diff --git a/backend/cmd/server/main.go b/backend/cmd/server/main.go
index c9b2b41a46..02d6f00b6c 100644
--- a/backend/cmd/server/main.go
+++ b/backend/cmd/server/main.go
@@ -155,9 +155,10 @@ func runMainServer() {
 	defer app.Cleanup()
 	if app.PromptAudit != nil {
 		if err := app.PromptAudit.Start(context.Background()); err != nil {
-			// Prompt Audit is default-off and isolated. Startup degradation must be
-			// observable but must not take unrelated APIs down.
-			log.Printf("Prompt Audit started in degraded state: %v", err)
+			// Startup continues so unrelated APIs stay up, but Prompt Audit itself
+			// fails closed (unavailable) until a later reload installs a trusted
+			// snapshot—avoiding a silent ModeOff bypass of persisted blocking policy.
+			log.Printf("Prompt Audit started in degraded fail-closed state: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_store.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_store.go
index e67f115fe1..795a8476c4 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_store.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_store.go
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ type ConfigManager struct {
 	// independently of whether endpoint credentials or the full config could be
 	// activated. A config version alone cannot distinguish async from blocking.
 	expectedBlocking atomic.Bool
+	// configUntrusted is set when a load/reload fails before a trustworthy
+	// snapshot is installed. While set, EffectiveMode fails closed so a
+	// persisted blocking policy cannot be silently skipped after startup or
+	// invalidation errors.
+	configUntrusted atomic.Bool
 
 	stateMu       sync.RWMutex
 	lastLoadError string
@@ -63,6 +68,9 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
 	m.cancel = cancel
 	m.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
 	loadErr := m.Reload(runCtx)
+	if loadErr != nil {
+		m.markConfigUntrusted()
+	}
 	m.wg.Add(1)
 	go m.refreshLoop(runCtx)
 	if m.redis != nil {
@@ -89,17 +97,20 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) Shutdown(_ context.Context) error {
 
 func (m *ConfigManager) Reload(ctx context.Context) error {
 	if m == nil || m.settings == nil {
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
 		return errors.New("prompt audit setting repository unavailable")
 	}
 	values, err := m.settings.GetMultiple(ctx, []string{SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig, SettingKeyRiskControl})
 	if err != nil {
 		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
 		return err
 	}
 	m.observeExpectedState(values[SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig], values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true")
 	storage, err := ParseStorageConfig(values[SettingKeyPromptAuditConfig])
 	if err != nil {
 		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
 		return err
 	}
 	m.expected.Store(storage.ConfigVersion)
@@ -107,10 +118,13 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) Reload(ctx context.Context) error {
 	active, err := ActiveFromStorage(storage, values[SettingKeyRiskControl] == "true", m.encryptor)
 	if err != nil {
 		m.recordLoadError(err)
+		// expectedBlocking may already require fail-closed via BlockingActivationDegraded.
+		m.markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot()
 		return err
 	}
 	now := m.clock.Now()
 	m.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{storage: cloneStorageConfig(storage), active: cloneActiveConfig(active), loadedAt: now})
+	m.configUntrusted.Store(false)
 	m.clearLoadError()
 	LogInfo(EventConfigLoaded, map[string]any{
 		"config_version": storage.ConfigVersion, "status": "loaded",
@@ -130,7 +144,13 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) Active() (ActiveConfig, bool) {
 }
 
 func (m *ConfigManager) BlockingActivationDegraded() bool {
-	if m == nil || !m.expectedBlocking.Load() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if m.configUntrusted.Load() {
+		return true
+	}
+	if !m.expectedBlocking.Load() {
 		return false
 	}
 	active, ok := m.Active()
@@ -153,6 +173,22 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) EffectiveMode() Mode {
 	return active.EffectiveMode()
 }
 
