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GitNexus/.github/workflows
Gergő Magyar 6906be3695 feat(autofix): replace inline reviewdog with /autofix ChatOps button (#1458)
* fix(autofix): verify reviewdog actually posted before claiming "click Apply"

The sticky summary comment was stating "Posted formatting suggestions
inline. Click Apply suggestion on each" even when reviewdog landed zero
inline review comments — typical case: the formatter touched lines
outside the PR's added range, so `-filter-mode=added` (correctly)
filtered everything out. The script unconditionally set `posted=true`
after running reviewdog regardless of whether any comments were
actually created, leaving the user staring at a sticky that promised
buttons that didn't exist.

The publish job now snapshots the count of `github-actions[bot]` review
comments before and after reviewdog. If the delta is zero, surface a
new `diff-no-overlap` UI state that tells the user plainly:

  "Formatter found fixable issues, but they're on lines outside this
  PR's added range — there's nothing to click here. Run locally:
  npm run lint:fix && npm run format."

Plus a matching `gitnexus/autofix` Check Run conclusion (still neutral,
distinct title) so agents reading `gh pr checks` see the same signal.

Three states are now machine-distinguishable in the sticky's
gitnexus-autofix JSON block: suggestions-posted (delta > 0),
diff-no-overlap (delta == 0), skipped-too-large (>3k lines).

* feat(autofix): replace inline reviewdog with /autofix ChatOps button

Pivot the PR autofix UX from per-line reviewdog suggestions to a single
slash-command button. Contributors comment `/autofix` on the PR; a new
trusted workflow downloads the existing autofix patch artifact, applies
it to the PR head, and pushes a commit back.

Why:
- 3K+ diffs hit GitHub's review-comment API 406 limit -> dead end.
- Diffs where the formatter touches lines outside the PR's added range
  ("no-overlap") get filtered by reviewdog's -filter-mode=added -> dead
  end (PR #1457 patched the lying sticky but the underlying UX gap
  remained).
- Per-line click-Apply-suggestion is high-friction for big diffs and
  easy to apply unevenly.
- A single `git apply` + push works at any size and lands fixes
  atomically.

Changes:
- pr-autofix-publish.yml: remove `Install reviewdog` and
  `Post inline suggestions` steps. Collapse three sticky states
  (suggestions-posted, diff-no-overlap, skipped-too-large) into one
  (fixes-available). Bump JSON schema v1 -> v2 with `apply_command`
  field; all v1 fields preserved.
- pr-autofix-apply.yml (new): triggers on issue_comment with body
  `/autofix`, validates body via strict regex, validates commenter
  has write/admin/maintain or is the PR author, locates latest
  successful pr-autofix run for PR head SHA, downloads artifact,
  applies patch, pushes commit. Reacts +1/-1/eyes on triggering
  comment per outcome. Idempotent (`git apply --check --reverse`
  detects already-applied state).
- CONTRIBUTING.md: document v2 schema and the /autofix flow,
  including the maintainer-edit requirement for fork PR pushes.

Trust posture: apply workflow runs from default-branch code only,
under issue_comment trigger. Comment body and author login flow
through env vars and pattern-matched, never interpolated into shell.
Permission gate (write/admin/maintain OR PR author) before any
artifact fetch. Fork PRs require "Allow edits by maintainers"
(GitHub-native; we don't bypass).

Net YAML: -139 lines in publish.yml, +260 in apply.yml. Removes
reviewdog binary pin and the entire review-comment API surface.

* fix(autofix): address Codex adversarial findings on PR #1458

Two findings from the Codex adversarial review of the autofix ChatOps
pivot. Both are localized YAML changes that close trust gaps the pivot
inherited from the original PR #1446 design.

U1 — Cross-verify metadata against workflow_run authority
(.github/workflows/pr-autofix-publish.yml):
  Previously the trusted publisher accepted pr_number, head_sha, and
  head_repo from metadata.json after only an allowlist regex. A
  fork-controlled `npm run lint:fix` could have written a syntactically
  valid metadata.json referencing another PR/SHA, redirecting the
  write-scoped sticky/check-run onto an attacker-chosen target.

  New `Verify metadata against workflow_run authority` step compares
  artifact-claimed identity against:
    - github.event.workflow_run.head_sha
    - github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name
    - workflow_run.pull_requests[].number (within-repo PRs)
    - gh api commits/{sha}/pulls fallback (fork PRs, where
      pull_requests[] is empty)
  Fail closed on mismatch — no sticky, no check-run, no override.

