zero(self):
m = np.array([[0.0, 0.0, 0.0], [1.0, 0.0, 0.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = normalize_rows(m)
# Zero row divided by eps -> very small values
assert np.linalg.norm(result[0]) < 1e-3
# Non-zero row should be unit norm
assert abs(np.linalg.norm(result[1]) - 1.0) < 1e-5
def test_preserves_direction(self):
m = np.array([[2.0, 0.0], [0.0, 3.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = normalize_rows(m)
np.testing.assert_allclose(result[0], [1.0, 0.0], atol=1e-5)
np.testing.assert_allclose(result[1], [0.0, 1.0], atol=1e-5)
class TestReduceDimensions:
"""Tests for PCA dimensionality reduction."""
def test_single_sample_returns_unchanged(self):
m = np.random.randn(1, 50).astype(np.float32)
result = reduce_dimensions(m, 10)
np.testing.assert_array_equal(result, m)
def test_reduces_dimensions(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((100, 50)).astype(np.float32)
result = reduce_dimensions(m, 10)
assert result.shape == (100, 10)
assert result.dtype == np.float32
def test_caps_at_n_minus_1(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# 5 samples, 20 features -> max components = 4 (n-1)
m = rng.standard_normal((5, 20)).astype(np.float32)
result = reduce_dimensions(m, 50)
assert result.shape == (5, 4)
def test_caps_at_d(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# 100 samples, 3 features -> max components = 3
m = rng.standard_normal((100, 3)).astype(np.float32)
result = reduce_dimensions(m, 50)
assert result.shape == (100, 3)
def test_max_components_respected(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((50, 30)).astype(np.float32)
result = reduce_dimensions(m, 5)
assert result.shape[1] == 5
class TestDetectOutliers:
"""Tests for IQR-based outlier detection."""
def test_single_sample_returns_empty(self):
m = np.random.randn(1, 5).astype(np.float32)
result = detect_outliers(m)
assert result == []
def test_empty_returns_empty(self):
# n < 2 case
m = np.empty((0, 5), dtype=np.float32)
result = detect_outliers(m)
assert result == []
def test_finds_outliers_in_synthetic_data(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# Create a tight cluster with one obvious outlier
cluster = rng.standard_normal((50, 3)).astype(np.float32) * 0.1
outlier = np.array([[100.0, 100.0, 100.0]], dtype=np.float32)
m = np.vstack([cluster, outlier])
result = detect_outliers(m)
# The outlier (index 50) should be detected
outlier_indices = [idx for idx, _ in result]
assert 50 in outlier_indices
def test_returns_list_of_index_distance_tuples(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# Tight cluster + outlier to guarantee at least one result
cluster = rng.standard_normal((20, 3)).astype(np.float32) * 0.1
far_point = np.array([[50.0, 50.0, 50.0]], dtype=np.float32)
m = np.vstack([cluster, far_point])
result = detect_outliers(m)
assert isinstance(result, list)
for item in result:
assert isinstance(item, tuple)
assert len(item) == 2
idx, dist = item
assert isinstance(idx, int)
assert isinstance(dist, float)
assert dist > 0
def test_iqr_cutoff_behavior(self):
"""Lower IQR multiplier should flag more items than higher multiplier."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((100, 3)).astype(np.float32)
low = detect_outliers(m, iqr_multiplier=1.0, max_outlier_pct=0.5)
high = detect_outliers(m, iqr_multiplier=5.0, max_outlier_pct=0.5)
assert len(low) >= len(high)
def test_dimension_aware_no_mass_flagging(self):
"""High-dimensional clean Gaussian data should not flag everything."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# 500 samples, 10 dims — well-conditioned for robust covariance
m = rng.standard_normal((500, 10)).astype(np.float32)
result = detect_outliers(m)
# With IQR-based cutoff on clean Gaussian data,
# only a small fraction should be flagged (well under 50%)
assert len(result) < 250
def test_contamination_parameter(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((50, 3)).astype(np.float32)
# Should not raise with different contamination values
result = detect_outliers(m, contamination=0.05)
assert isinstance(result, list)
def test_max_outlier_pct_hard_cap(self):
"""The hard cap should limit outlier count to max_outlier_pct * n."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# Create data with many potential outliers (bimodal)
cluster = rng.standard_normal((80, 3)).astype(np.float32) * 0.1
outliers = rng.standard_normal((20, 3)).astype(np.float32) * 50.0
m = np.vstack([cluster, outliers])
# Very low IQR multiplier to flag a lot, but cap at 5%
result = detect_outliers(m, iqr_multiplier=0.5, max_outlier_pct=0.05)
max_allowed = max(1, int(0.05 * 100)) # 5
assert len(result) <= max_allowed
def test_hard_cap_keeps_most_extreme(self):
"""When capped, the most extreme items (highest distance) should be kept."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
cluster = rng.standard_normal((90, 3)).astype(np.float32) * 0.1
# Create outliers with increasing extremity
outliers = np.array([
[10.0, 10.0, 10.0],
[20.0, 20.0, 20.0],
[50.0, 50.0, 50.0],
], dtype=np.float32)
m = np.vstack([cluster, outliers])
# Cap at ~1 item (0.01 * 93 = 0, but min is 1)
result = detect_outliers(m, iqr_multiplier=0.5, max_outlier_pct=0.02)
if len(result) > 0:
# The most extreme (index 92, distance for [50,50,50]) should be kept
indices = [idx for idx, _ in result]
assert 92 in indices
def test_cutoff_attribute(self):
"""Returned result should carry a cutoff attribute."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((50, 3)).astype(np.float32)
result = detect_outliers(m)
assert hasattr(result, "cutoff")
assert isinstance(result.cutoff, float)
assert result.cutoff > 0
class TestFindDuplicatePairs:
"""Tests for cosine similarity duplicate detection."""
def test_single_item_returns_empty(self):
m = np.random.randn(1, 10).astype(np.float32)
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.9)
assert result == []
def test_empty_returns_empty(self):
m = np.empty((0, 10), dtype=np.float32)
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.9)
assert result == []
def test_identical_vectors_detected(self):
vec = np.random.randn(10).astype(np.float32)
vec = vec / np.linalg.norm(vec)
m = np.vstack([vec, vec, np.random.randn(10).astype(np.float32)])
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.99)
# Items 0 and 1 are identical, should be found
assert any(i == 0 and j == 1 for i, j, _ in result)
def test_orthogonal_vectors_not_detected(self):
m = np.eye(5, dtype=np.float32)
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.5)
assert result == []
def test_returns_correct_format(self):
vec = np.random.randn(10).astype(np.float32)
vec = vec / np.linalg.norm(vec)
m = np.vstack([vec, vec])
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.5)
assert len(result) >= 1
for item in result:
assert len(item) == 3
i, j, sim = item
assert isinstance(i, int)
assert isinstance(j, int)
assert isinstance(sim, float)
assert i < j
def test_i_less_than_j(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# Create some similar vectors
base = rng.standard_normal(10).astype(np.float32)
m = np.vstack([base + rng.standard_normal(10) * 0.01 for _ in range(5)])
result = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.5)
for i, j, _ in result:
assert i < j
def test_high_threshold_fewer_pairs(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
m = rng.standard_normal((10, 20)).astype(np.float32)
# Normalize for meaningful cosine similarities
norms = np.linalg.norm(m, axis=1, keepdims=True)
m = m / norms
low = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.3)
high = find_duplicate_pairs(m, 0.9)
assert len(low) >= len(high)
class TestSuggestLabels:
"""Tests for z-score normalized label suggestion."""
def test_empty_items_returns_empty_lists(self):
items = np.empty((0, 10), dtype=np.float32)
labels = np.random.randn(3, 10).astype(np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(items, labels, ["a", "b", "c"])
assert result == []
def test_empty_labels_returns_empty_per_item(self):
items = np.random.randn(5, 10).astype(np.float32)
labels = np.empty((0, 10), dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(items, labels, [])
assert len(result) == 5
assert all(s == [] for s in result)
def test_identical_embedding_gets_that_label(self):
"""If an item embedding strongly matches one label, z-score should highlight it."""
# Create multiple items so z-score normalization is meaningful
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# 10 random items + 1 item that matches label "bug" exactly
random_items = rng.standard_normal((10, 3)).astype(np.float32)
bug_vec = np.array([[1.0, 0.0, 0.0]], dtype=np.float32)
items = np.vstack([random_items, bug_vec])
labels = np.array([[1.0, 0.0, 0.0], [0.0, 1.0, 0.0], [0.0, 0.0, 1.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, ["bug", "feature", "docs"],
z_threshold=0.5, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=0.1,
)
# The last item (matching bug_vec) should get "bug" as top suggestion
last_item_sugs = result[-1]
if last_item_sugs:
assert last_item_sugs[0][0] == "bug"
def test_z_score_suppresses_dominant_label(self):
"""When all items are similar to one label, z-scores should be low
(none stands out) and that label should not be blindly suggested."""
# All items identical — z-score for every item on every label is 0
items = np.ones((10, 3), dtype=np.float32)
labels = np.array([[1.0, 1.0, 1.0], [0.0, 1.0, 0.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, ["catch-all", "specific"],
z_threshold=1.5, min_raw_sim=0.3,
)
# With identical items, std=0 -> z-scores are all 0 -> nothing passes z_threshold
for sugs in result:
assert sugs == []
def test_margin_gate_blocks_top1(self):
"""Top-1 label must beat #2 by z_margin to be accepted as position 0."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(99)
# 20 items, each slightly different, 2 labels
items = rng.standard_normal((20, 5)).astype(np.float32)
# Two labels that are nearly identical -> margin gate should block top-1
labels = np.array([[1.0, 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0],
[1.0, 0.5, 0.01, 0.0, 0.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, ["label-a", "label-b"],
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=10.0, min_raw_sim=0.0, max_per_item=1,
)
# With a huge margin requirement and max_per_item=1, nothing should pass
# because the only candidate (top-1) is blocked by margin gate,
# and max_per_item=1 prevents falling through to position 2
for sugs in result:
assert sugs == []
def test_margin_gate_passes_when_clear_winner(self):
"""When top-1 clearly beats #2, it should pass the margin gate."""
# Create items where one strongly matches label 0 vs label 1
items = np.array([
[1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0], # strongly matches label-a
[0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0], # matches neither well
] * 5, dtype=np.float32) # 10 items for stable z-scores
labels = np.array([
[1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0], # label-a
[0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0], # label-b (orthogonal)
], dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, ["label-a", "label-b"],
z_threshold=0.5, z_margin=0.3, min_raw_sim=0.1,
)
# Items matching label-a should get it suggested (clear z-score advantage)
got_label_a = sum(1 for sugs in result if sugs and sugs[0][0] == "label-a")
assert got_label_a > 0
def test_min_raw_similarity_filter(self):
"""Even with high z-score, low raw similarity should be filtered out."""
# Items are orthogonal to all labels -> raw similarity near 0
items = np.array([[1.0, 0.0, 0.0]], dtype=np.float32)
labels = np.array([[0.0, 0.0, 1.0]], dtype=np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, ["irrelevant"],
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=0.9,
)
# Raw similarity is ~0, which is below min_raw_sim=0.9
assert result[0] == []
def test_max_per_item_respected(self):
"""Even if many labels qualify, max_per_item caps the results."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
# Create items with some variance so z-scores differentiate
items = rng.standard_normal((20, 10)).astype(np.float32)
base = items[0]
# All labels very similar to item 0
labels = np.array([base + rng.standard_normal(10) * 0.01 for _ in range(10)])
names = [f"label-{i}" for i in range(10)]
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, names,
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=0.0, max_per_item=2,
)
for sugs in result:
assert len(sugs) <= 2
def test_returns_raw_similarity_not_z_score(self):
"""Returned scores should be raw cosine similarity, not z-scores."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
items = rng.standard_normal((15, 5)).astype(np.float32)
labels = rng.standard_normal((3, 5)).astype(np.float32)
names = ["bug", "feature", "docs"]
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, names,
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=-1.0,
)
# Raw cosine similarity should be in [-1, 1] range
for sugs in result:
for name, score in sugs:
assert -1.0 <= score <= 1.0 + 1e-5
assert isinstance(name, str)
assert isinstance(score, float)
def test_returns_correct_format(self):
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
items = rng.standard_normal((3, 10)).astype(np.float32)
labels = rng.standard_normal((5, 10)).astype(np.float32)
names = ["bug", "feature", "docs", "ci", "test"]
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, names,
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=-1.0,
)
assert len(result) == 3
for sugs in result:
for name, score in sugs:
assert isinstance(name, str)
assert isinstance(score, float)
assert name in names
def test_text_truncation_in_labels(self):
"""Label names should be returned as-is even when very long."""
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
items = rng.standard_normal((10, 5)).astype(np.float32)
long_name = "a" * 200
labels = rng.standard_normal((1, 5)).astype(np.float32)
result = suggest_labels(
items, labels, [long_name],
z_threshold=0.0, z_margin=0.0, min_raw_sim=-1.0,
)
for sugs in result:
if sugs:
assert sugs[0][0] == long_name
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@@ -1,873 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for sweep.py — all external calls (API, embedding) are mocked."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sys
from io import BytesIO
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, mock_open
from urllib.error import HTTPError
import numpy as np
import pytest
# Mock fastembed before importing sweep (which imports embedding_utils)
sys.modules["fastembed"] = MagicMock()
# Set required env vars before importing sweep (module-level constants read env)
os.environ.setdefault("GITHUB_TOKEN", "test-token")
os.environ.setdefault("GITHUB_REPOSITORY", "owner/repo")
from sweep import (
github_api_get,
fetch_all_open_items,
fetch_repo_labels,
apply_labels_to_item,
generate_report,
create_report_issue,
write_report,
main,
TriageItem,
RepoLabel,
REPORT_FILE,
REPORT_LABEL,
API_PAGE_SIZE,
MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION,
PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS,
MAX_EMBED_CHARS,
IQR_MULTIPLIER,
MAX_OUTLIER_PCT,
_item_age,
_suggested_action,
)
def _make_api_issue(number: int, title: str = "Test issue", is_pr: bool = False,
body: str = "Issue body", labels: list[str] | None = None,
created_at: str = "2026-03-21T00:00:00Z") -> dict:
"""Helper to build a mock GitHub API issue response object."""
result: dict = {
"number": number,
"title": title,
"html_url": f"https://github.com/owner/repo/issues/{number}",
"body": body,
"created_at": created_at,
"labels": [{"name": lbl} for lbl in (labels or [])],
}
if is_pr:
result["pull_request"] = {"url": "..."}
return result
class TestGithubApiGet:
"""Tests for the github_api_get function."""
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_successful_request(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_resp = MagicMock()
mock_resp.read.return_value = json.dumps([{"id": 1}]).encode()
mock_resp.__enter__ = lambda s: s
mock_resp.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
mock_urlopen.return_value = mock_resp
result = github_api_get("/issues?state=open")
assert result == [{"id": 1}]
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_http_error_exits(self, mock_urlopen):
error = HTTPError(
url="https://api.github.com/repos/owner/repo/issues",
code=403,
msg="Forbidden",
hdrs=None, # type: ignore[arg-type]
fp=BytesIO(b'{"message": "rate limited"}'),
)
mock_urlopen.side_effect = error
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info:
github_api_get("/issues")
assert exc_info.value.code == 1
class TestConstants:
"""Tests for module-level constants."""
def test_min_samples_is_at_least_3x_pca_max(self):
"""MIN_SAMPLES must be >= 3 * PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS for reliable covariance."""
assert MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION >= 3 * PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS
def test_min_samples_is_100(self):
assert MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION == 100
def test_pca_max_components_is_20(self):
assert PCA_MAX_COMPONENTS == 20
def test_iqr_multiplier_default(self):
assert IQR_MULTIPLIER == 3.0
def test_max_outlier_pct_default(self):
assert MAX_OUTLIER_PCT == 0.05
class TestFetchAllOpenItems:
"""Tests for fetch_all_open_items."""
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_empty_repo(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = []
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert items == []
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_single_page(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [
_make_api_issue(1, "Bug report"),
_make_api_issue(2, "Feature request", is_pr=True),
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert len(items) == 2
assert items[0]["number"] == 1
assert items[0]["is_pr"] is False
assert items[1]["is_pr"] is True
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_text_field_constructed(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [
_make_api_issue(1, "My Title", body="My Body"),
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert items[0]["text"] == "My Title\n\nMy Body"
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_long_body_truncated(self, mock_get):
"""Bodies exceeding MAX_EMBED_CHARS are truncated to fit the token window."""
long_body = "x" * (MAX_EMBED_CHARS + 500)
mock_get.return_value = [
_make_api_issue(1, "Title", body=long_body),
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert len(items[0]["text"]) == MAX_EMBED_CHARS
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_short_body_not_truncated(self, mock_get):
"""Bodies under the limit are left intact."""
mock_get.return_value = [
_make_api_issue(1, "Title", body="Short body"),
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert items[0]["text"] == "Title\n\nShort body"
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_null_body_handled(self, mock_get):
issue = _make_api_issue(1, "No body")
issue["body"] = None
mock_get.return_value = [issue]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert items[0]["text"] == "No body\n\n"
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_labels_extracted(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [
_make_api_issue(1, "Labeled", labels=["bug", "high-priority"]),
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert items[0]["labels"] == ["bug", "high-priority"]
@patch("sweep.MAX_ITEMS", 3)
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_max_items_cap(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [_make_api_issue(i) for i in range(100)]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert len(items) == 3
@patch("sweep.API_PAGE_SIZE", 2)
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_pagination(self, mock_get):
# First page: 2 items (full page), second page: 1 item (partial -> stop)
mock_get.side_effect = [
[_make_api_issue(1), _make_api_issue(2)],
[_make_api_issue(3)],
]
items = fetch_all_open_items()
assert len(items) == 3
assert mock_get.call_count == 2
class TestItemAge:
"""Tests for _item_age helper."""
def test_recent_item(self):
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
recent = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=12)).isoformat()
assert _item_age(recent) == "<1d"
def test_days_old(self):
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
old = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=15)).isoformat()
assert _item_age(old) == "15d"
def test_months_old(self):
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
old = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=90)).isoformat()
assert _item_age(old) == "3mo"
def test_years_old(self):
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
old = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=400)).isoformat()
assert _item_age(old) == "1y"
def test_invalid_date(self):
assert _item_age("not-a-date") == "?"
class TestSuggestedAction:
"""Tests for _suggested_action helper."""
def test_both_issues_close_newer(self):
a = TriageItem(
number=1, title="A", html_url="u", is_pr=False, labels=[],
created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
b = TriageItem(
number=2, title="B", html_url="u", is_pr=False, labels=[],
created_at="2026-02-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
result = _suggested_action(a, b)
assert "Close #2 as duplicate" in result
def test_both_prs_review(self):
a = TriageItem(
number=1, title="A", html_url="u", is_pr=True, labels=[],
created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
b = TriageItem(
number=2, title="B", html_url="u", is_pr=True, labels=[],
created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
assert _suggested_action(a, b) == "Review for overlap"
def test_issue_pr_link(self):
a = TriageItem(
number=1, title="A", html_url="u", is_pr=False, labels=[],
created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
b = TriageItem(
number=2, title="B", html_url="u", is_pr=True, labels=[],
created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
)
assert _suggested_action(a, b) == "Link PR to issue"
class TestGenerateReport:
"""Tests for the markdown report generator."""
def test_no_findings(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Test", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="Test",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [])
assert "## Triage Sweep Report" in report
assert "Items analyzed:** 1" in report
assert "None found." in report
assert "0 outliers flagged" in report
assert "0 duplicate pairs found" in report
def test_health_summary_table(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Test", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="Test",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [])
assert "### Health Summary" in report
assert "| Metric | Value |" in report
assert "| Items analyzed | 1 |" in report
def test_iqr_multiplier_in_thresholds(self):
"""Report should show IQR multiplier, not percentile."""
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Test", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="Test",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [])
assert "IQR multiplier" in report
assert "percentile" not in report.lower().split("thresholds")[0] # not in thresholds line
def test_with_outliers_shows_distance_and_age(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=10, title="Spam Issue", html_url="https://example.com/10",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="spam",
),
TriageItem(
number=20, title="Good Issue", html_url="https://example.com/20",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="good",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [(0, 12.34)], [])
assert "#10" in report
assert "Spam Issue" in report
assert "12.34" in report
assert "1 outliers flagged" in report
# Age column should be present
assert "| Age |" in report
def test_outlier_borderline_in_details(self):
"""Borderline outliers should be in a <details> section."""
from embedding_utils import _OutlierResult
items = [
TriageItem(
number=10, title="Borderline", html_url="https://example.com/10",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="spam",
),
]
# Create outlier results with cutoff=10.0, distance=12.0 (< 2*cutoff=20)
outlier_results = _OutlierResult([(0, 12.0)])
outlier_results.cutoff = 10.0
report = generate_report(items, outlier_results, [])
assert "<details>" in report
assert "Borderline" in report
def test_outlier_high_confidence(self):
"""Items with distance > 2x cutoff should be in high confidence section."""
from embedding_utils import _OutlierResult
items = [
TriageItem(
number=10, title="Definite Spam", html_url="https://example.com/10",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="spam",
),
]
outlier_results = _OutlierResult([(0, 25.0)])
outlier_results.cutoff = 10.0
report = generate_report(items, outlier_results, [])
assert "High Confidence" in report
def test_with_duplicates_suggested_action(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="First", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="a",
),
TriageItem(
number=2, title="Second", html_url="https://example.com/2",
is_pr=True, labels=[], created_at="2026-02-01T00:00:00Z", text="b",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [(0, 1, 0.954)])
assert "#1" in report
assert "#2" in report
assert "0.954" in report
assert "1 duplicate pairs found" in report
assert "Suggested Action" in report
assert "Link PR to issue" in report
def test_duplicate_both_issues_close_newer(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="First", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="a",
),
TriageItem(
number=2, title="Second", html_url="https://example.com/2",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-02-01T00:00:00Z", text="b",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [(0, 1, 0.95)])
assert "Close #2 as duplicate" in report
def test_duplicate_both_prs_review(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="PR A", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=True, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="a",
),
TriageItem(
number=2, title="PR B", html_url="https://example.com/2",
is_pr=True, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="b",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [(0, 1, 0.95)])
assert "Review for overlap" in report
def test_pr_type_label(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=5, title="PR Title", html_url="https://example.com/5",
is_pr=True, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="pr",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [(0, 8.5)], [])
assert "| PR |" in report
def test_footer_present(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="T", html_url="u",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [])
assert "no LLM was used" in report
class TestCreateReportIssue:
"""Tests for creating the report GitHub issue."""
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_successful_creation(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_resp = MagicMock()
mock_resp.status = 201
mock_resp.read.return_value = json.dumps({
"html_url": "https://github.com/owner/repo/issues/99",
}).encode()
mock_resp.__enter__ = lambda s: s
mock_resp.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
mock_urlopen.return_value = mock_resp
# Should not raise
create_report_issue("# Test Report")
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_http_error_exits(self, mock_urlopen):
error = HTTPError(
url="https://api.github.com/repos/owner/repo/issues",
code=422,
msg="Unprocessable",
hdrs=None, # type: ignore[arg-type]
fp=BytesIO(b'{"message": "validation failed"}'),
)
mock_urlopen.side_effect = error
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info:
create_report_issue("# Test Report")
assert exc_info.value.code == 1
class TestWriteReport:
"""Tests for the write_report helper."""
@patch("builtins.open", mock_open())
def test_writes_to_file(self):
write_report("# Report Content")
from builtins import open as builtin_open # noqa
# Verify open was called with the right path
from unittest.mock import call
open_mock = open # The patched version
open_mock.assert_called_once_with(REPORT_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") # type: ignore[attr-defined]
open_mock().write.assert_called_once_with("# Report Content") # type: ignore[attr-defined]
class TestFetchRepoLabels:
"""Tests for fetch_repo_labels."""
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_fetches_and_constructs_labels(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [
{"name": "bug", "description": "Something isn't working"},
{"name": "enhancement", "description": "New feature or request"},
{"name": "docs", "description": ""},
]
labels = fetch_repo_labels()
assert len(labels) == 3
assert labels[0]["name"] == "bug"
assert labels[0]["text"] == "bug: Something isn't working"
assert labels[2]["text"] == "docs" # no description, just name
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_empty_repo_labels(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = []
labels = fetch_repo_labels()
assert labels == []
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_null_description_handled(self, mock_get):
mock_get.return_value = [
{"name": "wontfix", "description": None},
]
labels = fetch_repo_labels()
assert labels[0]["text"] == "wontfix"
@patch("sweep.API_PAGE_SIZE", 2)
@patch("sweep.github_api_get")
def test_label_pagination(self, mock_get):
"""Repos with more labels than one page should fetch all pages."""
mock_get.side_effect = [
# First page: full (2 items = API_PAGE_SIZE)
[
{"name": "bug", "description": "Broken"},
{"name": "feature", "description": "New"},
],
# Second page: partial (1 item < API_PAGE_SIZE) -> stop
[
{"name": "docs", "description": "Documentation"},
],
]
labels = fetch_repo_labels()
assert len(labels) == 3
assert mock_get.call_count == 2
assert labels[0]["name"] == "bug"
assert labels[2]["name"] == "docs"
class TestApplyLabelsToItem:
"""Tests for apply_labels_to_item."""
def test_empty_labels_skips(self):
# Should not make any API call
apply_labels_to_item(1, [])
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_successful_label_application(self, mock_urlopen):
mock_resp = MagicMock()
mock_resp.read.return_value = b'[{"name": "bug"}]'
mock_resp.__enter__ = lambda s: s
mock_resp.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
mock_urlopen.return_value = mock_resp
# Should not raise
apply_labels_to_item(42, ["bug", "enhancement"])
@patch("sweep.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_http_error_is_non_fatal(self, mock_urlopen):
error = HTTPError(
url="https://api.github.com/repos/owner/repo/issues/1/labels",
code=404,
msg="Not Found",
hdrs=None, # type: ignore[arg-type]
fp=BytesIO(b'{"message": "not found"}'),
)
mock_urlopen.side_effect = error
# Should NOT raise — labeling failures are warnings, not fatal
apply_labels_to_item(1, ["bug"])
class TestGenerateReportWithLabels:
"""Tests for label suggestions in the report."""
def test_report_includes_label_section_high_confidence(self):
"""High-confidence label (raw_sim >= 0.5) should appear in main table."""
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Fix crash", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="crash",
),
]
suggestions = [[("bug", 0.85)]]
report = generate_report(items, [], [], label_suggestions=suggestions)
assert "Suggested Labels" in report
assert "`bug` (0.85)" in report
assert "1 items suggested for labeling" in report
def test_report_low_confidence_in_details(self):
"""Low-confidence label (raw_sim < 0.5) should be in <details> section."""
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Something", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="something",
),
]
suggestions = [[("maybe-bug", 0.35)]]
report = generate_report(items, [], [], label_suggestions=suggestions)
assert "Low-confidence suggestions" in report
assert "<details>" in report
assert "`maybe-bug` (0.35)" in report
def test_report_skips_already_labeled_items(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Already labeled", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=["bug"], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="bug",
),
]
suggestions = [[("bug", 0.95)]]
report = generate_report(items, [], [], label_suggestions=suggestions)
assert "0 items suggested for labeling" in report
assert "No unlabeled items" in report
def test_report_excludes_outliers_from_suggestions(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Spam garbage", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="spam",
),
TriageItem(
number=2, title="Real bug", html_url="https://example.com/2",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="bug",
),
]
suggestions = [[("bug", 0.85)], [("bug", 0.90)]]
# Item 0 is an outlier (with distance) — should be excluded from label suggestions
report = generate_report(items, [(0, 15.2)], [], label_suggestions=suggestions)
assert "1 unlabeled items" in report # only item 2
assert "#2" in report
# Item 0 (outlier) should NOT be in the suggestions table
assert "Spam garbage" not in report.split("Suggested Labels")[1]
def test_report_without_label_suggestions(self):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="T", html_url="u",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="t",
),
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [], label_suggestions=None)
assert "Suggested Labels" not in report
def test_label_concentration_warning(self):
"""When >50% of suggestions point to the same label, a warning should appear."""
items = [
TriageItem(
number=i, title=f"Item {i}", html_url=f"https://example.com/{i}",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text=f"text {i}",
)
for i in range(4)
]
# 3 out of 4 items get "bug" label -> 75% concentration
suggestions = [
[("bug", 0.85)],
[("bug", 0.80)],
[("bug", 0.75)],
[("enhancement", 0.90)],
]
report = generate_report(items, [], [], label_suggestions=suggestions)
assert "Warning" in report
assert "`bug`" in report
assert "3/4" in report
class TestMain:
"""Tests for the main orchestration function."""
@patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITHUB_TOKEN": "", "GITHUB_REPOSITORY": "owner/repo"})
def test_missing_token_exits(self):
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info:
main()
assert exc_info.value.code == 1
@patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITHUB_TOKEN": "tok", "GITHUB_REPOSITORY": ""})
def test_missing_repo_exits(self):
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info:
main()
assert exc_info.value.code == 1
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items", return_value=[])
def test_no_items(self, mock_fetch, mock_write):
main()
mock_write.assert_called_once()
report = mock_write.call_args[0][0]
assert "No open issues or PRs found" in report
@patch("sweep.create_report_issue")
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.suggest_labels", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.find_duplicate_pairs", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.detect_outliers", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.reduce_dimensions")
@patch("sweep.normalize_rows")
@patch("sweep.embed_texts")
@patch("sweep.fetch_repo_labels")
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items")
def test_full_flow_with_enough_items(
self, mock_fetch, mock_labels, mock_embed, mock_norm, mock_reduce,
mock_outliers, mock_dupes, mock_suggest, mock_write, mock_create,
):
"""Test the full flow with >= MIN_SAMPLES items (outlier detection runs)."""
n = MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION
items = [
TriageItem(
number=i, title=f"Item {i}", html_url=f"https://example.com/{i}",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text=f"text {i}",
)
for i in range(n)
]
mock_fetch.return_value = items
mock_labels.return_value = [
RepoLabel(name="bug", description="Something broken", text="bug: Something broken"),
]
embeddings = np.random.randn(n, 384).astype(np.float32)
mock_embed.return_value = embeddings
mock_norm.return_value = embeddings
mock_reduce.return_value = np.random.randn(n, 10).astype(np.float32)
main()
mock_fetch.assert_called_once()
mock_labels.assert_called_once()
# embed_texts called twice: once for items, once for labels
assert mock_embed.call_count == 2
mock_norm.assert_called()
mock_reduce.assert_called_once()
mock_outliers.assert_called_once()
mock_dupes.assert_called_once()
mock_suggest.assert_called_once()
mock_write.assert_called_once()
mock_create.assert_called_once()
@patch("sweep.create_report_issue")
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.suggest_labels", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.find_duplicate_pairs", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.detect_outliers")
@patch("sweep.reduce_dimensions")
@patch("sweep.normalize_rows")
@patch("sweep.embed_texts")
@patch("sweep.fetch_repo_labels", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items")
def test_skips_outlier_detection_for_few_items(
self, mock_fetch, mock_labels, mock_embed, mock_norm, mock_reduce,
mock_outliers, mock_dupes, mock_suggest, mock_write, mock_create,
):
"""With < MIN_SAMPLES items, outlier detection should be skipped."""
n = MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION - 1
items = [
TriageItem(
number=i, title=f"Item {i}", html_url=f"https://example.com/{i}",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text=f"text {i}",
)
for i in range(n)
]
mock_fetch.return_value = items
embeddings = np.random.randn(n, 384).astype(np.float32)
mock_embed.return_value = embeddings
mock_norm.return_value = embeddings
main()
# Outlier detection should not have been called
mock_reduce.assert_not_called()
mock_outliers.assert_not_called()
# But duplicates should still be checked
mock_dupes.assert_called_once()
@patch.dict(os.environ, {"INPUT_DRY_RUN": "true"})
@patch("sweep.DRY_RUN", True)
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.create_report_issue")
@patch("sweep.apply_labels_to_item")
@patch("sweep.suggest_labels", return_value=[[("bug", 0.85)]])
@patch("sweep.find_duplicate_pairs", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.normalize_rows")
@patch("sweep.embed_texts")
@patch("sweep.fetch_repo_labels")
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items")
def test_dry_run_skips_issue_creation_and_labeling(
self, mock_fetch, mock_labels, mock_embed, mock_norm,
mock_dupes, mock_suggest, mock_apply, mock_create, mock_write,
):
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Item", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="text",
)
]
mock_fetch.return_value = items
mock_labels.return_value = [
RepoLabel(name="bug", description="Broken", text="bug: Broken"),
]
embeddings = np.random.randn(1, 384).astype(np.float32)
mock_embed.return_value = embeddings
mock_norm.return_value = embeddings
main()
mock_create.assert_not_called()
mock_apply.assert_not_called()
mock_write.assert_called_once()
@patch("sweep.create_report_issue")
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.apply_labels_to_item")
@patch("sweep.suggest_labels")
@patch("sweep.find_duplicate_pairs", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.normalize_rows")
@patch("sweep.embed_texts")
@patch("sweep.fetch_repo_labels")
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items")
def test_labels_not_auto_applied(
self, mock_fetch, mock_labels, mock_embed, mock_norm,
mock_dupes, mock_suggest, mock_apply, mock_write, mock_create,
):
"""Auto-labeling is disabled; labels should appear in report only."""
items = [
TriageItem(
number=1, title="Crash bug", html_url="https://example.com/1",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="crash",
),
TriageItem(
number=2, title="Already labeled", html_url="https://example.com/2",
is_pr=False, labels=["enhancement"], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text="feat",
),
]
mock_fetch.return_value = items
mock_labels.return_value = [
RepoLabel(name="bug", description="Broken", text="bug: Broken"),
]
mock_suggest.return_value = [
[("bug", 0.90)],
[("bug", 0.45)],
]
embeddings = np.random.randn(2, 384).astype(np.float32)
mock_embed.return_value = embeddings
mock_norm.return_value = embeddings
main()
# Auto-labeling is disabled — apply_labels_to_item should never be called
mock_apply.assert_not_called()
@patch("sweep.create_report_issue")
@patch("sweep.write_report")
@patch("sweep.apply_labels_to_item")
@patch("sweep.suggest_labels")
@patch("sweep.find_duplicate_pairs", return_value=[])
@patch("sweep.detect_outliers")
@patch("sweep.reduce_dimensions")
@patch("sweep.normalize_rows")
@patch("sweep.embed_texts")
@patch("sweep.fetch_repo_labels")
@patch("sweep.fetch_all_open_items")
def test_outliers_excluded_from_report_suggestions(
self, mock_fetch, mock_labels, mock_embed, mock_norm, mock_reduce,
mock_outliers, mock_dupes, mock_suggest, mock_apply, mock_write, mock_create,
):
"""Items flagged as outliers should not appear in report label suggestions."""
n = MIN_SAMPLES_FOR_OUTLIER_DETECTION
items = [
TriageItem(
number=i, title=f"Item {i}", html_url=f"https://example.com/{i}",
is_pr=False, labels=[], created_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", text=f"text {i}",
)
for i in range(n)
]
mock_fetch.return_value = items
mock_labels.return_value = [
RepoLabel(name="bug", description="Broken", text="bug: Broken"),
]
mock_outliers.return_value = [(0, 12.5), (5, 15.3)]
mock_suggest.return_value = [[("bug", 0.85)] for _ in range(n)]
embeddings = np.random.randn(n, 384).astype(np.float32)
mock_embed.return_value = embeddings
mock_norm.return_value = embeddings
mock_reduce.return_value = np.random.randn(n, 10).astype(np.float32)
main()
# Auto-labeling is disabled
mock_apply.assert_not_called()
# Report should still be generated (outliers excluded from suggestions in report)
mock_write.assert_called_once()
report = mock_write.call_args[0][0]
# Outlier items 0 and 5 should not appear in the label suggestions section
assert "Item 0" not in report.split("Suggested Labels")[1] if "Suggested Labels" in report else True
@@ -1,363 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Vendored tree-sitter grammar update monitor.