+func (m *ConfigManager) markConfigUntrusted() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m.configUntrusted.Store(true)
+}
+
+func (m *ConfigManager) markUntrustedIfNoActiveSnapshot() {
+	if m == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if _, ok := m.Active(); !ok {
+		m.markConfigUntrusted()
+	}
+}
+
 func (m *ConfigManager) Public() PublicConfig {
 	if m == nil {
 		return PublicFromStorage(DefaultStorageConfig(), false)
@@ -378,6 +414,11 @@ func (m *ConfigManager) subscribeLoop(ctx context.Context) {
 			}
 			m.expected.Store(version)
 			if err := m.Reload(ctx); err != nil {
+				// A newer published version failed to activate. Until reload
+				// succeeds, do not keep serving a potentially stale weaker mode.
+				if active, ok := m.Active(); !ok || active.ConfigVersion < version {
+					m.markConfigUntrusted()
+				}
 				LogWarn(EventConfigReloadDegraded, map[string]any{
 					"config_version": version, "status": "degraded", "error_code": "config_invalidation_reload_failed",
 				})
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_test.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_test.go
index 399f5d2500..ad25dac9e2 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_config_test.go
@@ -131,6 +131,22 @@ func TestConfigManagerStaleWeakerSnapshotFailsClosedWhenBlockingExpected(t *test
 	require.Equal(t, ErrorCodeUnavailable, guardErr.Code)
 }
 
+type errorSettingRepository struct{ staticSettingRepository }
+
+func (errorSettingRepository) GetMultiple(context.Context, []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("settings unavailable")
+}
+
+func TestConfigManagerStartupLoadFailureFailsClosedWithoutSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := NewConfigManager(nil, errorSettingRepository{}, nil, prefixEncryptor{})
+	err := manager.Start(context.Background())
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.True(t, manager.configUntrusted.Load())
+	require.True(t, manager.BlockingActivationDegraded())
+	require.Equal(t, ModeBlocking, manager.EffectiveMode())
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Shutdown(context.Background()))
+}
+
 func TestParseLegacyConfigDefaultsMissingFieldsWithoutEnablingBlocking(t *testing.T) {
 	storage, err := ParseStorageConfig(`{"enabled":false,"config_version":9}`)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security.go
index 40df98ef0a..f1e3ac3fc5 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security.go
@@ -164,11 +164,22 @@ func secureDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer, resolver DNSResolver, allowPrivate bo
 		}
 		var lastErr error
 		for _, addr := range addresses {
-			if isBlockedAddress(addr) || (!allowPrivate && (addr.IsPrivate() || addr.IsLoopback())) {
+			if isBlockedAddress(addr) {
 				lastErr = fmt.Errorf("prompt guard resolved address blocked")
 				continue
 			}
-			if !addr.IsGlobalUnicast() && !addr.IsPrivate() && !addr.IsLoopback() {
+			if allowPrivate {
+				// localhost / *.localhost may only resolve to loopback. A hosts or
+				// DNS mapping from localhost to RFC1918 must not become an SSRF pivot.
+				if !addr.IsLoopback() {
+					lastErr = fmt.Errorf("prompt guard resolved address blocked")
+					continue
+				}
+			} else if addr.IsPrivate() || addr.IsLoopback() {
+				lastErr = fmt.Errorf("prompt guard resolved address blocked")
+				continue
+			}
+			if !addr.IsGlobalUnicast() && !addr.IsLoopback() {
 				lastErr = fmt.Errorf("prompt guard resolved address blocked")
 				continue
 			}
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security_test.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security_test.go
index 15e56d0bc5..76d7f9fdb1 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_outbound_security_test.go
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ func TestSecureDialRejectsDNSRebindingToPrivateAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Error(t, err)
 }
 
+func TestSecureDialLocalhostAllowlistRejectsRFC1918Resolution(t *testing.T) {
+	dial := secureDialContext(nil, staticResolver{addresses: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.8")}}, true)
+	_, err := dial(context.Background(), "tcp", "localhost:8080")
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
+
 func TestSecureHTTPClientDoesNotBypassDestinationValidationThroughEnvironmentProxy(t *testing.T) {
 	client, err := NewSecureHTTPClient(ActiveEndpoint{BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com", TimeoutMS: 1000})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -207,6 +213,28 @@ func TestPromptAuditProbeModelsFallbackAndResponseSafety(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+func TestResolveProbeEndpointReusesTokenOnlyForMatchingBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &ConfigManager{}
+	manager.snapshot.Store(&activeConfigSnapshot{active: ActiveConfig{Endpoints: []ActiveEndpoint{{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com", Token: "STORED_GUARD_TOKEN", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024, Enabled: true,
+	}}}})
+	service := &PromptService{config: manager}
+
+	matched, applied, err := service.resolveProbeEndpoint(UpdateEndpoint{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://guard.example.com/v1", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, applied)
+	require.Equal(t, "STORED_GUARD_TOKEN", matched.Token)
+
+	mismatched, applied, err := service.resolveProbeEndpoint(UpdateEndpoint{
+		ID: "guard-1", BaseURL: "https://attacker.example.com", TimeoutMS: 1000, InputLimit: 1024,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, applied)
+	require.Empty(t, mismatched.Token)
+}
+
 func newProbeTestService() *PromptService {
 	return &PromptService{
 		config: &ConfigManager{}, scanner: NewOpenAICompatibleScanner(), clock: realClock{},
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service.go
index 8402e60d99..71d0fadbe5 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_service.go
@@ -312,21 +312,27 @@ func modelsResponseReady(body []byte, model string) bool {
 }
 