U2 — Lease-protected push in apply workflow
(.github/workflows/pr-autofix-apply.yml):
  Previously the apply step pushed `HEAD:${HEAD_REF}` plain. A force-
  push between resolve (Step 5) and push (Step 9) would silently
  fast-forward an older commit graph over the contributor's newer
  state.

  Push now uses `--force-with-lease=refs/heads/${HEAD_REF}:${HEAD_SHA}`
  against the SHA resolved earlier. Distinct `lease-failed` result code
  + retry-message reply, separated from `push-failed` (fork without
  maintainer-edit) so contributors can diagnose the actual cause.

Plan: docs/plans/2026-05-09-005-fix-autofix-codex-adversarial-findings-plan.md
(local-only per repo convention).

Trust posture preserved: no new permissions, no new workflows, no
contract change. JSON v2 schema unchanged. CodeQL js/server-side-
request-forgery and template-injection posture unchanged — all new
inputs flow via env vars and pattern-matched.

* fix(autofix): close zizmor credential-persistence finding on apply checkout

actions/checkout's default behavior writes the GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config as an extraheader. The token then sits on disk in the
checkout directory — an actions/upload-artifact step on that
directory would leak it. We don't upload, but zizmor's
credential-persistence lint correctly flags the latent risk.

Set persist-credentials: false on the Checkout PR head step. Provide
push auth inline via `git -c http.extraheader="Authorization: Basic
<base64-of-x-access-token:TOKEN>"` so the credential never lands on
disk and never appears in process listings (the URL form
https://x-access-token:TOKEN@… is rejected here because it leaks via
ps and git remote -v).

Push lease semantics from U2 unchanged — same --force-with-lease
against the resolved HEAD_SHA, same lease-failed/push-failed/stale
result codes.

* fix(review): apply autofix feedback

ce-code-review surfaced 15 findings on PR #1458; this commit applies
the 7 with concrete fixes (#1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #9, #13). Five P2
findings (#6, #7, #8, #10, #12) are recorded as residual actionable
work for follow-up; two advisory items (#11, #14) skipped.

#1 — applied_run_id schema drift (CONTRIBUTING.md):
  v2 docs claimed `state: applied` enum value and an `applied_run_id`
  field that no code path emits. Trimmed docs to match what the
  workflow actually writes (state: fixes-available; v1 field set as
  superset). Implementing the apply-side sticky upsert that would
  populate `applied_run_id` is deferred — cleaner than carrying a
  contract claim with no code.

#2 — result= unset between idempotency probe and lease push
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
  After `git apply --check` passed, an early non-zero exit from
  `git config` / `git apply` / `git add` / `git commit` left
  `result=` unset, sending the user to the `*` "unexpected state
  (`unknown`)" arm. Wrapped the apply/commit phase in a single
  if-test that sets `result=apply-failed` on any failure. New
  React-and-reply branch surfaces an actionable message.

#3 — permission lookup conflated transient API failures with denial
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
  `gh api … 2>/dev/null || echo "none"` swallowed 5xx, 429 secondary
  rate-limit, and network failures, surfacing them as a public 👎
  refusal to legitimate maintainers. Now distinguishes 404
  (genuine non-collaborator) from other API failures via stderr
  match. New `allowed=api-failed` state triggers a 😕 reaction with
  a "transient API failure, retry" reply instead of a misleading
  refusal.

#4 — lease-failure grep missed git's "remote rejected" / branch-
deleted phrasings (pr-autofix-apply.yml):
  Real lease failures got classified as `push-failed` →
  user told to enable maintainer-edit, which won't help. Expanded
  regex to match `remote rejected` and `! [rejected]`.

#5 — broken bullet continuation in CONTRIBUTING.md release-candidate
section: rejoined the split bullet so it renders correctly.

#9 — base64 GITHUB_TOKEN bypassed GitHub's secret-masker
(pr-autofix-apply.yml):
  Added `::add-mask::${auth_header}` immediately after construction
  so any subsequent log line (set -x, GIT_TRACE) gets *** redacted.

#13 — misleading schema-bump comment in pr-autofix-publish.yml:
  Comment claimed all v1 fields preserved exactly, but the `state`
  enum was redefined v1→v2. Updated to make the migration path
  explicit (v1 readers see unfamiliar schema, fall back to prose).