*
* Checks each vendored grammar against its upstream source-of-origin and, for an
* available AND ABI-compatible update, re-vendors the grammar source in place so
* a PR can be opened. The version bump in vendor/<name>/package.json then triggers
* .github/workflows/build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml, which cross-builds + ABI-
* validates the prebuilds — so even an imperfect re-vendor can never silently
* ship: its PR's CI goes red.
*
* ABI awareness is load-bearing. Every grammar is pinned to tree-sitter@0.21.1
* (LANGUAGE_VERSION 13–14, the #1922 gate). Most upstream grammar releases target
* a newer tree-sitter, so a blind "bump to latest" would pull an ABI-incompatible
* parser and open doomed PRs. This monitor fetches the candidate source, reads its
* parser.c `#define LANGUAGE_VERSION`, and only re-vendors when it is 13 or 14;
* incompatible updates are reported (and surfaced as a workflow notice), not
* applied.
*
* Usage:
* node update-vendored-grammars.mjs # detect only → JSON report on stdout
* node update-vendored-grammars.mjs --apply X # re-vendor grammar X in place
*
* tree-sitter-c is MONITORED but report-only (`hold`): it is ABI-pinned at 0.21.4
* (#1242/#858) and must not auto-bump without a tree-sitter runtime upgrade, so an
* available c update is detected + reported but never auto-applied — even if it is
* ABI-13/14. A maintainer re-vendors it deliberately.
*/
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import os from 'node:os';
import path from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..');
const VENDOR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'gitnexus', 'vendor');
const COMPATIBLE_ABI = new Set([13, 14]); // tree-sitter@0.21.1 LANGUAGE_VERSION range
// Source-of-origin per grammar. npm grammars resolve `latest` via the registry;
// github grammars (no usable npm release) track the default branch HEAD. A `hold`
// reason makes a grammar report-only: updates are detected + surfaced but never
// auto-applied (c is ABI-pinned and must not move without a runtime upgrade).
//
// The vendored set lives in .github/vendored-grammars.json — the SHARED source of
// truth this monitor and .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py both
// read, so the two tree-sitter workflows can never disagree about which grammars are
// vendored or where their upstream lives. We reshape the manifest's
// `{ upstream: { npm | github } }` form into the flat `{ npm? , github? }` shape the
// rest of this script consumes. This is a local file read (import-safe, no network).
const MANIFEST = path.join(REPO_ROOT, '.github', 'vendored-grammars.json');
// `raw` is injectable for testing; production reads the manifest file.
function loadManifestGrammars(raw = null) {
if (raw === null) {
// Fail loud with a pointer, not a bare ENOENT/SyntaxError: this runs at import.
try {
raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(MANIFEST, 'utf8'));
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(
`Could not load the vendored-grammars manifest at ${MANIFEST} ` +
`(shared source of truth — see CONTRIBUTING.md → CI automation contracts): ${e.message}`,
);
}
}
return Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(raw.grammars || {}).map(([key, g]) => {
if (!g.name)
throw new Error(`manifest entry '${key}' is missing a 'name' field (${MANIFEST})`);
// Defense-in-depth: `name` is joined into gitnexus/vendor/<name> paths (and
// apply() WRITES there), so reject anything that isn't a plain grammar name
// before it can traverse the filesystem (#2187).
if (!/^tree-sitter-[a-z0-9-]+$/.test(g.name))
throw new Error(
`manifest entry '${key}' has an invalid grammar name '${g.name}' ` +
`(must match tree-sitter-[a-z0-9-]+)`,
);
return [
key,
{
name: g.name,
...(g.upstream?.npm ? { npm: g.upstream.npm } : {}),
...(g.upstream?.github ? { github: g.upstream.github } : {}),
...(g.hold ? { hold: g.hold } : {}),
},
];
}),
);
}
const GRAMMARS = loadManifestGrammars();
const sh = (cmd, args, opts = {}) =>
execFileSync(cmd, args, { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], ...opts }).trim();
const clean = (v) =>
String(v || '')
.replace(/^[v^~]/, '')
.trim();
// Shared "is the candidate newer than what we ship?" check, used by BOTH detect()
// and apply() so they can never disagree. up.version is the comparable identity for
// both kinds: a plain semver for npm, and the `<base>-g<sha7>` provenance string for
// github (which apply() also writes to package.json). detect() previously compared
// the bare sha7 for github, so after the bot re-vendored a github grammar once it
// reported a perpetual false "update available" while apply() saw "already current"
// (#2187 review). Comparing up.version on both sides removes that asymmetry.
const isNewer = (up, have) => !have || up.version !== have;
// apply() throws this (instead of calling process.exit) so its error branches are
// exercisable in-process by tests; the CLI entrypoint maps `.code` back to the
// original exit code, keeping the monitor's subprocess contract identical (#2187).
class ApplyExit extends Error {
constructor(message, code) {
super(message);
this.name = 'ApplyExit';
this.code = code;
}
}
function vendoredVersion(g) {
const p = path.join(VENDOR, g.name, 'package.json');
return clean(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).version);
}
/** Resolve the upstream candidate: { version, ref, kind }. */
function resolveUpstream(g) {
if (g.npm) {
const version = clean(sh('npm', ['view', g.npm, 'version']));
return { version, ref: version, kind: 'npm' };
}
// github: no reliable release tags here, so track the default branch HEAD sha.
const meta = JSON.parse(sh('gh', ['api', `repos/${g.github}`]));
const branch = meta.default_branch;
const sha = JSON.parse(sh('gh', ['api', `repos/${g.github}/commits/${branch}`])).sha;
// Version key: "<upstreamPkgVersion>-g<sha7>" — safeRef-compatible (no `+`,
// which the build workflow's ref validator rejects) and changes on every commit.
let base = '0.0.0';
try {
const pkg = JSON.parse(
Buffer.from(
JSON.parse(sh('gh', ['api', `repos/${g.github}/contents/package.json?ref=${sha}`])).content,
'base64',
).toString('utf8'),
);
if (pkg.version) base = clean(pkg.version);
} catch {
/* no upstream package.json — base stays 0.0.0 */
}
return { version: `${base}-g${sha.slice(0, 7)}`, ref: sha, kind: 'github' };
}
/** Fetch the candidate source into a temp dir; return the package root. */
function fetchSource(g, ref) {
const work = fs.mkdtempSync(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), `revendor-${Object.keys(GRAMMARS).find((k) => GRAMMARS[k] === g)}-`),
);
if (g.npm) {
sh('npm', ['pack', `${g.npm}@${ref}`, '--silent'], { cwd: work });
const tgz = fs.readdirSync(work).find((f) => f.endsWith('.tgz'));
sh('tar', ['xzf', tgz], { cwd: work });
return path.join(work, 'package');
}
// github tarball at the resolved sha. Download + extract WITHOUT a shell
// (no `bash -c`/redirect): `gh api` writes the binary tarball to stdout, which
// we capture as a Buffer and write to a fixed path, then extract with execFile.
// Avoids the shell-command-injection surface CodeQL flags when an API-derived
// ref is interpolated into a `bash -c` string.
const tgz = path.join(work, 'src.tgz');
fs.writeFileSync(
tgz,
execFileSync('gh', ['api', `repos/${g.github}/tarball/${ref}`], {
maxBuffer: 512 * 1024 * 1024,
}),
);
sh('tar', ['xzf', tgz], { cwd: work });
const dir = fs.readdirSync(work).find((f) => fs.statSync(path.join(work, f)).isDirectory());
return path.join(work, dir);
}
/** Read parser.c's LANGUAGE_VERSION (ABI). Prefer the ABI-14 default parser.c. */
function readAbi(srcRoot) {
const candidates = ['src/parser.c', 'parser.c'];
for (const rel of candidates) {
const p = path.join(srcRoot, rel);
if (!fs.existsSync(p)) continue;
// Read only the head — the #define is near the top.
const head = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8').slice(0, 4000);
const m = head.match(/#define\s+LANGUAGE_VERSION\s+(\d+)/);
if (m) return Number(m[1]);
}
return null; // unknown (e.g. parser.c only generated at build time)
}
// `deps` injects the network/filesystem seams (vendoredVersion / resolveUpstream /
// fetchSource / readAbi) so the classification logic — newer-detection, the ABI
// gate, and the policy-hold gate — can be unit-tested offline with fixtures, never
// touching live npm/GitHub. Production passes nothing and gets the real functions.
function detect(deps = {}) {
const getVendored = deps.vendoredVersion || vendoredVersion;
const resolveUp = deps.resolveUpstream || resolveUpstream;
const fetchSrc = deps.fetchSource || fetchSource;
const readAbiFn = deps.readAbi || readAbi;
const report = [];
for (const [key, g] of Object.entries(GRAMMARS)) {
const have = getVendored(g);
let up;
try {
up = resolveUp(g);
} catch (err) {
report.push({ grammar: key, error: String(err.message || err) });
continue;
}
const newer = isNewer(up, have);
let abi = null;
if (newer) {
try {
abi = readAbiFn(fetchSrc(g, up.ref));
} catch {
/* fetch/abi best-effort; null = unknown */
}
}
report.push({
grammar: key,
vendored: have,
upstream: up.version,
ref: up.ref,
kind: up.kind,
update: newer,
abi,
abiCompatible: abi == null ? null : COMPATIBLE_ABI.has(abi),
hold: g.hold || null,
// Auto-appliable only when there's an update, the ABI is known-compatible,
// AND the grammar is not on a policy hold (c).
applicable: newer && abi != null && COMPATIBLE_ABI.has(abi) && !g.hold,
});
}
return report;
}
const copyFile = (srcRoot, dest, rel) => {
const from = path.join(srcRoot, rel);
if (!fs.existsSync(from)) return false;
const to = path.join(dest, rel);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(to), { recursive: true });
fs.copyFileSync(from, to);
return true;
};
/**
* Re-vendor one grammar in place from its ABI-compatible upstream candidate.
* Copies ONLY the generated source-build + runtime files; deliberately KEEPS the
* GitNexus-hardened binding.gyp (Windows cflags, target_name), README (vendor
* notice), LICENSE, and prebuilds/ (the build workflow refreshes those). Bumps the
* stripped vendor package.json version + provenance — never re-introduces
* scripts/dependencies (#836/#1728). Returns the new version.
*
* opts.dryRun resolves + ABI-validates the candidate but writes NOTHING — it logs
* what it would re-vendor and returns the version, so the flow can be rehearsed
* (locally or in CI) without mutating gitnexus/vendor/. opts.deps injects the
* network/fs seams for offline testing (same shape as detect()).
*/
function apply(key, opts = {}) {
const dryRun = opts.dryRun || false;
const deps = opts.deps || {};
const getVendored = deps.vendoredVersion || vendoredVersion;
const resolveUp = deps.resolveUpstream || resolveUpstream;
const fetchSrc = deps.fetchSource || fetchSource;
const readAbiFn = deps.readAbi || readAbi;
const g = GRAMMARS[key];
if (!g) throw new ApplyExit(`unknown grammar '${key}'`, 2);
if (g.hold)
throw new ApplyExit(
`${key}: report-only (${g.hold}); not auto-applied. Re-vendor manually if intended.`,
3,
);
const have = getVendored(g);
const up = resolveUp(g);
const newer = isNewer(up, have);
if (!newer) {
// Already current: nothing to apply. Return (exit 0 via the CLI) — NOT an error.
console.error(`${key}: already current (${have}); nothing to apply.`);
return have;
}
const srcRoot = fetchSrc(g, up.ref);
const abi = readAbiFn(srcRoot);
if (abi == null || !COMPATIBLE_ABI.has(abi))
throw new ApplyExit(
`${key}: candidate ${up.version} is ABI ${abi ?? 'unknown'} — not tree-sitter@0.21.1 ` +
`compatible (need 13/14); refusing to re-vendor. Handle manually.`,
3,
);
if (dryRun) {
console.log(
`${key}: [dry-run] would re-vendor ${g.name} → ${up.version} (ABI ${abi}); no files written.`,
);
return up.version;
}
const dest = path.join(VENDOR, g.name);
// The source-build inputs + runtime entrypoints that change between versions.
// binding.gyp / README / LICENSE / prebuilds are intentionally NOT touched.
for (const rel of [
'src/parser.c',
'src/scanner.c',
'src/node-types.json',
'src/tree_sitter/alloc.h',
'src/tree_sitter/array.h',
'src/tree_sitter/parser.h',
'bindings/node/binding.cc',
'bindings/node/index.js',
'bindings/node/index.d.ts',
]) {
copyFile(srcRoot, dest, rel);
}
const pkgPath = path.join(dest, 'package.json');
const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf8'));
pkg.version = up.version;
pkg._vendoredBy =
`gitnexus - re-vendored from ${g.npm ? `npm ${g.npm}@${up.version}` : `${g.github}@${up.ref}`} ` +
`by grammar-update-monitor on ABI ${abi}. Source-build inputs (parser.c/scanner.c/src/) refreshed; ` +
`the GitNexus-hardened binding.gyp + vendor README + prebuilds are preserved (prebuilds are ` +
`rebuilt by build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml on this version change). No scripts/dependencies here ` +
`(#836/#1728).`;
fs.writeFileSync(pkgPath, JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2) + '\n');
console.log(`${key}: re-vendored ${g.name} → ${up.version} (ABI ${abi}).`);
return up.version;
}
// Run the CLI only when invoked directly (not when imported by a test) — detect()
// makes live network calls, so importing must be side-effect-free.
const isMain = process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href;
if (isMain) {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
const dryRun = args.includes('--dry-run');
if (args[0] === '--apply') {
// `--apply <grammar> [--dry-run]` — --dry-run previews without writing.
// Map apply()'s thrown ApplyExit back to the original exit codes (0/2/3) so
// the monitor workflow's subprocess (which only distinguishes zero vs non-zero)
// sees identical behavior.
try {
apply(args[1], { dryRun });
} catch (e) {
console.error(e.message);
process.exit(e instanceof ApplyExit ? e.code : 1);
}
} else {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(detect(), null, 2) + '\n');
}
}
export {
detect,
apply,
resolveUpstream,
readAbi,
vendoredVersion,
loadManifestGrammars,
GRAMMARS,
COMPATIBLE_ABI,
};
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
{
"_comment": "Single source of truth for the VENDORED SET + policy holds, read by BOTH .github/scripts/update-vendored-grammars.mjs (weekly auto-PR bot) and .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py (daily readiness report -> issue #858). The monitor also resolves each grammar's upstream from the `upstream` field here; the readiness report reads vendored ABIs from gitnexus/vendor/<name>/src/parser.c and keeps its own upstream-drift coords. A consistency-guard test asserts this set equals the gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-* directories. See CONTRIBUTING.md.",
"grammars": {
"c": {
"name": "tree-sitter-c",
"upstream": { "npm": "tree-sitter-c" },
"hold": "ABI-pinned at 0.21.4 (#1242/#858) — needs a tree-sitter runtime upgrade before bumping"
},
"swift": {
"name": "tree-sitter-swift",
"upstream": { "npm": "tree-sitter-swift" }
},
"kotlin": {
"name": "tree-sitter-kotlin",
"upstream": { "npm": "tree-sitter-kotlin" },
"hold": "pinned to unreleased fwcd main commit c8ac3d26 for `fun interface` support (fwcd/tree-sitter-kotlin#169, closes #87) — npm latest (0.3.8) lacks the fix, so the monitor must NOT auto-revert (isNewer is strict-inequality: 0.3.8 != 0.4.0). Drop this hold and bump when upstream cuts a release that includes the fix"
},
"dart": {
"name": "tree-sitter-dart",
"upstream": { "github": "UserNobody14/tree-sitter-dart" }
},
"proto": {
"name": "tree-sitter-proto",
"upstream": { "github": "coder3101/tree-sitter-proto" }
}
}
}
@@ -1,632 +0,0 @@
name: Build tree-sitter prebuilds
# Cross-builds the native tree-sitter prebuilds GitNexus vendors itself, so that
# grammars whose upstream packages ship SOURCE ONLY (no usable prebuilds/) never
# require a C/C++ toolchain at a user's install. This is the "no operational
# risk for any tree-sitter grammar" pipeline.
#
# Grammars covered here (the at-risk set — everything else already ships 6
# upstream prebuilds AND stays dependency-review-tracked, so it is left alone).
# All five are vendored under gitnexus/vendor/; `kind` (below) only picks where
# the build job fetches the C source to compile:
# - tree-sitter-c (vendored prebuild-only; built from the published npm
# package — closes upstream's 4/6 ARM gap #2116 for a
# REQUIRED grammar)
# - tree-sitter-dart (vendored source; built from gitnexus/vendor/)
# - tree-sitter-proto (vendored source; built from gitnexus/vendor/)
# - tree-sitter-kotlin (vendored source; built from gitnexus/vendor/ — pinned to
# an unreleased main commit for `fun interface` support
# (#169) that no npm release carries yet)
# - tree-sitter-swift (vendored source; built from gitnexus/vendor/ — its
# prebuilds were originally upstream-shipped, now
# GitNexus-cross-built like the rest for uniformity)
#
# Output: gitnexus/vendor/<grammar>/prebuilds/<platform-arch>/<grammar>.node for
# all 6 targets ({linux,darwin,win32}-{x64,arm64}). tree-sitter grammars are
# N-API, so one ABI-stable .node per platform-arch works across all Node majors.
#
# COST DISCIPLINE — this is a HEAVY native matrix (up to 3 grammars x 6 runners,
# incl. macOS + arm64). It is DELIBERATELY NOT wired into normal PR/push CI. It
# runs only:
# 1. on manual dispatch (workflow_dispatch); or
# 2. when a covered grammar's VENDORED SOURCE changes in a PR — a version bump
# OR an edit to the grammar's build-affecting source (parser.c / grammar.js /
# binding.gyp / scanner / bindings). The `guard` job is the real gate (it
# diffs BOTH the recorded version AND the source files vs the PR base); the
# `paths:` filter below keeps ordinary code PRs at ZERO matrix time and
# excludes the prebuilds the job commits back, so it never retriggers itself.
# Net effect: an ordinary code PR triggers nothing; touching one grammar's source
# costs exactly one matrix run for that grammar. Delivery of the rebuilt binaries:
# - same-repo PR -> committed straight onto the PR's own branch (in the SAME PR);
# - manual dispatch (open_pr=true) -> a fresh chore/ PR;
# - fork PR -> the trusted commit-fork-prebuilds.yml (workflow_run) pushes them
# onto the fork branch when "Allow edits by maintainers" is on, else
# comments download-and-commit instructions. That consumer must be
# on the DEFAULT branch to run, so it activates once merged to main.
#
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md -> "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
#
# NOTE: every action below is pinned to a release commit SHA (with the matching
# `# vX.Y.Z` tag comment verified against the GitHub API). If a future bump adds
# a new action, pin its real release SHA and allowlist it in .github/zizmor.yml /
# Scorecard before merge.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
grammars:
description: 'Comma-separated grammar shortnames to build (c,dart,proto,kotlin,swift), or "all".'
required: false
type: string
default: 'all'
ref:
description: 'Upstream version/tag/sha override (only honored when exactly one grammar is selected).'
required: false
type: string
default: ''
force:
description: 'Build even if the recorded version is unchanged (re-cut a broken prebuild).'
required: false
type: boolean
default: false
open_pr:
description: 'Open a PR with the rebuilt prebuilds (false = artifacts only).'
required: false
type: boolean
default: true
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths:
# Any build-affecting change under a vendored grammar triggers a rebuild —
# not just a version bump — so editing the vendored source (parser.c,
# grammar.js, binding.gyp, scanner, bindings) re-cuts the prebuilds too.
# The prebuilds we commit back are EXCLUDED (negated last) so the bot's own
# in-PR commit can never retrigger this workflow (no build->commit->build loop).
- 'gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/**'
- '!gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/prebuilds/**'
# Self-test: re-run the guard if a future grammar pin is reintroduced in
# the main package.json (optionalDependencies fallback). No-op otherwise —
# all five grammars are now fully vendored (kotlin included).
- 'gitnexus/package.json'
# Self-test: re-run the guard (normally a no-op) when the recipe changes.
- '.github/workflows/build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml'
# Least privilege by default; only `aggregate` opts up.
permissions:
contents: read
# One slot per ref. Collapse PR re-pushes, but never cancel a manual re-cut.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
jobs:
# ── Gate: decide which grammars (if any) need a native rebuild, and emit the
# {grammar x platform-arch} matrix the build job consumes. ───────────────
guard:
name: Decide what to build
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
contents: read
outputs:
any: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.any }}
matrix: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.matrix }}
release_app: ${{ steps.relapp.outputs.configured }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # need base history to diff recorded versions
persist-credentials: false
- name: Decide
id: decide
env:
EVENT: ${{ github.event_name }}
# Untrusted dispatch inputs — read via env only, validated in JS.
INPUT_GRAMMARS: ${{ inputs.grammars }}
INPUT_REF: ${{ inputs.ref }}
FORCE: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.force || 'false' }}
BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
node --input-type=module - <<'NODE'
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import { appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';
// Registry of the at-risk grammars this workflow owns. `kind` drives
// how the build job resolves source: 'npm' pulls the published package;
// 'vendored' builds from gitnexus/vendor/<name> (which carries the C
// source + binding.gyp). Extend this list to cover a new grammar.
const REGISTRY = {
// c is vendored prebuild-only but BUILT from the published npm
// package (kind 'npm'), held at 0.21.4 — it closes upstream's 4/6
// ARM gap (#2116) for a REQUIRED grammar that otherwise hard-fails
// install on toolchain-less ARM.
c: { name: 'tree-sitter-c', kind: 'npm' },
dart: { name: 'tree-sitter-dart', kind: 'vendored' },
proto: { name: 'tree-sitter-proto', kind: 'vendored' },
// kotlin is vendored WITH its source (parser.c/scanner.c/binding.gyp),
// so it builds from gitnexus/vendor/ like dart/proto/swift. It was
// 'npm' while tracking released versions, but is now pinned to an
// unreleased main commit for `fun interface` support (#169) that no
// npm release carries yet — so it must build from the vendored source.
kotlin: { name: 'tree-sitter-kotlin', kind: 'vendored' },
// swift is vendored WITH its source (parser.c/scanner.c/binding.gyp),
// so it builds from gitnexus/vendor/ like dart/proto. Its prebuilds
// were originally upstream-shipped; rebuilding them here unifies it.
swift: { name: 'tree-sitter-swift', kind: 'vendored' },
};
const PLATFORMS = [
{ platform_arch: 'linux-x64', os: 'ubuntu-24.04' },
{ platform_arch: 'linux-arm64', os: 'ubuntu-24.04-arm' },
{ platform_arch: 'darwin-arm64', os: 'macos-15' },
{ platform_arch: 'darwin-x64', os: 'macos-15-intel' }, // macos-13 retired Dec-2025; Intel EOL ~Aug-2027
{ platform_arch: 'win32-x64', os: 'windows-2022' },
{ platform_arch: 'win32-arm64', os: 'windows-11-arm' },
];
const clean = (v) => (v || '').replace(/^[\^~]/, '').trim();
const json = (p) => { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')); } catch { return null; } };
// Durable version key for a grammar at a checkout root. Prefer the
// vendor snapshot (the post-vendor source of truth); fall back to the
// optionalDependencies pin during the transition window. (A guard keyed
// on the node_modules lock entry would self-disable once a grammar is
// vendored, because that entry is deleted.)
function recordedVersion(root, name) {
const v = json(`${root}/gitnexus/vendor/${name}/package.json`);
if (v && v.version) return clean(v.version);
const pkg = json(`${root}/gitnexus/package.json`);
const od = pkg && (pkg.optionalDependencies || {});
const d = pkg && (pkg.dependencies || {});
return clean((od && od[name]) || (d && d[name]) || '');
}
const event = process.env.EVENT;
const force = process.env.FORCE === 'true';
// Select which grammar shortnames are in play.
let selected;
if (event === 'workflow_dispatch') {
const raw = (process.env.INPUT_GRAMMARS || 'all').trim();
selected = raw === 'all' ? Object.keys(REGISTRY)
: raw.split(',').map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
for (const s of selected) if (!REGISTRY[s]) throw new Error(`unknown grammar '${s}'`);
} else {
selected = Object.keys(REGISTRY);
}
// Resolve the base-ref recorded versions (pull_request only) so we can
// diff. On dispatch, base is irrelevant (manual intent / force wins).
const baseRoot = `${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP}/base`;
const baseSha = process.env.BASE_SHA;
// Defense in depth: baseSha is interpolated into git commands below, so
// reject anything that is not a plain commit-ish before we touch a shell.
if (event === 'pull_request' && baseSha && !/^[0-9a-fA-F]{7,40}$/.test(baseSha)) {
throw new Error(`unexpected base sha '${baseSha}'`);
}
if (event === 'pull_request') {
for (const s of selected) {
const name = REGISTRY[s].name;
for (const rel of [`gitnexus/vendor/${name}/package.json`, `gitnexus/package.json`]) {
const dst = `${baseRoot}/${rel}`;
fs.mkdirSync(dst.slice(0, dst.lastIndexOf('/')), { recursive: true });
try {
const buf = execSync(`git show ${baseSha}:${rel}`, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] });
fs.writeFileSync(dst, buf);
} catch { /* file absent at base — fine */ }
}
}
}
// The single-ref override is only meaningful for a one-grammar dispatch.
const refOverride = clean(process.env.INPUT_REF);
if (refOverride && !(event === 'workflow_dispatch' && selected.length === 1)) {
throw new Error('ref override requires exactly one grammar selected');
}
const safeRef = (r) => /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$/.test(r);
const include = [];
const built = [];
for (const short of selected) {
const { name, kind } = REGISTRY[short];
const head = recordedVersion('.', name);
const ref = refOverride || head;
if (!ref) { console.log(`skip ${short}: no recorded version`); continue; }
if (!safeRef(ref)) throw new Error(`unsafe ref for ${short}: '${ref}'`);
let build = false;
if (event === 'workflow_dispatch') {
build = true; // manual intent (force toggles only the unchanged-guard, which is bypassed here)
} else {
// pull_request: build when the recorded version changed OR any
// build-affecting source file under the vendored grammar changed vs
// the PR base. The prebuilds/ subtree is excluded from the diff so
// the bot's own in-PR commit (which adds ONLY prebuilds) never reads
// as a source change — this is the other half of the no-loop guard.
const base = recordedVersion(baseRoot, name);
const versionChanged = !!head && head !== base;
let sourceChanged = false;
try {
const diff = execSync(
`git diff --name-only ${baseSha} -- gitnexus/vendor/${name} ` +
`':(exclude)gitnexus/vendor/${name}/prebuilds/**'`,
{ stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] },
).toString().trim();
sourceChanged = diff.length > 0;
} catch { /* base unavailable -> fall back to the version gate */ }
build = versionChanged || sourceChanged;
console.log(`${short}: version ${versionChanged ? 'changed' : 'same'}, source ${sourceChanged ? 'changed' : 'same'} -> ${build ? 'BUILD' : 'skip'}`);
}
if (force) build = true;
if (!build) continue;
built.push(short);
for (const p of PLATFORMS) include.push({ grammar: short, name, kind, ref, ...p });
}
const out = process.env.GITHUB_OUTPUT;
appendFileSync(out, `any=${include.length > 0}\n`);
appendFileSync(out, `matrix=${JSON.stringify({ include })}\n`);
if (include.length === 0) {
console.log('::notice::No covered grammar version changed — skipping native matrix.');
} else {
console.log(`Building: ${built.join(', ')} (${include.length} jobs)`);
}
NODE
# The aggregate job opens a PR via a GitHub App token; without the App
# secrets it would hard-fail AFTER a full native build. Surface their
# presence as a guard output so aggregate skips cleanly (the build job's
# artifacts still upload). secrets aren't available in a job-level `if:`,
# so we compute the boolean here (a step CAN read secrets) and gate on it.
- name: Check release App secret
id: relapp
env:
HAS_APP: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID != '' && secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY != '' }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
echo "configured=$HAS_APP" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
if [ "$HAS_APP" != "true" ]; then
echo "::notice::Release GitHub App secrets (RELEASE_APP_ID / RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY) are not configured — prebuilds will build and upload as artifacts, but the auto-PR is skipped. Provision the App, or run with open_pr=false to suppress this notice."
fi
# ── Fork PRs: emit the PR identity so the trusted `commit-fork-prebuilds`
# workflow_run job can push the rebuilt prebuilds back onto the fork's
# branch. That job has no PR context of its own (workflow_run.pull_requests
# is empty for forks), so it reads this. Same-repo PRs don't need it — the
# aggregate job below commits straight onto their branch. This artifact is
# untrusted producer output: every field is allowlist-validated again on
# the consumer side AND cross-checked against the workflow_run authority.
- name: Record fork PR identity
id: forkmeta
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork == true && steps.decide.outputs.any == 'true'
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
HEAD_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
HEAD_REPO: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
BASE_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/pr-meta"
# Values flow through env + jq so an exotic head_ref is quoted, never
# interpolated into a shell command.
jq -n \
--arg schema "gitnexus.ts-prebuild/v1" \
--argjson pr_number "$PR_NUMBER" \
--arg head_sha "$HEAD_SHA" \
--arg head_ref "$HEAD_REF" \
--arg head_repo "$HEAD_REPO" \
--arg base_repo "$BASE_REPO" \
'{schema:$schema, pr_number:$pr_number, head_sha:$head_sha, head_ref:$head_ref, head_repo:$head_repo, base_repo:$base_repo}' \
> "$RUNNER_TEMP/pr-meta/metadata.json"
cat "$RUNNER_TEMP/pr-meta/metadata.json"
- name: Upload fork PR meta
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork == true && steps.decide.outputs.any == 'true'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: pr-meta
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/pr-meta/metadata.json
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 7
# ── Build one native prebuild per (grammar, platform-arch). No cross-compile. ─
build:
name: ${{ matrix.grammar }} ${{ matrix.platform_arch }}
needs: guard
if: needs.guard.outputs.any == 'true'
permissions:
contents: read
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix: ${{ fromJSON(needs.guard.outputs.matrix) }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
# 45 (not 30) for headroom: the kotlin parser.c is ~23 MB and swift's ~18 MB,
# and compiling them under emulation on the arm runners is slow.
timeout-minutes: 45
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false # this job uploads artifacts (artipacked)
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
- name: Ensure Python (arm64 Windows only)
if: matrix.platform_arch == 'win32-arm64'
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Build prebuild
id: build
shell: bash
env:
GRAMMAR: ${{ matrix.grammar }}
NAME: ${{ matrix.name }}
KIND: ${{ matrix.kind }}
REF: ${{ matrix.ref }}
PLATFORM_ARCH: ${{ matrix.platform_arch }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
work="$RUNNER_TEMP/ts-build"
rm -rf "$work"; mkdir -p "$work"; cd "$work"
npm init -y >/dev/null
# node-addon-api must match what the grammar's binding.cc expects.
# GitNexus hoists ^8 for the vendored grammars; npm grammars declare
# their own (do NOT pin it for npm grammars — let the dep resolve it).
if [ "$KIND" = "vendored" ]; then
# Build from the vendored C source (carries parser.c + binding.gyp).
srcdir="$work/$NAME"
cp -R "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/gitnexus/vendor/$NAME" "$srcdir"
rm -rf "$srcdir/prebuilds" "$srcdir/build" "$srcdir/node_modules"
npm install --no-audit --no-fund --ignore-scripts \
prebuildify@^6 node-gyp@^11 node-addon-api@^8
pkgdir="$srcdir"
export npm_config_node_gyp="$work/node_modules/node-gyp/bin/node-gyp.js"
else
# Pull the published source-only package.
npm install --no-audit --no-fund --ignore-scripts \
"$NAME@${REF}" prebuildify@^6 node-gyp@^11
pkgdir="$work/node_modules/$NAME"
fi
test -f "$pkgdir/binding.gyp" || { echo "::error::no binding.gyp for $NAME@$REF"; exit 1; }
# Drop any prebuilds the package shipped in its own tarball before we
# build. The tree-sitter-org npm grammars (e.g. tree-sitter-c) bundle
# prebuilds/ for all 6 tuples; left in place, the `find ... -print -quit`
# below would pick a non-host tuple (e.g. win32-x64 on a linux runner)
# and the assertion would wrongly fail. prebuildify rebuilds THIS host's
# tuple from the source the tarball also ships. (Vendored grammars are
# already cleaned above; this also covers the npm branch.)
rm -rf "$pkgdir/prebuilds"
# N-API, stripped, single ABI-stable binary for THIS host's arch. No
# `-t <node-version>`: an N-API prebuild is Node-version-agnostic, and
# prebuildify parses a bare `-t 22` as the NUMBER 22 and crashes
# (`v.indexOf is not a function`). prebuildify emits
# prebuilds/<platform>-<arch>/<something>.node.
( cd "$pkgdir" && npx --no-install prebuildify --napi --strip )
out=$(find "$pkgdir/prebuilds" -name '*.node' -print -quit)
test -n "$out" || { echo "::error::prebuildify produced no .node"; exit 1; }
produced=$(basename "$(dirname "$out")")
[ "$produced" = "$PLATFORM_ARCH" ] || { echo "::error::built $produced, expected $PLATFORM_ARCH"; exit 1; }
stage="$RUNNER_TEMP/stage/$GRAMMAR/$PLATFORM_ARCH"; mkdir -p "$stage"
cp "$out" "$stage/$NAME.node"
echo "stage=$stage" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Validate the .node loads and parses on this arch
shell: bash
env:
GRAMMAR: ${{ matrix.grammar }}
NAME: ${{ matrix.name }}
PLATFORM_ARCH: ${{ matrix.platform_arch }}
EXPECT_ARCH: ${{ contains(matrix.platform_arch, 'arm64') && 'arm64' || 'x64' }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
probe="$RUNNER_TEMP/probe"; rm -rf "$probe"
mkdir -p "$probe/prebuilds/$PLATFORM_ARCH"
cp "$RUNNER_TEMP/stage/$GRAMMAR/$PLATFORM_ARCH/$NAME.node" \
"$probe/prebuilds/$PLATFORM_ARCH/$NAME.node"
cd "$probe"
# Pin tree-sitter to the repo's exact runtime peer so an ABI mismatch
# fails HERE, not in a user's install (mirrors the #1922 ABI gate).
# NOT --ignore-scripts: tree-sitter@0.21.1's tarball ships prebuilds for
# the common tuples but NOT linux-arm64 / win32-arm64, so on the arm64
# runners node-gyp-build must source-build the runtime — give it node-gyp
# + node-addon-api to do so. Where tree-sitter ships a prebuild (x64,
# darwin-arm64) node-gyp-build uses it and nothing compiles. The grammar
# .node we built is still loaded as a prebuild; only the runtime peer may
# compile. The grammar-vs-runtime ABI check still fires at setLanguage.
npm install --no-audit --no-fund \
node-gyp-build@^4 node-gyp@^11 node-addon-api@^8 tree-sitter@0.21.1
# The node script is single-quoted on purpose — its ${...} are JS
# template literals read from the environment, not shell expansions.
# shellcheck disable=SC2016
GRAMMAR="$GRAMMAR" EXPECT_ARCH="$EXPECT_ARCH" node -e '
const expect = process.env.EXPECT_ARCH;
// Catch an emulated x64 Node silently mis-passing on an arm64 runner.