 func (s *PromptService) resolveProbeEndpoint(input UpdateEndpoint) (ActiveEndpoint, bool, error) {
+	baseURL, err := NormalizeBaseURL(input.BaseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ActiveEndpoint{}, false, err
+	}
 	token := strings.TrimSpace(input.Token)
 	if token == "" {
 		if cfg, ok := s.config.Active(); ok {
 			for _, endpoint := range cfg.Endpoints {
-				if endpoint.ID == strings.TrimSpace(input.ID) {
-					token = endpoint.Token
-					break
+				if endpoint.ID != strings.TrimSpace(input.ID) {
+					continue
 				}
+				// Reuse a stored credential only when the probe targets the same
+				// normalized base URL. Otherwise an admin probe could exfiltrate
+				// the Guard token to an attacker-controlled HTTPS host.
+				if endpoint.BaseURL == baseURL {
+					token = endpoint.Token
+				}
+				break
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	baseURL, err := NormalizeBaseURL(input.BaseURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return ActiveEndpoint{}, false, err
-	}
 	model := strings.TrimSpace(input.Model)
 	if model == "" {
 		model = DefaultGuardModel
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot.go
index 13002ded14..6b87ad1865 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot.go
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ func extractProtocolSegments(protocol string, document any) []string {
 	}
 }
 
-var clientInstructionRoles = []string{"user", "system", "developer"}
+// clientInstructionRoles are roles a client may freely populate. Attackers can
+// place jailbreak/PII text in assistant/tool turns, so blocking audit must scan
+// them too—not only user/system/developer instructions.
+var clientInstructionRoles = []string{"user", "system", "developer", "assistant", "tool"}
 
 func extractChatLikeSegments(root map[string]any) []string {
 	if root == nil {
@@ -168,7 +171,7 @@ func extractResponses(value any) []string {
 				result = append(result, entry)
 			case map[string]any:
 				role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(entry["role"]))
-				if role != "" && role != "user" && role != "system" && role != "developer" {
+				if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
 					continue
 				}
 				if content, exists := entry["content"]; exists {
@@ -183,7 +186,7 @@ func extractResponses(value any) []string {
 		return result
 	case map[string]any:
 		role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(typed["role"]))
-		if role != "" && role != "user" && role != "system" && role != "developer" {
+		if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
 			return nil
 		}
 		return contentTexts(typed["content"])
@@ -192,6 +195,15 @@ func extractResponses(value any) []string {
 	}
 }
 