Residual actionable work (deferred to follow-up):
  #6 locate step gh api retry; #7 artifact-expired graceful fallback;
  #8 re-entrancy comment-spam guard; #10 producer-still-running UX;
  #12 gh_retry wrapper for apply.yml.

Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.

* fix(autofix): apply remaining ce-code-review residual findings (#6, #7, #8, #10, #12)

Pulls the deferred items from the previous review pass into this PR so
the workflow ships with full reliability + UX coverage rather than
follow-up debt.

#6 + #12 — gh_retry wrapper on idempotent GETs in apply.yml:
  Permission lookup, PR metadata fetch, and workflow-run lookup are now
  wrapped in the same gh_retry helper publish.yml uses (3 attempts,
  linear backoff). Reaction/comment POSTs remain unwrapped (retrying
  POST would dupe the resource).

#10 — producer-still-running UX:
  The locate step now distinguishes three cases via `found_status`
  output: success (proceed), in-progress / queued / pending / waiting
  (reply ⏳ "wait for autofix run to finish"), not-found (reply 🤔
  "push a commit"), api-failed (reply ⚠️ "transient API failure"). The
  "no successful autofix run" message no longer fires immediately after
  a fresh push while the producer is still mid-run.

#7 — artifact-expired graceful fallback:
  actions/download-artifact gains `continue-on-error: true`. The apply
  step distinguishes patch-file-missing (artifact expired, 1-day
  retention elapsed) from patch-file-zero-bytes (formatter found
  nothing). New `result=artifact-expired` case + ⏳ "push a new commit
  to regenerate" reply.

#8 — re-entrancy loop guard:
  After checkout but before applying, check if HEAD itself is a
  github-actions[bot] `chore(autofix)` commit. If so, refuse to
  re-apply (`result=loop-prevented`) with a 🔁 reply telling the user
  to push a human-authored commit or revert before retrying. Prevents
  formatter-config-drift loops where an automated agent watching the
  sticky could pump arbitrary apply commits.

Net effect: every code path in apply.yml now sets a meaningful `result=`
that maps to a specific user-facing reaction + reply. The `*` "unexpected
state (unknown)" arm becomes truly unreachable in normal operation.

Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.

* fix(autofix): refresh stale reviewdog comments + reject patches touching .github/

Two follow-up findings on PR #1458:

#1 — Stale reviewdog references in workflow header comments:
  pr-autofix-publish.yml's header still described the removed inline-
  suggestion path ("posts inline review-comment suggestions to the PR
  using `reviewdog`", "Reviewdog reporter: github-pr-review reads
  $REVIEWDOG_GITHUB_API_TOKEN…"). The Check Run permissions comment
  enumerated the old outcomes (clean / suggestions-posted /
  skipped-too-large) instead of the current set (clean / fixes-
  available). pr-autofix.yml's header described the trusted job as
  posting "inline review-comment suggestions" and the changed_lines
  comment referenced the dead 3000-line cap. Refreshed all three to
  describe the actual sticky + Check Run + /autofix flow.

#2 — Reject patches touching .github/ (sensitive-paths guard):
  Theoretical supply-chain vector: a malicious PR could ship a custom
  prettier/ESLint config that reformats workflow YAML, dependabot.yml,
  or CODEOWNERS. The producer would capture those edits in
  autofix.patch; a maintainer running `/autofix` would push them under
  `contents: write` without human review. The default GITHUB_TOKEN
  lacks the `workflows` scope so workflow-file pushes would fail at
  the platform layer anyway, but as a generic `push-failed` (which
  misleads users into enabling maintainer-edit). Reject early with
  a specific reason.

  Match runs against the patch with grep on `^(diff --git|---|+++)
  [ab]?/?\.github/`. New `result=sensitive-paths` case + 🛑 reply
  telling the user to apply .github/ formatter changes manually.

  Documented the constraint in CONTRIBUTING.md under the /autofix
  section so contributors aren't surprised when the workflow refuses
  a patch that includes formatter changes to workflow files.

Validations: yaml.safe_load OK, check-workflow-concurrency.py OK.
2026-05-09 16:32:38 +01:00
..
2026-04-18 08:39:18 +01:00
2026-04-30 19:06:21 +01:00