if (process.arch !== expect) throw new Error(`runner arch ${process.arch} != ${expect}`);
const snippets = {
c: "int main(void) { return 0; }",
dart: "void main() { print(\"hi\"); }",
proto: "syntax = \"proto3\";\nmessage M { int32 id = 1; }",
kotlin: "fun main() { println(\"hi\") }",
swift: "func greet() { print(\"hi\") }",
};
const lang = require("node-gyp-build")(process.cwd());
const Parser = require("tree-sitter");
const p = new Parser(); p.setLanguage(lang);
const tree = p.parse(snippets[process.env.GRAMMAR]);
if (!tree || !tree.rootNode || tree.rootNode.hasError) {
throw new Error("parse failed/error: " + (tree && tree.rootNode && tree.rootNode.type));
}
console.log("OK", process.env.GRAMMAR, process.platform + "-" + process.arch, tree.rootNode.type);
'
- name: Upload prebuild artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: ts-prebuild-${{ matrix.grammar }}-${{ matrix.platform_arch }}
path: ${{ steps.build.outputs.stage }}/${{ matrix.name }}.node
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 7
# ── Aggregate every grammar's six prebuilds, assert completeness, deliver them. ─
aggregate:
name: Vendor prebuilds + deliver
needs: [guard, build]
# Runs on a non-fork pull_request whose vendored grammar source changed — the
# rebuilt prebuilds are committed straight onto that PR's own branch (same PR)
# — or on a manual dispatch with open_pr=true, which opens a fresh chore/ PR.
# Fork PRs are excluded: a bot cannot push into a fork branch, so they get
# artifacts only. Event-gating is explicit so we never rely on GHA coercing a
# null `inputs.open_pr` on pull_request events (Codex F4): `inputs.open_pr` is
# null off-dispatch, and `null != false` is direction-ambiguous, so `open_pr`
# is only consulted on workflow_dispatch.
if: >-
needs.guard.outputs.any == 'true' &&
needs.guard.outputs.release_app == 'true' &&
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork != true &&
(github.event_name == 'pull_request' || inputs.open_pr == true)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: read # actual writes use a short-lived App token below
id-token: write # SLSA provenance attestation
attestations: write
steps:
- name: Mint GitHub App token
id: app-token
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49218906704ab6c1aa796996da409d3eb1 # v3.2.0
with:
app-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
# On a (non-fork) PR, check out the PR's HEAD branch — not the merge ref —
# so the rebuilt-prebuilds commit lands on the PR's own branch (same PR).
# Empty on manual dispatch -> the workflow's default ref.
ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.ref || '' }}
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download all prebuild artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/dl
pattern: ts-prebuild-*
- name: Place prebuilds, assert each built grammar has all 6, write SHA256SUMS
id: place
shell: bash
env:
MATRIX: ${{ needs.guard.outputs.matrix }}
DL: ${{ runner.temp }}/dl
run: |
set -euo pipefail
node --input-type=module - <<'NODE'
import fs from 'node:fs';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
const include = JSON.parse(process.env.MATRIX).include;
const dl = process.env.DL;
const byGrammar = {};
for (const e of include) (byGrammar[e.grammar] ||= { name: e.name, archs: [] }).archs.push(e.platform_arch);
const PLATFORMS = ['linux-x64','linux-arm64','darwin-arm64','darwin-x64','win32-x64','win32-arm64'];
const changed = [];
for (const [grammar, { name }] of Object.entries(byGrammar)) {
const dest = `gitnexus/vendor/${name}/prebuilds`;
// A vendored grammar with 5/6 prebuilds silently breaks node-gyp-build
// on the 6th platform — refuse a partial result.
for (const pa of PLATFORMS) {
const art = `${dl}/ts-prebuild-${grammar}-${pa}/${name}.node`;
if (!fs.existsSync(art)) throw new Error(`missing ${grammar} prebuild for ${pa}`);
fs.mkdirSync(`${dest}/${pa}`, { recursive: true });
fs.copyFileSync(art, `${dest}/${pa}/${name}.node`);
}
execSync(`cd ${dest} && find . -name '*.node' | sort | xargs sha256sum > SHA256SUMS`);
changed.push(name);
}
fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_OUTPUT, `grammars=${changed.join(',')}\n`);
console.log('Vendored prebuilds for:', changed.join(', '));
NODE
- name: Attest build provenance (SLSA)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@0f67c3f4856b2e3261c31976d6725780e5e4c373 # v4.1.1
with:
subject-path: 'gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/prebuilds/**/*.node'
- name: Deliver rebuilt prebuilds
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
env:
GRAMMARS: ${{ steps.place.outputs.grammars }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
with:
github-token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
script: |
const { execSync } = require('node:child_process');
const run = (c) => execSync(c, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'inherit'] }).toString().trim();
const grammars = process.env.GRAMMARS;
const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
const remote = `https://x-access-token:${process.env.GH_TOKEN}@github.com/${owner}/${repo}.git`;
run('git add gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/prebuilds');
if (!run('git status --porcelain -- gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/prebuilds')) {
core.notice('Prebuilds byte-identical to vendor; nothing to commit.');
return;
}
run('git config user.name "gitnexus-release-bot[bot]"');
run('git config user.email "gitnexus-release-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"');
run(`git commit -m "chore(vendor): rebuild native prebuilds (${grammars})" -m "Built by ${process.env.RUN_URL}"`);
// ── Same-repo PR: ride the rebuilt prebuilds into the SAME PR by
// pushing one commit onto its head branch. The aggregate checkout
// used `ref: head.ref`, so HEAD is the PR branch tip (NOT the merge
// ref) and this is a clean fast-forward of exactly our new commit.
// Plain push (NOT --force): we only ever ADD on top of head, so we
// must never clobber the contributor's commits. If the branch
// advanced mid-build the push is rejected — and the PR's
// cancel-in-progress concurrency will already have started a fresher
// run against the new head — so a rejection is a no-op we just note.
if (context.eventName === 'pull_request') {
const headRef = context.payload.pull_request.head.ref;
try {
run(`git push "${remote}" "HEAD:${headRef}"`);
core.notice(`Pushed rebuilt prebuilds onto PR branch '${headRef}' (included in this PR).`);
} catch (e) {
core.warning(`Could not fast-forward '${headRef}' (it likely advanced mid-build); a fresher run will rebuild. ${e.message}`);
}
return;
}
// ── Manual dispatch: there is no PR to attach to, so open a fresh one
// off an ephemeral, run-unique branch. Plain --force is safe here:
// the branch is keyed by context.runId and written ONLY by this job,
// so there is no concurrent writer to protect against.
const slug = grammars.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/gi, '-');
const branch = `chore/vendor-ts-prebuilds-${slug}-${context.runId}`;
run(`git checkout -b "${branch}"`);
run(`git push --force "${remote}" "HEAD:${branch}"`);
const body = [
`Rebuilt the vendored native prebuilds for: **${grammars}**.`,
'',
`Builder run: ${process.env.RUN_URL}`,
'Each `.node` was `require()`-loaded + parsed a real snippet on its target',
'platform-arch before upload. SLSA build-provenance attested; `SHA256SUMS`',
'committed alongside each grammar.',
].join('\n');
const { data: pr } = await github.rest.pulls.create({
owner, repo, head: branch, base: 'main',
title: `chore(vendor): tree-sitter prebuilds (${grammars})`, body,
});
core.info(`Opened PR #${pr.number}`);
-127
View File
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
name: Devcontainer Smoke
# Smoke-tests .devcontainer/ whenever it changes. Two things happen here.
# First, unit tests run on the pure host->container config transforms: the
# plugin-registry path translation, and the strip of the machine field from
# $HOME/.claude.json. Second, the devcontainer image is built through the
# standard @devcontainers/cli path. That CLI reads build.args from
# devcontainer.json, so the version pin there stays the single source of truth.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths:
- '.devcontainer/**'
- '.github/workflows/ci-devcontainer.yml'
pull_request:
paths:
- '.devcontainer/**'
- '.github/workflows/ci-devcontainer.yml'
permissions:
contents: read
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Grouped per branch or tag. Cancel a PR run when a newer one replaces it.
# Never cancel a push-to-main run.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
jobs:
config-transforms:
name: Config-transform unit tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — this job only reads (tests and syntax
# checks) and never pushes. The setting keeps GITHUB_TOKEN out of
# .git/config, which zizmor flags as the "artipacked" issue.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
- name: Unit-test the host->container config transforms
run: node --test .devcontainer/translate-plugin-registries.test.cjs
- name: Syntax-check the lifecycle shell scripts
run: |
bash -n .devcontainer/install-deps.sh
bash -n .devcontainer/post-create.sh
build:
name: Build devcontainer image
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — this is a read-only build smoke that
# never pushes. The setting keeps GITHUB_TOKEN out of .git/config,
# which zizmor flags as the "artipacked" issue.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
# Builds the image the same way a developer's "Reopen in Container" does.
# @devcontainers/cli reads devcontainer.json (jsonc format), resolves
# build.args (the CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION / CODEX_VERSION pins), and runs the
# Dockerfile. This smoke catches Dockerfile regressions and any drift from
# the canonical version pins. The lifecycle hooks (post-create.sh) do not
# run here. They need the host config mounts, and CI has none.
#
# ARCH COVERAGE: this runs on an x64 runner with no --platform or QEMU, so
# it builds only the amd64 Cursor branch (CURSOR_SHA256_X64). The arm64
# branch (CURSOR_SHA256_ARM64 plus the arm64 tarball URL) is pinned by a
# sha256 checked against the published artifact, but it is not BUILT here.
# Cursor's extract-and-symlink step does not depend on the architecture, so
# the only remaining gap is a stale arm64 URL or hash. If that becomes a
# concern, add a linux/arm64 matrix leg (docker/setup-qemu-action plus
# `--platform`).
#
# The @devcontainers/cli version is pinned on purpose. A bare
# `npx --yes @devcontainers/cli` would resolve @latest at run time. A
# breaking or malicious publish could then change CI behavior, or change
# how devcontainer.json is read, with no diff to show for it. Bump this pin
# deliberately, alongside the Dockerfile and devcontainer.json pins.
#
# @devcontainers/cli wraps the Dockerfile with `# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1`,
# which BuildKit resolves from Docker Hub. Hub blips surface as
# `DeadlineExceeded` / `i/o timeout` on the syntax frontend (see run
# 26797815133). Build retry (2 attempts, 45s backoff) matches
# `.github/actions/docker-build-push-retry` (docker/build-push-action#1422).
# Pre-pull of docker/dockerfile:1 is extra hardening; best-effort so the
# build retry still runs if Hub is flaky only during pull.
- name: Pre-pull BuildKit Dockerfile frontend (retry)
continue-on-error: true
run: |
set -euo pipefail
img="docker/dockerfile:1"
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
if docker pull "$img"; then
exit 0
fi
echo "::warning::docker pull ${img} attempt ${attempt} failed"
if [ "$attempt" -lt 3 ]; then
sleep $((attempt * 15))
fi
done
echo "::warning::failed to pre-pull ${img} after 3 attempts; continuing — build step may still succeed"
exit 1
- name: Build devcontainer via @devcontainers/cli
run: |
set -euo pipefail
for attempt in 1 2; do
if npx --yes @devcontainers/cli@0.87.0 build --workspace-folder .; then
if [ "$attempt" -eq 2 ]; then
echo "::notice::devcontainer build retry succeeded (attempt 2); investigate if this recurs across runs."
fi
exit 0
fi
if [ "$attempt" -eq 2 ]; then
echo "::error::devcontainer build failed after 2 attempts"
exit 1
fi
echo "::warning::devcontainer build attempt ${attempt} failed; retrying in 45s…"
sleep 45
done
-98
View File
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
name: E2E Tests
on:
workflow_call:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
check-changes:
name: Check web module changes
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
outputs:
web_changed: ${{ steps.filter.outputs.web }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: dorny/paths-filter@7b450fff21473bca461d4b92ce414b9d0420d706 # v3
id: filter
with:
filters: |
web:
- 'gitnexus-web/**'
e2e:
name: e2e (chromium)
needs: check-changes
if: needs.check-changes.result == 'success' && needs.check-changes.outputs.web_changed == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Configure e2e GitNexus home
run: echo "GITNEXUS_HOME=${RUNNER_TEMP}/gitnexus-home" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus-web
- name: Install Playwright browsers
run: npx playwright install --with-deps chromium
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Install backend dependencies
run: npm ci
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Build backend
run: npm run build
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Analyze repository (index for backend)
run: |
E2E_REPO="${RUNNER_TEMP}/gitnexus-e2e-repo"
rm -rf "${E2E_REPO}"
mkdir -p "${E2E_REPO}"
cp -R gitnexus/test/fixtures/mini-repo/src "${E2E_REPO}/src"
printf '%s\n' '{"name":"e2e-mini-repo","version":"0.0.0","private":true}' > "${E2E_REPO}/package.json"
node gitnexus/dist/cli/index.js analyze "${E2E_REPO}" --skip-git --skip-agents-md --name e2e-mini-repo
if [ ! -d "${E2E_REPO}/.gitnexus" ]; then
echo "::error::No fixture .gitnexus index created"
exit 1
fi
- name: Start backend server
run: node dist/cli/index.js serve &
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Wait for backend readiness
run: npx wait-on http://localhost:4747/api/repos --timeout 30000
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Start Vite dev server
run: npm run dev &
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Wait for Vite dev server
run: npx wait-on http://localhost:5173 --timeout 30000
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Run E2E tests
run: npx playwright test
working-directory: gitnexus-web
env:
E2E: '1'
- name: Upload test results
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: e2e-results
path: |
gitnexus-web/test-results/
gitnexus-web/playwright-report/
retention-days: 5
+173
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
name: Integration Tests
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
collect-coverage:
description: 'Whether to run the coverage collection job (only needed for PR reports)'
required: false
default: true
type: boolean
jobs:
# ── Integration test matrix ─────────────────────────────────────────
# Each test-group runs on a SEPARATE runner per OS, giving full process
# isolation for the KuzuDB native C++ addon.
# 3 OS x 4 groups = 12 parallel jobs.
#
# Groups:
# kuzu-db — 7 files using withTestKuzuDB / kuzu-adapter (native addon)
# Each file runs as its own `vitest run` invocation for full
# process isolation. KuzuDB's native N-API addon registers
# persistent handles that prevent fork workers from exiting
# on Linux, and its C++ destructors segfault during
# process.exit(). Running each file in its own process lets
# the OS reclaim all resources cleanly.
# pipeline — 3 files: ingestion pipeline + csv, each creates own temp DB
# e2e — 2 files: child-process only (spawnSync), no in-process kuzu
# standalone — 4 files: pure logic, no kuzu, no child processes
test-matrix:
name: integration (${{ matrix.os }} / ${{ matrix.test-group }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest, macos-latest]
test-group: [kuzu-db, pipeline, e2e, standalone]
include:
- test-group: kuzu-db
# Marker — actual files are listed in the run step below
test-glob: ''
- test-group: pipeline
test-glob: >-
test/integration/pipeline.test.ts
test/integration/csv-pipeline.test.ts
test/integration/parsing.test.ts
- test-group: e2e
test-glob: >-
test/integration/cli-e2e.test.ts
test/integration/hooks-e2e.test.ts
- test-group: standalone
test-glob: >-
test/integration/filesystem-walker.test.ts
test/integration/enrichment.test.ts
test/integration/tree-sitter-languages.test.ts
test/integration/worker-pool.test.ts
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
# kuzu-db: run each file in its own vitest process for full isolation.
# KuzuDB's native addon hangs fork workers on Linux — process isolation
# is the only reliable fix boundary.
- name: Run integration tests — kuzu-db (process-isolated)
if: matrix.test-group == 'kuzu-db'
working-directory: gitnexus
shell: bash
run: |
set -e
files=(
test/integration/kuzu-core-adapter.test.ts
test/integration/kuzu-pool.test.ts
test/integration/local-backend.test.ts
test/integration/local-backend-calltool.test.ts
test/integration/search-core.test.ts
test/integration/search-pool.test.ts
test/integration/augmentation.test.ts
)
exit_code=0
for f in "${files[@]}"; do
echo "::group::$f"
if ! npx vitest run --reporter=verbose --pool=forks "$f"; then
exit_code=1
echo "::error::Test file failed: $f"
fi
echo "::endgroup::"
done
exit $exit_code
# Non-kuzu groups: run all files in a single vitest invocation
- name: Run integration tests — ${{ matrix.test-group }}
if: matrix.test-group != 'kuzu-db'
shell: bash
env:
TEST_GLOB: ${{ matrix.test-glob }}
run: npx vitest run --reporter=verbose $TEST_GLOB
working-directory: gitnexus
# ── Coverage collection (ubuntu only) ─────────────────────────────────
# Runs non-kuzu integration tests with coverage enabled so the PR report
# can merge integration + unit coverage for a combined view.
# kuzu-db tests are excluded because each file must run in its own vitest
# process (native addon isolation) which prevents single-run coverage merge.
coverage:
name: integration (ubuntu / coverage)
if: inputs.collect-coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Run integration tests with coverage
working-directory: gitnexus
run: >-
npx vitest run
--reporter=default
--reporter=json
--outputFile=integration-results.json
--coverage
--coverage.reporter=json-summary
--coverage.reporter=json
--coverage.reporter=text
--coverage.thresholdAutoUpdate=false
--coverage.reportOnFailure=true
--coverage.thresholds.statements=0
--coverage.thresholds.branches=0
--coverage.thresholds.functions=0
--coverage.thresholds.lines=0
test/integration/pipeline.test.ts
test/integration/csv-pipeline.test.ts
test/integration/parsing.test.ts
test/integration/cli-e2e.test.ts
test/integration/hooks-e2e.test.ts
test/integration/filesystem-walker.test.ts
test/integration/enrichment.test.ts
test/integration/tree-sitter-languages.test.ts
test/integration/worker-pool.test.ts
- name: Upload integration coverage
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: integration-reports
path: |
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-summary.json
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-final.json
gitnexus/integration-results.json
retention-days: 5
# ── Unified status gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Branch protection should require THIS job, not the matrix jobs directly.
# ci.yml's needs.integration.result aggregates through this gate.
status:
name: integration (all groups)
needs: test-matrix
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Check all matrix jobs passed
shell: bash
env:
RESULT: ${{ needs.test-matrix.result }}
run: |
if [[ "$RESULT" != "success" ]]; then
echo "::error::Integration matrix failed or cancelled: $RESULT"
exit 1
fi
+1 -72
View File
@@ -3,83 +3,12 @@ name: Quality Checks
on:
workflow_call:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
format:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- run: npm ci
- run: npx prettier --check .
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
- run: npm ci
- run: npx eslint .
typecheck:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
- run: npx tsc --noEmit
working-directory: gitnexus
typecheck-web:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus-web
- run: npx tsc -b --noEmit
working-directory: gitnexus-web
# Enforces the convention documented in CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions —
# Concurrency Convention":
# 1. Every entry-point (non-reusable) workflow declares a top-level
# `concurrency:` block.
# 2. Reusable workflows (`on: workflow_call` only) do NOT declare one —
# they inherit concurrency from the caller.
# 3. The concurrency group key starts with `${{ github.workflow }}` or
# the literal `CI-` prefix (the documented ci.yml exception for
# reusable-workflow-safe grouping).
# Reusability is detected by parsing each workflow's `on:` block, not an
# allowlist, so new reusable workflows never produce false positives.
workflow-convention:
name: Workflow concurrency convention
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Validate workflow concurrency convention
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
python3 .github/scripts/check-workflow-concurrency.py .github/workflows
+177 -189
View File
@@ -6,24 +6,14 @@ name: CI Report
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ['CI']
workflows: ["CI"]
types: [completed]
permissions:
actions: read # needed to list/download workflow run artifacts
contents: read # needed for sparse checkout of vitest.config.ts
actions: read # needed to list/download workflow run artifacts
contents: read # needed for sparse checkout of vitest.config.ts
pull-requests: write # needed to post sticky PR comment
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Serialize sticky-comment writes per PR so two rapid CI completions don't race.
# Internal PRs surface in `pull_requests[0].number`. Fork PRs leave that array empty,
# so we fall back to `<head-repo-full-name>/<head-branch>`, which is stable across
# reruns and subsequent pushes for the same fork PR (unlike `workflow_run.id` which
# is unique per run and therefore does not serialize anything).
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number || format('{0}/{1}', github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name, github.event.workflow_run.head_branch) }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
pr-report:
name: PR Report
@@ -36,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# ── Download artifacts from the CI run ────────────────────────
- name: Download artifacts
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v7
uses: actions/github-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea # v7
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
@@ -69,6 +59,7 @@ jobs:
const temp = process.env.RUNNER_TEMP;
await downloadArtifact('pr-meta', path.join(temp, 'dl'));
await downloadArtifact('test-reports', path.join(temp, 'dl'));
await downloadArtifact('integration-reports', path.join(temp, 'dl'));
- name: Extract artifacts
shell: bash
@@ -95,117 +86,93 @@ jobs:
# Validate PR number is a positive integer (artifact comes from
# untrusted fork code, so treat contents defensively).
PR_NUM=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$DIR/pr_number")
PR_NUM=$(cat "$DIR/pr_number" | tr -d '[:space:]')
if ! [[ "$PR_NUM" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "skip=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "::error::Invalid PR number in artifact: '$PR_NUM'"
exit 0
fi
echo "skip=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "pr_number=$PR_NUM" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Validate job-result strings against known GitHub Actions values.
# Artifact contents come from the PR workflow (potentially untrusted
# fork code), so we whitelist to prevent newline injection into
# GITHUB_OUTPUT.
validate_result() {
local val
val=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$1")
val=$(cat "$1" | tr -d '[:space:]')
case "$val" in
success|failure|cancelled|skipped) echo "$val" ;;
*) echo "unknown" ;;
esac
}
{
echo "skip=false"
echo "pr_number=$PR_NUM"
echo "quality=$(validate_result "$DIR/quality_result")"
echo "tests=$(validate_result "$DIR/tests_result")"
echo "e2e=$(validate_result "$DIR/e2e_result")"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "quality=$(validate_result "$DIR/quality_result")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "unit=$(validate_result "$DIR/unit_result")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "integration=$(validate_result "$DIR/integration_result")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Checkout (for vitest config)
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
sparse-checkout: gitnexus/vitest.config.ts
sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
# ── Fetch base branch coverage for delta reporting ───────────
- name: Fetch base branch coverage
# ── Merge coverage from unit + integration ─────────────────────
- name: Setup Node.js
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
id: base-coverage
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v7
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
node-version: 20
// Find recent successful CI runs on main (check several in case
// the most recent artifact has expired).
const runs = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRuns({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
workflow_id: 'ci.yml',
branch: 'main',
status: 'success',
per_page: 5,
});
- name: Install coverage merge tools
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
run: npm install --no-save istanbul-lib-coverage istanbul-lib-report istanbul-reports
if (runs.data.workflow_runs.length === 0) {
core.setOutput('found', 'false');
core.info('No successful main branch CI runs found');
return;
}
// Try each run until we find a downloadable test-reports artifact
for (const run of runs.data.workflow_runs) {
const artifacts = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
run_id: run.id,
});
const testReports = artifacts.data.artifacts.find(a => a.name === 'test-reports');
if (!testReports) {
core.info(`Run ${run.id}: no test-reports artifact, trying next`);
continue;
}
try {
const zip = await github.rest.actions.downloadArtifact({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
artifact_id: testReports.id,
archive_format: 'zip',
});
const dest = path.join(process.env.RUNNER_TEMP, 'base-coverage');
fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dest, 'base.zip'), Buffer.from(zip.data));
core.setOutput('found', 'true');
core.setOutput('dir', dest);
return;
} catch (err) {
// 410 Gone means the artifact expired; try the next run
if (err.status === 410 || err.response?.status === 410) {
core.info(`Run ${run.id}: artifact expired, trying next`);
continue;
}
throw err;
}
}
// All attempts exhausted — no usable base coverage
core.setOutput('found', 'false');
core.info('No downloadable test-reports artifact found on main (all expired or missing)');
- name: Extract base coverage
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true' && steps.base-coverage.outputs.found == 'true'
- name: Merge coverage reports
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
id: coverage
shell: bash
run: |
cd "${{ steps.base-coverage.outputs.dir }}"
mkdir -p base
unzip -o base.zip -d base
DIR="$RUNNER_TEMP/artifacts"
UNIT_COV=$(find "$DIR/test-reports" -name "coverage-final.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
INTEG_COV=$(find "$DIR/integration-reports" -name "coverage-final.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
MERGED_DIR="$RUNNER_TEMP/merged-coverage"
mkdir -p "$MERGED_DIR"
if [ -n "$UNIT_COV" ] && [ -n "$INTEG_COV" ]; then
echo "has_merged=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Merge using Node.js + istanbul-lib-coverage.
# Paths are passed via env vars to avoid shell interpolation
# inside the script string.
UNIT_COV_PATH="$UNIT_COV" \
INTEG_COV_PATH="$INTEG_COV" \
MERGED_OUT_DIR="$MERGED_DIR" \
node -e "
const libCoverage = require('istanbul-lib-coverage');
const libReport = require('istanbul-lib-report');
const reports = require('istanbul-reports');
const fs = require('fs');
const map = libCoverage.createCoverageMap({});
map.merge(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(process.env.UNIT_COV_PATH, 'utf8')));
map.merge(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(process.env.INTEG_COV_PATH, 'utf8')));
const context = libReport.createContext({
coverageMap: map,
dir: process.env.MERGED_OUT_DIR,
});
reports.create('json-summary').execute(context);
console.log('Merged coverage written to ' + process.env.MERGED_OUT_DIR + '/coverage-summary.json');
"
elif [ -n "$UNIT_COV" ]; then
echo "has_merged=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "::warning::Integration coverage not found — using unit coverage only"
else
echo "has_merged=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "::warning::No coverage data found"
fi
- name: Build report
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
@@ -213,15 +180,16 @@ jobs:
shell: bash
env:
QUALITY: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.quality }}
TESTS: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tests }}
E2E: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.e2e }}
BASE_FOUND: ${{ steps.base-coverage.outputs.found }}
BASE_DIR: ${{ steps.base-coverage.outputs.dir }}
UNIT: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.unit }}
INTEG: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.integration }}
HAS_MERGED: ${{ steps.coverage.outputs.has_merged }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.html_url }}
run: |
DIR="$RUNNER_TEMP/artifacts"
MERGED_DIR="$RUNNER_TEMP/merged-coverage"
# ── Helper: read coverage summary into prefixed vars ──
# Uses printf -v for safe variable assignment (no eval).
read_cov() {
local prefix=$1 file=$2
if [ -n "$file" ] && [ -f "$file" ]; then
@@ -252,47 +220,64 @@ jobs:
printf -v "${prefix}_BRANCH_COV" '%s' ""
printf -v "${prefix}_FUNCS_COV" '%s' ""
printf -v "${prefix}_LINES_COV" '%s' ""
return 0
return 1
fi
}
# ── Read coverage reports ──
# ── Read all three coverage reports ──
UNIT_SUMMARY=$(find "$DIR/test-reports" -name "coverage-summary.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
INTEG_SUMMARY=$(find "$DIR/integration-reports" -name "coverage-summary.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
MERGED_SUMMARY="$MERGED_DIR/coverage-summary.json"
read_cov "U" "$UNIT_SUMMARY"
HAS_UNIT=$?
read_cov "I" "$INTEG_SUMMARY"
HAS_INTEG=$?
read_cov "M" "$MERGED_SUMMARY"
# ── Read base branch coverage (main) ──
BASE_SUMMARY=""
if [ "$BASE_FOUND" = "true" ] && [ -n "$BASE_DIR" ]; then
BASE_SUMMARY=$(find "$BASE_DIR/base" -name "coverage-summary.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
fi
read_cov "B" "$BASE_SUMMARY"
# ── Locate test results ──
# ── Locate test results (unit) ──
RESULTS_FILE=$(find "$DIR/test-reports" -name "test-results.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
WEB_RESULTS_FILE=$(find "$DIR/test-reports" -name "web-test-results.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
INTEG_RESULTS=$(find "$DIR/integration-reports" -name "integration-results.json" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1)
sum_results() {
local file=$1
if [ -n "$file" ] && [ -f "$file" ]; then
jq -r '"\(.numTotalTests) \(.numPassedTests) \(.numFailedTests) \(.numPendingTests) \(.numTotalTestSuites) \(((.testResults | map(.endTime) | max) - (.startTime)) / 1000 | floor)"' "$file" 2>/dev/null || echo "0 0 0 0 0 0"
else
echo "0 0 0 0 0 0"
fi
}
if [ -n "$RESULTS_FILE" ]; then
U_TOTAL=$(jq -r '.numTotalTests' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
U_PASSED=$(jq -r '.numPassedTests' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
U_FAILED=$(jq -r '.numFailedTests' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
U_SKIPPED=$(jq -r '.numPendingTests' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
U_SUITES=$(jq -r '.numTotalTestSuites' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
U_DURATION=$(jq -r '((.testResults | map(.endTime) | max) - (.startTime)) / 1000 | floor' "$RESULTS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
else
U_TOTAL=0; U_PASSED=0; U_FAILED=0; U_SKIPPED=0; U_SUITES=0; U_DURATION=0
fi
# `_` placeholder for the suite-count column — positional
# readability for sum_results' 6-field output, but the value
# isn't surfaced in the report (suites are tracked per-test
# framework, not as a top-line metric).
read -r CLI_T CLI_P CLI_F CLI_S _ CLI_D <<< "$(sum_results "$RESULTS_FILE")"
read -r WEB_T WEB_P WEB_F WEB_S _ WEB_D <<< "$(sum_results "$WEB_RESULTS_FILE")"
if [ -n "$INTEG_RESULTS" ]; then
I_TOTAL=$(jq -r '.numTotalTests' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
I_PASSED=$(jq -r '.numPassedTests' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
I_FAILED=$(jq -r '.numFailedTests' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
I_SKIPPED=$(jq -r '.numPendingTests' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
I_SUITES=$(jq -r '.numTotalTestSuites' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
I_DURATION=$(jq -r '((.testResults | map(.endTime) | max) - (.startTime)) / 1000 | floor' "$INTEG_RESULTS" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
else
I_TOTAL=0; I_PASSED=0; I_FAILED=0; I_SKIPPED=0; I_SUITES=0; I_DURATION=0
fi
TOTAL=$((CLI_T + WEB_T))
PASSED=$((CLI_P + WEB_P))
FAILED=$((CLI_F + WEB_F))
SKIPPED=$((CLI_S + WEB_S))
DURATION=$((CLI_D > WEB_D ? CLI_D : WEB_D))
# ── Sum test results ──
TOTAL=$((U_TOTAL + I_TOTAL))
PASSED=$((U_PASSED + I_PASSED))
FAILED=$((U_FAILED + I_FAILED))
SKIPPED=$((U_SKIPPED + I_SKIPPED))
SUITES=$((U_SUITES + I_SUITES))
DURATION=$((U_DURATION + I_DURATION))
# ── Coverage thresholds (read from vitest.config.ts) ──
if [ -f gitnexus/vitest.config.ts ]; then
THRESH_STMTS=$(grep -oP 'statements:\s*\K[0-9]+' gitnexus/vitest.config.ts || echo 0)
THRESH_BRANCH=$(grep -oP 'branches:\s*\K[0-9]+' gitnexus/vitest.config.ts || echo 0)
THRESH_FUNCS=$(grep -oP 'functions:\s*\K[0-9]+' gitnexus/vitest.config.ts || echo 0)
THRESH_LINES=$(grep -oP 'lines:\s*\K[0-9]+' gitnexus/vitest.config.ts || echo 0)
else
THRESH_STMTS=0; THRESH_BRANCH=0; THRESH_FUNCS=0; THRESH_LINES=0
fi
# ── Status helpers ──
status_icon() {
@@ -304,39 +289,18 @@ jobs:
esac
}
# Validate a value looks like a number (integer or decimal, optional
# leading minus). Returns 1 for anything else — guards against awk
# injection when artifact values come from untrusted fork code.
is_numeric() { [[ "$1" =~ ^-?[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?$ ]]; }
cov_delta() {
local pct=$1 base=$2
if [ "$pct" = "N/A" ] || [ "$base" = "N/A" ]; then echo "—"; return; fi
if ! is_numeric "$pct" || ! is_numeric "$base"; then echo "—"; return; fi
local diff
diff=$(awk -v p="$pct" -v b="$base" 'BEGIN { printf "%.1f", p - b }')
if [ "$(awk -v p="$pct" -v b="$base" 'BEGIN { print (p > b) ? 1 : 0 }')" = "1" ]; then
echo "📈 +${diff}"
elif [ "$(awk -v p="$pct" -v b="$base" 'BEGIN { print (p < b) ? 1 : 0 }')" = "1" ]; then
echo "📉 ${diff}"
else
echo "= ${diff}"
fi
}
cov_bar() {
local pct=$1 base=$2
if [ "$pct" = "N/A" ] || ! is_numeric "$pct"; then echo "—"; return; fi
local pct=$1 thresh=$2
if [ "$pct" = "N/A" ]; then echo "—"; return; fi
local filled
filled=$(awk -v p="$pct" 'BEGIN { printf "%d", p / 5 }')
filled=$(awk "BEGIN { printf \"%d\", $pct / 5 }")
(( filled < 0 )) && filled=0
(( filled > 20 )) && filled=20
local empty=$((20 - filled))
local bar=""
for ((i=0; i<filled; i++)); do bar+="█"; done
for ((i=0; i<empty; i++)); do bar+="░"; done
# Green if >= base (or base unavailable), red if dropped
if [ "$base" = "N/A" ] || ! is_numeric "$base" || [ "$(awk -v p="$pct" -v b="$base" 'BEGIN { print (p >= b) ? 1 : 0 }')" = "1" ]; then
if [ "$(awk "BEGIN { print ($pct >= $thresh) ? 1 : 0 }")" = "1" ]; then
echo "🟢 ${bar}"
else
echo "🔴 ${bar}"
@@ -344,7 +308,7 @@ jobs:
}
# ── Overall status ──
if [[ "$QUALITY" == "success" && "$TESTS" == "success" && ("$E2E" == "success" || "$E2E" == "skipped") ]]; then
if [[ "$QUALITY" == "success" && "$UNIT" == "success" && "$INTEG" == "success" ]]; then
OVERALL="✅ **All checks passed**"
else
OVERALL="❌ **Some checks failed**"
@@ -362,40 +326,25 @@ jobs:
echo "| Stage | Status | Details |"
echo "|-------|--------|---------|"
echo "| $(status_icon "$QUALITY") Typecheck | \`${QUALITY}\` | tsc --noEmit |"
echo "| $(status_icon "$TESTS") Tests | \`${TESTS}\` | unit tests, 3 platforms |"
echo "| $(status_icon "$E2E") E2E | \`${E2E}\` | gitnexus-web changes only |"
echo "| $(status_icon "$UNIT") Unit Tests | \`${UNIT}\` | 3 platforms |"
echo "| $(status_icon "$INTEG") Integration | \`${INTEG}\` | 3 OS x 4 groups = 12 jobs |"
echo ""
if [ "$TOTAL" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null; then
echo "### Test Results"
echo ""
echo "| Tests | Passed | Failed | Skipped | Duration |"
echo "|-------|--------|--------|---------|----------|"
echo "| ${TOTAL} | ${PASSED} | ${FAILED} | ${SKIPPED} | ${DURATION}s |"
echo ""
if [ "$FAILED" = "0" ]; then
echo "✅ All **${PASSED}** tests passed"
echo "✅ **${PASSED}** passed"
else
echo "❌ **${FAILED}** failed / **${PASSED}** passed"
fi
if [ "$SKIPPED" != "0" ]; then
echo ""
echo "<details>"
echo "<summary>${SKIPPED} test(s) skipped — expand for details</summary>"
echo ""
for rf in "$RESULTS_FILE" "$WEB_RESULTS_FILE"; do
if [ -n "$rf" ] && [ -f "$rf" ]; then
jq -r '
.testResults[]
| .assertionResults[]?
| select(.status == "pending" or .status == "skipped")
| "- \(.ancestorTitles | join(" > ")) > \(.title)"
' "$rf" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
done
echo ""
echo "</details>"
echo " · ${SKIPPED} skipped"
fi
echo " · ${SUITES} suites · ${TOTAL} total"
echo " · ⏱️ ${DURATION}s"
if [ "$I_TOTAL" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null; then
echo " · 📊 ${U_TOTAL} unit + ${I_TOTAL} integration"
fi
echo ""
fi
@@ -404,25 +353,64 @@ jobs:
cov_table() {
local label=$1 s=$2 b=$3 f=$4 l=$5 sc=$6 bc=$7 fc=$8 lc=$9
shift 9
local bs=$1 bb=$2 bf=$3 bl=$4
local ts=$1 tb=$2 tf=$3 tl=$4
echo "#### ${label}"
echo ""
echo "| Metric | Coverage | Covered | Base | Delta | Status |"
echo "|--------|----------|---------|------|-------|--------|"
echo "| Statements | **${s}%** | ${sc} | ${bs}% | $(cov_delta "$s" "$bs") | $(cov_bar "$s" "$bs") |"
echo "| Branches | **${b}%** | ${bc} | ${bb}% | $(cov_delta "$b" "$bb") | $(cov_bar "$b" "$bb") |"
echo "| Functions | **${f}%** | ${fc} | ${bf}% | $(cov_delta "$f" "$bf") | $(cov_bar "$f" "$bf") |"
echo "| Lines | **${l}%** | ${lc} | ${bl}% | $(cov_delta "$l" "$bl") | $(cov_bar "$l" "$bl") |"
echo "| Metric | Coverage | Covered | Threshold | Status |"
echo "|--------|----------|---------|-----------|--------|"
echo "| Statements | **${s}%** | ${sc} | ${ts}% | $(cov_bar "$s" "$ts") |"
echo "| Branches | **${b}%** | ${bc} | ${tb}% | $(cov_bar "$b" "$tb") |"
echo "| Functions | **${f}%** | ${fc} | ${tf}% | $(cov_bar "$f" "$tf") |"
echo "| Lines | **${l}%** | ${lc} | ${tl}% | $(cov_bar "$l" "$tl") |"
echo ""
}
if [ "$U_STMTS" != "N/A" ]; then
if [ "$M_STMTS" != "N/A" ]; then
echo "### Code Coverage"
echo ""
cov_table "Tests" \
cov_table "Combined (Unit + Integration)" \
"$M_STMTS" "$M_BRANCH" "$M_FUNCS" "$M_LINES" \
"$M_STMTS_COV" "$M_BRANCH_COV" "$M_FUNCS_COV" "$M_LINES_COV" \
"$THRESH_STMTS" "$THRESH_BRANCH" "$THRESH_FUNCS" "$THRESH_LINES"
echo "<details>"
echo "<summary>Coverage breakdown by test suite</summary>"
echo ""
if [ "$U_STMTS" != "N/A" ]; then
cov_table "Unit Tests" \
"$U_STMTS" "$U_BRANCH" "$U_FUNCS" "$U_LINES" \
"$U_STMTS_COV" "$U_BRANCH_COV" "$U_FUNCS_COV" "$U_LINES_COV" \
"$THRESH_STMTS" "$THRESH_BRANCH" "$THRESH_FUNCS" "$THRESH_LINES"
fi
if [ "$I_STMTS" != "N/A" ]; then
cov_table "Integration Tests" \
"$I_STMTS" "$I_BRANCH" "$I_FUNCS" "$I_LINES" \
"$I_STMTS_COV" "$I_BRANCH_COV" "$I_FUNCS_COV" "$I_LINES_COV" \
"$THRESH_STMTS" "$THRESH_BRANCH" "$THRESH_FUNCS" "$THRESH_LINES"
fi
echo "</details>"
echo ""
echo "<details>"
echo "<summary>Coverage thresholds are auto-ratcheted — they only go up</summary>"
echo ""
echo "Vitest \`thresholds.autoUpdate\` bumps the floor whenever local coverage exceeds it."
echo "CI enforces the current thresholds; developers commit the ratcheted values."
echo "</details>"
echo ""
elif [ "$U_STMTS" != "N/A" ]; then
echo "### Code Coverage (Unit only)"
echo ""
cov_table "Unit Tests" \
"$U_STMTS" "$U_BRANCH" "$U_FUNCS" "$U_LINES" \
"$U_STMTS_COV" "$U_BRANCH_COV" "$U_FUNCS_COV" "$U_LINES_COV" \
"$B_STMTS" "$B_BRANCH" "$B_FUNCS" "$B_LINES"
"$THRESH_STMTS" "$THRESH_BRANCH" "$THRESH_FUNCS" "$THRESH_LINES"
echo "<details>"
echo "<summary>Coverage thresholds are auto-ratcheted — they only go up</summary>"
echo ""
echo "Vitest \`thresholds.autoUpdate\` bumps the floor whenever local coverage exceeds it."
echo "CI enforces the current thresholds; developers commit the ratcheted values."
echo "</details>"
echo ""
else
echo "### Code Coverage"
echo ""
@@ -437,7 +425,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Comment on PR
if: steps.meta.outputs.skip != 'true'
uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@0ea0beb66eb9baf113663a64ec522f60e49231c0 # v2
uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@773744901bac0e8cbb5a0dc842800d45e9b2b405 # v2
with:
header: ci-report
number: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pr_number }}
-522
View File
@@ -1,522 +0,0 @@
name: Tests
on:
workflow_call:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
# Ubuntu full-suite coverage, sharded. Each shard writes a vitest blob report
# (carrying its slice of V8 coverage) with thresholds forced OFF — a single
# shard's partial coverage can't meet the gate. The coverage-merge job below
# reduces the blobs and enforces the real thresholds on the combined coverage.
# FTS self-installs per shard (test/helpers/fts-availability.ts), so sharding
# the full suite across fresh runners is safe. Shard count: shard-plan.cov_total.
tests:
name: ubuntu / coverage ${{ matrix.shard }}/${{ needs.shard-plan.outputs.cov_total }}
needs: shard-plan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 25
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
shard: ${{ fromJSON(needs.shard-plan.outputs.cov_shards) }}
# Fail loudly (don't silently skip) if the FTS extension is unavailable, so
# FTS-dependent lbug integration suites are guaranteed to run in CI.
env:
GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS: '1'
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — runs tests + uploads a blob artifact; the
# default-persisted token must not be capturable through it (zizmor
# credential-persistence / artipacked audit). The job never pushes.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
# Warm-cache the FTS extension (same per-OS key as the cross-platform job)
# and install it up front, so every coverage shard has FTS in ~/.lbdb before
# any test module loads. The file-path FTS gate (extension-binary-real)
# resolves the extension at module load and can't self-install, so sharding
# could otherwise drop it into a shard with no installer sibling.
- name: Cache LadybugDB FTS extension
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v5
with:
path: ~/.lbdb/extension
key: lbug-fts-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('gitnexus/package-lock.json') }}
- name: Ensure FTS extension installed
run: npx tsx scripts/ensure-fts.ts
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Run sharded tests with coverage (blob)
# Shard via env var (not `${{ }}` inlined into the shell) so it isn't a
# template-injection sink; shell: bash makes "$SHARD" expand uniformly.
# Thresholds forced to 0 — the merge job enforces the real gate on the
# MERGED coverage; a single shard's partial coverage would always fail.
shell: bash
env:
SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }}/${{ needs.shard-plan.outputs.cov_total }}
run: >-
npx vitest run
--shard="$SHARD"
--reporter=default
--reporter=blob
--coverage
--coverage.thresholds.lines=0
--coverage.thresholds.functions=0
--coverage.thresholds.branches=0
--coverage.thresholds.statements=0
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Upload coverage blob
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: coverage-blob-${{ matrix.shard }}
path: gitnexus/.vitest-reports/
# .vitest-reports is a dotdir; upload-artifact excludes hidden files by
# default, which would upload an empty artifact and break the merge.
include-hidden-files: true
retention-days: 5
# Merge the sharded coverage blobs into one report and enforce the real
# thresholds on the combined ('new') coverage — `vitest --mergeReports` re-runs
# nothing, it just reduces the stored blobs. Also emits the merged
# test-results.json and runs the (unsharded) web + docker suites, so the
# `test-reports` artifact keeps the exact shape ci-report.yml consumes for its
# base-branch ('baseline') vs new coverage delta.
coverage-merge:
name: ubuntu / coverage merge
needs: tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
env:
GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS: '1'
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Download coverage blobs
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8
with:
pattern: coverage-blob-*
path: gitnexus/.vitest-reports
merge-multiple: true
- name: Merge coverage + enforce thresholds
run: >-
npx vitest --mergeReports
--reporter=default
--reporter=json
--outputFile=test-results.json
--coverage
--coverage.reporter=json-summary
--coverage.reporter=json
--coverage.reporter=text
--coverage.thresholdAutoUpdate=false
working-directory: gitnexus
# gitnexus-shared already built by setup-gitnexus above
- name: Install gitnexus-web dependencies
run: npm ci
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Run gitnexus-web unit tests
run: >-
npx vitest run
--reporter=default
--reporter=json
--outputFile=web-test-results.json
working-directory: gitnexus-web
- name: Run docker-server integration tests
run: node --test docker-server.test.mjs
- name: Upload test reports
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: test-reports
path: |
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-summary.json
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-final.json
gitnexus/test-results.json
gitnexus-web/web-test-results.json
retention-days: 5
# Single source of truth for the platform-sensitive shard count. TOTAL below
# generates both the shard index list (the matrix) and the /N denominator (job
# name + --shard arg), so they can't drift — bump the shard count by editing
# TOTAL alone. Checkout-free (ubuntu ships jq), so no credential surface.
shard-plan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
shards: ${{ steps.gen.outputs.shards }}
total: ${{ steps.gen.outputs.total }}
cov_shards: ${{ steps.gen.outputs.cov_shards }}
cov_total: ${{ steps.gen.outputs.cov_total }}
steps:
- id: gen
run: |
TOTAL=3 # cross-platform (windows/macOS) shards per OS
COV_TOTAL=3 # ubuntu coverage shards (merged before thresholds)
if [ "$TOTAL" -lt 1 ] || [ "$COV_TOTAL" -lt 1 ]; then
echo "shard totals must be >= 1" >&2; exit 1
fi
{
echo "shards=$(jq -nc --argjson n "$TOTAL" '[range(1; $n + 1)]')"
echo "total=$TOTAL"
echo "cov_shards=$(jq -nc --argjson n "$COV_TOTAL" '[range(1; $n + 1)]')"
echo "cov_total=$COV_TOTAL"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Platform-sensitive subset only — the full suite runs on Ubuntu above.
# See gitnexus/scripts/cross-platform-tests.ts for the file list and
# rationale for each included test.
cross-platform:
name: ${{ matrix.os }} (platform-sensitive) ${{ matrix.shard }}/${{ needs.shard-plan.outputs.total }}
needs: shard-plan
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
# Ubuntu already covered by the coverage job above
os: [windows-latest, macos-latest]
# Shard the fixed file list across N runners per OS (N = TOTAL in the
# shard-plan job). The suite is dominated by ~50 CLI/worker process
# spawns and Windows is ~5x slower than macOS at those, so the unsharded
# run crept past the 15-min watchdog in run-cross-platform.ts. vitest
# shards by file COUNT, not runtime, so the heaviest spawn suites can
# cluster on one shard. The busiest Windows shard has grown to the old
# 15-minute watchdog (14m57s on the v1.6.10-rc.19 green run, one
# observed timeout since — #2449), so the job env below raises the
# per-shard watchdog to 20 minutes, still bounded by timeout-minutes.
# Shard indices come from the shard-plan job (single source of truth):
# its TOTAL drives this list and the /N in the job name + --shard arg.
shard: ${{ fromJSON(needs.shard-plan.outputs.shards) }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 25
# Same guarantee on the platform-sensitive runners: FTS-dependent suites in
# the cross-platform subset must run, not silently skip.
#
# GITNEXUS_E2E_CLI=dist: the e2e suites spawn the CLI ~50 times; each spawn via
# `node --import tsx src/cli/index.ts` re-transpiles the whole CLI, and Windows
# is ~5x slower at process startup. `build: true` below produces a fresh dist
# before tests, so opting these runners into the built CLI removes that
# per-spawn transpile (see test/helpers/cli-entry.ts). Deliberately scoped to
# THIS job: the Ubuntu coverage job leaves it unset, so it keeps exercising the
# tsx-on-source path in CI (both entry points stay covered).
env:
GITNEXUS_REQUIRE_FTS: '1'
GITNEXUS_E2E_CLI: dist
# #2449: hosted Windows runners intermittently push the busiest shard past
# the default 15-minute watchdog. 20 minutes restores real headroom while
# the 25-minute job timeout above still bounds a genuine hang.
GITNEXUS_CROSS_PLATFORM_TIMEOUT_MINUTES: '20'
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — runs tests only, never pushes (zizmor
# credential-persistence / artipacked audit).
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
# Warm-cache the installed LadybugDB FTS extension (~/.lbdb/extension) per
# OS + lockfile so a warm run skips the network install entirely, and the
# parallel shards share one download across runs. Pure reliability/speed:
# on a cache miss the tests self-install FTS on demand (see
# test/helpers/fts-availability.ts), so a miss just falls back to install —
# never a correctness dependency. Keyed by lockfile hash so a LadybugDB
# version bump re-installs; per-OS because the extension is a native binary.
- name: Cache LadybugDB FTS extension
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v5
with:
path: ~/.lbdb/extension
key: lbug-fts-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('gitnexus/package-lock.json') }}
- name: Ensure FTS extension installed
run: npx tsx scripts/ensure-fts.ts
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Run platform-sensitive tests
# Pass the shard through an env var (not `${{ }}` inlined into the shell)
# so it isn't a template-injection sink (zizmor). shell: bash makes the
# `"$SHARD"` expansion uniform across the windows + macOS matrix (the
# default run shell is pwsh on Windows, where `$SHARD` would be empty).
shell: bash
env:
SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }}/${{ needs.shard-plan.outputs.total }}
run: npx tsx scripts/run-cross-platform.ts --shard="$SHARD"
working-directory: gitnexus
# Tree-sitter ABI gate (#1922). Two halves, both blocking:
# 1. Static, offline: assert every grammar's compiled ABI loads on the
# pinned runtime (check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py --assert-current).
# 2. Dynamic: run the parser-loader ABI load-smoke on the OS matrix so an
# ABI-incompatible committed vendor prebuilt (e.g. Swift's — the static
# check introspects source, not the shipped .node) fails on the platform
# it ships to.
abi-assert:
name: tree-sitter ABI (${{ matrix.os }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, windows-latest, macos-latest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 20
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Assert installed + vendored grammar ABIs (static)
shell: bash
run: python3 .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py --assert-current
- name: Run parser-loader ABI load-smoke (dynamic)
run: npx vitest run test/unit/parser-loader-abi.test.ts
working-directory: gitnexus
# End-to-end smoke test for the #1728 packaging fix: pack the published
# tarball, install it globally into a temp prefix, and assert no junction
# creation (the EPERM root cause) plus working CLI plus vendor cleanliness
# (#836). Runs on windows-latest because that is the platform the fix
# targets; the in-repo `npm ci` job above only exercises the dev-tree path
# and skips the tarball reify step where the historical EPERM occurred.
packaged-install-smoke:
name: packaged install smoke (${{ matrix.os }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [windows-latest, ubuntu-latest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — this job runs npm pack + npm install -g
# from a tarball and never pushes back; the token in .git/config would
# be at risk of leaking through any future artifact-upload step
# (zizmor artipacked audit). Disable upfront.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Pack gitnexus tarball
shell: bash
run: npm pack
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Install gitnexus tarball into isolated prefix
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
PREFIX="$RUNNER_TEMP/gitnexus-smoke"
mkdir -p "$PREFIX"
TARBALL=$(find . -maxdepth 1 -name 'gitnexus-*.tgz' -print -quit)
if [ -z "$TARBALL" ]; then
echo "ERROR: no gitnexus-*.tgz tarball found in $(pwd)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Installing $TARBALL into $PREFIX"
npm install -g --prefix "$PREFIX" "./$TARBALL" --no-audit --no-fund
echo "PREFIX=$PREFIX" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Assert no junctions or vendor build artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Locate the installed gitnexus package across npm prefix layouts
# (lib/node_modules on POSIX, node_modules on Windows).
for candidate in "$PREFIX/lib/node_modules/gitnexus" "$PREFIX/node_modules/gitnexus"; do
if [ -d "$candidate" ]; then
INSTALLED="$candidate"
break
fi
done
if [ -z "${INSTALLED:-}" ]; then
echo "ERROR: installed gitnexus package not found under $PREFIX" >&2
ls -la "$PREFIX" || true
exit 1
fi
echo "Installed package at: $INSTALLED"
# #836 invariant: no node_modules/ or build/ under any vendor/*.
BAD=$(find "$INSTALLED/vendor" \( -name node_modules -o -name build \) -print 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$BAD" ]; then
echo "ERROR: vendor tree contains forbidden build artifacts (#836):" >&2
echo "$BAD" >&2
exit 1
fi
# #1728 invariant: materialized grammar dirs are real directories,
# not junctions/symlinks (which is what the EPERM regression created).
for name in tree-sitter-dart tree-sitter-proto tree-sitter-swift; do
entry="$INSTALLED/node_modules/$name"
if [ ! -e "$entry" ]; then
echo "WARN: $name not materialized (toolchain/prebuild may be unavailable on $RUNNER_OS)"
continue
fi
if [ -L "$entry" ]; then
echo "ERROR: $entry is a symlink/junction — #1728 regression" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ ! -d "$entry" ]; then
echo "ERROR: $entry is not a directory" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
- name: Assert gitnexus --version works
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "$RUNNER_OS" = "Windows" ]; then
"$PREFIX/gitnexus.cmd" --version
else
"$PREFIX/bin/gitnexus" --version
fi
# Node engines-floor gate (#2372). The embedding resolvers statically named
# `module.registerHooks`, which only exists on Node >= 22.15 / >= 23.5, so on
# the supported floor (engines: >=22.0.0) those ESM modules failed to LINK —
# a class vitest/tsx transforms structurally mask, and the default
# `node-version: 22` (resolves to latest) never hits. Build the dist on 22.x,
# then import-link every module R1 names as a load surface on a pinned 22.14
# so a regression fails here instead of shipping to users on that Node range.
node-floor-compat:
name: node floor compat (22.14)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — builds and import-links only, never pushes
# (zizmor credential-persistence / artipacked audit).
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: gitnexus/package-lock.json
- name: Build gitnexus-shared
run: npm install && npm run build
working-directory: gitnexus-shared
- name: Install and build gitnexus
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
npm ci
npm run build
working-directory: gitnexus
# Switch to the engines-floor Node AFTER building — native deps built on
# 22.x load across the whole 22.x ABI line, and nothing installs after this
# (so no package-manager cache is needed).
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: '22.14.0'
package-manager-cache: false
- name: Import-link the built dist on Node 22.14
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
node --version
node --version | grep -q '^v22\.14\.' || { echo "expected Node 22.14.x" >&2; exit 1; }
for m in \
core/embeddings/runtime-install \
core/embeddings/onnxruntime-node-resolver \
core/embeddings/onnxruntime-common-resolver \
cli/embeddings \
cli/analyze \
cli/doctor \
mcp/core/embedder; do
echo "import dist/$m.js"
node --input-type=module -e "await import('./dist/$m.js')"
done
working-directory: gitnexus
# ── Dedicated benchmark gate ─────────────────────────────────────
# The cross-language `*-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts` suites are gated behind
# GITNEXUS_BENCH (they generate synthetic codebases at scale), so the main
# coverage job above SKIPS them — their O(n^2) scaling guards never ran in CI.
# Run them here with GITNEXUS_BENCH=1, alongside the Python scope-capture and
# import-resolution fingerprint + scaling guards (PR #1918 P2a).
#
# `--no-file-parallelism` is REQUIRED: these suites measure wall-clock and peak
# heap, so parallel forks both skew the timings and OOM the worker pool — they
# must run one file at a time.
#
# go-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts is deliberately NOT included: its
# worker-pool (#1848) suite spins a real worker pool that exits unexpectedly
# under vitest's fork pool (reproduced in validation), which would make this
# gate flaky. Go is already guarded by its non-gated O(n^2) tripwire (runs in
# the main coverage job) plus its golden capture-parity test.
benchmarks:
name: benchmarks (GITNEXUS_BENCH)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 25
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — this job only runs npm + vitest benchmarks
# and never pushes; the default-persisted token in .git/config would be at
# risk of leaking through an artifact upload (zizmor credential-persistence
# / artipacked audit). Mirrors the packaged-install-smoke job below.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Python scope-capture + import-resolution fingerprint / scaling guards
run: |
node --import tsx bench/python-scope/measure.mjs --check
node --import tsx bench/python-scope/import-target-fingerprint.mjs --check
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Cross-language scope-capture fingerprint + scaling guards
# Build-free: asserts emit<Lang>ScopeCaptures output is unchanged
# (fingerprint) and stays linear (scaling < 1.5) for go/csharp/rust/php/
# ruby/cobol. Catches an O(n^2) re-regression without the worker pool.
run: node --import tsx bench/scope-capture/measure.mjs --check
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: CFG construction time / disk / memory guards (#2081 M1)
# Build-free: asserts collectFunctionCfgs output is unchanged
# (fingerprint) and that wall-time, cfgSideChannel disk bytes, AND
# retained heap all stay sub-quadratic for the straight-line /
# many-functions / branchy scenarios. Catches an O(n^2) re-regression in
# the per-function CFG builder (e.g. an extendBlock concat chain) and a
# memory/disk blow-up. --expose-gc enables the retained-heap measurement.
run: node --expose-gc --import tsx bench/cfg/measure.mjs --check
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Emit-persistence throughput / byte-identity guards (#2203)
# Build-free: asserts streamAllCSVsToDisk output is byte-identical
# (order-independent CSV-line fingerprint — the #2203 U2/U3 emit
# optimisations must not change graph content) and that emit wall-time
# stays linear in node+edge count. The LadybugDB COPY half needs a real
# DB, so its timing lives in the runtime PROF_LBUG_LOAD breakdown.
run: node --import tsx bench/emit-persistence/measure.mjs --check
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Streaming PDG-emit byte-identity / bounded-RSS guards (#2202)
# Build-free: asserts the streaming PdgEmitSink emits a CSV row SET
# byte-identical to the whole-graph streamAllCSVsToDisk emit, AND that
# the in-memory graph retains zero BasicBlock nodes (the O(chunk) peak-RSS
# bound that unblocks full-kernel-scale repos). Fails on fingerprint drift
# or any resident BasicBlock.
run: node --import tsx bench/emit-persistence/measure-streaming.mjs --check
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Cross-language pipeline benchmarks (GITNEXUS_BENCH, serial)
env:
GITNEXUS_BENCH: '1'
run: >-
npx vitest run --no-file-parallelism
test/integration/cobol-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts
test/integration/csharp-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts
test/integration/rust-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts
test/integration/php-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts
test/integration/ruby-pipeline-benchmark.test.ts
working-directory: gitnexus
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
name: Unit Tests
on:
workflow_call:
jobs:
unit-tests:
name: unit (ubuntu / coverage)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
- name: Run unit tests with coverage
run: >-
npx vitest run test/unit
--reporter=default
--reporter=json
--outputFile=test-results.json
--coverage
--coverage.reporter=json-summary
--coverage.reporter=json
--coverage.reporter=text
--coverage.thresholdAutoUpdate=false
--coverage.reportOnFailure=true
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Upload test reports
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: test-reports
path: |
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-summary.json
gitnexus/coverage/coverage-final.json
gitnexus/test-results.json
retention-days: 5
cross-platform:
name: unit (${{ matrix.os }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
# Ubuntu already covered by the coverage job above
os: [windows-latest, macos-latest]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
- run: npx vitest run test/unit
working-directory: gitnexus
+30 -63
View File
@@ -1,34 +1,23 @@
name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore: ['**.md', 'docs/**', 'LICENSE']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore: ['**.md', 'docs/**', 'LICENSE']
workflow_call:
permissions:
contents: read
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Hardcoded `CI-` prefix (not `${{ github.workflow }}`) because this workflow is
# invoked as a reusable workflow from publish.yml. In called-workflow context
# `github.workflow` evaluation is ambiguous across GitHub Actions versions, and a
# prefix that could resolve to the caller's name would share a concurrency group
# with the caller → deadlock. A literal prefix is immune. Direct `pull_request`
# invocations use `CI-<ref>`; invocations from a reusable-workflow caller fall
# into a per-run-unique group that never serializes with the caller. `push` to
# main is handled by publish.yml (RC mode), which calls this workflow once
# before publishing.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && format('CI-{0}', github.ref) || format('CI-nested-{0}', github.run_id) }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
group: ci-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
# ── Reusable workflow orchestration ─────────────────────────────────
# Each concern lives in its own workflow file for maintainability:
# ci-quality.yml — typecheck (tsc --noEmit)
# ci-tests.yml — unit + integration tests with coverage + cross-platform
# (includes the scope-resolution resolver tests)
# ci-e2e.yml — E2E tests (only when gitnexus-web/ changes)
# ci-unit-tests.yml — unit tests with coverage + cross-platform
# ci-integration.yml — integration test matrix (3 OS x 4 groups)
#
# Shared setup is DRY via .github/actions/setup-gitnexus composite action.
@@ -38,13 +27,15 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: read
tests:
uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-tests.yml
unit-tests:
uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-unit-tests.yml
permissions:
contents: read
e2e:
uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-e2e.yml
integration:
uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-integration.yml
with:
collect-coverage: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -56,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
save-pr-meta:
name: Save PR Metadata
if: always() && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
needs: [quality, tests, e2e]
needs: [quality, unit-tests, integration]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
@@ -65,27 +56,17 @@ jobs:
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.number }}
QUALITY: ${{ needs.quality.result }}
TESTS: ${{ needs.tests.result }}
E2E: ${{ needs.e2e.result }}
UNIT: ${{ needs.unit-tests.result }}
INTEG: ${{ needs.integration.result }}
run: |
mkdir -p pr-meta
echo "$PR_NUMBER" > pr-meta/pr_number
echo "$QUALITY" > pr-meta/quality_result
echo "$TESTS" > pr-meta/tests_result
echo "$E2E" > pr-meta/e2e_result
# TODO(post-merge): remove backward-compat copies once ci-report.yml
# on main reads underscore names.
# Backward-compat: ci-report.yml on main still reads hyphenated
# names. workflow_run always executes from the default branch, so
# the main-branch reader won't find the underscore variants until
# this PR is merged. Write both until then.
cp pr-meta/pr_number pr-meta/pr-number
cp pr-meta/quality_result pr-meta/quality-result
cp pr-meta/tests_result pr-meta/tests-result
cp pr-meta/e2e_result pr-meta/e2e-result
echo "$PR_NUMBER" > pr-meta/pr_number
echo "$QUALITY" > pr-meta/quality_result
echo "$UNIT" > pr-meta/unit_result
echo "$INTEG" > pr-meta/integration_result
- name: Upload PR metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: pr-meta
path: pr-meta/
@@ -95,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
# Single required check for branch protection.
ci-status:
name: CI Gate
needs: [quality, tests, e2e]
needs: [quality, unit-tests, integration]
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
@@ -104,29 +85,15 @@ jobs:
shell: bash
env:
QUALITY: ${{ needs.quality.result }}
# The tree-sitter ABI gate (#1922) runs as the `abi-assert` job
# inside the `tests` reusable workflow. A failed job fails the
# reusable workflow, so `needs.tests.result` below blocks the merge
# on an ABI mismatch. (`jobs.<id>.result` cannot be exposed as a
# workflow_call output, so the gate is enforced transitively here.)
# The scope-resolution resolver tests also run inside the `tests`
# workflow (RING4-1 #942 removed the separate scope-parity gate),
# so a resolver regression makes TESTS != success and blocks here.
TESTS: ${{ needs.tests.result }}
E2E: ${{ needs.e2e.result }}
UNIT: ${{ needs.unit-tests.result }}
INTEG: ${{ needs.integration.result }}
run: |
echo "Quality: $QUALITY"
echo "Tests: $TESTS"
echo "E2E: $E2E"
# A failed `abi-assert` job (#1922) inside the tests reusable
# workflow makes TESTS != success, so this clause also blocks the
# merge on a tree-sitter ABI mismatch.
echo "Quality: $QUALITY"
echo "Unit Tests: $UNIT"
echo "Integration: $INTEG"
if [[ "$QUALITY" != "success" ]] ||
[[ "$TESTS" != "success" ]]; then
echo "::error::Quality or test jobs failed (includes the tree-sitter ABI gate, #1922)"
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$E2E" != "success" && "$E2E" != "skipped" ]]; then
echo "::error::E2E job failed"
[[ "$UNIT" != "success" ]] ||
[[ "$INTEG" != "success" ]]; then
echo "::error::One or more CI jobs failed"
exit 1
fi
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
name: Claude Code Review
# Uses pull_request_target so the workflow runs as defined on the default branch,
# which allows access to secrets for posting review comments on fork PRs.
# SECURITY: The checkout below uses the PR head SHA to review the correct code.
# The claude-code-action sandboxes execution — it does NOT run arbitrary code
# from the checked-out source.
on:
# Trigger only when explicitly requested:
# - Add the "claude-review" label to a PR, OR
# - Comment "@claude" or "/review" on a PR
pull_request_target:
types: [labeled]
issue_comment:
types: [created]
jobs:
claude-review:
# Run only when:
# 1. The "claude-review" label is added to a non-draft PR by a trusted contributor, OR
# 2. A trusted contributor comments "@claude" or "/review" on a PR
if: |
(
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' &&
github.event.label.name == 'claude-review' &&
github.event.pull_request.draft == false &&
(github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
) ||
(
github.event_name == 'issue_comment' &&
github.event.issue.pull_request &&
(contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') ||
contains(github.event.comment.body, '/review')) &&
(github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: write # needed to push fork branch to origin
pull-requests: write
issues: read
id-token: write
steps:
# For issue_comment triggers, resolve the PR number, head SHA, and branch name
- name: Resolve PR context
id: pr
uses: actions/github-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea # v7
with:
script: |
let pr;
if (context.eventName === 'issue_comment') {
const resp = await github.rest.pulls.get({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
pull_number: context.payload.issue.number,
});
pr = resp.data;
} else {
pr = context.payload.pull_request;
}
core.setOutput('number', pr.number);
core.setOutput('sha', pr.head.sha);
core.setOutput('branch', pr.head.ref);
core.setOutput('is_fork', String(pr.head.repo.full_name !== pr.base.repo.full_name));