+func isClientInstructionRole(role string) bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(role)) {
+	case "user", "system", "developer", "assistant", "tool", "model":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
 func extractGemini(value any) []string {
 	var contents []any
 	switch typed := value.(type) {
@@ -209,7 +221,7 @@ func extractGemini(value any) []string {
 			continue
 		}
 		role := strings.ToLower(stringValue(content["role"]))
-		if role != "" && role != "user" {
+		if role != "" && !isClientInstructionRole(role) {
 			continue
 		}
 		parts, _ := content["parts"].([]any)
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot_test.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot_test.go
index 17ab363711..a1427ba1aa 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_snapshot_test.go
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func TestExtractPromptSnapshotProtocols(t *testing.T) {
 		protocol, body, first string
 		count                 int
 	}{
-		{"openai_chat_completions", `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"old"},{"role":"assistant","content":"ignore"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"最新😀"}]}]}`, "最新😀", 2},
+		{"openai_chat_completions", `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"old"},{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant turn"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"最新😀"}]}]}`, "最新😀", 3},
 		{"openai_responses", `{"input":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"response text"}]}]}`, "response text", 1},
 		{"anthropic_messages", `{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"claude"}]}]}`, "claude", 1},
 		{"gemini", `{"contents":[{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"gemini"},{"inline_data":{"data":"BASE64"}}]}]}`, "gemini", 1},
@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotLatestUserMessageIsOnePrioritizedSegment(t *testing.T) {
 	body := []byte(`{
 		"messages":[
 			{"role":"user","content":"历史输入"},
-			{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant output must be ignored"},
-			{"role":"tool","content":"tool output must be ignored"},
+			{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant client injection"},
+			{"role":"tool","content":"tool client injection"},
 			{"role":"user","content":[
 				{"type":"text","text":"最新第一块😀"},
 				{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"_CANARY_BASE64"}},
@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotLatestUserMessageIsOnePrioritizedSegment(t *testing.T) {
 	}`)
 	snapshot, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: body})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, 2, snapshot.MessageCount)
-	require.Equal(t, "最新第一块😀\n最新第二块é\n\n历史输入", snapshot.ScanText)
-	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "assistant output")
-	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "tool output")
+	require.Equal(t, 4, snapshot.MessageCount)
+	require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(snapshot.ScanText, "最新第一块😀\n最新第二块é"))
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "历史输入")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "assistant client injection")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "tool client injection")
 	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "IMAGE_CANARY_BASE64")
 	require.Equal(t, utf8.RuneCountInString(snapshot.ScanText), snapshot.PromptLength)
 }
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotResponsesShapes(t *testing.T) {
 		want string
 	}{
 		{name: "string", body: `{"input":"plain response input"}`, want: "plain response input"},
-		{name: "message array", body: `{"input":[{"role":"assistant","content":"ignore"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"message block"}]}]}`, want: "message block"},
+		{name: "message array", body: `{"input":[{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant turn"},{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"message block"}]}]}`, want: "message block\n\nassistant turn"},
 		{name: "direct input text", body: `{"input":[{"type":"input_text","text":"direct block"}]}`, want: "direct block"},
 		{name: "single object", body: `{"input":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"input_text","text":"single object"}]}}`, want: "single object"},
 	}
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotGeminiBatchShapesAndMediaExclusion(t *testing.T) {
 		require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, expected)
 	}
 	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ROOT_BASE64")
-	require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ignore model")
+	require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ignore model")
 }
 
 func TestPromptSnapshotMediaOnlyExtractsDeterministicTextPrompts(t *testing.T) {
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ func TestResponsesWebSocketOnlyAuditsResponseCreateAndPreservesStage(t *testing.
 }
 
 func TestPromptSnapshotEmptyAndLongUnicodeInput(t *testing.T) {
-	_, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"assistant","content":"not user"},{"role":"user","content":"  "}]}`)})
+	_, err := ExtractPromptSnapshot(Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"function","content":"not audited role"},{"role":"user","content":"  "}]}`)})
 	require.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrNoPromptText))
 
 	latest := strings.Repeat("最新😀é", 80)
@@ -186,10 +187,10 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotIncludesClientControlledInstructions(t *testing.T) {
 		want                 []string
 	}{
 		{
-			name:     "openai system and developer",
+			name:     "openai system developer assistant tool",
 			protocol: "openai_chat_completions",
-			body:     `{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system jailbreak"},{"role":"developer","content":"developer policy"},{"role":"assistant","content":"ignore"},{"role":"user","content":"hello"}]}`,
-			want:     []string{"system jailbreak", "developer policy", "hello"},
+			body:     `{"messages":[{"role":"system","content":"system jailbreak"},{"role":"developer","content":"developer policy"},{"role":"assistant","content":"assistant jailbreak"},{"role":"tool","content":"tool payload"},{"role":"user","content":"hello"}]}`,
+			want:     []string{"system jailbreak", "developer policy", "assistant jailbreak", "tool payload", "hello"},
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "openai system only",
@@ -223,7 +224,6 @@ func TestPromptSnapshotIncludesClientControlledInstructions(t *testing.T) {
 			for _, expected := range tt.want {
 				require.Contains(t, snapshot.ScanText, expected)
 			}
-			require.NotContains(t, snapshot.ScanText, "ignore")
 		})
 	}
 }
diff --git a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker_test.go b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker_test.go
index 6c7ed7f3b9..5c39be8e44 100644
--- a/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker_test.go
+++ b/backend/internal/securityaudit/prompt_worker_test.go
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ func TestEnqueuerSkipsOffOutOfScopeAndNoText(t *testing.T) {
 			cfg.GroupIDs = []int64{9}
 			return cfg
 		}(), req: asyncRequest()},
-		{name: "no user text", cfg: asyncConfig(), req: Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"assistant","content":"ignore"}]}`)}},
+		{name: "no user text", cfg: asyncConfig(), req: Request{Protocol: "openai_chat_completions", Body: []byte(`{"messages":[{"role":"function","content":"not audited"}]}`)}},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {