A hijacked session must not be able to silently add a passkey as a
persistent backdoor or remove the victim's credentials. Registration
(begin) and deletion now verify the account password server-side,
reusing the existing PASSWORD_REQUIRED / PASSWORD_INCORRECT errors.
The password is used instead of TOTP step-up so the guard also protects
deployments that never configured a TOTP encryption key. The password
key in both request bodies is covered by the audit middleware's
key-substring redaction, so no credential material reaches audit_logs.
Frontend: the add-passkey form gains a current-password field, and the
delete confirmation is now a dialog with a password input (replacing
window.confirm), mirroring the TOTP disable dialog. Backend error
messages (e.g. wrong password) are surfaced instead of the generic
failure toast. Rename remains password-free as it is cosmetic.
- parseSettings now reports passkey_enabled=false whenever the WebAuthn
deployment config is absent: a stale "true" row left behind after the
config is removed previously made the admin update gate reject every
settings save while the UI toggle was disabled, leaving no recovery
path from the admin panel. Added a regression test.
- update the admin settings API contract goldens with the new
passkey_enabled/passkey_configured/passkey_rp_id/passkey_rp_origins
fields.
- errcheck: check rows.Close in passkey repository (repo convention).
- staticcheck QF1001: apply De Morgan's law in WebAuthn origin scheme
validation.
An OpenAI account with auto-passthrough enabled (extra.openai_passthrough=true,
"replace auth only, allow all models") was still filtered out during account
selection when it had a non-empty credentials.model_mapping that did not list the
requested model. isOpenAICompatibleAccountEligibleForRequest calls
Account.IsModelSupported directly, and IsModelSupported only bypassed the mapping
whitelist for passthrough accounts when the mapping was empty. A leftover mapping
(common after switching an account from whitelist mode to passthrough) therefore
excluded the account -> zero candidates -> ErrNoAvailableAccounts, and the client
saw 404 "Model ... is not supported by any configured account in this group" even
though a direct account test with the same model succeeded (that path already
honored passthrough via isModelSupportedByAccount).
Fix: short-circuit passthrough at the top of Account.IsModelSupported, before the
model_mapping check, so it is consistent with isModelSupportedByAccount. Add a
regression test covering passthrough + non-empty leftover mapping.
When an upstream API gateway (e.g. new-api) relays real Claude Code
requests, the User-Agent becomes Go-http-client while the body retains
the full Claude Code fingerprint (billing attribution block +
metadata.user_id + cache_control breakpoints).
Previously, the OAuth mimicry path relied solely on UA matching to
detect Claude Code clients. Without a matching UA, the gateway would
rewrite the system prompt — replacing the client's carefully structured
system blocks and cache_control breakpoints with its own injection.
This breaks Anthropic's prefix-based prompt cache: since the cache key
evaluates tools → system → messages in order, a changed system
invalidates all downstream message caching.
Symptoms observed:
- cache_read permanently locked at ~25K (only system prompt cached)
- cache_creation growing monotonically every turn (full messages rewrite)
- Single-request costs $17-27 instead of normal $1-2
Fix: when UA does not match but the body contains a valid billing
attribution block (x-anthropic-billing-header with cc_entrypoint=),
treat the request as proxied Claude Code traffic and skip mimicry.
This preserves the client's original system structure and cache_control
breakpoints, allowing Anthropic's prompt cache to function correctly.
Manual Grok connection tests previously surfaced upstream HTTP 402 errors without changing account availability. Persist the same 30-minute payment-required cooldown used by the live forwarding path so refreshed account lists no longer present the account as schedulable.
Constraint: Keep manual-test HTTP 402 handling aligned with existing Grok forwarding semantics.
Rejected: Mark the account permanently error | payment state can recover and the forwarding path intentionally uses a bounded cooldown.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep the manual-test cooldown reason and duration aligned with handleGrokAccountUpstreamError.
Tested: go test -tags=unit ./internal/service -count=1; go vet -tags=unit ./internal/service; production package compile check
Not-tested: Live xAI account with an exhausted subscription
Related: #4794
Wesley Liddick