- name: Checkout PR head
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
ref: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.sha }}
fetch-depth: 1
# claude-code-action fetches branches by name from origin, which fails
# for fork PRs. Work around by pushing the fork branch to origin so
# the action can find it. Cleaned up in the post step below.
- name: Push fork branch to origin
if: steps.pr.outputs.is_fork == 'true'
run: git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/${{ steps.pr.outputs.branch }}
- name: Run Claude Code Review
id: claude-review
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@9469d113c6afd29550c402740f22d1a97dd1209b # v1
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git'
plugins: 'code-review@claude-code-plugins'
prompt: '/code-review:code-review ${{ github.repository }}/pull/${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }}'
# Clean up the temporary branch we pushed for fork PRs
- name: Delete fork branch from origin
if: always() && steps.pr.outputs.is_fork == 'true'
run: git push origin --delete refs/heads/${{ steps.pr.outputs.branch }} || true
+6 -129
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
name: Claude Code
# Label-triggered code-review requests use pull_request_target so the workflow
# runs as defined on the default branch, which allows access to secrets for
# posting review comments on fork PRs. SECURITY: PR checkouts pin the fork's
# HEAD SHA (not the branch name) to prevent TOCTOU races.
# The claude-code-action sandboxes execution; it does not run arbitrary code
# from the checked-out source.
on:
issue_comment:
types: [created]
pull_request_target:
types: [labeled]
pull_request_review_comment:
types: [created]
issues:
@@ -19,57 +10,13 @@ on:
pull_request_review:
types: [submitted]
permissions:
contents: read
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Serialize per-PR/issue to avoid racing comments.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.issue.number || github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.id }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
claude:
if: |
(
github.event_name == 'issue_comment' &&
(
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') ||
(github.event.issue.pull_request && contains(github.event.comment.body, '/review'))
) &&
(github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
) ||
(
github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' &&
contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') &&
(github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.comment.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
) ||
(
github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude') &&
(github.event.review.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.review.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.review.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
) ||
(
github.event_name == 'issues' &&
(contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')) &&
(github.event.issue.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.issue.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.issue.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
) ||
(
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' &&
github.event.label.name == 'claude-review' &&
github.event.pull_request.draft == false &&
(github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'OWNER' ||
github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'MEMBER' ||
github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'COLLABORATOR')
)
(github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')))
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
@@ -77,89 +24,19 @@ jobs:
pull-requests: write
issues: write
id-token: write
actions: read # required for Claude to read CI results on PRs
actions: read # Required for Claude to read CI results on PRs
steps:
# For PR-related triggers, resolve the fork repo so we can checkout correctly.
- name: Resolve PR context
id: pr
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v7
with:
script: |
// Determine if this event is PR-related
let pr = null;
if (context.eventName === 'issue_comment' && context.payload.issue.pull_request) {
const resp = await github.rest.pulls.get({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
pull_number: context.payload.issue.number,
});
pr = resp.data;
} else if (context.eventName === 'pull_request_review_comment') {
pr = context.payload.pull_request;
} else if (context.eventName === 'pull_request_review') {
pr = context.payload.pull_request;
} else if (context.eventName === 'pull_request_target') {
pr = context.payload.pull_request;
}
if (!pr) {
core.setOutput('is_pr', 'false');
return;
}
core.setOutput('is_pr', 'true');
core.setOutput('number', String(pr.number));
core.setOutput('sha', pr.head.sha);
core.setOutput('repo', pr.head.repo.full_name);
core.setOutput('branch', pr.head.ref);
- name: Resolve Claude mode
id: mode
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v7
with:
script: |
const body = (context.payload.comment?.body ?? '').toLowerCase();
const isCodeReview =
(context.eventName === 'pull_request_target' &&
context.payload.label?.name === 'claude-review') ||
(context.eventName === 'issue_comment' &&
Boolean(context.payload.issue?.pull_request) &&
body.includes('/review'));
core.setOutput('code_review', isCodeReview ? 'true' : 'false');
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
repository: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.is_pr == 'true' && steps.pr.outputs.repo || github.repository }}
ref: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.is_pr == 'true' && steps.pr.outputs.sha || '' }}
fetch-depth: 1
- name: Run Claude Code
if: steps.mode.outputs.code_review != 'true'
id: claude
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@9469d113c6afd29550c402740f22d1a97dd1209b # v1
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
allowed_non_write_users: '*'
show_full_output: true
# This is an optional setting that allows Claude to read CI results on PRs
additional_permissions: |
actions: read
- name: Run Claude Code Review
if: steps.mode.outputs.code_review == 'true'
id: claude-review
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@9469d113c6afd29550c402740f22d1a97dd1209b # v1
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
allowed_non_write_users: '*'
show_full_output: true
# Review posts use Bash (`gh`, etc.); default mode asks for approval — impossible in CI.
claude_args: '--dangerously-skip-permissions'
plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git'
plugins: 'code-review@claude-code-plugins'
prompt: '/code-review:code-review https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/pull/${{ steps.pr.outputs.number }} --comment'
-78
View File
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
name: CodeQL
# Static analysis (SAST) for TypeScript/JavaScript and Python sources.
# Findings upload to the GitHub Security tab as SARIF.
#
# Advisory only on first introduction — see docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md.
# Promote to a required check after baseline triage (operator decision).
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore: ['**.md', 'docs/**', 'LICENSE']
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
# Weekly Monday 06:00 UTC — catches advisories newly published against
# already-merged code without waiting for the next PR.
- cron: '0 6 * * 1'
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
permissions:
actions: read
contents: read
# security-events:write is what enables SARIF upload to the Security tab.
security-events: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: [javascript-typescript, python]
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
# Don't leave GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config for downstream steps to read.
persist-credentials: false
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@8aad20d150bbac5944a9f9d289da16a4b0d87c1e # v4.36.2
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
queries: security-and-quality
# Exclude generated/vendored code; tune after first-run signal.
# gitnexus/vendor/ holds tree-sitter-proto sources (regenerated, not authored).
# CodeQL path filters use .gitignore-style globs and do NOT support
# brace expansion — list each generated parser file separately.
config: |
paths-ignore:
- '**/dist/**'
- '**/node_modules/**'
- 'gitnexus/vendor/**'
- 'gitnexus/src/core/parsing/**/parser.c'
- 'gitnexus/src/core/parsing/**/parser.js'
# Test fixtures are intentionally synthetic inputs (broken/unused
# code, malformed samples) used to exercise the analyzer. CodeQL
# findings here are noise, not real bugs. The second glob also
# covers fixtures nested deeper in the test tree, e.g.
# test/integration/cfg/fixtures/ (the CFG/PDG hazard inputs that
# deliberately contain use-before-init / unused-variable shapes).
- '**/test/fixtures/**'
- '**/test/**/fixtures/**'
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@8aad20d150bbac5944a9f9d289da16a4b0d87c1e # v4.36.2
with:
category: '/language:${{ matrix.language }}'
-351
View File
@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
name: Commit fork prebuilds
# TRUSTED HALF of the vendored-grammar prebuild pipeline — FORK PRs only.
#
# `build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml` runs in the UNTRUSTED `pull_request`
# context. On a fork PR it has a read-only token and no secrets, so it can
# build + validate the native prebuilds and upload them as artifacts, but it
# cannot commit them back. This workflow is the trusted consumer: triggered by
# `workflow_run`, it runs from the DEFAULT BRANCH's copy of this file (the trust
# anchor) with a writable token, downloads ONLY the artifacts (data — the
# already-built-and-validated `.node` files + a small metadata.json), verifies
# the metadata against the GitHub-controlled workflow_run authority, then pushes
# the prebuilds onto the fork PR's head branch.
#
# It NEVER checks out or executes fork-controlled code: the producer already
# `require()`-loaded + parsed each `.node` on its target platform in the
# untrusted half (the correct place to run untrusted code). Here we only move
# bytes and run git. The prebuilds touch ONLY gitnexus/vendor/<g>/prebuilds/**,
# never .github/ — so the GITHUB_TOKEN's lack of `workflows` scope is irrelevant.
#
# Pushing to a fork branch with the GITHUB_TOKEN works only when the contributor
# left "Allow edits by maintainers" enabled (the PR default) — the same
# constraint as pr-autofix-apply.yml. When it's off we fall back to a comment.
#
# Same-repo PRs do NOT come here: they have secrets in the producer run, so the
# `aggregate` job in build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml commits straight onto their
# branch. This workflow's `if:` filters to forks.
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ['Build tree-sitter prebuilds']
types: [completed]
concurrency:
# Per-PR identity, NOT workflow_run.id (which is per-run unique and would
# defeat serialization). Fork PRs have an empty pull_requests[] in the
# workflow_run payload, so fall back to head-repo + head-branch.
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number || format('{0}/{1}', github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name, github.event.workflow_run.head_branch) }}
cancel-in-progress: false
permissions: {}
jobs:
deliver:
name: deliver-fork-prebuilds
# Only a SUCCESSFUL fork pull_request producer run. Same-repo PRs
# (head_repository == base) are handled by the producer's aggregate job.
if: >-
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request'
&& github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
&& github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name != github.repository
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: write # push the prebuilds commit to the fork PR head branch
pull-requests: write # comment the delivery outcome
actions: read # download artifacts produced by the producer run
steps:
# Pinned to v8.0.1 (same SHA used across this repo's workflows).
- name: Download prebuild artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
continue-on-error: true
with:
run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
pattern: ts-prebuild-*
path: prebuilds-in
- name: Download PR meta
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
continue-on-error: true
with:
name: pr-meta
run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
path: meta-in
- name: Read and validate metadata
id: meta
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# No meta => this producer run had no fork-PR prebuilds to deliver
# (nothing changed, or it wasn't a fork). Exit cleanly.
if [ ! -f meta-in/metadata.json ]; then
echo "No pr-meta artifact — nothing to deliver."
echo "deliver=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# No prebuild artifacts => same (defensive; producer uploads both together).
if ! ls prebuilds-in/ts-prebuild-* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "No ts-prebuild-* artifacts — nothing to deliver."
echo "deliver=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
jq . meta-in/metadata.json
# The artifact comes from the untrusted producer running fork code.
# Allowlist EVERY field before it flows into $GITHUB_OUTPUT — a newline
# in head_ref would otherwise inject a second output line and redirect
# this job's write-scoped push/comment onto a victim PR.
assert_field() {
local key="$1" pattern="$2" value
value=$(jq -r ".${key} // empty" meta-in/metadata.json)
if [ -z "$value" ] || ! [[ "$value" =~ $pattern ]]; then
echo "::error::metadata.${key} failed allowlist (got: $(printf '%q' "$value"))"
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$value"
}
SCHEMA=$(assert_field schema '^gitnexus\.ts-prebuild/v[0-9]+$')
PR_NUMBER=$(assert_field pr_number '^[0-9]+$')
HEAD_SHA=$(assert_field head_sha '^[0-9a-f]{40}$')
HEAD_REF=$(assert_field head_ref '^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$')
HEAD_REPO=$(assert_field head_repo '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')
BASE_REPO=$(assert_field base_repo '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')
# Defence-in-depth: refuse to act if the artifact claims another repo.
if [ "$BASE_REPO" != "${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact base_repo does not match \$GITHUB_REPOSITORY — refusing to deliver."
exit 1
fi
{
echo "deliver=true"
echo "schema=${SCHEMA}"
echo "pr_number=${PR_NUMBER}"
echo "head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}"
echo "head_ref=${HEAD_REF}"
echo "head_repo=${HEAD_REPO}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Cross-verify the artifact's claimed identity against the GitHub-controlled
# workflow_run event. The allowlist above only proves the fields are
# well-formed — not that they refer to the PR/SHA that actually triggered
# us. A fork-controlled build could mutate metadata.json to reference
# another PR/SHA and redirect our write-scoped push. Authority sources are
# all server-controlled: workflow_run.head_sha, head_repository.full_name,
# and pull_requests[].number (empty on forks -> commits/{sha}/pulls).
- name: Verify metadata against workflow_run authority
if: steps.meta.outputs.deliver == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
META_PR_NUMBER: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pr_number }}
META_HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
META_HEAD_REPO: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_repo }}
WF_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
WF_HEAD_REPO: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}
WF_PR_NUMBERS: ${{ toJSON(github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests.*.number) }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# 1) head_sha must match exactly — the commit GitHub ran the producer against.
if [ "${META_HEAD_SHA}" != "${WF_HEAD_SHA}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact head_sha (${META_HEAD_SHA}) != workflow_run.head_sha (${WF_HEAD_SHA}) — refusing."
exit 1
fi
# 2) head_repo must match exactly.
if [ "${META_HEAD_REPO}" != "${WF_HEAD_REPO}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact head_repo (${META_HEAD_REPO}) != workflow_run.head_repository (${WF_HEAD_REPO}) — refusing."
exit 1
fi
# 3) pr_number must reference an open PR with this head SHA. Forks have
# an empty pull_requests[] by design — fall back to commits/{sha}/pulls.
allowed_numbers=$(jq -c '.' <<< "${WF_PR_NUMBERS}")
if [ "${allowed_numbers}" = "[]" ]; then
echo "workflow_run.pull_requests empty (fork) — using commits/{sha}/pulls."
allowed_numbers=$(gh api "repos/${GH_REPO}/commits/${WF_HEAD_SHA}/pulls" \
--jq '[.[] | select(.state == "open") | .number]' 2>/dev/null || echo "[]")
if [ "${allowed_numbers}" = "[]" ]; then
echo "::error::No open PR for head ${WF_HEAD_SHA} — refusing."
exit 1
fi
fi
if ! jq -e --argjson n "${META_PR_NUMBER}" 'index($n) != null' <<< "${allowed_numbers}" >/dev/null; then
echo "::error::Artifact pr_number (${META_PR_NUMBER}) not in authoritative list (${allowed_numbers}) — refusing."
exit 1
fi
echo "Verified identity: PR=${META_PR_NUMBER} head_sha=${META_HEAD_SHA} head_repo=${META_HEAD_REPO}."
# Pinned to v6.0.3 (same SHA used by build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml).
# persist-credentials: false — push auth is provided inline at push time,
# never written to .git/config on disk.
- name: Checkout fork PR head
if: steps.meta.outputs.deliver == 'true'
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
repository: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_repo }}
ref: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
persist-credentials: false
fetch-depth: 0
path: pr-checkout
- name: Place prebuilds into the fork checkout
if: steps.meta.outputs.deliver == 'true'
env:
DL: prebuilds-in
CHECKOUT: pr-checkout
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
node --input-type=module - <<'NODE'
import fs from 'node:fs';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
const dl = process.env.DL;
const checkout = process.env.CHECKOUT;
const PLATFORMS = ['linux-x64', 'linux-arm64', 'darwin-arm64', 'darwin-x64', 'win32-x64', 'win32-arm64'];
// Reconstruct {grammar -> archs} from the downloaded artifact dir names
// (ts-prebuild-<grammar>-<platform-arch>; grammar shortnames are dash-free).
const byGrammar = {};
for (const d of (fs.existsSync(dl) ? fs.readdirSync(dl) : [])) {
const m = d.match(/^ts-prebuild-([a-z0-9]+)-(.+)$/);
if (m) (byGrammar[m[1]] ||= []).push(m[2]);
}
const grammars = Object.keys(byGrammar);
if (grammars.length === 0) throw new Error('no ts-prebuild-* artifacts present');
const changed = [];
for (const grammar of grammars) {
const name = `tree-sitter-${grammar}`;
const dest = `${checkout}/gitnexus/vendor/${name}/prebuilds`;
// A grammar with 5/6 prebuilds silently breaks node-gyp-build on the
// 6th platform — refuse a partial result.
for (const pa of PLATFORMS) {
const art = `${dl}/ts-prebuild-${grammar}-${pa}/${name}.node`;
if (!fs.existsSync(art)) throw new Error(`missing ${grammar} prebuild for ${pa}`);
fs.mkdirSync(`${dest}/${pa}`, { recursive: true });
fs.copyFileSync(art, `${dest}/${pa}/${name}.node`);
}
execSync(`cd ${dest} && find . -name "*.node" | sort | xargs sha256sum > SHA256SUMS`);
changed.push(name);
}
console.log('Placed prebuilds for:', changed.join(', '));
NODE
- name: Commit and push to the fork branch
id: push
if: steps.meta.outputs.deliver == 'true'
working-directory: pr-checkout
env:
HEAD_REF: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_ref }}
HEAD_REPO: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_repo }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
# Push auth only — supplied via env, never interpolated into the command.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
git add gitnexus/vendor/tree-sitter-*/prebuilds
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "Prebuilds byte-identical to the fork branch — nothing to commit."
echo "result=nothing-to-commit" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Loop guard: if HEAD is already our prebuild bot commit, don't stack
# another. (The producer's paths filter already excludes prebuilds/**,
# so a prebuild-only push cannot retrigger it — this is defence in depth.)
head_author=$(git log -1 --format='%ae' HEAD)
head_subject=$(git log -1 --format='%s' HEAD)
if [ "${head_author}" = "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" ] \
&& [[ "${head_subject}" =~ ^chore\(vendor\) ]]; then
echo "::warning::HEAD is already a prebuild bot commit — refusing to re-apply."
echo "result=loop-prevented" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
grammars=$(git diff --cached --name-only \
| sed -n 's#gitnexus/vendor/\(tree-sitter-[a-z0-9]*\)/.*#\1#p' | sort -u | paste -sd, -)
git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git commit -q -m "chore(vendor): rebuild native prebuilds (${grammars})" \
-m "Built + validated by ${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"
# Push to the fork head with a lease against the resolved SHA, so a
# contributor force-push during the build surfaces as lease-failed (not
# push-failed, which would mislead them into the maintainer-edit fix).
# Auth via per-invocation http.extraheader (never persisted, never in
# the process args / git remote -v). Base64-encoded form is masked too.
push_url="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${HEAD_REPO}.git"
auth_header="Authorization: Basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "${GITHUB_TOKEN}" | base64 -w0)"
echo "::add-mask::${auth_header}"
push_stderr=$(mktemp)
if git -c http.extraheader="${auth_header}" \
push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${HEAD_REF}:${HEAD_SHA}" \
"${push_url}" "HEAD:${HEAD_REF}" 2>"$push_stderr"; then
echo "result=applied" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
cat "$push_stderr" >&2
if grep -qE "stale info|force-with-lease|rejected.*non-fast-forward|remote rejected|! \[rejected\]" "$push_stderr"; then
echo "::error::Push lease failed — fork branch moved during build."
echo "result=lease-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::error::Push failed — likely a fork without 'Allow edits by maintainers'."
echo "result=push-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
exit 0
fi
- name: Comment delivery outcome
if: always() && steps.meta.outputs.deliver == 'true' && steps.push.outcome != 'skipped'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pr_number }}
RESULT: ${{ steps.push.outputs.result }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
marker="<!-- gitnexus:ts-prebuild-fork -->"
case "${RESULT}" in
applied)
body="${marker}
✅ **Rebuilt native prebuilds pushed to this PR branch.** A grammar source change re-cut the vendored \`tree-sitter\` prebuilds for all 6 platforms and they're now committed on your branch. ([builder run](${RUN_URL}))" ;;
nothing-to-commit)
body="${marker}
✅ Native prebuilds are already up to date on this branch — nothing to push." ;;
loop-prevented)
body="${marker}
🔁 Skipping prebuild push: the branch HEAD is already an automated prebuild commit." ;;
lease-failed)
body="${marker}
⏳ The PR head moved while the prebuilds were building, so they weren't pushed. Push another commit (or wait for the next build) and they'll be re-cut. ([builder run](${RUN_URL}))" ;;
push-failed)
body="${marker}
⚠️ Rebuilt native prebuilds are ready but **couldn't be pushed to your fork branch**. Tick **Allow edits by maintainers** in the PR sidebar so CI can commit them — or download them from the [builder run](${RUN_URL}) artifacts (\`ts-prebuild-*\`) and commit them under \`gitnexus/vendor/<grammar>/prebuilds/\` yourself." ;;
*)
body="${marker}
❓ Prebuild delivery finished in an unexpected state (\`${RESULT:-unknown}\`). See the [builder run](${RUN_URL})." ;;
esac
# Strip the YAML block indent so the rendered comment starts at column 0.
body="$(printf '%s\n' "$body" | sed 's/^ //')"
# Upsert a single sticky comment keyed by the marker; only ever edit our
# own bot comment (PATCH on someone else's 403s and would abort).
existing=$(gh api "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" --paginate \
--jq ".[] | select(.user.login == \"github-actions[bot]\" and (.body | contains(\"${marker}\"))) | .id" \
| head -n1 || true)
if [ -n "${existing}" ]; then
gh api -X PATCH "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${existing}" -f body="${body}" >/dev/null
echo "Updated comment ${existing}."
else
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" -f body="${body}" >/dev/null
echo "Created delivery comment."
fi
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
name: Dependency Review
# Blocks PRs that introduce dependencies with high/critical known vulnerabilities.
# Reads the dependency graph diff between PR head and base.
#
# This is a required-check candidate after one week of clean runs
# (operator decision — see docs/plans/2026-05-03-001-feat-automated-security-scans-plan.md).
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
review:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
# pull-requests:write enables the inline summary comment on failure.
pull-requests: write
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Dependency Review
uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5.0.0
with:
fail-on-severity: high
comment-summary-in-pr: on-failure
-271
View File
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
name: Docker Build & Push
on:
push:
tags:
- 'v*'
pull_request:
# workflow_dispatch is allowed for dry-run testing only. Publishing is still
# exclusively tag-driven so that every signed image corresponds 1:1 to a
# published `gitnexus@X.Y.Z` on npm. dry_run:true (the default) skips all
# push, sign, and attestation steps — the build runs but nothing is published.
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
dry_run:
description: 'Build only — skip push, signing, and attestations'
required: false
default: true
type: boolean
workflow_call:
inputs:
tag:
description: >-
The full v-prefixed tag to build (e.g. v1.2.3-rc.1).
The tag must already exist in the repo and its tree must contain
a gitnexus/package.json whose version matches the tag.
required: true
type: string
# Explicit secret contract — callers pass these by name. Replaces the
# blanket `secrets: inherit` pattern (zizmor `secrets-inherit` audit).
# GHCR auth uses the implicit GITHUB_TOKEN; only Docker Hub credentials
# need to be passed through.
secrets:
DOCKERHUB_USERNAME:
required: true
DOCKERHUB_TOKEN:
required: true
permissions:
contents: read
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Tag refs are unique per release, so distinct tags run in parallel.
# Re-pushes of the same tag serialize. cancel-in-progress: false — never cancel a publish mid-flight.
# Hardcoded `docker-build-push-` prefix (not `${{ github.workflow }}`) when invoked as a reusable
# workflow: in called-workflow context `github.workflow` is ambiguous and could resolve to the
# caller's name, sharing a concurrency group with the caller → deadlock.
# Direct tag-push invocations use `docker-build-push-<ref>`; workflow_call invocations get a
# per-run-unique group (they are already serialized by the caller's own concurrency group).
concurrency:
group: ${{ (github.event_name == 'push') && format('docker-build-push-{0}', github.ref) || format('docker-build-push-nested-{0}', github.run_id) }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
build-push:
name: Build & Push ${{ matrix.image.name }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
# Required for Cosign keyless signing via the OIDC token exchange,
# and for build provenance / SBOM attestations.
id-token: write
attestations: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
image:
# Static UI bundle. Small, fast image. Drop-in replacement for the
# legacy single-image setup at the same `gitnexus` repository slug
# is intentionally avoided — the UI now lives at `gitnexus-web` and
# the CLI/server takes the canonical `gitnexus` slug below.
- name: gitnexus-web
dockerfile: Dockerfile.web
slug: gitnexus-web
# CLI / `gitnexus serve` backend. Heavy native deps (tree-sitter,
# onnxruntime-node) live only in this image.
- name: gitnexus
dockerfile: Dockerfile.cli
slug: gitnexus
steps:
# Only the workflow_call path requires a non-empty `inputs.tag` — callers
# (publish.yml in RC mode) must pass the RC tag explicitly. On direct
# tag pushes the tag comes from `github.ref`, so `inputs.tag` is always
# empty and validating it here would break every real release (#1064).
# The downstream "Verify tag matches gitnexus/package.json version" step
# handles both event types by falling back to GITHUB_REF.
- name: Validate tag input
if: github.event_name == 'workflow_call'
shell: bash
env:
TAG_INPUT: ${{ inputs.tag }}
run: |
if [ -z "${TAG_INPUT}" ]; then
echo "::error::No tag provided to docker.yml — refusing to build/push."
exit 1
fi
# When triggered by workflow_call the caller passes the RC tag as an input;
# we check out that tag so the Dockerfile and package.json match the built image.
# For tag-push events github.ref is already the tag ref — no override needed.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.tag || github.ref }}
# ── Lock the docker image version to the npm package version ──────────
# Mirrors the check in publish.yml: refuse to build unless the git tag
# exactly matches `gitnexus/package.json`'s version. This guarantees
# `ghcr.io/<owner>/gitnexus:X.Y.Z` always corresponds to the same
# `gitnexus@X.Y.Z` published to npm — no drift, no surprises.
- name: Verify tag matches gitnexus/package.json version
id: version
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' && github.event_name != 'pull_request'
shell: bash
env:
# For workflow_call the tag comes from the caller input; for push events
# it is derived from GITHUB_REF (set to empty so the else-branch fires).
INPUT_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag }}
run: |
if [ -n "$INPUT_TAG" ]; then
TAG_VERSION="${INPUT_TAG#v}"
else
TAG_VERSION="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}"
fi
if ! [[ "$TAG_VERSION" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Tag does not follow semver: v$TAG_VERSION"
exit 1
fi
PKG_VERSION=$(node -p "require('./gitnexus/package.json').version")
if [ "$TAG_VERSION" != "$PKG_VERSION" ]; then
echo "::error::Tag version (v$TAG_VERSION) does not match gitnexus/package.json version ($PKG_VERSION)"
exit 1
fi
echo "version=$PKG_VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Version verified: $PKG_VERSION"
# Required for multi-platform (linux/arm64) emulation.
- name: Set up QEMU
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@96fe6ef7f33517b61c61be40b68a1882f3264fb8 # v4.2.0
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4.2.0
- name: Install Cosign
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 # v4.1.2
- name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Docker Hub is a mirror of GHCR: same tags, same digests, same Cosign
# signatures. GHCR remains authoritative (it is the registry the
# ClusterImagePolicy globs against by default), but Docker Hub is the
# registry most users reach for first, so we publish there too.
# Requires repo secrets DOCKERHUB_USERNAME and DOCKERHUB_TOKEN (a scoped
# access token, NOT the account password) with write access to the
# `akonlabs/gitnexus` and `akonlabs/gitnexus-web` repos.
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
with:
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
# Computes image tags and labels from the verified semver tag:
# v1.2.3 → :1.2.3, :1.2, :1, :latest (auto, only for non-prerelease)
# v1.2.3-rc.1 → :1.2.3-rc.1 only (prereleases never become :latest)
# `:latest` is only emitted for tag pushes thanks to `flavor: latest=auto`,
# ensuring it always points at a real npm-published version.
#
# For workflow_call invocations github.ref is the caller's branch ref, so
# the type=semver patterns would not match. In that case we add an explicit
# type=raw tag using the version already verified above, so the same
# image-naming rules apply regardless of how the workflow was triggered.
# NOTE: We check `inputs.tag` rather than `github.event_name` because in a
# reusable workflow the github context is inherited from the caller —
# `github.event_name` would still be "push", not "workflow_call".
- name: Extract Docker metadata
id: meta
uses: docker/metadata-action@80c7e94dd9b9319bd5eb7a0e0fe9291e23a2a2e9 # v6.1.0
with:
# Dual-registry publish. metadata-action expands the same tag set
# against every image ref listed here, and build-push-action pushes
# one build to all of them, so the GHCR and Docker Hub images share
# a digest and are byte-identical. The Docker Hub namespace
# (`akonlabs`) is hardcoded because it differs from the GitHub org
# (`abhigyanpatwari`) — `github.repository_owner` would produce the
# wrong ref.
images: |
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/${{ matrix.image.slug }}
docker.io/akonlabs/${{ matrix.image.slug }}
flavor: latest=auto
tags: |
type=semver,pattern={{version}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
type=semver,pattern={{major}}
type=raw,value=${{ steps.version.outputs.version }},enable=${{ inputs.tag != '' }}
# Transient 502s from GHCR / Docker Hub / GHA cache during multi-platform
# exports are retried inside `.github/actions/docker-build-push-retry`
# (see docker/build-push-action#1422 — retry policy stays out of the
# upstream action). `ignore-error=true` on cache-to avoids cache export
# flakes failing an otherwise successful push.
- name: Build and push
id: build
uses: ./.github/actions/docker-build-push-retry
with:
context: .
file: ${{ matrix.image.dockerfile }}
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
cache-from: type=gha,scope=${{ matrix.image.slug }}
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=${{ matrix.image.slug }},ignore-error=true
# Cosign keyless signing. Each pushed tag is signed by the workflow's
# OIDC identity, so consumers can verify the image with the strict,
# fully-anchored identity regex (kept in sync with README.md and
# deploy/kubernetes/cluster-image-policy.yaml — update all three together).
# NOTE: `${...}` expression syntax is NOT evaluated inside YAML comments, so
# the example below uses literal `<owner>/<repo>` placeholders that consumers
# substitute themselves; the canonical, fully-rendered command lives in README.md.
# cosign verify ghcr.io/<owner>/<slug>:<tag> \
# --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/<owner>/<repo>/\.github/workflows/docker\.yml@refs/tags/v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?$' \
# --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
# Do NOT relax to `@.*` — that accepts signatures from any ref, including
# unprotected branches and PRs, and defeats the supply-chain guarantee.
- name: Sign image with Cosign (keyless)
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
env:
# Cosign v2 (installed by sigstore/cosign-installer above) makes
# keyless the default. COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL is a v1-only opt-in flag
# that is now deprecated/no-op, so it is intentionally omitted.
DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
TAGS: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
run: |
# Sign every tag at the same digest so consumers can verify by tag or by digest.
# Use `while read` instead of `for $TAGS` to be robust against tags that
# could ever contain whitespace (the metadata-action output is newline-
# separated, not space-separated).
while IFS= read -r tag; do
[[ -n "$tag" ]] && cosign sign --yes "${tag}@${DIGEST}"
done <<< "$TAGS"
# Attach the SBOM produced by buildx as a verifiable attestation on the
# digest. Attestations are pushed as OCI referrers to the registry named
# in `subject-name`, so we call the action once per registry. The digest
# is identical across registries (same build, same push), so consumers
# pulling from either GHCR or Docker Hub see the same provenance.
- name: Generate build provenance attestation (GHCR)
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@0f67c3f4856b2e3261c31976d6725780e5e4c373 # v4.1.1
with:
subject-name: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/${{ matrix.image.slug }}
subject-digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
push-to-registry: true
- name: Generate build provenance attestation (Docker Hub)
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' && !inputs.dry_run }}
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@0f67c3f4856b2e3261c31976d6725780e5e4c373 # v4.1.1
with:
subject-name: docker.io/akonlabs/${{ matrix.image.slug }}
subject-digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
push-to-registry: true
-60
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@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
name: Gitleaks
# Deterministic in-CI secret scanning. Defense-in-depth on top of GitHub's
# native secret-scanning push protection (which is a repo Settings toggle —
# see SECURITY.md for the recommended admin action).
#
# PR runs scan the diff (fast); main pushes scan full history.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
push:
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
jobs:
gitleaks:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
# Full history needed for the on-push full-history scan; on PRs the
# action diffs against the base ref so the cost is bounded by the PR.
fetch-depth: 0
# Don't bake the token into the cloned .git/config; downstream
# steps (and Gitleaks itself) don't need it for repo operations.
persist-credentials: false
# gitleaks-action builds `base^..head` for pull_request events; both SHAs
# must exist locally (fork PRs and shallow checkouts otherwise fail with
# "unknown revision" — see gitleaks/gitleaks-action#199).
- name: Fetch PR refs for gitleaks range
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
env:
BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
git fetch --no-tags origin "$BASE_SHA"
git fetch --no-tags origin "$HEAD_SHA"
# No GITLEAKS_LICENSE secret is required for OSS / public-repo usage.
# If this repo becomes private, the action will require a license key.
- name: Gitleaks
uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@e0c47f4f8be36e29cdc102c57e68cb5cbf0e8d1e # v3.0.0
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITLEAKS_ENABLE_UPLOAD_ARTIFACT: true
GITLEAKS_ENABLE_SUMMARY: true
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
name: Vendored grammar update monitor
# Periodically checks each vendored tree-sitter grammar against its
# source-of-origin and opens a PR re-vendoring any update that is ABI-COMPATIBLE
# with the pinned tree-sitter@0.21.1 (LANGUAGE_VERSION 13–14, #1922). The version
# bump then triggers build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml, which cross-builds + ABI-
# validates the prebuilds — so a re-vendor that is subtly wrong can never silently
# ship: its PR's CI goes red.
#
# ABI-INCOMPATIBLE updates (the common case — upstreams move to newer tree-sitter)
# are reported as a notice + job summary, NOT applied, so the monitor never opens
# doomed PRs. tree-sitter-c is MONITORED but report-only: it is ABI-pinned at
# 0.21.4 (#1242/#858), so an available c update is surfaced (notice + summary) but
# never auto-bumped — a maintainer re-vendors it deliberately after a runtime
# upgrade.
#
# The vendored set + per-grammar upstream coords + the tree-sitter-c hold live in
# .github/vendored-grammars.json — the SHARED source of truth this monitor and
# tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.yml both read, so the two workflows can never
# disagree about which grammars are vendored (#858). This monitor additionally
# resolves each grammar's upstream from it; the readiness report reads vendored
# ABIs from gitnexus/vendor/ and keeps its own upstream-drift coords.
#
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md -> "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
on:
schedule:
- cron: '17 6 * * 1' # weekly, Monday 06:17 UTC
workflow_dispatch:
# Least privilege; the actual writes use a short-lived App token minted below.
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
monitor:
name: Check upstreams + open update PRs
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
timeout-minutes: 20
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
# secrets aren't usable in a job/step `if:`, so compute presence here.
- name: Check release App secret
id: relapp
env:
HAS_APP: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID != '' && secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY != '' }}
run: echo "configured=$HAS_APP" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Mint GitHub App token
id: app-token
if: steps.relapp.outputs.configured == 'true'
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49218906704ab6c1aa796996da409d3eb1 # v3.2.0
with:
app-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
- name: Detect updates, re-vendor ABI-compatible ones, open PRs
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
env:
HAS_APP: ${{ steps.relapp.outputs.configured }}
# App token writes; falls back to the read-only job token (PRs then skip).
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token || github.token }}
with:
github-token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token || github.token }}
script: |
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const SCRIPT = '.github/scripts/update-vendored-grammars.mjs';
const run = (cmd, args, opts = {}) =>
execFileSync(cmd, args, { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], ...opts });
const report = JSON.parse(run('node', [SCRIPT]));
const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
const hasApp = process.env.HAS_APP === 'true';
const applied = [], held = [], errors = [], skipped = [];
run('git', ['config', 'user.name', 'gitnexus-release-bot[bot]']);
run('git', ['config', 'user.email', 'gitnexus-release-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com']);
const baseSha = run('git', ['rev-parse', 'HEAD']).trim();
for (const r of report) {
if (r.error) { errors.push(r); continue; }
if (!r.update) continue;
if (!r.applicable) { held.push(r); continue; } // ABI-incompatible / unknown
const name = `tree-sitter-${r.grammar}`;
const branch = `chore/update-${name}-${r.upstream}`.replace(/[^a-z0-9._/-]+/gi, '-');
// Idempotency: don't reopen an existing PR for this exact version.
const existing = await github.rest.pulls.list({ owner, repo, head: `${owner}:${branch}`, state: 'all' });
if (existing.data.length > 0) { skipped.push({ ...r, reason: 'PR exists' }); continue; }
// Re-vendor in place (refuses + exits non-zero if ABI turns out wrong).
try {
run('node', [SCRIPT, '--apply', r.grammar]);
} catch (e) {
errors.push({ ...r, error: `apply failed: ${String(e.message || e).slice(0, 200)}` });
run('git', ['checkout', '--', 'gitnexus/vendor']);
continue;
}
if (!hasApp) {
skipped.push({ ...r, reason: 'no RELEASE_APP secret — PR not opened' });
run('git', ['checkout', '--', 'gitnexus/vendor']);
continue;
}
const remote = `https://x-access-token:${process.env.GH_TOKEN}@github.com/${owner}/${repo}.git`;
run('git', ['checkout', '-B', branch, baseSha]);
run('git', ['add', `gitnexus/vendor/${name}`]);
run('git', ['commit', '-m', `chore(vendor): update ${name} to ${r.upstream}`]);
run('git', ['push', '--force-with-lease', remote, `HEAD:${branch}`]);
const body = [
`Automated re-vendor of **${name}** to \`${r.upstream}\` (from ${r.kind === 'npm' ? `npm \`${name}\`` : `\`${r.ref}\``}).`,
'',
`Verified ABI **${r.abi}** — compatible with the pinned \`tree-sitter@0.21.1\` (13–14).`,
'Source-build inputs refreshed; the GitNexus binding.gyp / README / prebuilds are preserved.',
'The version bump triggers `build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml` to rebuild + ABI-validate the',
'prebuilds — review its result before merging.',
].join('\n');
const pr = await github.rest.pulls.create({
owner, repo, head: branch, base: 'main',
title: `chore(vendor): update ${name} to ${r.upstream}`, body,
});
applied.push({ ...r, pr: pr.data.number });
run('git', ['checkout', '--force', baseSha]);
}
// Summary
const s = core.summary.addHeading('Vendored grammar update monitor');
if (applied.length) s.addRaw(`\n**Opened PRs:** ${applied.map((a) => `${a.grammar}→${a.upstream} (#${a.pr})`).join(', ')}\n`);
if (held.length) s.addRaw(`\n**Held (not auto-applied):** ${held.map((h) => `${h.grammar} ${h.upstream} (${h.hold ? 'report-only: ' + h.hold : 'ABI ' + (h.abi ?? '?') + ' — needs the tree-sitter runtime upgrade'})`).join(', ')}\n`);
if (skipped.length) s.addRaw(`\n**Skipped:** ${skipped.map((x) => `${x.grammar} (${x.reason})`).join(', ')}\n`);
if (errors.length) s.addRaw(`\n**Errors:** ${errors.map((e) => `${e.grammar}: ${e.error}`).join('; ')}\n`);
if (!applied.length && !held.length && !skipped.length && !errors.length) s.addRaw('\nAll vendored grammars are up to date. ✅\n');
await s.write();
for (const h of held) core.notice(`${h.grammar}: update to ${h.upstream} available — ${h.hold ? `report-only (${h.hold})` : `ABI ${h.abi ?? 'unknown'} (need 13/14), held until the tree-sitter runtime upgrade`}.`);
if (!hasApp && (applied.length || skipped.some((x) => /secret/.test(x.reason)))) {
core.notice('RELEASE_APP_ID / RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY not configured — update PRs were not opened. Provision the App to enable auto-PRs.');
}
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
name: Impact PDG Mutation Report
# Off-the-fast-path mutation oracle for the PDG-backed `impact` mode.
#
# The `--mutation` oracle (bench/impact-pdg/measure.mjs) is a ~280s dynamic
# value-diff check: it mutates each fixture, re-analyzes with `--pdg`, and scores
# the realized recall of the statement slice against the behavioral diff. It is
# far too slow for the PR critical path, so it runs on a nightly schedule (and on
# demand via workflow_dispatch) and uploads the JSON report as an artifact rather
# than gating merges.
#
# The harness shells out to `gitnexus analyze --pdg`, which spawns workers from
# dist/, so dist must be built first — setup-gitnexus with build: 'true' does
# that (mirrors ci-tests.yml).
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 3 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
mutation-report:
name: impact-pdg mutation oracle
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 25
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
# persist-credentials: false — this job runs the bench + uploads an
# artifact and never pushes; the default-persisted token in .git/config
# must not be capturable through that upload (zizmor credential-persistence
# / artipacked audit). Mirrors ci-tests.yml.
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
# setup-gitnexus is the repo's composite install action (Node 22 + npm ci);
# build: 'true' runs `node scripts/build.js` so dist/ exists for the
# analyze workers the mutation harness spawns.
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'true'
- name: Run PDG impact mutation oracle (~280s)
run: node --import tsx bench/impact-pdg/measure.mjs --mutation --json > mutation-report.json
working-directory: gitnexus
# Regression gate: write a recall summary to the run AND fail if the
# minimum realized recall drops below the (tunable) floor, so a recall
# regression surfaces instead of sitting unread in the artifact. Runs
# before the (always) upload so the artifact is preserved even on a fail.
- name: Gate on mutation recall regression
run: node bench/impact-pdg/gate-mutation-recall.mjs mutation-report.json
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
MUTATION_RECALL_FLOOR: '0.5'
- name: Upload mutation report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: impact-pdg-mutation-report
path: gitnexus/mutation-report.json
retention-days: 14
-595
View File
@@ -1,595 +0,0 @@
name: PR Autofix (apply)
# CHATOPS HALF of the autofix pipeline.
#
# Triggered when a contributor comments `/autofix` on a PR. Validates
# permission, locates the most recent successful `pr-autofix.yml`
# artifact for the PR's current head SHA, applies the patch to the PR
# head, and pushes a commit back to the PR branch.
#
# This workflow runs from the default branch's copy of the file
# regardless of where the comment originates -- that's the trust
# anchor. Comment body and author login are untrusted; both flow
# through env vars and pattern-matched, never interpolated into shell.
#
# Fork PR support: `git push` with the GITHUB_TOKEN succeeds against
# fork branches only when the contributor enabled "Allow edits by
# maintainers" on the PR (the default). When they disabled it, we
# fail loud with a 👎 reaction and an explanation comment.
on:
issue_comment:
types: [created]
concurrency:
# Per-PR scope. issue_comment events expose `github.event.issue.number`
# for both PR and Issue comments; the `pull_request != null` guard on
# the job ensures we only run on PRs, so this number is the PR number.
# cancel-in-progress: false — a second `/autofix` should wait for the
# first to finish (idempotency check on the second invocation handles
# the no-op case).
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}
cancel-in-progress: false
permissions: {}
jobs:
apply:
name: apply-autofix
# Pre-filter at the workflow level so non-PR comments and unrelated
# comments don't even spawn a runner. The job-level body re-check
# below (Step 1) is the strict gate.
if: >-
github.event.issue.pull_request != null
&& startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/autofix')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
# React on the triggering comment + post reply comments.
pull-requests: write
# Push the apply commit to the PR head branch.
contents: write
# Required by actions/download-artifact to fetch artifacts produced
# by a different workflow run.
actions: read
steps:
- name: Validate comment body precisely
id: body
env:
BODY: ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Whole-line, case-sensitive match: `^/autofix\s*$`. The
# workflow-level startsWith guard is coarse — `please don't
# /autofix this code` would pass that filter but fail this one.
# We exit silently (no reaction) on body mismatch so quoted
# text in unrelated discussions doesn't get a visible response.
if [[ ! "${BODY}" =~ ^/autofix[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "Body did not match strict /autofix regex — exiting silently."
echo "match=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "match=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Validate commenter permission
id: perm
if: steps.body.outputs.match == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENTER: ${{ github.event.comment.user.login }}
PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.issue.user.login }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Retry wrapper for transient 5xx / 429 / network blips.
# Mirrors the helper in pr-autofix-publish.yml. Used on
# idempotent GETs only; reactions/comment-POSTs are NOT
# wrapped (retrying a POST would dupe the resource).
gh_retry() {
local n=0 max=3
while true; do
if gh "$@"; then return 0; fi
n=$((n+1))
if [ "$n" -ge "$max" ]; then return 1; fi
sleep $((n * 2))
done
}
# Allowlist the commenter login before it flows into a URL.
# GitHub usernames: alphanumeric + dashes, max 39 chars.
if ! [[ "${COMMENTER}" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,39}$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Invalid commenter login format: $(printf '%q' "${COMMENTER}")"
echo "allowed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Self-comparison: PR author can always /autofix their own PR.
if [ "${COMMENTER}" = "${PR_AUTHOR}" ]; then
echo "Commenter is PR author — granting access."
echo "allowed=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Repo permission lookup. admin/write/maintain are sufficient.
# Distinguish API failure (5xx, 429, network) from genuine
# permission denial (404 = not a collaborator). Conflating them
# would silently refuse a legitimate maintainer with a public
# 👎 every time GitHub blips. gh_retry handles transient blips;
# the stderr-grep distinguishes 404 from persistent failure.
perm_stderr=$(mktemp)
if permission=$(gh_retry api "repos/${GH_REPO}/collaborators/${COMMENTER}/permission" \
--jq '.permission' 2>"$perm_stderr"); then
echo "Commenter permission: ${permission}"
case "${permission}" in
admin|write|maintain)
echo "allowed=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
;;
*)
echo "allowed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
;;
esac
else
err=$(cat "$perm_stderr")
echo "Permission lookup stderr: ${err}" >&2
# 404 (not a collaborator) is a genuine deny.
# Anything else is a transient API/network failure.
if grep -qE "HTTP 404|Not Found" "$perm_stderr"; then
echo "allowed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::error::Permission lookup failed transiently — refusing to act."
echo "allowed=api-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
fi
- name: React 😕 on transient permission-API failure
if: steps.body.outputs.match == 'true' && steps.perm.outputs.allowed == 'api-failed'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
PR: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ Couldn't verify your repo permission (transient GitHub API failure). Please comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](https://github.com/${GH_REPO}/actions/runs/${RUN_ID}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
- name: React 👎 on permission denial
if: steps.body.outputs.match == 'true' && steps.perm.outputs.allowed == 'false'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
PR: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="🚫 \`/autofix\` is restricted to users with write access or the PR author. Comment ignored." \
>/dev/null
# Hard exit so the rest of the job is skipped.
exit 1
- name: React 👀 to acknowledge
if: steps.perm.outputs.allowed == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="eyes" >/dev/null
- name: Resolve PR head and locate autofix run
id: locate
if: steps.perm.outputs.allowed == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Same retry wrapper used in the permission step, repeated
# because each YAML `run:` block is a fresh bash session.
gh_retry() {
local n=0 max=3
while true; do
if gh "$@"; then return 0; fi
n=$((n+1))
if [ "$n" -ge "$max" ]; then return 1; fi
sleep $((n * 2))
done
}
# Fetch PR metadata. All fields here are server-controlled API
# output, but we still allowlist before exporting so anything
# weird short-circuits before $GITHUB_OUTPUT. Wrapped in
# gh_retry so transient blips don't surface as "no autofix run
# found" with a wrong remediation.
if ! pr_json=$(gh_retry api "repos/${GH_REPO}/pulls/${PR}"); then
echo "::error::PR metadata fetch failed after retries."
echo "found_status=api-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
head_sha=$(jq -r '.head.sha' <<< "${pr_json}")
head_ref=$(jq -r '.head.ref' <<< "${pr_json}")
head_repo=$(jq -r '.head.repo.full_name' <<< "${pr_json}")
[[ "${head_sha}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || { echo "::error::Bad head_sha"; exit 1; }
[[ "${head_ref}" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$ ]] || { echo "::error::Bad head_ref"; exit 1; }
[[ "${head_repo}" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$ ]] || { echo "::error::Bad head_repo"; exit 1; }
# Find the latest successful pr-autofix.yml run for this head SHA.
if ! runs_json=$(gh_retry api "repos/${GH_REPO}/actions/workflows/pr-autofix.yml/runs?head_sha=${head_sha}&per_page=10"); then
echo "::error::Workflow run lookup failed after retries."
echo "found_status=api-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
run_id=$(jq -r '[.workflow_runs[] | select(.conclusion == "success")] | .[0].id // empty' <<< "${runs_json}")
if [ -n "${run_id}" ] && [[ "${run_id}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "found_status=success" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
{
echo "found=true"
echo "head_sha=${head_sha}"
echo "head_ref=${head_ref}"
echo "head_repo=${head_repo}"
echo "run_id=${run_id}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# No successful run. Distinguish "still running" (producer in
# flight after a recent push) from "never ran / all failed".
# in_progress / queued / pending / waiting cover the GitHub
# workflow-run lifecycle states that precede success/failure.
in_progress=$(jq -r '[.workflow_runs[] | select(.status == "in_progress" or .status == "queued" or .status == "pending" or .status == "waiting")] | length' <<< "${runs_json}")
if [ "${in_progress:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "::warning::pr-autofix run is still in progress for head ${head_sha}."
echo "found_status=in-progress" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::warning::No successful pr-autofix run found for head ${head_sha}."
echo "found_status=not-found" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
# Existing `found` boolean is preserved so downstream gates
# (`steps.locate.outputs.found == 'true'`) still work.
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Reply when locate did not yield a usable run
if: steps.perm.outputs.allowed == 'true' && steps.locate.outputs.found != 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
PR: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
FOUND_STATUS: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.found_status }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
run_url="https://github.com/${GH_REPO}/actions/runs/${RUN_ID}"
case "${FOUND_STATUS}" in
in-progress)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⏳ A pr-autofix run is still in progress for this PR's current head SHA. Wait for it to finish, then comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
;;
api-failed)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ Couldn't reach the GitHub API to look up the autofix run (transient failure after retries). Please comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
;;
*)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="🤔 No successful autofix run found for this PR's current head SHA. Push a new commit to trigger one, then comment \`/autofix\` again." \
>/dev/null
;;
esac
exit 1
# Pinned to v8.0.1. Same SHA as pr-autofix-publish.yml.
# `continue-on-error: true` lets the workflow proceed when the
# artifact is expired or pruned (1-day retention). The apply
# step distinguishes "patch file missing entirely" (artifact-
# expired) from "patch file zero bytes" (genuinely empty patch).
- name: Download autofix artifact
if: steps.locate.outputs.found == 'true'
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
continue-on-error: true
with:
name: autofix
run-id: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.run_id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
path: autofix-in
# Pinned to v5.0.4. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/actions/checkout/git/refs/tags/v5.0.4
#
# `persist-credentials: false` disables the default behavior where
# actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN into `.git/config` as an
# extraheader. That default is convenient (subsequent git commands
# auth automatically) but it means the token is sitting on disk in
# the checkout directory — an `actions/upload-artifact` step on
# this directory would leak the token. We don't upload, but
# zizmor's `credential-persistence` lint flags it defensively.
# Push auth is provided inline at push time via the URL.
- name: Checkout PR head
if: steps.locate.outputs.found == 'true'
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v5.0.4
with:
repository: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.head_repo }}
ref: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.head_sha }}
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
persist-credentials: false
# Fetch full history so the push doesn't hit shallow-clone errors.
fetch-depth: 0
path: pr-checkout
- name: Apply patch and push
id: apply
if: steps.locate.outputs.found == 'true'
env:
HEAD_REF: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.head_ref }}
HEAD_REPO: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.head_repo }}
# The SHA we resolved earlier in `locate` — this is what the
# remote ref MUST still equal at push time. If the contributor
# force-pushed between resolve and now, the lease fails and
# we surface that distinctly from a fork-without-maintainer
# -edit push failure.
HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.locate.outputs.head_sha }}
# Auth for the push only — never persisted to disk. Provided
# via env to avoid interpolating into the shell command line.
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
shell: bash
working-directory: pr-checkout
run: |
set -euo pipefail
patch="../autofix-in/autofix.patch"
# Distinguish artifact-expired (file missing entirely, because
# actions/download-artifact ran with continue-on-error and the
# 1-day retention had elapsed) from genuinely empty patch
# (file present, zero bytes, formatter found nothing).
if [ ! -e "$patch" ]; then
echo "::warning::Patch file does not exist — autofix artifact likely expired."
echo "result=artifact-expired" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
if [ ! -s "$patch" ]; then
echo "::warning::Empty patch — nothing to apply."
echo "result=empty-patch" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Sensitive-paths guard: refuse to apply patches that touch
# `.github/` — workflow files, action definitions, CODEOWNERS,
# dependabot config, etc. A malicious PR could ship a custom
# prettier/ESLint config that reformats workflow YAML; the
# producer would then capture those edits in autofix.patch,
# and a maintainer running `/autofix` would push them under
# `contents: write`. The default GITHUB_TOKEN lacks `workflows`
# scope so the platform would reject workflow-file pushes
# anyway, but that surfaces as a generic `push-failed` and
# misleads users into enabling maintainer-edit. Reject early
# with a specific reason. CODEOWNERS and dependabot.yml live
# under .github/ but outside .github/workflows/ — the broader
# match is intentional (they all govern trust boundaries).
if grep -qE '^(diff --git|---|\+\+\+) [ab]?/?\.github/' "$patch"; then
echo "::warning::Patch touches .github/ — refusing to apply (sensitive paths)."
echo "result=sensitive-paths" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Re-entrancy guard: if HEAD itself is an autofix bot commit,
# refuse to apply again. Without this, lint/formatter config
# drift between runs could pump arbitrary apply commits into
# the same PR if an automated agent watches the sticky and
# re-fires `/autofix` on each new "fixes-available" surface.
# The contributor can still get out by force-pushing a
# human-authored commit to revert the autofix and re-trigger.
head_author=$(git log -1 --format='%ae' HEAD)
head_subject=$(git log -1 --format='%s' HEAD)
if [ "${head_author}" = "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" ] \
&& [[ "${head_subject}" =~ ^chore\(autofix\) ]]; then
echo "::warning::HEAD is an autofix bot commit — refusing to re-apply (loop guard)."
echo "result=loop-prevented" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Idempotency probe: does the forward apply work?
if git apply --check "$patch" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Patch applies cleanly — proceeding."
elif git apply --check --reverse "$patch" 2>/dev/null; then
# Reverse-check passes => the patch is already applied to
# the current tree. Treat as success no-op.
echo "Patch is already applied (reverse-check passed) — no-op."
echo "result=already-applied" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
else
echo "::error::Patch does not apply (stale or conflicting)."
echo "result=stale" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Wrap the apply/commit phase so any non-zero exit sets a
# meaningful `result=` instead of leaving it unset (which would
# send the user to the `*` "unexpected state" arm with a
# non-actionable confused-emoji reply).
if ! {
git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" &&
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" &&
git apply "$patch" &&
git add -A &&
git commit -m "chore(autofix): apply prettier + eslint fixes via /autofix command"
}; then
echo "::error::git apply / config / commit failed after idempotency probe passed."
echo "result=apply-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Push to the PR head branch with a lease against the resolved
# SHA. The lease ensures the remote ref still points at HEAD_SHA
# when the push lands — if the contributor force-pushed in the
# window between resolve and now, the lease fails and we return
# `lease-failed` (NOT `push-failed`, which would mislead users
# into enabling maintainer-edit). For fork PRs, the push still
# requires "Allow edits by maintainers" to be enabled.
#
# Auth is supplied inline via `-c http.<base>.extraheader` (NOT
# via a `https://x-access-token:TOKEN@…` URL — those leak into
# process listings and `git remote -v` output). The header is
# set per-invocation; it never lands in `.git/config` on disk.
# The token is base64-encoded for the Basic auth header per
# GitHub's documented pattern for this scope.
push_url="https://github.com/${HEAD_REPO}.git"
auth_header="Authorization: Basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "${GITHUB_TOKEN}" | base64 -w0)"
# GitHub's secret-masker only masks the raw token, not its
# base64-encoded form. Mask the encoded value so any subsequent
# log line (set -x, GIT_TRACE, error spew) gets ***-redacted.
echo "::add-mask::${auth_header}"
push_stderr=$(mktemp)
if git -c http.extraheader="${auth_header}" \
push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${HEAD_REF}:${HEAD_SHA}" \
"${push_url}" "HEAD:${HEAD_REF}" 2>"$push_stderr"; then
echo "result=applied" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
cat "$push_stderr" >&2
# `--force-with-lease` reports "stale info" when the remote
# ref has moved past the expected SHA. Other lease-failure
# phrases git emits include "remote rejected" (server-side
# reject), "non-fast-forward", and the literal flag name. Match
# any of those to distinguish from auth/network/maintainer-
# edit failures.
if grep -qE "stale info|force-with-lease|rejected.*non-fast-forward|remote rejected|! \[rejected\]" "$push_stderr"; then
echo "::error::git push lease failed — branch moved during apply."
echo "result=lease-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::error::git push failed — likely fork without maintainer-edit enabled."
echo "result=push-failed" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
exit 0
fi
- name: React and reply on outcome
if: always() && steps.locate.outputs.found == 'true' && steps.apply.outcome != 'skipped'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMENT_ID: ${{ github.event.comment.id }}
PR: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
RESULT: ${{ steps.apply.outputs.result }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
run_url="https://github.com/${GH_REPO}/actions/runs/${RUN_ID}"
case "${RESULT}" in
applied)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="+1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="✅ Applied autofix and pushed a commit. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
;;
already-applied)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="+1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="✅ Autofix is already applied — no changes needed." \
>/dev/null
;;
empty-patch)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="+1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="✅ No autofix to apply — formatter found nothing." \
>/dev/null
;;
artifact-expired)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⏳ The autofix artifact for this PR's head SHA has expired (1-day retention). Push a new commit to regenerate it, then comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
loop-prevented)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="🔁 Refusing to re-apply autofix on top of an existing autofix commit. If formatter rules drifted and you genuinely need another pass, push a human-authored commit (or revert the existing autofix commit) before commenting \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
sensitive-paths)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="🛑 Refusing to apply: the autofix patch touches files under \`.github/\` (workflow / CODEOWNERS / dependabot config). Apply formatter changes to those files manually in a regular commit so they get human review. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
stale)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ The autofix patch is stale or conflicts with the current head — push a new commit to regenerate, then comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
apply-failed)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ Autofix applied cleanly in the dry run, but \`git apply\` / \`git commit\` failed when actually landing the patch. This usually means a race with concurrent edits or a corrupt patch. See logs: ${run_url}" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
push-failed)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ Couldn't push the autofix commit. If this is a fork PR, please tick **Allow edits by maintainers** in the PR sidebar, then comment \`/autofix\` again. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
lease-failed)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="-1" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="⚠️ The PR head moved while autofix was applying — a new commit landed in the window between resolve and push. Comment \`/autofix\` again to retry against the latest head. ([apply run](${run_url}))" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
*)
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${COMMENT_ID}/reactions" \
-f content="confused" >/dev/null
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="❓ Autofix run finished in an unexpected state (\`${RESULT:-unknown}\`). See logs: ${run_url}" \
>/dev/null
exit 1
;;
esac
-316
View File
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
name: PR Autofix (publish)
# TRUSTED HALF of the autofix pipeline.
#
# Triggered by `pr-autofix.yml` completing on a PR (including fork PRs).
# Downloads the diff artifact produced by the untrusted job, verifies
# its claimed PR identity against the workflow_run authority, then
# posts (or edits) a single sticky summary comment plus a
# `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run. This job NEVER checks out fork code —
# it only consumes the diff (data) and calls the GitHub API. That
# isolation is what makes it safe to run under `pull-requests: write`
# on fork-triggered events.
#
# The sticky comment is the contributor signal: heading
# "## :sparkles: PR Autofix" in the PR's top-level comments, with a
# fenced `gitnexus-autofix` JSON block carrying machine-readable state
# for AI agents. Contributors apply the patch by commenting `/autofix`
# on the PR — handled by the separate `pr-autofix-apply.yml` workflow.
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ['PR Autofix']
types: [completed]
concurrency:
# Key on PR identity, NOT workflow_run.id — workflow_run.id is per-run
# unique, which would defeat serialization and let two parallel
# publishes both POST a sticky summary comment. CONTRIBUTING.md
# § GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention names this anti-pattern
# explicitly. For fork PRs, `pull_requests[]` is empty in the
# workflow_run payload, so we fall back to head-repo + head-branch.
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests[0].number || format('{0}/{1}', github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name, github.event.workflow_run.head_branch) }}
cancel-in-progress: false
permissions: {}
jobs:
publish:
name: publish-autofix
if: >-
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request'
&& github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
pull-requests: write
# Required by actions/download-artifact to fetch artifacts produced
# by a different workflow run.
actions: read
# Required to create the `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run that reports
# the outcome (clean / fixes-available) to the PR's Checks tab.
# Branch protection or agents can grep the conclusion + output
# title without parsing the sticky comment.
checks: write
steps:
# Pinned to v8.0.1. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/git/refs/tags/v8.0.1
- name: Download autofix artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: autofix
run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
path: autofix-in
- name: Read and validate metadata
id: meta
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
test -f autofix-in/metadata.json
jq . autofix-in/metadata.json
# The artifact comes from the untrusted half running fork code.
# Every field is allowlist-validated before it can flow into
# $GITHUB_OUTPUT. A newline in head_ref would otherwise let a
# malicious branch name inject a second `pr_number=N` line and
# redirect this job's reviewdog suggestions / sticky summary
# comment onto a victim PR under github-actions[bot] with
# pull-requests: write.
assert_field() {
local key="$1" pattern="$2" value
value=$(jq -r ".${key} // empty" autofix-in/metadata.json)
if [ -z "$value" ] || ! [[ "$value" =~ $pattern ]]; then
echo "::error::metadata.${key} failed allowlist (got: $(printf '%q' "$value"))"
exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$value"
}
SCHEMA=$(assert_field schema '^gitnexus\.pr-autofix/v[0-9]+$')
PR_NUMBER=$(assert_field pr_number '^[0-9]+$')
HEAD_SHA=$(assert_field head_sha '^[0-9a-f]{40}$')
HEAD_REF=$(assert_field head_ref '^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$')
HEAD_REPO=$(assert_field head_repo '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')
BASE_REPO=$(assert_field base_repo '^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')
CHANGED=$(assert_field changed_lines '^[0-9]+$')
# Defence-in-depth: refuse to act if the artifact claims to
# belong to a different repo than the one that triggered us.
if [ "$BASE_REPO" != "${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact base_repo does not match \$GITHUB_REPOSITORY — refusing to publish."
exit 1
fi
{
echo "schema=${SCHEMA}"
echo "pr_number=${PR_NUMBER}"
echo "head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}"
echo "head_ref=${HEAD_REF}"
echo "head_repo=${HEAD_REPO}"
echo "base_repo=${BASE_REPO}"
echo "changed_lines=${CHANGED}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Cross-verify the artifact's claimed identity against the
# GitHub-controlled workflow_run event. The previous step's
# allowlist only proves the fields are well-formed — not that
# they refer to the PR/SHA that actually triggered this run.
# A fork-controlled `npm run lint:fix` could plausibly mutate
# metadata.json to reference another PR or SHA, redirecting our
# write-scoped sticky/check-run onto an attacker-chosen target.
#
# Authority sources are all server-controlled GitHub event fields:
# - workflow_run.head_sha
# - workflow_run.head_repository.full_name
# - workflow_run.pull_requests[].number (within-repo PRs only;
# empty array on fork PRs — fall back to commits/{sha}/pulls)
#
# Mismatch => fail loud BEFORE any sticky/check-run side effect.
- name: Verify metadata against workflow_run authority
id: verify
if: steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines != '0'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
META_PR_NUMBER: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pr_number }}
META_HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
META_HEAD_REPO: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_repo }}
WF_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
WF_HEAD_REPO: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}
WF_PR_NUMBERS: ${{ toJSON(github.event.workflow_run.pull_requests.*.number) }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# 1) head_sha must match exactly. workflow_run.head_sha is the
# commit GitHub actually ran the producer against — definitive.
if [ "${META_HEAD_SHA}" != "${WF_HEAD_SHA}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact head_sha (${META_HEAD_SHA}) does not match workflow_run.head_sha (${WF_HEAD_SHA}) — refusing to publish."
exit 1
fi
# 2) head_repo must match exactly. Same authority anchor.
if [ "${META_HEAD_REPO}" != "${WF_HEAD_REPO}" ]; then
echo "::error::Artifact head_repo (${META_HEAD_REPO}) does not match workflow_run.head_repository (${WF_HEAD_REPO}) — refusing to publish."
exit 1
fi
# 3) pr_number must reference an open PR with this head SHA.
# Within-repo PRs: workflow_run.pull_requests[] is populated.
# Fork PRs: that array is empty by GitHub design — fall back
# to the REST commit-to-PRs lookup. Fail closed if the lookup
# finds no matching open PR (avoids attacker-forged PR ids).
allowed_numbers=$(jq -c '.' <<< "${WF_PR_NUMBERS}")
if [ "${allowed_numbers}" = "[]" ]; then
echo "workflow_run.pull_requests is empty (fork PR) — falling back to commits/{sha}/pulls."
allowed_numbers=$(gh api "repos/${GH_REPO}/commits/${WF_HEAD_SHA}/pulls" \
--jq '[.[] | select(.state == "open") | .number]' 2>/dev/null || echo "[]")
if [ "${allowed_numbers}" = "[]" ]; then
echo "::error::No open PR found for head ${WF_HEAD_SHA} via commits/{sha}/pulls — refusing to publish."
exit 1
fi
fi
if ! jq -e --argjson n "${META_PR_NUMBER}" 'index($n) != null' <<< "${allowed_numbers}" >/dev/null; then
echo "::error::Artifact pr_number (${META_PR_NUMBER}) is not in the authoritative PR list (${allowed_numbers}) — refusing to publish."
exit 1
fi
echo "Verified: metadata identity matches workflow_run authority (PR=${META_PR_NUMBER}, head_sha=${META_HEAD_SHA}, head_repo=${META_HEAD_REPO})."
- name: Upsert sticky summary comment
# Only post when ci-quality found something fixable (= the
# autofix patch is non-empty). When prettier/eslint are clean
# the patch is zero bytes and the sticky comment is pure noise,
# so we skip it.
if: >-
always()
&& steps.meta.outputs.pr_number != ''
&& steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines != '0'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pr_number }}
CHANGED: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Stable heading + marker — agents grep for these exact strings.
marker="<!-- gitnexus:pr-autofix-summary -->"
heading="## :sparkles: PR Autofix"
# Single state. The /autofix slash command works for any diff
# size — there's no 3K cap and no no-overlap dead-end because
# the apply workflow uses `git apply` + push, not the GitHub
# review-comment API.
ui_state="fixes-available"
prose="Found fixable formatting / unused-import issues across **${CHANGED}** changed lines. **Comment \`/autofix\` on this PR to apply them**, or run \`npm run lint:fix && npm run format\` locally."
# Machine-readable JSON block — agents parse this instead of
# regexing English. Fenced code-block info string is
# `gitnexus-autofix` so agents can locate it without ambiguity.
# Schema bumped from v1 -> v2: adds `apply_command`. The v1
# field set is preserved as a superset, but the `state` enum
# is redefined (v1: suggestions-posted | skipped-too-large |
# diff-no-overlap; v2: fixes-available). v1 readers checking
# `schema == 'gitnexus.pr-autofix/v1'` see an unfamiliar version
# and fall back to prose, which is the intended migration path.
json=$(jq -n -c \
--arg state "${ui_state}" \
--argjson pr_number "${PR}" \
--argjson changed_lines "${CHANGED}" \
--arg head_sha "${HEAD_SHA}" \
--arg run_id "${RUN_ID}" \
'{schema:"gitnexus.pr-autofix/v2", state:$state, pr_number:$pr_number, changed_lines:$changed_lines, head_sha:$head_sha, run_id:$run_id, apply_command:"/autofix"}')
# Multi-line quoted string instead of a column-0 heredoc — YAML's
# `run: |` block ends as soon as a content line dedents below the
# block's first-line indent, which would mis-parse the workflow.
body="${marker}
${heading}
${prose}
\`\`\`gitnexus-autofix
${json}
\`\`\`"
# Strip the leading 10-space indent that the YAML block requires
# so the rendered comment body starts at column 0.
body="$(printf '%s\n' "$body" | sed 's/^ //')"
# Small retry wrapper for transient 5xx / rate-limit responses
# on the GitHub REST API. Three tries with linear backoff. We
# only retry GET (idempotent) and PATCH on a known comment id
# (idempotent). POST is NOT wrapped — retrying a comment-create
# would create duplicates if the first attempt actually landed.
gh_retry() {
local n=0 max=3
while true; do
if gh "$@"; then return 0; fi
n=$((n+1))
if [ "$n" -ge "$max" ]; then return 1; fi
sleep $((n * 2))
done
}
# Find existing bot comment by the marker and edit-in-place; else create.
# CRITICAL: filter by `.user.login == "github-actions[bot]"`. A regular
# user posting a comment containing the marker would otherwise be the
# `head -n1` match; PATCH on someone else's comment 403s, `set -e`
# aborts, and the bot is permanently DoS'd for that PR.
existing=$(gh_retry api "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
--paginate --jq ".[] | select(.user.login == \"github-actions[bot]\" and (.body | contains(\"${marker}\"))) | .id" \
| head -n1 || true)
if [ -n "${existing}" ]; then
gh_retry api -X PATCH "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/comments/${existing}" \
-f body="${body}" >/dev/null
echo "Updated comment ${existing}."
else
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/issues/${PR}/comments" \
-f body="${body}" >/dev/null
echo "Created summary comment."
fi
- name: Emit gitnexus/autofix Check Run
# Stable check name `gitnexus/autofix` so PR-watching agents can
# `gh pr checks <pr>` and read the conclusion + title without
# parsing the sticky comment. Two outcomes:
# clean → conclusion: success
# fixes-available → conclusion: neutral
# `neutral` does not block branch-protection required-checks but
# is visually distinct from a green pass.
if: always() && steps.meta.outputs.head_sha != ''
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.head_sha }}
CHANGED: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.changed_lines }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${CHANGED}" = "0" ]; then
conclusion="success"
title="Formatting clean"
summary="Prettier and ESLint --fix produced no changes."
else
conclusion="neutral"
title="Autofix available — comment /autofix to apply"
summary="Comment \`/autofix\` on this PR to apply formatter + unused-import fixes (works at any diff size). Or run \`npm run lint:fix && npm run format\` locally."
fi
gh api -X POST "repos/${GH_REPO}/check-runs" \
-f name="gitnexus/autofix" \
-f head_sha="${HEAD_SHA}" \
-f status="completed" \
-f conclusion="${conclusion}" \
-f "output[title]=${title}" \
-f "output[summary]=${summary}" \
>/dev/null
echo "Posted check-run gitnexus/autofix=${conclusion} (${title})"
-146
View File
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
name: PR Autofix
# UNTRUSTED HALF of the autofix pipeline.
#
# Runs `npm run lint:fix` + `npm run format` against the PR head
# (including fork heads) and uploads the resulting diff as an artifact.
# This job has NO privileged token and CANNOT post to the PR. The trusted
# `pr-autofix-publish.yml` workflow downloads the artifact via
# `workflow_run` and posts a sticky summary comment + Check Run.
# Contributors apply the patch by commenting `/autofix` on the PR —
# handled by the separate `pr-autofix-apply.yml` ChatOps workflow.
#
# Why the split:
# ESLint loads plugins from fork-controlled `node_modules`, so running
# it in a job with `pull-requests: write` would let a malicious fork PR
# ship a poisoned eslint plugin and execute arbitrary code under that
# token. By keeping fork code execution in this job (token: read-only)
# and posting from a separate trusted job that never touches fork
# code, we get the autofix UX for fork PRs without the supply-chain
# hole. (See autofix.ci for the same pattern.)
#
# Removes unused imports via `eslint-plugin-unused-imports`, already in
# devDependencies and wired into the `lint` config.
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
# Skip lockfile / generated-file PRs entirely — `action-suggester`
# cannot post on diffs > ~3k lines (GitHub returns 406) and these
# paths produce massive diffs no human wants suggested back inline.
paths-ignore:
- '**/package-lock.json'
- '**/*.snap'
- '**/dist/**'
- '**/node_modules/**'
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
# Don't cancel in-flight runs; the publish workflow may already be
# downloading the artifact and a cancelled untrusted run produces no
# signal at all (worse DX than waiting).
cancel-in-progress: false
# This workflow runs untrusted fork code. Top-level deny-all and NO
# job-level grants — the job can only read its own checkout.
permissions: {}
jobs:
autofix:
name: autofix
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
# PR head commit (not the synthetic merge ref) — we need the
# exact tree the contributor pushed so suggestions line up.
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
node-version: 22
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: package-lock.json
# `--ignore-scripts` blocks pre/postinstall lifecycle hooks. ESLint
# plugins still load from node_modules (that is the actual escape
# hatch on a typical fork), but this job has no token to abuse —
# which is the whole point of the split.
- run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
- name: ESLint --fix (removes unused imports)
run: npm run lint:fix
# Lint errors that --fix can't auto-resolve must not block the
# diff artifact — partial fixes are still useful as suggestions.
continue-on-error: true
- name: Prettier --write
run: npm run format
continue-on-error: true
- name: Capture diff and metadata
id: capture
# Pass GitHub-context values via env: rather than `${{ }}`
# interpolated directly into the bash body. `head.ref` and
# `head.repo.full_name` are fork-controlled strings; expanding
# them into shell source is the canonical template-injection
# vector zizmor flags. Even though this job has `permissions: {}`,
# routing through env: makes it impossible for a future scope
# grant to turn into RCE. Inside bash, reference as `$HEAD_REF`
# etc. — the values are then plain strings, not code.
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
HEAD_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
HEAD_REPO: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
BASE_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p autofix-out
# Produce a unified diff of the working tree vs. the PR head.
# Empty diff => nothing to suggest; the publish job short-circuits.
git diff --no-color > autofix-out/autofix.patch
# NOTE: `changed_lines` is the line-count of the patch file,
# (hunk headers + context lines + added/removed). Surfaced in
# the sticky comment so contributors and AI agents have a
# quick size hint before invoking `/autofix`.
changed_lines=$(wc -l < autofix-out/autofix.patch | tr -d ' ')
echo "changed_lines=${changed_lines}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Carry PR identity over to the trusted job. workflow_run
# context is base-repo-only, so the publish job needs these
# to call the GitHub PR API on the right resource.
# CONTRACT: keep this schema in sync with pr-autofix-publish.yml's
# `assert_field` validators and the agent-facing JSON block in
# the sticky comment. Bump `schema` when changing field names.
jq -n \
--arg schema 'gitnexus.pr-autofix/v1' \
--argjson pr_number "${PR_NUMBER}" \
--arg head_sha "${HEAD_SHA}" \
--arg head_ref "${HEAD_REF}" \
--arg head_repo "${HEAD_REPO}" \
--arg base_repo "${BASE_REPO}" \
--argjson changed_lines "${changed_lines}" \
'{schema:$schema, pr_number:$pr_number, head_sha:$head_sha, head_ref:$head_ref, head_repo:$head_repo, base_repo:$base_repo, changed_lines:$changed_lines}' \
> autofix-out/metadata.json
echo "--- metadata ---"
cat autofix-out/metadata.json
echo "--- diff (head) ---"
head -c 2000 autofix-out/autofix.patch || true
# Pinned to v7.0.1. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/git/refs/tags/v7.0.1
- name: Upload autofix artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: autofix
path: autofix-out/
retention-days: 1
if-no-files-found: error
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
name: PR Description Check
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, edited, reopened]
branches: [main]
permissions:
pull-requests: write
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
check-description:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Check PR description quality
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
with:
script: |
const MIN_BODY_LENGTH = 50;
const LABEL = 'needs-description';
const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
const body = (pr.body || '').trim();
const owner = context.repo.owner;
const repo = context.repo.repo;
const number = pr.number;
const hasLabel = pr.labels.some(l => l.name === LABEL);
if (body.length < MIN_BODY_LENGTH) {
// Add label if not already present
if (!hasLabel) {
await github.rest.issues.addLabels({
owner, repo, issue_number: number,
labels: [LABEL],
});
}
// Post or update a comment
const marker = '<!-- pr-desc-check -->';
const message = [
marker,
`### PR description is too short`,
'',
`This PR's description is **${body.length}** characters, ` +
`but the minimum is **${MIN_BODY_LENGTH}**.`,
'',
'Please update the PR description to explain:',
'- **What** this PR changes',
'- **Why** the change is needed',
'',
'Use the PR template as a guide. This check will re-run when you edit the description.',
].join('\n');
// Find existing bot comment to update (avoid spam)
const comments = await github.rest.issues.listComments({
owner, repo, issue_number: number,
});
const existing = comments.data.find(c =>
c.body && c.body.includes(marker)
);
if (existing) {
await github.rest.issues.updateComment({
owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id,
body: message,
});
} else {
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner, repo, issue_number: number,
body: message,
});
}
core.setFailed(
`PR description is ${body.length} chars (minimum: ${MIN_BODY_LENGTH})`
);
} else {
// Description is acceptable — remove the label if present
if (hasLabel) {
await github.rest.issues.removeLabel({
owner, repo, issue_number: number,
name: LABEL,
}).catch(() => {});
// .catch: label may have been removed manually
}
core.info(`PR description OK (${body.length} chars)`);
}
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
name: PR Conventional Labeler
# Two workflows in one file with different triggers, matched to the minimum
# privilege each needs:
#
# validate-title (on: pull_request)
# Fork-safe. Runs with the PR-head's read-only GITHUB_TOKEN. Uses
# `amannn/action-semantic-pull-request` to fail the check when the PR
# title doesn't follow the conventional-commit format. Because the
# action only reads the event payload, no fork-controlled code runs.
#
# autolabel (on: pull_request_target)
# Needs `pull-requests: write` to apply labels, so must be
# pull_request_target. Uses `release-drafter/release-drafter` with
# `dry-run: true` to only run the autolabeler against the
# `.github/release-drafter.yml` config from the BASE ref (release-
# drafter reads the config from the repository's default branch, NOT
# the PR head — verify with `gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/contents/...`
# or a fork-test PR before merging if the repo is high-value).
# `sync-labels: true` in the config removes managed autolabels that no
# longer match (e.g. when `!` or `BREAKING CHANGE:` is dropped).
#
# Title format: <type>[(scope)][!]: <subject>
# Allowed types: feat, fix, perf, refactor, docs, test, ci, build, chore, revert, deps
# Trailing `!` on the type marks a breaking change.
# See CONTRIBUTING.md → "Pull request titles".
on:
pull_request:
# Title-only changes fire `edited`. `opened` and `reopened` cover creation.
# `synchronize` (push to the PR branch) is intentionally excluded — titles
# don't change on push, so it only wastes CI minutes and broadens the
# privileged-token exposure window on the autolabel job.
types: [opened, edited, reopened]
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, edited, reopened]
permissions:
contents: read
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Include `github.event_name` so `pull_request` (validate-title) and
# `pull_request_target` (autolabel) runs for the same PR do NOT share a slot
# and therefore cannot cancel each other — a cancelled required-check would
# permanently block merge until the next title edit.
# Within each trigger the latest title edit still supersedes the prior run.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event_name }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
validate-title:
# Fork-safe job — only runs on `pull_request` (not `pull_request_target`).
# Token is read-only; writes a commit status that branch protection can
# require before merge.
name: Validate PR title
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
pull-requests: read
steps:
# Pinned to v6.1.1. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/git/refs/tags/v6.1.1
- uses: amannn/action-semantic-pull-request@48f256284bd46cdaab1048c3721360e808335d50 # v6.1.1
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
with:
types: |
feat
fix
perf
refactor
docs
test
ci
build
chore
revert
deps
requireScope: false
# Subject must be non-empty. We DO allow capitalized proper nouns
# (MCP, GitHub, API, etc.) — the old `^(?![A-Z]).+$` pattern
# rejected legitimate titles like `fix: MCP tool schema`.
subjectPattern: ^\S.{2,}$
subjectPatternError: |
The subject "{subject}" in PR title "{title}" is invalid.
Subjects must be at least 3 characters and must not start with whitespace.
wip: false
autolabel:
# Privileged job — runs only on `pull_request_target` so it can write labels.
# Never checks out fork code, never executes fork-controlled input; only
# reads the PR metadata (title, body, labels) and calls the GitHub API.
name: Apply conventional label
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
# `contents: read` is required — release-drafter's context.config() reads
# `.github/release-drafter.yml` from the repo's default branch via the
# repo-contents API. Without it the job silently 403s and no labels are
# applied. Job-level permissions nullify all unlisted scopes, so an
# explicit grant is necessary here.
contents: read
pull-requests: write
steps:
# Pinned to v7.2.0. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/release-drafter/release-drafter/git/refs/tags/v7.2.0
# v7 removed `disable-releaser`; use `dry-run: true` to only autolabel.
- uses: release-drafter/release-drafter@4d75298e00d9e34c483e5ff8c68d0ea1c1940c1e # v7.5.1
with:
config-name: release-drafter.yml
dry-run: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+21 -872
View File
@@ -1,421 +1,43 @@
name: Publish
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Sole publisher for the `gitnexus` npm package, GitHub Releases, and Docker
# images. Replaces the former two-workflow design — see issue #1609 for the
# double-publish race this unification closes.
#
# Two release modes, both routed through this file:
# • Release candidate (rc) — triggered by push to `main` or workflow_dispatch.
# The RC path computes the next rc version, applies it in-CI, pushes a
# detached release commit with v<X.Y.Z>-rc.<N> + rc/<SHA> marker
# atomically, then publishes to npm with --tag rc and creates a GitHub
# prerelease. RC-only docker.yml invocation follows.
# • Stable — triggered by push of a v<X.Y.Z> tag (no -rc.*
# suffix). Verifies package.json matches the tag, publishes to npm with
# --tag latest, creates a stable GitHub Release. No docker (RC-only).
#
# ⚠️ SELF-TRIGGER INVARIANT — DO NOT WEAKEN ⚠️
# The `tags:` filter below uses a negative glob `'!v*-rc.*'` to prevent the
# workflow from re-triggering itself when the RC path pushes its own v-tag.
# Without this exclusion, every RC publish double-fires (the bug fixed by
# #1609). If a NEW prerelease channel is introduced (e.g. `-beta.N`,
# `-alpha.N`, `-next.N`), the negative-glob list MUST be extended in
# lock-step or self-trigger returns. The same invariant applies to the
# `Classify` step further below — its accepted-tag regex must align with
# the trigger filter's exclusion list.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
name: Publish to npm
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- '**.md'
- 'docs/**'
- 'LICENSE'
tags:
# Negative-globbed exclusion of RC tags this workflow itself produces
# (see the SELF-TRIGGER INVARIANT in the header comment).
- 'v*'
- '!v*-rc.*'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
bump:
description: >-
Cycle policy. 'auto' (default) continues the active rc cycle on
this branch if there is one, otherwise bumps patch from latest.
Choose 'patch' / 'minor' / 'major' to explicitly start or reset
an rc cycle.
required: false
default: 'auto'
type: choice
options:
- auto
- patch
- minor
- major
force:
description: 'Publish even when HEAD already has an rc marker'
required: false
default: 'false'
type: choice
options:
- 'false'
- 'true'
# Workflow-level deny-all; each job declares the minimum it needs.
permissions: {}
# Distinct refs (refs/heads/main, refs/tags/v*) run in parallel. The
# release-PR-skip in rc-guard is the load-bearing invariant that prevents
# an RC main-push and a stable tag-push colliding on the same release commit.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: false
# No workflow-level permissions — scoped per job below.
jobs:
# ── Phase 1: classify the triggering event into a release mode ─────────────
route:
name: Classify release event
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 2
permissions:
contents: read
outputs:
mode: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.mode }}
head_sha: ${{ steps.classify.outputs.head_sha }}
bump_input: ${{ inputs.bump }}
force_input: ${{ inputs.force }}
steps:
- name: Classify
id: classify
shell: bash
env:
EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
GH_REF: ${{ github.ref }}
GH_REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
HEAD_SHA="${GITHUB_SHA}"
echo "head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Sanitize before logging (annotation-injection defense in depth).
REF_SAFE="${GH_REF//::/__}"
REF_NAME_SAFE="${GH_REF_NAME//::/__}"
echo "event=${EVENT_NAME} ref=${REF_SAFE} ref_name=${REF_NAME_SAFE}"
MODE=""
case "${EVENT_NAME}" in
workflow_dispatch)
# Manual dispatch is only valid on main — that's the only ref
# where a real publish makes sense.
if [ "${GH_REF}" = "refs/heads/main" ]; then
MODE="rc"
else
echo "::error::workflow_dispatch is only permitted on refs/heads/main (got ${REF_SAFE})."
exit 1
fi
;;
push)
case "${GH_REF}" in
refs/heads/main)
MODE="rc"
;;
refs/tags/v*)
# The trigger filter already excluded v*-rc.* tags. Anything
# reaching here is either a stable semver or a malformed v*.
TAG="${GH_REF#refs/tags/}"
if [[ "${TAG}" =~ ^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
MODE="stable"
else
echo "::error::malformed v* tag rejected: ${REF_NAME_SAFE}"
echo "::error::stable tags must match ^v[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\$"
exit 1
fi
;;
*)
echo "::error::unexpected push ref ${REF_SAFE} reached publish workflow."
exit 1
;;
esac
;;
*)
echo "::error::unsupported event ${EVENT_NAME}."
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "mode=${MODE}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Classified as mode=${MODE}"
# ── Phase 2 (RC only): dedup marker + release-PR skip ──────────────────────
rc-guard:
name: RC guard (marker + release-PR skip)
needs: route
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
outputs:
should_run: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.should_run }}
head_sha: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.head_sha }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
fetch-depth: 0
fetch-tags: true
# rc-guard reads only — no git pushes from this job. Skip the
# default extraheader credential persistence (artipacked audit).
persist-credentials: false
- name: Decide
id: decide
shell: bash
env:
FORCE: ${{ inputs.force }}
BUMP_INPUT: ${{ inputs.bump }}
EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
HEAD_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
echo "head_sha=$HEAD_SHA" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
if [ "$FORCE" = "true" ]; then
echo "Force flag set — running regardless of marker tag."
echo "should_run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Explicit cycle reset on dispatch bypasses dedup.
if [ "$EVENT_NAME" = "workflow_dispatch" ] \
&& [ -n "${BUMP_INPUT:-}" ] \
&& [ "${BUMP_INPUT:-auto}" != "auto" ]; then
echo "Explicit bump=$BUMP_INPUT — bypassing marker dedup."
echo "should_run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# ── Skip when the merge commit corresponds to a release ───────────
# This skip is load-bearing: it prevents an RC build firing on the
# release-PR commit from racing the imminent stable-tag push on the
# same SHA. Two complementary checks:
# 1. HEAD subject matches `chore: release vX.Y.Z` (the canonical
# release-PR title). Anchored to require the bare title or the
# squash-merge `(#NNNN)` suffix exactly. Case-insensitive so
# `Chore: Release v1.2.3` (IDE auto-capitalization) still
# matches — prior commit-author conventions left the door open.
# 2. Squash-merged PR carries the `release` label.
# Either match suppresses the rc build — stable releases publish on
# the v-tag instead.
HEAD_SUBJECT="$(git log -1 --pretty=%s HEAD)"
# Sanitize GitHub-Actions annotation prefixes before logging — even
# though %s strips newlines, a crafted subject containing `::error::`
# could forge log annotations.
HEAD_SUBJECT_SAFE="${HEAD_SUBJECT//::/__}"
RELEASE_SUBJECT_RE='^chore:[[:space:]]*release[[:space:]]+v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+([[:space:]]+\(#[0-9]+\))?$'
shopt -s nocasematch
if [[ "$HEAD_SUBJECT" =~ $RELEASE_SUBJECT_RE ]]; then
shopt -u nocasematch
echo "HEAD commit subject matches a release commit — skipping rc."
echo " subject (sanitised): $HEAD_SUBJECT_SAFE"
echo "should_run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
shopt -u nocasematch
# Squash-merge commits include `(#NNNN)` at the end of the subject.
if [[ "$HEAD_SUBJECT" =~ \(#([0-9]+)\)[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
PR_NUM="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
echo "Detected squash-merge of PR #$PR_NUM — checking labels."
if LABELS_JSON="$(gh pr view "$PR_NUM" --repo "$REPO" --json labels 2>/dev/null)"; then
if printf '%s' "$LABELS_JSON" | jq -e '.labels[] | select(.name == "release")' >/dev/null; then
echo "PR #$PR_NUM has the 'release' label — skipping rc."
echo "should_run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "PR #$PR_NUM has no 'release' label — proceeding."
else
# Lookup failure is not fatal — fall through to dedup check.
echo "::warning::Could not read labels for PR #${PR_NUM} — falling through."
fi
fi
# Dedup: is there already an rc/<HEAD_SHA> marker pointing at HEAD?
MARKER="rc/${HEAD_SHA}"
if git rev-parse "refs/tags/$MARKER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "HEAD already has marker $MARKER — skipping."
echo "should_run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "No marker on HEAD — proceeding."
echo "should_run=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
# ── Phase 3: reusable CI gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Runs for both rc (when guard says go) and stable. No `secrets:` passed —
# ci.yml and its entire reusable-workflow chain (ci-quality, ci-tests,
# ci-e2e, ci-report) reference zero `secrets.*` values;
# passing any would be unused surface. GITHUB_TOKEN is implicit.
ci:
needs: [route, rc-guard]
if: ${{ always() && (needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable' || needs.rc-guard.outputs.should_run == 'true') }}
uses: ./.github/workflows/ci.yml
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
pull-requests: write
# ── Phase 4: publish to npm + push refs (RC path) ──────────────────────────
# INVARIANT: `timeout-minutes` MUST stay below the App-token TTL (~60 min
# for actions/create-github-app-token installation tokens). The atomic
# tag-push step relies on the token minted at job start; if the job ever
# runs longer than the TTL, the push fails with an opaque 401. If you
# need to raise the timeout, re-mint the token immediately before the
# `Create and push rc tags` step instead.
publish:
name: Publish to npm
needs: [route, rc-guard, ci]
if: ${{ always() && needs.ci.result == 'success' && (needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable' || needs.rc-guard.outputs.should_run == 'true') }}
needs: ci
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 20
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
# contents: write — RC path needs it for `git push --atomic` (v-tag +
# marker). Stable path runs in the same job and inherits the grant; it
# never invokes `git push`, so the elevated scope is unused there.
# id-token: write — npm provenance attestation.
contents: write
id-token: write
outputs:
# Two distinct step IDs feed this output; exactly one fires per run.
vtag: ${{ steps.rc-tags.outputs.vtag || steps.stable-vtag.outputs.vtag }}
steps:
# ── Mint short-lived GitHub App token (RC only) ──────────────────────
# Industry direction (2025-2026): GitHub Apps with
# `actions/create-github-app-token` over long-lived PATs for
# workflow-touching tag pushes. Same fine-grained permission surface,
# ~1h expiry, not tied to a user seat, organizationally auditable.
# Replaces a prior fine-grained PAT.
#
# Required secrets (set in repo Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions):
# secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID — the App's numeric ID
# secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY — the App's PEM private key
# (The App ID is technically not sensitive — it's visible on the App's
# settings page — but storing it as a secret is harmless and avoids
# mixing storage classes for the same App.)
# The App must be installed on this repository with:
# - Contents: write (push the v-tag and rc marker)
# - Workflows: write (because the v-tag's tree may touch
# .github/workflows/**, which the default
# GITHUB_TOKEN cannot author)
# - Metadata: read (required for the `gh api /users/<slug>[bot]`
# bot-identity lookup in the tag-push step)
- name: Mint GitHub App token (RC)
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
id: app-token
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49218906704ab6c1aa796996da409d3eb1 # v3.2.0
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
# `client-id` is the renamed input that supersedes the deprecated
# `app-id` in v3.x. The action accepts the App's numeric ID or
# its Client ID under this name. We pass the numeric App ID,
# which the action resolves correctly.
client-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
# ── Separate checkout steps per mode ─────────────────────────────────
# Conditional `token:` expressions are footguns: empty string passed to
# actions/checkout fails opaquely, and `|| github.token` silently
# degrades a missing token to GITHUB_TOKEN, masking auth failures until
# the eventual `git push`. Two distinct steps make the auth contract
# explicit and fail loudly at checkout when the App token mint failed
# on the RC path.
- name: Checkout (RC)
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
fetch-depth: 0
fetch-tags: true
# Short-lived GitHub App installation token. Required because the
# v-tag push lands at a SHA whose tree may touch
# `.github/workflows/**`, which the default GITHUB_TOKEN cannot
# author.
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
# Do not persist the token in .git/config (artipacked audit). The
# RC tag push uses an inline `http.extraheader` at push time only;
# the credential never lands on disk. See the
# `Create and push rc tags` step below.
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout (stable)
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable'
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
# No `token:` — actions/checkout uses GITHUB_TOKEN by default. Stable
# path performs no git pushes; the default scope is sufficient.
with:
# No git pushes from the stable path either. Skip credential
# persistence (artipacked audit).
persist-credentials: false
- name: Working-tree sanity
# Defense in depth (mirrors the vtag integrity gate, but on the input side):
# if a route-mode regression skipped both checkout `if:` gates, all
# downstream steps would run on a bare runner and produce confusing
# ENOENT errors. Fail loudly and early here instead.
shell: bash
run: |
if [ ! -f gitnexus/package.json ]; then
echo "::error::no working tree at gitnexus/package.json — route classification likely failed silently."
exit 1
fi
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
with:
# Node 24 ships with npm >= 11.5.x, which is the minimum that
# supports npm Trusted Publishing OIDC. Node 22 ships with npm
# 10.9.x (no OIDC) and `npm install -g npm@latest` to self-upgrade
# is fragile — it can crash the in-flight reify with
# `MODULE_NOT_FOUND` on `promise-retry` etc. Bumping the Node
# version is the clean fix; the package's `engines` field is
# `>=22.0.0` so consumer-side compatibility is unaffected (this
# Node version is only used during publish, not by package users).
node-version: 24
# `registry-url:` is intentionally OMITTED. Under npm Trusted
# Publishing, OIDC only engages when no credential is configured.
# Setting `registry-url:` would make setup-node write
# `//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}` into the
# runner's .npmrc AND export NODE_AUTH_TOKEN from its `token:`
# input (default github.token). `npm publish` would then attempt
# GITHUB_TOKEN as the npm token, get rejected with 404, and OIDC
# would never be tried. See actions/setup-node#1440 and the GitHub
# Community discussion #176761 for the upstream bug and consensus
# workaround.
#
# Hermetic install for published artifacts — opt out of the v5+
# default packageManager-based caching (clears the zizmor
# cache-poisoning audit). ~30s slower per release; runs rarely.
package-manager-cache: false
- name: Build gitnexus-shared
run: npm install && npm run build
working-directory: gitnexus-shared
- name: Install gitnexus dependencies
run: npm ci
node-version: 20
registry-url: https://registry.npmjs.org
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: gitnexus/package-lock.json
- run: npm ci
working-directory: gitnexus
# ── Stable-only: verify the tag and package.json agree ───────────────
- name: Verify version consistency (stable)
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable'
- name: Verify version consistency
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TAG_VERSION="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}"
# Stable mode REJECTS prerelease suffixes — those are filtered at
# trigger by the negative-glob filter, but defend at the bash layer too.
if ! [[ "$TAG_VERSION" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Stable tag must be ^v[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+$ — got v$TAG_VERSION"
if ! [[ "$TAG_VERSION" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.]+)?$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Tag does not follow semver: v$TAG_VERSION"
exit 1
fi
PKG_VERSION=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")
@@ -423,497 +45,24 @@ jobs:
echo "::error::Tag version (v$TAG_VERSION) does not match package.json version ($PKG_VERSION)"
exit 1
fi
# Stable releases carry their version bump on main via the release
# PR, so the manifest surfaces must already be in sync — refuse to
# publish a stable whose manifests drifted (#2445).
node scripts/sync-plugin-manifests.mjs --check
echo "Version verified: $PKG_VERSION"
# ── RC-only: compute the next rc version against the live registry ──
- name: Resolve rc version (rc)
id: rc-version
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
BUMP_INPUT: ${{ inputs.bump }}
EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
PKG_NAME: gitnexus
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# 1. Current published `latest` — the floor for any new rc base.
# Only E404 ("never published") falls back to package.json; any
# other error (network, auth, malformed response) fails fast
# (retry-loud policy: never silently substitute on transient errors).
NPM_STDERR_LATEST="$(mktemp)"
if CURRENT_LATEST="$(npm view "$PKG_NAME" version 2>"$NPM_STDERR_LATEST")"; then
:
else
if grep -qiE 'E404|not found' "$NPM_STDERR_LATEST"; then
CURRENT_LATEST="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
echo "Package not on registry (E404) — seeding from package.json: $CURRENT_LATEST"
else
echo "::error::npm registry unreachable for 'view version':" >&2
cat "$NPM_STDERR_LATEST" >&2
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_LATEST"
exit 1
fi
fi
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_LATEST"
CURRENT_LATEST_CLEAN="${CURRENT_LATEST%%-*}"
# 2. Full version list — needed for the counter and active-cycle
# inference. Same E404-only fallback.
NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS="$(mktemp)"
if VERSIONS_JSON="$(npm view "$PKG_NAME" versions --json 2>"$NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS")"; then
:
else
if grep -qiE 'E404|not found' "$NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS"; then
VERSIONS_JSON='[]'
echo "No published versions for $PKG_NAME yet (E404)."
else
echo "::error::npm registry unreachable for 'view versions':" >&2
cat "$NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS" >&2
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS"
exit 1
fi
fi
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_VERSIONS"
# 3. Base selection.
# - workflow_dispatch + bump != auto → explicit cycle reset.
# - Otherwise (push, or dispatch with bump=auto) → continue the
# highest active rc base > latest if any; else patch from latest.
# Curated wrapper around `npx semver` — bare npx errors are noisy
# and don't distinguish registry-unreachable from invalid-bump-spec.
semver_bump() {
local kind="$1" current="$2" stderr_file out
stderr_file="$(mktemp)"
if out="$(npx --yes -p semver@7 semver -i "$kind" "$current" 2>"$stderr_file")"; then
rm -f "$stderr_file"
printf '%s' "$out"
return 0
fi
echo "::error::semver bump failed (kind=${kind}, current=${current}):" >&2
cat "$stderr_file" >&2
rm -f "$stderr_file"
return 1
}
if [ "$EVENT_NAME" = "workflow_dispatch" ] \
&& [ -n "${BUMP_INPUT:-}" ] \
&& [ "${BUMP_INPUT:-auto}" != "auto" ]; then
BASE="$(semver_bump "$BUMP_INPUT" "$CURRENT_LATEST_CLEAN")"
echo "Explicit bump=$BUMP_INPUT → BASE=$BASE"
else
cat > /tmp/active_base.mjs <<'NODESCRIPT'
const latest = process.env.LATEST;
let v;
try { v = JSON.parse(process.env.VERSIONS_JSON); } catch { v = []; }
if (!Array.isArray(v)) v = [v];
const parse = s => s.split(".").map(n => parseInt(n, 10));
const gt = (a, b) => {
const [A, B] = [parse(a), parse(b)];
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (A[i] !== B[i]) return A[i] > B[i];
return false;
};
const bases = new Set();
for (const s of v) {
const m = /^(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)-rc\.\d+$/.exec(s);
if (m && gt(m[1], latest)) bases.add(m[1]);
}
if (!bases.size) { process.stdout.write(""); process.exit(0); }
const sorted = [...bases].sort((a, b) => gt(a, b) ? 1 : -1);
process.stdout.write(sorted[sorted.length - 1]);
NODESCRIPT
ACTIVE_BASE="$(LATEST="$CURRENT_LATEST_CLEAN" VERSIONS_JSON="$VERSIONS_JSON" node /tmp/active_base.mjs)"
if [ -n "$ACTIVE_BASE" ]; then
BASE="$ACTIVE_BASE"
echo "Continuing active rc cycle → BASE=$BASE"
else
BASE="$(semver_bump patch "$CURRENT_LATEST_CLEAN")"
echo "No active rc cycle → patch bump from latest → BASE=$BASE"
fi
fi
# 4. Counter: 1 + max existing N for `${BASE}-rc.*`, else 1.
cat > /tmp/next_rc.mjs <<'NODESCRIPT'
const base = process.env.BASE;
const prefix = base + "-rc.";
let v;
try { v = JSON.parse(process.env.VERSIONS_JSON); } catch { v = []; }
if (!Array.isArray(v)) v = [v];
const ns = v
.filter(s => typeof s === "string" && s.startsWith(prefix))
.map(s => parseInt(s.slice(prefix.length), 10))
.filter(n => Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0);
process.stdout.write(String(ns.length ? Math.max(...ns) + 1 : 1));
NODESCRIPT
NEXT_N="$(BASE="$BASE" VERSIONS_JSON="$VERSIONS_JSON" node /tmp/next_rc.mjs)"
RC_VERSION="${BASE}-rc.${NEXT_N}"
echo "Computed rc: $RC_VERSION"
# 5. Defensive: if the exact version already exists on the registry
# (race with another run), abort before re-publishing.
NPM_STDERR_EXISTS="$(mktemp)"
if npm view "$PKG_NAME@$RC_VERSION" version 2>"$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS" >/dev/null; then
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS"
echo "::error::Version $RC_VERSION already exists on npm — aborting."
exit 1
else
if grep -qiE 'E404|not found' "$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS"; then
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS"
# Version doesn't exist — safe to proceed.
else
echo "::error::npm registry unreachable for existence check:" >&2
cat "$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS" >&2
rm -f "$NPM_STDERR_EXISTS"
exit 1
fi
fi
{
echo "base=$BASE"
echo "rc_n=$NEXT_N"
echo "rc_version=$RC_VERSION"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Apply rc version in-CI
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
run: |
set -euo pipefail
npm version "${{ steps.rc-version.outputs.rc_version }}" \
--no-git-tag-version --allow-same-version
# ── Verify the plugin manifest surfaces synced (#2445) ───────────────
# The npm `version` lifecycle script in gitnexus/package.json syncs all
# four manifest surfaces whenever `npm version` runs (the step above,
# and a maintainer's laptop alike). This step only verifies fail-closed
# so a future removal of that wiring cannot ship a drifted RC again.
- name: Verify plugin manifests (rc)
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
run: node scripts/sync-plugin-manifests.mjs --check
- name: Build gitnexus
- name: Build
run: npm run build
working-directory: gitnexus
- name: Dry-run publish
# Cheap verification that the tarball assembles before the real publish.
shell: bash
run: npm publish --dry-run
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
NPM_TAG: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' && 'rc' || 'latest' }}
run: npm publish --dry-run --tag "$NPM_TAG"
# ── Acquire the "rc lock" BEFORE publishing (idempotency anchor) ─────
# We create two refs and push atomically:
# v<RC_VERSION> → annotated tag on a detached release commit whose
# tree contains the rewritten package.json, so the
# tag's source matches the npm tarball.
# rc/<HEAD_SHA> → lightweight tag on HEAD; the guard's dedup key.
# Push fails → nothing published. Push succeeds, npm fails → marker
# blocks retries until manual cleanup (see Rollback Runbook in plan).
- name: Create and push rc tags
id: rc-tags
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
RC_VERSION: ${{ steps.rc-version.outputs.rc_version }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ needs.rc-guard.outputs.head_sha }}
# Short-lived GitHub App token. Auth is supplied inline at push
# time via `http.extraheader` (per GitHub's documented
# x-access-token Basic pattern). It is NOT persisted in
# .git/config (artipacked audit) — checkout above ran with
# `persist-credentials: false`.
PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
# App's slug from create-github-app-token (e.g. `gitnexus-release-bot`).
# Used to attribute the release commit to the App identity rather
# than the generic github-actions[bot]. The bot's numeric user-id
# is resolved at runtime via the GitHub API (the action does not
# expose it directly as of v3.2.0).
APP_SLUG: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.app-slug }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VTAG="v${RC_VERSION}"
MARKER="rc/${HEAD_SHA}"
# Resolve the App's bot user-id and construct the noreply email
# in the GitHub-canonical `<id>+<slug>[bot]@users.noreply.github.com`
# shape. `[bot]` is part of the actual login on GitHub.
#
# The lookup is wrapped in a bounded retry because the first RC
# after App installation may hit propagation delay (404), and
# transient api.github.com 5xx during heavy org activity is a real
# failure class. Without retry, every transient blip aborts the
# entire release after CI has already succeeded.
BOT_LOGIN="${APP_SLUG}[bot]"
BOT_USER_ID=""
api_stderr="$(mktemp)"
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
if BOT_USER_ID="$(gh api "/users/${BOT_LOGIN}" --jq .id 2>"$api_stderr")" \
&& [[ "${BOT_USER_ID}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
break
fi
BOT_USER_ID=""
if [ "$attempt" -lt 3 ]; then
echo "::warning::bot user-id lookup attempt ${attempt} failed; retrying in $((attempt * 5))s"
sleep $((attempt * 5))
fi
done
if ! [[ "${BOT_USER_ID}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Could not resolve bot user-id for ${BOT_LOGIN} after 3 attempts."
echo "::error::gh api stderr:"
cat "$api_stderr" >&2 || true
echo "::error::Common causes: (a) newly-installed App — user record still propagating to /users/ (wait ~5min, redispatch with force=true); (b) App lacks Metadata: read permission; (c) transient api.github.com 5xx (redispatch)."
rm -f "$api_stderr"
exit 1
fi
rm -f "$api_stderr"
git config user.name "${BOT_LOGIN}"
git config user.email "${BOT_USER_ID}+${BOT_LOGIN}@users.noreply.github.com"
# Detached release commit with the version bump — main stays
# pristine, but the v-tag's tree matches the published package
# exactly (release-integrity).
git add package.json package-lock.json 2>/dev/null || git add package.json
# The synced manifest surfaces (#2445) belong in the same detached
# release commit so the tag's tree passes its own version contract.
git add ../gitnexus-claude-plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json \
../.claude-plugin/marketplace.json \
../gitnexus-claude-plugin/.codex-plugin/plugin.json \
../.agents/plugins/marketplace.json
git commit -m "release: ${VTAG}" --allow-empty
RELEASE_SHA="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
echo "Detached release commit: $RELEASE_SHA"
git tag -a "$VTAG" "$RELEASE_SHA" -m "$VTAG"
git tag "$MARKER" "$HEAD_SHA"
# Inline auth header. The base64-encoded form is masked as well
# as the raw token, because GitHub's secret-masker only masks the
# raw value — any subsequent `set -x` / GIT_TRACE line would
# otherwise expose the encoded credential.
#
# `set +x` wraps the compute+mask pair so that if an operator
# enables ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG=true for triage (which turns on
# `set -x` globally), the assignment is NOT traced for the one
# line between compute and mask-registration. Without this wrap,
# debug mode would log `+ auth_header='Authorization: Basic <encoded>'`
# exposing a still-valid (~1h) App token.
{ set +x; } 2>/dev/null
auth_header="Authorization: Basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "${PUSH_TOKEN}" | base64 -w0)"
echo "::add-mask::${auth_header}"
# Re-enable tracing only when explicitly requested via step-debug.
if [ "${ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG:-false}" = "true" ]; then set -x; fi
# Atomic push of both refs. If either would clobber an existing
# remote ref, the push fails and we stop before npm publish.
git -c http.extraheader="${auth_header}" \
push --atomic origin "refs/tags/$VTAG" "refs/tags/$MARKER"
{
echo "vtag=$VTAG"
echo "marker=$MARKER"
echo "release_sha=$RELEASE_SHA"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Set vtag (stable)
id: stable-vtag
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable'
shell: bash
# github.ref_name flows in via env to avoid templating into the
# shell source (template-injection audit). Even though refs are
# constrained by git naming rules, the env-passthrough pattern
# makes injection structurally impossible.
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
echo "vtag=${REF_NAME}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# ── vtag integrity gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Fail closed before any artifact-producing step (npm publish, Release,
# Docker) runs against an empty or mode-mismatched vtag. Prevents the
# silent "Release named main" / "Docker tagged from ref fallback"
# failure modes that the previous draft was vulnerable to.
- name: vtag integrity gate
id: vtag-gate
shell: bash
env:
MODE: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode }}
VTAG: ${{ steps.rc-tags.outputs.vtag || steps.stable-vtag.outputs.vtag }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ -z "$VTAG" ]; then
echo "::error::vtag is empty — refusing to create GitHub Release or trigger Docker."
exit 1
fi
case "$MODE" in
rc)
if ! [[ "$VTAG" =~ ^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+-rc\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::vtag '${VTAG}' does not match rc shape ^v[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+-rc.[0-9]+$"
exit 1
fi
;;
stable)
if ! [[ "$VTAG" =~ ^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::vtag '${VTAG}' does not match stable shape ^v[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+$"
exit 1
fi
;;
*)
echo "::error::unknown mode '${MODE}' at vtag integrity gate."
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "vtag verified: ${VTAG} (mode=${MODE})"
echo "vtag=${VTAG}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# npm Trusted Publishing (GA'd 2025-07-31). OIDC authentication only
# engages when no npm credential is configured anywhere — the absence
# is the signal. Two upstream behaviors had to be neutralized for
# this to work:
#
# 1. setup-node's `registry-url:` is omitted (see the setup-node
# step above). With it, setup-node writes
# `//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}` into
# .npmrc and exports NODE_AUTH_TOKEN from `token:` (defaulting
# to github.token). npm publish then sends GITHUB_TOKEN as the
# bearer credential and the registry returns 404. OIDC is never
# tried because npm thinks it already has a credential.
# 2. The runner's bundled npm (10.9.x on Node 22) has no OIDC
# support; the upgrade step above pins it to >= 11.5.1.
#
# Provenance is auto-attached by the registry on trusted-publisher
# publishes — no --provenance flag needed.
#
# Prerequisite: register the package as a trusted publisher at
# https://www.npmjs.com/package/gitnexus/access (Publishing access →
# Trusted Publishers → GitHub Actions):
# Owner: abhigyanpatwari
# Repository: GitNexus
# Workflow: publish.yml
# Environment: (none)
- name: Publish to npm
shell: bash
run: npm publish --provenance --access public
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
NPM_TAG: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' && 'rc' || 'latest' }}
run: npm publish --access public --tag "$NPM_TAG"
# ── Stable-only: pull CHANGELOG body if present ──────────────────────
- name: Extract release notes from CHANGELOG (stable)
id: changelog
if: needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable'
shell: bash
run: |
VERSION="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}"
NOTES=$(awk "/^## \\[$VERSION\\]/{found=1; next} /^## \\[/{if(found) exit} found" gitnexus/CHANGELOG.md)
if [ -z "$NOTES" ]; then
echo "::warning::No CHANGELOG entry found for v$VERSION, falling back to auto-generated notes"
echo "fallback=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "$NOTES" > /tmp/release-notes.md
echo "fallback=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
- name: Create GitHub Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@718ea10b132b3b2eba29c1007bb80653f286566b # v2
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@a06a81a03ee405af7f2048a818ed3f03bbf83c7b # v2
with:
tag_name: ${{ steps.vtag-gate.outputs.vtag }}
name: >-
${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
&& format('Release Candidate {0}', steps.vtag-gate.outputs.vtag)
|| steps.vtag-gate.outputs.vtag }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' }}
make_latest: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable' && 'true' || 'false' }}
# Stable: prefer CHANGELOG body, fall back to auto-generated.
# RC: always auto-generated + the prerelease body block below.
body_path: >-
${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'stable' && steps.changelog.outputs.fallback == 'false'
&& '/tmp/release-notes.md' || '' }}
generate_release_notes: >-
${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc'
|| steps.changelog.outputs.fallback == 'true' }}
body: >-
${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' && format(
'Automated release candidate build from `main`.{0}{0}**npm:** `npm install gitnexus@rc`{0}**Version:** `{1}`{0}**Target base:** `{2}` (rc #{3}){0}**Source commit (main):** {4}{0}**Release commit (versioned tree):** {5}{0}{0}Release candidates are pre-stable builds intended for early testing. Stable releases remain on the `latest` dist-tag.',
'\n',
steps.rc-version.outputs.rc_version,
steps.rc-version.outputs.base,
steps.rc-version.outputs.rc_n,
needs.rc-guard.outputs.head_sha,
steps.rc-tags.outputs.release_sha
) || '' }}
# ── RC partial-failure cleanup ───────────────────────────────────────
# If anything after the atomic tag-push step failed (npm publish
# blew up, GitHub Release call timed out, etc.), the v-tag and
# rc/<SHA> marker are already on origin. External consumers
# (Renovate, Dependabot, Releases RSS) can ingest a phantom tag for
# a version that was never published to npm. This step deletes them
# automatically so the operator's recovery is just "redispatch with
# force=true on the next commit", not a manual ref cleanup.
#
# Scoped strictly to RC + real (non-dry-run) + the rc-tags step
# actually produced a vtag (otherwise nothing to clean up). The
# App token is still valid (~1h TTL, job timeout 20min).
- name: Cleanup pushed tags on partial failure
if: ${{ failure() && needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' && steps.rc-tags.outputs.vtag != '' }}
shell: bash
working-directory: gitnexus
env:
VTAG: ${{ steps.rc-tags.outputs.vtag }}
MARKER: ${{ steps.rc-tags.outputs.marker }}
PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
run: |
set -uo pipefail
echo "::warning::Publish step failed after tag push. Cleaning up remote refs to prevent phantom-version ingestion by downstream consumers."
{ set +x; } 2>/dev/null
auth_header="Authorization: Basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "${PUSH_TOKEN}" | base64 -w0)"
echo "::add-mask::${auth_header}"
if [ "${ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG:-false}" = "true" ]; then set -x; fi
# Delete v-tag and marker. Each delete is best-effort — if one
# is already absent (atomic push partially rejected, or earlier
# cleanup ran), the other still gets attempted.
for ref in "refs/tags/${VTAG}" "refs/tags/${MARKER}"; do
if git -c http.extraheader="${auth_header}" push origin --delete "${ref}" 2>&1; then
echo "deleted origin ${ref}"
else
echo "::warning::could not delete origin ${ref} — may already be absent or protected. Manual cleanup may be required."
fi
done
echo "::notice::Cleanup complete. To retry the release, redispatch the workflow with force=true on the same SHA, or push a new commit to main."
# ── Phase 5 (RC only): Docker images ───────────────────────────────────────
# R6: Docker remains RC-only. Stable Docker builds are explicitly deferred.
# Secrets are passed explicitly (not via `secrets: inherit`) so the
# callee's secret surface is auditable from the caller's source.
docker:
name: Build & Push RC Docker images
needs: [route, publish]
if: ${{ needs.route.outputs.mode == 'rc' && needs.publish.outputs.vtag != '' }}
uses: ./.github/workflows/docker.yml
secrets:
DOCKERHUB_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
DOCKERHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
with:
tag: ${{ needs.publish.outputs.vtag }}
generate_release_notes: true
-58
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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
name: Scorecard
# OpenSSF Scorecard supply-chain posture check. Runs weekly + on main push +
# branch_protection_rule changes. SARIF uploads to the Security tab; the public
# badge URL resolves once the first scheduled run lands (see README badge wiring).
on:
branch_protection_rule:
schedule:
- cron: '0 7 * * 1'
push:
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: false
permissions: read-all
jobs:
analysis:
name: Scorecard analysis
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
# Needed to upload SARIF results to the Security tab.
security-events: write
# Needed for the publish_results badge flow (OIDC).
id-token: write
contents: read
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Run Scorecard
uses: ossf/scorecard-action@4eaacf0543bb3f2c246792bd56e8cdeffafb205a # v2.4.3
with:
results_file: results.sarif
results_format: sarif
# publish_results enables the public Scorecard badge.
publish_results: true
- name: Upload artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: SARIF file
path: results.sarif
retention-days: 5
- name: Upload to Security tab
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@8aad20d150bbac5944a9f9d289da16a4b0d87c1e # v4.36.2
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
name: Tree-sitter Upgrade Readiness
# Monitors readiness for upgrading tree-sitter to 0.25.x. Tracks:
# 1. Peer-dep compatibility — can each NPM-installed grammar install cleanly
# with tree-sitter@0.25.0 without --legacy-peer-deps?
# 2. Vendored grammars — each grammar in .github/vendored-grammars.json
# (c/swift/kotlin/dart/proto) is classified by its vendored ABI, read
# straight from gitnexus/vendor/<name>/src/parser.c (NOT node_modules,
# which is never populated for vendored grammars — that mismatch is why
# the report used to render bare "?" placeholders, #858).
# See .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py for the logic.
#
# .github/vendored-grammars.json is the SHARED source of truth for the vendored
# SET + policy holds: this readiness report and grammar-update-monitor.yml both
# read it, so the two workflows can never disagree about which grammars are
# vendored. (The monitor also resolves upstreams from it; this report keeps its
# own upstream-drift coords and reads vendored ABIs from gitnexus/vendor/.)
#
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
on:
schedule:
# Daily at 09:00 UTC. Matches Dependabot's daily cadence so drift
# and dep PRs surface together.
- cron: '0 9 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
pull_request:
paths:
- '.github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py'
- '.github/scripts/test_check_tree_sitter_upgrade_readiness.py'
- '.github/vendored-grammars.json'
- '.github/workflows/tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.yml'
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
report:
name: Check upgrade readiness
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
# Least privilege: rendering the report needs no write. The issue mutation
# lives in the schedule-only `upsert-issue` job below, so PR runs (incl. forks)
# never receive `issues: write` (#2187 review).
permissions:
contents: read
outputs:
report: ${{ steps.readiness.outputs.report }}
exit_code: ${{ steps.readiness.outputs.exit_code }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-gitnexus
with:
build: 'false'
# Guard the readiness script's logic (vendored classification, no bare "?",
# the manifest⇄vendor-dir consistency guard). Stdlib-only, so no extra deps;
# node_modules is populated by setup-gitnexus above, which the npm-path ABI
# reads need. Runs only on validation events (PR / manual), not the daily
# scheduled report.
- name: Run readiness script unit tests
if: github.event_name != 'schedule'
shell: bash
working-directory: .github/scripts
run: python3 -m unittest test_check_tree_sitter_upgrade_readiness -v
- name: Run upgrade readiness check
id: readiness
shell: bash
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set +e
python3 .github/scripts/check-tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.py > drift-report.md
code=$?
set -e
echo "exit_code=$code" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Unguessable per-run heredoc delimiter: the report includes the manifest's
# `hold` field, which a fork PR can edit — a fixed delimiter (e.g. DRIFT_EOF)
# in a hold value could close the heredoc early and inject $GITHUB_OUTPUT keys.
# A random hex delimiter the report cannot contain neutralizes that.
DELIM="DRIFT_EOF_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
{
echo "report<<${DELIM}"
cat drift-report.md
echo "${DELIM}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "=== Report ==="
cat drift-report.md
# On PR runs, the script validates that it runs correctly. Blockers
# are informational — the scheduled run opens a tracking issue.
- name: Annotate PR with readiness status
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && steps.readiness.outputs.exit_code != '0'
run: |
echo "::warning::Tree-sitter 0.25 upgrade has blockers. See job output for the full readiness report."
# Issue mutation is isolated here so `issues: write` is only ever granted on the
# scheduled run (never on PRs). Consumes the report + exit_code via job outputs.
upsert-issue:
name: Upsert tracking issue
needs: report
if: github.event_name == 'schedule'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
issues: write
steps:
- name: Upsert tracking issue on blockers
if: needs.report.outputs.exit_code != '0'
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
env:
REPORT: ${{ needs.report.outputs.report }}
with:
script: |
const title = 'Tree-sitter 0.25 upgrade readiness';
const report = process.env.REPORT;
const body = report + '\n\n' +
'<sub>Generated daily by `.github/workflows/tree-sitter-upgrade-readiness.yml`. ' +
'Closes automatically when all blockers are resolved.</sub>';
const { data: open } = await github.rest.issues.listForRepo({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
state: 'open',
labels: 'tree-sitter-drift',
per_page: 10,
});
const existing = open.find(i => i.title === title);
if (existing) {
// Extract ready/total count for the changelog comment.
// The two report.match() regexes below are mirrored as
// _ISSUE_READY_RE / _ISSUE_BLOCKER_RE in
// .github/scripts/test_check_tree_sitter_upgrade_readiness.py, which is
// the ONLY place the contract is asserted against the rendered report.
// Keep all three in sync: changing the report prose means updating both
// these literals AND the test mirror, or requireMatch throws on the next
// scheduled run (the silent "?" fallback that used to hide drift is gone).
const requireMatch = (name, match) => {
if (!match) {
throw new Error(
`Could not extract ${name} from tree-sitter readiness report`,
);
}
return match;
};
const readyMatch = requireMatch(
'ready npm grammar count',
report.match(/- (\d+)\/(\d+) npm-installed grammars already accept tree-sitter@/),
);
const blockerMatch = requireMatch(
'blocker count',
report.match(/\*\*Blocked\*\* — (\d+) grammars? /),
);
const ready = readyMatch[1];
const total = readyMatch[2];
const blockers = blockerMatch[1];
// Find grammars whose status changed by diffing the old and
// new table rows. Each row looks like:
// | `tree-sitter-foo` | ... | Ready |
// | `tree-sitter-foo` | ... | Blocking |
const parseRows = (md) => {
const map = {};
// Group 2 captures ONLY the Status cell ([^|]+? before the final
// `|$`), so change-detection fires on status transitions, not on
// unrelated cell drift (e.g. an upstream-ABI bump). Mirror this in
// _ROW_DIFF_RE in test_check_tree_sitter_upgrade_readiness.py.
for (const m of md.matchAll(/\| `(tree-sitter-[^`]+)` \|.*\| ([^|]+?) \|$/gm)) {
map[m[1]] = m[2].trim();
}
return map;
};
const oldRows = parseRows(existing.body || '');
const newRows = parseRows(report);
const changes = [];
for (const [name, newStatus] of Object.entries(newRows)) {
const oldStatus = oldRows[name];
if (oldStatus && oldStatus !== newStatus) {
changes.push(`\`${name}\`: ${oldStatus} → ${newStatus}`);
}
}
const today = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
let comment = `**${today}:** ${ready}/${total} npm-installed ready. ${blockers} blocker(s) remaining.`;
if (changes.length > 0) {
comment += '\n\nChanges:\n' + changes.map(c => `- ${c}`).join('\n');
} else {
comment += ' No changes from previous run.';
}
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: existing.number,
body: comment,
});
await github.rest.issues.update({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: existing.number,
body,
});
core.info(`Updated existing issue #${existing.number}`);
} else {
const { data: created } = await github.rest.issues.create({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
title,
body,
labels: ['tree-sitter-drift', 'dependencies'],
});
core.info(`Opened issue #${created.number}`);
}
- name: Close tracking issue on clean runs
if: needs.report.outputs.exit_code == '0'
uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
with:
script: |
const title = 'Tree-sitter 0.25 upgrade readiness';
const { data: open } = await github.rest.issues.listForRepo({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
state: 'open',
labels: 'tree-sitter-drift',
per_page: 10,
});
const existing = open.find(i => i.title === title);
if (existing) {
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: existing.number,
body: 'All grammars are now compatible with tree-sitter@0.25. Upgrade is ready! Closing automatically.',
});
await github.rest.issues.update({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: existing.number,
state: 'closed',
});
core.info(`Closed issue #${existing.number}`);
}
-105
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@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
name: Triage Sweep
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
iqr_multiplier:
description: >-
IQR multiplier for outlier cutoff.
cutoff = Q75 + multiplier * IQR.
Higher = fewer outliers flagged.
type: number
default: 3.0
max_outlier_pct:
description: >-
Maximum fraction of items that can be flagged as outliers (0-1).
Hard cap to prevent over-flagging.
type: number
default: 0.05
contamination:
description: >-
Expected fraction of outliers in the data (0-0.5).
Controls how aggressively EllipticEnvelope downweights extremes.
type: number
default: 0.1
cosine_threshold:
description: >-
Cosine similarity threshold for duplicate detection.
Pairs with similarity above this are flagged as potential duplicates.
Higher = only very similar pairs flagged.
type: number
default: 0.92
max_items:
description: >-
Maximum number of open issues + PRs to process.
Hard cap to prevent runaway costs on very large repos.
type: number
default: 500
dry_run:
description: >-
Check this to only log results to the workflow summary.
Uncheck to create a GitHub issue with the report and apply labels.
type: boolean
default: false
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
pull-requests: write
# Concurrency convention: see CONTRIBUTING.md → "GitHub Actions — Concurrency Convention".
# Single global slot — newest manual dispatch supersedes any in-flight run.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
sweep:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
sparse-checkout: .github/scripts/triage
sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
fetch-depth: 1
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6
with:
python-version: '3.12'
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: .github/scripts/triage/requirements.txt
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install -r .github/scripts/triage/requirements.txt
- name: Cache FastEmbed model weights
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v5
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.fastembed_cache
key: fastembed-bge-small-en-v1.5
- name: Run triage sweep
id: sweep
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITHUB_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH: ${{ github.workspace }}/.fastembed_cache
INPUT_IQR_MULTIPLIER: ${{ inputs.iqr_multiplier }}
INPUT_MAX_OUTLIER_PCT: ${{ inputs.max_outlier_pct }}
INPUT_CONTAMINATION: ${{ inputs.contamination }}
INPUT_COSINE_THRESHOLD: ${{ inputs.cosine_threshold }}
INPUT_MAX_ITEMS: ${{ inputs.max_items }}
INPUT_DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run }}
run: python .github/scripts/triage/sweep.py
- name: Post summary
if: always()
run: |
if [ -f /tmp/triage-report.md ]; then
cat /tmp/triage-report.md >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
else
echo "No report generated." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
fi
-82
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@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
name: Trivy Image Scan
# Builds Dockerfile.cli and Dockerfile.web, then scans the resulting images
# for OS-package and language-package CVEs at MEDIUM+ severity.
# Findings upload to the Security tab; record-only (does not block merges).
#
# Trigger on Dockerfile changes in PRs so base-image/npm-layer remediation can
# be verified before merge without running image scans on every PR.
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'Dockerfile.cli'
- 'Dockerfile.web'
- 'gitnexus/Dockerfile.test'
- '.github/workflows/trivy.yml'
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: '0 8 * * 1'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
scan:
name: Trivy (${{ matrix.image.name }})
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
image:
- { dockerfile: Dockerfile.cli, name: gitnexus-cli }
- { dockerfile: Dockerfile.web, name: gitnexus-web }
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4.2.0
- name: Build image (load locally for scan)
uses: docker/build-push-action@53b7df96c91f9c12dcc8a07bcb9ccacbed38856a # v7.3.0
with:
context: .
file: ${{ matrix.image.dockerfile }}
load: true
push: false
tags: scan-target:${{ matrix.image.name }}
# aquasecurity/trivy-action versions < 0.35.0 are flagged by
# GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 (briefly compromised supply chain). Pinned to
# v0.36.0 (post-incident clean release) by commit SHA.
- name: Run Trivy
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
with:
image-ref: scan-target:${{ matrix.image.name }}
format: sarif
output: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}.sarif
severity: MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL
# Hides CVEs with no available fix in the base image.
ignore-unfixed: true
exit-code: '0'
- name: Upload to Security tab
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@8aad20d150bbac5944a9f9d289da16a4b0d87c1e # v4.36.2
with:
sarif_file: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}.sarif
category: trivy-${{ matrix.image.name }}
-85
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
name: Workflow Lint
# Lints .github/workflows/** for both:
# - actionlint: YAML syntax, expression typing, shellcheck inside `run:`
# blocks, unknown contexts, deprecated runner labels.
# - zizmor: security misconfigurations — unpinned actions, dangerous
# `${{ }}` interpolation, missing per-job permissions, etc.
#
# Scoped to PRs that touch .github/** only — keeps off the typical PR
# critical path.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths:
- '.github/**'
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
actionlint:
name: actionlint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Pinned to v2.1.2. Verify SHA via:
# gh api repos/raven-actions/actionlint/git/refs/tags/v2.1.2
# The action wraps the upstream `rhysd/actionlint` binary and emits
# GitHub-annotation-formatted findings on PRs.
- name: Run actionlint
uses: raven-actions/actionlint@3d39aea434753780c3b3d4a1a31c854b4dbf49d7 # v2.2.0
with:
fail-on-error: true
zizmor:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Install zizmor
# Pinned — resolves to whatever's latest on PyPI otherwise.
# Bump via Dependabot pip ecosystem (see .github/dependabot.yml).
run: pipx install zizmor==1.24.1
# Initial threshold: medium. High+ findings fail the job; medium findings
# appear in the Security tab without blocking. Tune after first run.
# Per-rule exemptions for pre-existing intentional patterns live in
# .github/zizmor.yml (each carries a documented mitigation).
- name: Run zizmor
run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --format sarif --min-severity medium . > zizmor.sarif
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload SARIF
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@8aad20d150bbac5944a9f9d289da16a4b0d87c1e # v4.36.2
with:
sarif_file: zizmor.sarif
category: zizmor
- name: Fail on high+ findings
run: zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml --min-severity high .
-56
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
# zizmor config — pre-existing intentional patterns flagged on initial introduction.
# Each ignore below has a documented mitigation. Re-evaluate when the source workflow changes.
#
# To run zizmor locally with this config:
# zizmor --config .github/zizmor.yml .
rules:
dangerous-triggers:
ignore:
# workflow_run is REQUIRED to post sticky comments on fork PRs — the
# default-branch privileged token isn't accessible from `pull_request`
# on a fork. Mitigated by: read-only `actions:read` + `contents:read`
# for artifact download; `pull-requests:write` is the only write scope;
# no checkout of fork code occurs. Header comment in the file documents.
- ci-report.yml
# workflow_run is the trusted half of the autofix pipeline. The
# untrusted half (pr-autofix.yml) runs fork code with permissions:{}
# and produces only a diff artifact (data, not executable code). The
# publish job consumes the artifact, allowlist-validates every field
# of metadata.json before exporting to $GITHUB_OUTPUT, never checks
# out fork code, and never executes anything fork-controlled. Header
# comment in the file documents the split.
- pr-autofix-publish.yml
# workflow_run is the trusted half of the vendored-grammar prebuild
# pipeline (commit-fork-prebuilds.yml). The untrusted producer
# (build-tree-sitter-prebuilds.yml on a fork pull_request) builds +
# validates the .node prebuilds and uploads them as artifacts. This
# consumer downloads ONLY those artifacts + metadata.json,
# allowlist-validates every metadata field, cross-checks identity against
# the workflow_run authority (head_sha / head_repo / pr_number), and
# checks out the fork head pinned to that HEAD SHA solely to ADD prebuild
# files (never executes fork code) before pushing. Header comment in the
# file documents the split.
- commit-fork-prebuilds.yml
# pull_request_target needed by claude-code-action to access secrets
# and post review comments on fork PRs. Mitigated by: PR checkouts pin
# the fork's HEAD SHA (not the branch ref) to prevent TOCTOU races,
# and claude-code-action sandboxes execution. Header comment documents.
- claude.yml
# pull_request_target on the autolabel job needs `pull-requests:write`
# to apply labels. Mitigated by: release-drafter runs with `dry-run:
# true`, reads only `.github/release-drafter.yml` from the BASE ref,
# and the validate-title job (which runs untrusted `pull_request`
# context) holds no write permissions. Header comment documents.
- pr-labeler.yml
# Note: cache-poisoning is NOT exempted. The two prior findings in
# publish.yml and the former release-candidate.yml were fixed structurally
# by dropping `cache: npm` from those workflows (matches the pattern used
# by PyO3/maturin for the same audit). After the publish-workflow
# unification (issue #1609), only publish.yml remains; the same
# cache-poisoning hardening applies there.
+3 -64
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ Thumbs.db
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
docker/.env
# Logs
*.log
@@ -34,8 +33,6 @@ coverage/
# Misc
*.local
HANDOFF.md
HANDOFF*.md
.vercel
@@ -51,73 +48,15 @@ HANDOFF*.md
# Claude Code worktrees
.claude/worktrees/
# Claude code skills
.claude/skills/generated/
# Assets (screenshots, images)
assets/
# Generated files (should not be indexed)
repomix-output*
# Playwright artifacts
gitnexus-web/playwright-report/
gitnexus-web/test-results/
# Python test artifacts
eval/.coverage
eval/.hypothesis/
# Local docs
docs/
# Design docs (local only)
docs/plans/
gitnexus/test/fixtures/mini-repo/*.md
gitnexus/test/fixtures/mini-repo/.claude
gitnexus/test/fixtures/mini-repo/.gitignore
# Ignore csharp generated obj and bin folders
gitnexus/test/fixtures/lang-resolution/**/obj
gitnexus/test/fixtures/lang-resolution/**/bin
GitNexus.sln
# Git worktrees
.worktrees/
# Vendored tree-sitter grammar build artifacts (created at install time,
# never committed). See docs/plans/2026-04-15-002-fix-tree-sitter-proto-vendor-deps-plan.md
gitnexus/vendor/**/build/
gitnexus/vendor/**/node_modules/
/github/scripts/triage/__pycache__/
.claude-flow/
.claude/agents/*
!.claude/agents/gitnexus-*.md
.claude/commands/
.claude/helpers
.claude/skills/*
!.claude/skills/gitnexus/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-cli/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-debugging/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-exploring/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-guide/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-impact-analysis/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-refactoring/
!.claude/skills/gitnexus-pr-swarm-review/
.history/
.swarm/
local_docs/
# Local agent scratch / review prompts (never commit)
# (.agents/plugins/marketplace.json is the checked-in Codex plugin
# marketplace registry — the rest of .agents/ stays local scratch.)
.tmp/
.agents/*
!.agents/plugins/
.agents/plugins/*
!.agents/plugins/marketplace.json
.context/
gitnexus/web/
gitnexus/test/fixtures/mini-repo/.gitignore
-19
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
title = "GitNexus"
[extend]
useDefault = true
# Fake credentials in unit tests — none are real secrets:
# - embedding API keys in the http-embedder tests (regexes below)
# - synthetic GitHub PAT fixtures in the git-clone PAT-injection tests
# (e.g. ghp_secret123, ghp_uniqueRawSecret_98765) — allowlisted by path
# so the exception is bounded to that one test file.
[allowlist]
description = "fake credentials in unit tests (no real secrets)"
regexes = [
'''secret-key-12345''',
'''test-api-key-redaction-check''',
]
paths = [
'''gitnexus/test/unit/git-clone\.test\.ts''',
]
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
# Deleted README placeholder from PR #2458; no credential was present.
c9fdab17f25ebaf332fba6e6ba55ee328f20fe66:README.md:curl-auth-header:348
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
export default defineConfig({
test: {
globalSetup: ['test/global-setup.ts'],
include: ['test/**/*.test.ts'],
testTimeout: 30000,
hookTimeout: 120000,
pool: 'forks',
globals: true,
setupFiles: ['test/setup.ts'],
teardownTimeout: 3000,
dangerouslyIgnoreUnhandledErrors: true, // LadybugDB N-API destructor segfaults on fork exit — not a test failure
coverage: {
provider: 'v8',
include: ['src/**/*.ts'],
exclude: [
'src/cli/index.ts', // CLI entry point (commander wiring)
'src/server/**', // HTTP server (requires network)
'src/core/wiki/**', // Wiki generation (requires LLM)
],
// Auto-ratchet: vitest bumps thresholds when coverage exceeds them.
// CI will fail if a PR drops below these floors.
thresholds: {
statements: 26,
branches: 23,
functions: 28,
lines: 27,
autoUpdate: true,
},
},
},
});
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Pre-commit hook: format staged files + typecheck.
# Tests run in CI (ci-tests.yml), not here.
# Skip with: git commit --no-verify
ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
# 1. Format staged files with prettier via lint-staged
echo "pre-commit: formatting staged files..."
"$ROOT/node_modules/.bin/lint-staged" || exit 1
# 2. Typecheck changed packages
WEB_CHANGED=$(git diff --cached --name-only -- 'gitnexus-web/' | head -1)
CLI_CHANGED=$(git diff --cached --name-only -- 'gitnexus/' | head -1)
if [ -n "$WEB_CHANGED" ]; then
echo "pre-commit: typechecking gitnexus-web (tsc -b)..."
cd "$ROOT/gitnexus-web" && ./node_modules/.bin/tsc -b --noEmit || exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$CLI_CHANGED" ]; then
echo "pre-commit: typechecking gitnexus..."
cd "$ROOT/gitnexus" && ./node_modules/.bin/tsc --noEmit || exit 1
fi
echo "pre-commit: all checks passed"
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
dist/
coverage/
gitnexus/vendor/
gitnexus/test/fixtures/
gitnexus-web/test/fixtures/
gitnexus-web/playwright-report/
gitnexus-web/test-results/
*.d.ts
*.snap
*.wasm
*.md
.gitnexus/
.vercel/
.claude-flow/
.swarm/
assets/
repomix-output*

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